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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida. Although the article is focused primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1994, and June 30, 1995, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period which are either of
particular interest to the appellate practitioner or which provide the
background for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided during that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those substan-
tive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this article will
focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and will deal
with substantive areas only with regard to appellate considerations unique
to those areas. Additionally, this article will not discuss cases relating to the
preservation of issues, nor the question of whether particular errors were
harmless.
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted three amendments to the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Two of those amendments will be discussed
in this section of this article, while the third will be discussed in section In
(B), infra.'
A. Rule 9.600: Jurisdiction of Lower Tribunal Pending Review
The court amended rule 9.600(c) to provide that when an appeal is
taken in a dissolution of marriage action, the lower tribunal shall retain
jurisdiction to enter and enforce orders awarding "temporary attorneys'fees
and costs reasonably necessary to prosecute or defend an appeal."'2 The
1994 Committee Note indicates that the rule was amended "to conform to
and implement section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), authorizing
the lower tribunal to award temporary appellate attorneys' fees, suit money,
1. The amendment not discussed here arose from the fact that the First District Court
of Appeal has split into two autonomous divisions of court. That split is discussed in section
III (A) of this article. Discussion of the amendment, which currently impacts only on the
First District, has thus been deferred until after discussion of the split.
2. Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.140 and 9.600, 657 So. 2d
897, 898 (Fla. 1995).
Vol. 20
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and costs."'3 The amendment also makes some changes in the wording of
the rule with regard to attorney's fees and costs for services rendered in the
lower tribunal, but it continues to allow the lower tribunal to retain
jurisdiction to enter and enforce orders relating to such matters, as well as
"orders awarding separate maintenance, child support, alimony... or other
awards necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending
appeal."4
B. Rule 9.800: Uniform Citation System
Rule 9.800(n) was amended to include a sentence that states: "When
referring to specific material within a Florida court's opinion, pinpoint
citation to the page of the Southern Reporter where that material occurs is
optional, although preferred. 5 This amendment is the result of problems
that have arisen from the increasing use of electronic databases that do not
utilize the page numbering system employed by the West Publishing
Company in the Southern Reporter.
6
III. COURT DIVISIONS
A. The First District
In In re Court Divisions,7 the First District Court of Appeal' became
the first Florida district court to create two autonomous divisions of court.
The Administrative Division, to which five judges were initially assigned,9
will consider administrative appeals arising under specifically enumerated
provisions of the Florida Statutes,10 and original proceedings arising out
3. lad at 898 app. A (citing the 1994 committee note to FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.600).
4. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.600(c).
5. In re Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.800(n), 20 Fla. L. Weekly S524 (October
12, 1995).
6. It is interesting to note that the amendment refers only to "material within a Florida
court's opinion." IM Presumably, the use of such limiting language means that the rule does
require specific page citations to West, or other official, reporters when references are made
to material within opinions of courts from other jurisdictions.
7. 648 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
8. Florida's district courts of appeal will hereinafter be referred to as the First District,
the Second District, the Third District, the Fourth District and the Fifth District.
9. In re Assignment of Judges to Divisions, 648 So. 2d 764, 764 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
10. The specific provisions are set forth in Court Divisions, 648 So. 2d at 761-62.
1995]
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of or involving proceedings under those provisions." The General
Division, to which the court's other ten judges were assigned,' 2 will
consider all matters not assigned to the Administrative Division. 3
B. En Banc Determination
Subsequent to the division of the First District, the supreme court
amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331 by creating a new
subparagraph (b). 4  The new provision states that if a district court
chooses to sit in subject matter divisions, "en banc determinations shall be
limited to those regular active judges within the division to which the case
is assigned, unless the chief judge determines that the case involves matters
of general application and that en banc determination should be made by all
regular active judges."15 It goes on to provide that "in the absence of such
a determination by the chief judge, the full court may determine by an
affirmative vote of three-fifths of the active judges that the case involves
matters that should be heard and decided by the full court ....""
The supreme court adopted this rule amendment by a 4-3 vote.' 7 In
a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Shaw and Kogan concurred, Justice
Anstead pointed out that three judges in a five-judge division of a fifteen-
judge court 8 will have the authority to control an en banc decision.' 9
Justice Anstead further stated that since three judges will be able to overturn
a prior decision, and since the chances of overturning a decision will be
increased as judges regularly rotate into and out of the five-judge division,
"the consistency and stability provided by the required participation of the
entire court will be lost. 20
Justice Overton, in a specially concurring opinion with which Chief
Justice Grimes concurred, responded to the dissenters' concerns. He stated,
11. Id. at 762.
12. Assignment of Judges, 648 So. 2d at 764.
13. Court Divisions, 648 So. 2d at 761.
14. In re Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(b), 646 So. 2d 730
(Fla. 1994).
15. Id. at 731.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 730.
18. Although not specifically noted by Justice Anstead, the numbers to which he refers
reflect the size of the First District as a whole and of its Administrative Division.
Assignment of Judges, 648 So. 2d at 764.
19. Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(b), 646 So. 2d at 731
(Anstead, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
Vol. 20
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"I disagree with the anticipated horribles of the dissent. We need to allow
new ideas an opportunity to be tested to see if they will work in a way that
will improve efficiency and consistency in the appellate decision-making
process."2'
C. Appellate Division of the Circuit Court
In Melkonian v. Goldman,22 the petitioner sought certiorari review, in
the Circuit Court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, of an administra-
tive decision to suspend his driver's license.' An individual judge denied
the petition, concluding that it failed to demonstrate a prima facie case.24
The Third District granted certiorari and quashed the order, finding that the
failure to assign the case to a three-judge panel, and the delegation instead
to an individual judge, of the task of deciding the petition on its merits,
constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law.25
The Third District pointed out that the supreme court promulgated a
local rule for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit that establishes an Appellate
Division of that court.26 That rule provides that certiorari petitions are to
be heard on their merits by three-judge panels of the Appellate Division.27
Through a memorandum, however, the administrative judge of the Appellate
Division implemented a procedure by which individual judges rule on the
motions.28 The memorandum provided for petitions for writs of certiorari
to be assigned to an individual judge for determination of "'whether a Prima
Facie case has been raised requiring a panel's review."'' 29
The Third District found the portion of the administrative order that
allowed an individual judge to rule on the merits of a petition for writ of
certiorari to be inconsistent with the local rule and therefore void.30 The
court relied on Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.020(c), which
indicates that administrative orders must not be inconsistent with "'court
rules and administrative orders entered by the supreme court.'" 3 The court
21. Id. at 730 (Overton, J., concurring specially).
22. 647 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
23. Id. at 1009.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Melkonian, 647 So. 2d at 1009.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1009-10.
31. Id. at 1009 (emphasis omitted).
1995]
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did indicate, however, that its opinion should not be read to invalidate the
remaining portions of the administrative order.32
IV. JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction on Discretionary Review
In both Gee v. Seidman & Seidman33 and Salgat v. State,34 the
supreme court declined to reach the merits of the case because the district
courts certified to be of great public importance questions upon which they
did not first pass.35 The court noted in Gee that under article V, section
3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, the court only "has jurisdiction to review
'any decision of a district court on appeal that passes upon a question
certified by it to be of great public importance.'
' 36
B. Jurisdiction When a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Is Filed
In State v. Schopp,37 the supreme court addressed a respondent's claim
that the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had filed a notice
of voluntary dismissal in the district court prior to the final disposition of
his appeal.38 After the district court's decision was issued, the respondent,
Schopp, who was the appellant in the district court, timely filed a motion for
rehearing. 39 Before the district court ruled on that motion, the State, the
appellee in the district court, timely sought review in the supreme court.4°
While the motion for rehearing was still pending, Schopp filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.350(b).4'
The State moved to strike the notice.42 Schopp then sought a writ of
mandamus from the supreme court to compel the district court to dismiss the
appeal. The district court granted the motion to strike and denied the
32. Melkonian, 647 So. 2d at 1010 n.2.
33. 653 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1995).
34. 652 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1995).
35. Gee, 653 So. 2d at 385; Salgat, 652 So. 2d at 815.
36. Gee, 653 So. 2d at 385 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4)).
37. 653 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1995).
38. Id. at 1018.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1018.
Vol. 20
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motion for rehearing 3 Schopp then moved to dismiss the supreme court
proceeding, alleging that he had a right to have the district court proceeding
dismissed and that the supreme court therefore lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.4
The supreme court rejected Schopp's claim, stating that "[e]ven where
a notice of voluntary dismissal is timely filed, a reviewing court has
discretion to retain jurisdiction and proceed with the appeal."45 The court
noted that it is particularly true that the court retains such discretion when,
as in the case under review, a case presents a question of public impor-
tance46 and when substantial judicial labor has been expended, as evi-
denced by the issuance of an initial opinion.47
C. Jurisdiction of a District Court When Discretionary Review
Has Been Sought
In Portu v. State,4" nine days after the issuance of an opinion, the
State filed a notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the supreme
court.49  Six days thereafter, the defendant filed a timely motion for
clarification of the opinion in the district court." - In response to the
motion, the State argued that its notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction
stripped the district court of the power to act on the defendant's motion.51
The court granted the defendant's motion for clarification,52 and the State
then filed a motion to reinstate the original opinion, continuing to assert that
the court lacked jurisdiction.53
The Third District disagreed, concluding that its jurisdiction to rule on
timely filed motion does not expire until it renders an order disposing of
such motions.54 The court noted that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.020(g)(1) states that when a motion for rehearing or clarification of an
43. Id
44. Ua
45. d
46. The district court had certified the existence of a question of great public
importance. Id. at 1018 n.1.
47. Schopp, 653 So. 2d at 1018.
48. 654 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
49. IM. at 169.
50. Md
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Portu, 654 So. 2d at 169.
54. Id
1995]
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order has been filed, the order is not deemed rendered "'until the filing of
a signed, written order disposing of all such motions between such
parties. '''5 The court went on to find that since rule 9.120(b) provides that
the discretionary jurisdiction of the supreme court is invoked by the filing
of a notice within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, 6 the
State's time for filing a notice did not even begin until the court rendered
a written order disposing of the defendant's motion for clarification.
Accordingly, the court found the State's notice to be premature, and denied
the motion to reinstate. 8
V. ORDERS REVIEWABLE
A. Appeals from Denials of Summary Judgment Motions Based
on Claims of Qualified Immunity
Although the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide for
appeals from orders denying motions for summary judgment, the supreme
court, in Tucker v. Resha,59 concluded that when a public official asserts
qualified immunity in response to a federal civil rights claim in a Florida
court, an order denying such a motion is subject to interlocutory review to
the extent that the order turns on an issue of law. 60 The court's conclusion
was based primarily on the reasoning of Mitchell v. Forsyth.6' In that case,
the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the qualified immunity
of public officials involves immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability; that this is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial; and that an order denying qualified immunity is effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment, as the public official cannot
be "re-immunized" if erroneously required to stand trial or face other
burdens of litigation.62
In its opinion, the Tucker court specifically noted that Florida's
appellate rules do not provide for interlocutory review of orders of the sort
addressed by the case.63 The court therefore requested the Florida Bar
55. Id. (quoting FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(g)(1)).
56. Id. at 170.
57. Id. at 169.
58. Portu, 654 So. 2d at 170.
59. 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1994).
60. ld at 1190.
61. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
62. Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1189 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27).
63. Id. at 1189.
Vol. 20
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Appellate Court Rules Committee to submit a proposed amendment that will
address the rule change mandated by this decision.'
4
Subsequently, the First District, in Department of Education v. Roe,65
concluded that it would not extend Tucker beyond its specific facts, and thus
declined to review a denial of a motion to dismiss that asserted a claim of
sovereign immunity regarding a cause of action under state law.
66
B. Certiorari Review of Orders Permitting Plaintiffs to Amend
Complaints to Include Claims for Punitive Damages
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. King,67 the supreme court resolved a
conflict among the districts regarding the question of whether it is appropri-
ate for an appellate court to review by certiorari an order of a trial court
permitting a plaintiff to amend a complaint to include a punitive damages
claim under section 768.72 of the Florida Statutes.68
The statute provides that "no claim for punitive damages shall be
permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or
proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for
recovery of such damages. '69  The statute goes on to state that "[n]o
discovery of financial worth shall proceed until after the pleading concerning
punitive damages is permitted."
70
The court indicated that it read the statute to "create a substantive legal
right not to be subject to a punitive damages claim and ensuing financial
worth discovery until the trial court makes a determination that there is a
reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of punitive damages. 71
The court then noted that the Fourth District, in Kraft General Foods,
Inc. v. Rosenblum,72 Henn v. Sadler,73 and Sports Products, Inc. v. Estate
of Inalien,74 ruled that the procedure established by the statute must be
followed, and that the failure to adhere to that procedure is a departure from
64. Id. at 1190.
65. 656 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
66. Id, at 507.
67. 658 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1995).
68. I& at 519.
69. FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Globe Newspaper, 658 So. 2d at 519.
72. 635 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 642 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.
1994).
73. 589 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1991) (en banc).
74. 658 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1995]
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the essential requirements of law. The court expressed its agreement with
the Fourth District and held "that appellate courts should grant certiorari in
instances in which there is a demonstration by a petitioner that the
procedures of section 768.72 have not been followed."75
The court declined the petitioner's invitation "to take a further step..
and hold that certiorari may also be granted to review the sufficiency of
the evidence considered by a trial judge in a section 768.72 determina-
tion. 76  The court thus disapproved of the Third District's decision in
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Rockhead,77 which had taken such an
approach.78 The court summed up its holding by stating:
We specifically agree with the reasoning of the Fourth District in its
decision in Sports Products, Inc., that certiorari review is appropriate to
determine whether a court has conducted the evidentiary inquiry
required by section 768.72, Florida Statutes, but not so broad as to
encompass review of the sufficiency of the evidence considered in that
inquiry.79
C. Issues Certified to the Supreme Court
In Canal Insurance Co. v. Reed,8" the First District held that review
is not available, either by appeal or certiorari, of an order deciding an
insurance coverage issue in a third party declaratory judgment action
between an insurer and its insured, prior to a final determination of liability
in the underlying action, that results in the insurer having to provide liability
coverage for the insured in the underlying action.8 The court certified to
the supreme court, however, as a question of great public importance, the
issue of whether, under such circumstances, the insurer may seek immediate
review of the order and, if so, whether such review should be by certiorari,
appeal of a non-final order, or appeal of a final order.82
75. Globe Newspaper, 658 So. 2d at 520.
76. Id.
77. 639 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
78. In a humorous aside to the legal issues involved, Chief Judge Schwartz, the author
of the majority opinion in Commercial Carrier, noting the fact that both the petitioner and
the respondent were represented by attorneys with the last name of "Schwartz," stated, "[like
a pride of lions, and an exaltation of larks, this case involves an intelligence of (unrelated)
Schwartzes." Id. at 661 n.*.
79. Globe Newspaper, 658 So. 2d at 520.
80. 653 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
81. Id. at 1090.
82. Id. at 1090-91.
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In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Century Construction Corp.,"3 the First
District found that a non-final order denying motions to dismiss a third-party
complaint, which was entered after the entry of judgment in the main action
was not appealable.84 The court certified conflict with the decision in
Mogul v. Fodiman,85 which concluded that Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130(a)(4), which allows for appeals from non-final orders
entered after a final order, appear "'broad enough to permit an appeal from'
an order denying a motion seeking a protective order to prevent certain
discovery in a supplementary proceeding."86 The First District reasoned
that "the rule was intended to apply only to orders entered after a final order
which would otherwise be unreviewable."87 The court stated: "To hold
that the order sought to be appealed here is immediately reviewable pursuant
to rule 9.130(a)(4) would lead inevitably to the result that all interlocutory
orders entered in third-party actions following the entry of judgment in the
main action would, likewise, be immediately reviewable."88 The court
pointed out that since such a conclusion would result in an enormous waste
of scarce judicial resources, it must presume that the drafters of the rule
intended no such consequence. 9
D. Other Cases
As usual, the appellate courts decided a large number of cases dealing
with the question of whether particular orders were subject to review. A
sampling of those cases includes:
Hernando County v. Leisure Hills, Inc.90 A partial final judgment
determining that the appellee was entitled to have a plat recorded was not
appealable because the trial court had reserved jurisdiction to specifically
order the clerk of court at some future time to record, the plat and to
determine whether damages were appropriate and, if so, the amount of
damages.91
83. 656 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
84. Id at 612.
85. 406 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
86. Maryland Casualty, 656 So. 2d at 612 (quoting Mogul, 406 So. 2d at 1226).
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id
90. 648 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
91. Id at 258.
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Cohen, Scherer & Cohen, P.A. v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co.92
Found to be nonappealable was an order dismissing a counterclaim with
prejudice, but leaving the main claim pending.93 The court relied on the
fact that the main claim and the counterclaim both arose out of a malprac-
tice claim and the obligations of the parties under the insurance policy in
regard to the malpractice claim.94
Arthur v. Gibson.95 Certiorari was deemed an appropriate method to
review a non-final order denying a motion to disqualify counsel.96
Waller v. Waller.9 7 Not appealable was an order granting a motion
to amend a complaint to add a defendant who had previously obtained a
dismissal based on an allegation that the defendant had not been served with
the initial complaint within the time required by the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.8
Polo v. Polo.99 A non-final order denying a motion to dismiss based
on a claim that the initial process and pleading were not served within the
time required by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was nonappeal-
able.' °
Gregg v. State.'° The court stated that it had no jurisdiction to
review an oral order."°
Valenzuela v. Valenzuela. °3 A non-final order directing a party to
pay an expert witness fee prior to taking the expert's deposition was found
not to be subject to review, either by appeal or by certiorari. 4
Ramseyer v. Williamson.'°5 A trial court's order denying a motion
to dissolve a writ of garnishment was not appealable.'0 6
92. 654 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
93. Id. at 283.
94. Id.
95. 654 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
96. Id. at 984.
97. 650 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
98. Id. at 194.
99. 643 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
100. Id. at 56.
101. 643 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
102. Id. at 107.
103. 648 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
104. Id. at 741.
105. 639 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
106. Id. at 206.
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City of Dania v. Broward County."°  Orders denying motions to
intervene in eminent domain proceedings were held to be appealable, final
orders.'0 8
Stufflebean v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co."° An order granting a
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, and holding that under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a jury verdict in another case was
determinative of the negligence and comparative negligence of the parties,
was held not to be appealable by the plaintiff.110 The plaintiff argued that
the order was appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), which allows for review of orders that determine the
issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief. The court
relied on the fact that the jury verdict had found the plaintiff sixty-five
percent at fault in causing the accident and the fact that the plaintiff had
opposed the application of collateral estoppel. Under these circumstances,
the court found that the order was not one in favor of the plaintiff, who was
the only party seeking affirmative relief, and thus was not appealable.'
Ownby v. Ownby."2 The court reviewed by certiorari an order in a
dissolution of marriage action requiring the husband to comply with a
stipulation in which he agreed to submit to a blood test to determine
paternity.'
Bierman v. Miller."4 Certiorari was employed to review an order
vacating a stay in a legal malpractice action." 5
Robert v. W.R. Grace & Co.16 The court concluded that the denial
of a request to perpetuate testimony by a terminally ill person is a matter
which may be entertained by petition for writ of certiorari. 7
107. 658 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
108. Id. at 164.
109. 645 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1994).
110. Id. at 137.
111. Id.
112. 639 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1994).
113. Id. at 136.
114. 639 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
115. Id. at 627.
116. 639 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Id. at 1057.
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Oenbrink, D.O. v. Schiegner."' The court recognized that certiorari
review may be used to challenge an order that denies a motion to dismiss
for failure to comply with the statutory presuit notice requirements.' 19
Hickey v. Pompano K of C, Inc. 2' Certiorari was deemed appropri-
ate to review an order severing a plaintiff's trial against one defendant from
her trial against a codefendant.
12 1
Medero v. Florida Power & Light Co." The court reviewed by
certiorari an order denying the plaintiff's motion to compel the deposition
of an executive employed by the defendant."2
Pevsner v. Frederick.124 A non-party witness was found to have the
right to certiorari review of an order imposing sanctions against him for
discovery violations.2"
Becker & Poliakoff v. King. 26  Certiorari was deemed the proper
method of reviewing an order denying a law firm's motion to withdraw as
counsel. 27
Randall v. Guenther.128  A non-final discovery order compelling a
party to testify after she invoked her privilege against self-incrimination was
a proper subject of certiorari review. 29
VI. RENDITION
A. Rubber-Stamped Form Orders
The Second District dealt with a series of cases130 that concerned the
issue of whether orders were rendered when trial judges ruled on them by
using a form order rubber stamp on motions, filling in blanks to indicate the
118. 645 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 131 (Fla.
1995).
119. Id. at 167.
120. 647 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
121. Id. at 271.
122. 658 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
123. Id. at 567.
124. 656 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
125. Id. at 263.
126. 642 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
127. Id. at 822.
128. 650 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
129. Id. at 1072-73.
130. Parnell v. State, 642 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gibson v. State,
642 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Davenport v. State, 640 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Sullivan, 640 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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date and whether the motions were granted or denied and signing beneath
the stamp.131 The court indicated that while it did "not discourage the use
of a short form order stamped on the face of a motion[,] ... such an order
should not be used when it is essential to fix a point from which crucial
time periods are to be calculated for purposes of rendition.'13  The court's
primary problem with the use of such orders was the fact that there was no
indication that the orders were ever filed with the clerk of the circuit
court,133 a requirement for rendition, as that term is defined by Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g).' 34 In light of the fact that a trial
court's order "is not appealable until it is rendered,"' 35 the Second District
dismissed each of the appeals as premature and remanded the matters with
directions to the trial courts to render appropriate orders. 36
In Parnell, however, the court may have given an indication as to how
such form orders could be used in a manner that would result in rendition.
In finding that there was no indication that the order there was filed, the
court stated: "When the document does not receive a second date stamp
from the clerk, 'there is nothing on the face of the appellate record to
establish that the order has ever been rendered.' 37 This language would
seem to imply that rendition would occur if, after a trial court enters a
rubber-stamped order, the clerk would place a date stamp on the motion
indicating that the motion was refiled after the order was entered.
B. Court Status Forms
In State v. Tremblay,3 ' the Fourth District addressed a contention that
an order was rendered when the trial court signed and filed a court status
form reflecting that a charge was dismissed.1 39 The court denied a motion
131. The use of such stamps was apparently widespread by the judges of one particular
circuit, since the four appeals cited in the preceding footnote were from orders entered by
four different judges in the same circuit.
132. Sullivan, 640 So. 2d at 78.
133. Parnell, 642 So. 2d at 1093; Gibson, 642 So. 2d at 44; Davenport, 640 So. 2d at
1225; Sullivan, 640 So. 2d at 78.
134. In pertinent part, rule 9.020(g) provides that "[a]n order is rendered when a signed,
written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal." FLA. R. App. P. 9.020(g).
135. Sullivan, 640 So. 2d at 78 (quoting Billie v. State, 473 So. 2d 34, 34 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985)).
136. Parnell, 642 So. 2d at 1093; Gibson, 642 So. 2d at'44; Davenport, 640 So. 2d at
1225-26; Sullivan, 640 So. 2d at 78.
137. Parnell, 642 So. 2d at 1093.
138. 642 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
139. Id. at 65.
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to dismiss that was based on this contention, finding no authority to the
effect that a status form constituted a final, appealable order." The court
went on to warn, however, that "although that day has not arrived, we can
envision an occasion when a peculiar set of circumstances might lead us to
conclude that a court status form might be found appealable."'' Thus, the
court felt "compelled to comment that it would behoove the bench and bar
to take precautionary measures in this regard,"' 42 such as "for the trial
judge to make it clear on the record that a subsequent written order will be
prepared, and that any sheet of paper the judge signs which records a
particular ruling as a docket entry, is not intended to be the order subject to
be appealed."' 14
3
VII. VENUE
In Vasilinda v. Lozano, 44 the supreme court adopted the following
principles to be applied to determine in which court appellate jurisdiction
lies when the trial court has granted a change of venue to a circuit located
within another district:
(1) Changes of venue in criminal cases do not become effective
until the court file has been received in the transferee court. Changes
of venue in civil cases do not become effective until the court file has
been received in the transferee court and costs and service charges
required by section 47.191, Florida Statutes (1991), and Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.060 which are applicable to the case are paid.
(2) Appellate jurisdiction is determined at the time the notice of
appeal or petition for extraordinary writ is filed. If the change of venue
has not yet become effective when the notice or petition is filed,
appellate jurisdiction lies in the district court of appeal which serves as
the appellate court for the transferor court. That district court of appeal
shall retain jurisdiction of the matter before it even though the change
of venue is later effected. Once the change of venue has become
effective, appellate jurisdiction shall be in the district court of appeal
which serves as the district court of appeal for the transferee court, even
if the challenged order was entered before the change of venue. Of
140. Id. at 66.
141. Id. (footnotes omitted).
142. Id.
143. Tremblay, 642 So. 2d at 66.
144. 631 So. 2d 1082 (Fa. 1994).
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course, the time for filing appeals and petitions for certiorari shall run
from the date of the challenged order.1
4 5
The First District was called upon to interpret one aspect of Vasilinda
in Cottingham v. State. 46 In that case, an inverse condemnation matter,
a circuit judge in Hernando County, which is located within the Fifth
District, entered an order transferring venue to Leon County, which is
located within the First District. 47 The order provided that the plaintiffs
should pay the service charge to the clerk of court of Hernando County and
directed the clerk to effect the transfer to Leon County upon proof of
payment of the service charge. 48 Before the service charge was paid, the
clerk mailed the file to Leon County. 49 The clerk of court in Leon
County advised the appellants by telephone that the file had been received
and that payment of a transfer fee was required. 50 The following day,
counsel for appellants sent a notice of appeal by overnight mail to the clerk
for Hemando County.' Later that day, counsel mailed the transfer fee to
the clerk for Leon County.' 52 The fee was accompanied by a .letter
explaining that a notice of appeal had been filed in the circuit court of
Hernando County, appealing the case to the Fifth District.' The notice
of appeal was received by the clerk in Hernando County, and four days
later, the transfer fee was received by the clerk in Leon County.s 4
The State filed a motion to dismiss in the Fifth District, erroneously
asserting that the required fee had been paid four days before the notice of
appeal was mailed. 5 5 The Fifth District denied the motion, but transferred
the appeal to the First District.'56 The First District concluded that
because the notice of appeal was filed in the circuit court in Hernando
County before the transfer fee was received in Leon County, jurisdiction of
145. Id. at 1087 (footnotes omitted).
146. 656 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
147. Id. at 598.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Cottingham, 656 So. 2d at 598.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Cottingham, 656 So. 2d at 598.
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the appeal lay solely in the Fifth District,157 and transferred the case back
to that court. 58
The court rejected the argument that the transfer was complete when
the transfer fee was mailed,'59 but certified the following question as one
of great public importance:
FOR PURPOSES OF THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN VASILINDA V.
LOZANO, 631 SO.2D 1082 (FLA. 1994), IS THE DATE OF PAY-
MENT OF THE TRANSFER FEES AND CHARGES THE DATE OF
RECEIPT OF SUCH CHARGES BY THE TRANSFEREE COURT OR
THE DATE OF MAILING BY THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR
PAYMENT? 60
VIII. NOTICE OF APPEAL
A. Impact of a Notice of Appeal on Pending Motions
in the Trial Court
The Fourth District, in Kennedy v. Alberto,'6' addressed the question
of whether pending post-judgment motions which do not delay rendition of
the judgment, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g)(3),
are deemed abandoned by the filing of a notice of appeal directed to the
judgment.' 62 The court initially recognized that the post-judgment motions
named in rule 9.020(g) that suspend rendition of the judgment to which they
are directed are considered abandoned by the filing of a notice of appeal
before their disposition. 163 These motions are timely and authorized "for
new trial or rehearing, clarification, or certification; motions to alter or
amend; for judgment notwithstanding verdict or in accordance with prior
motion for directed verdict, or in arrest of judgment; or a challenge to the
verdictd.5
'64
157. Id. at 599.
158. Id. at 597.
159. Id. at 599.
160. Id.
161. 649 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
162. Id. at 287.
163. Id.
164. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.0 20(g).
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Noting that the case under review was not concerned with one of the
orders set forth in the rule, but with a motion for relief from judgment under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b),165 the court stated:
We do not believe, therefore, that motions filed after final
judgment which are not named in rule 9.020(g) and do not suspend
rendition are deemed abandoned by a later filed notice of appeal
directed to the judgment itself. Among this class of motions are
motions for writ of garnishment, motions to tax costs or award
attorney's fees, motions for proceedings supplementary, and motions for
relief from judgment under rule 1.540(b).'66
The Second District also dealt with the impact of a notice of appeal on
a pending motion. In Rice v. Brown,67 the court concluded that the filing
of a notice of appeal from a final judgment and the denial of a motion for
new trial constituted an abandonment of a motion for remittitur and divested
the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on that motion.168
B. Filing in the Proper Court
In Upshaw v. State,169 the appellant sought to appeal an order entered
by the Circuit Court for Eighth Judicial Circuit in Baker County. 7 A
notice of appeal was filed with the court clerk in Alachua County, which is
also located in the Eighth Circuit.' Although efforts to do so may have
been made by the appellant and by the Alachua County court clerk, no
notice was ever filed with the Baker County court clerk.'72 The First Dis-
trict refused to consider the appeal, holding "that when a party initiates an
appeal.., by filing a notice of appeal in circuit court, the notice must be
filed in the circuit court in the county where the original proceeding was
165. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d at 288. As the court noted, not only is such a motion not set
forth in the appellate rule as one which delays rendition of a judgment, but rule 1.540(b)
expressly states that "[a] motion under this sub-division does not affect the finality of a
judgment or decree or suspend its operation." Id. (quoting FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.540(b)).
166. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d at 288.
167. 645 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 658 So. 2d 992 (Fla.
1995).
168. Id. at 1021.
169. 641 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1994).
170. Id. at 452.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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pending to validly invoke appellate jurisdiction." '73 The court recognized
that the supreme court has liberally construed the appellate rules "to allow
valid invocation of appellate jurisdiction when an appellant or petitioner has
not strictly filed the notice in the correct court,"'74 but pointed out that
those supreme court cases involved situations in which the party invoking
appellate jurisdiction filed a timely notice either with the district court of
appeal or with the correct lower tribunal.'75 "In this case," the court
concluded, "petitioner did neither, so we are without jurisdiction of the
appeal."' 1
76
C. Timeliness
In Metropolitan Dade County v. Vasquez,7 7 the appellant, on the last
day for filing a timely notice of appeal, forwarded its notice to a private
carrier with directions to deliver it that day to the Judge of Compensation
Claims.178  The courier did not reach the building housing the judge's
office until 5:05 p.m. and the security guard would not permit her to enter
the building or leave the package at the building site.'79 The appellee then
moved to dismiss, arguing that the notice, which was filed on the next
business day, three days later, was not timely filed. 8' The appellant
maintained that because the notice was delivered for filing within the
required period, it should be treated as timely.''
The First District dismissed the appeal, finding that the "attempt to
deliver a notice of appeal" under the circumstances of the case was not
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.8 2 In doing so, the court
stated: "A party who waits until the last available day to file its notice of
appeal, and who fails to assure that the notice is delivered prior to the close
of the business day bears the risk that it will be denied access to file the
notice 'after hours. '" 8
3
173. Id.
174. Upshaw, 641 So. 2d at 453 (citing Alfonso v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 616
So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1993); Skinner v. Skinner, 561 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1990); Johnson v. Citizens
State Bank, 537 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989)).
175. Upshaw, 641 So. 2d at 453.
176. Id.
177. 659 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
178. Id. at 355.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Vasquez, 659 So. 2d at 356.
183. Id.
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D. Amended Judgments
In Wetherington v. Minch, 84 the appellant did not timely appeal from
a final judgment of foreclosure, but attempted to appeal from an amended
final judgment which changed the sale date and awarded additional
interest. 85 The Fifth District first noted that the amendment of a final
judgment which does not change matters of substance or resolve a genuine
ambiguity does not toll the time within which the parties must seek
review."86 The court then pointed out that an appeal from an amended
final judgment is "'limited to the party adversely affected by the amendment
and should involve only those issues affected by the amendment."'187
Since the appellant raised no challenges involving the amendments, and
failed to timely appeal the original judgment, the court dismissed the
appeal.18
8
E. Amendment of Notice of Appeal
The Third District, in Ashraf v. Smith,"8 9 denied a motion to amend
a notice of appeal to include the appellant's insurer.Y Although the court
found the amendment "entirely unnecessary" under the facts of the case, the
denial of the motion was based on the court's determination that it "lack[ed]
the jurisdiction to permit such an amendment.''.
IX. INDIGENCY
In Schwab v. Brevard County School Board,"g the Fifth District dealt
with a contention that a 1994 amendment to section 57.08 1(1) of the Florida
Statutes lifted the burden of determining indigency for purposes of appeal
from the circuit court and allows individuals to proceed as indigents upon
the filing by counsel of a certificate of indigency in the appellate court. 93
Prior to the amendment, the statute required an indigent person to submit an
184. 637 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
185. Id. at 967.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting First Continental Corp. v. Khan, 605 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1992)).
188. Id.
189. 647 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 658 So. 2d 989 (Fla.
1995).
190. Id. at 893.
191. Id.
192. 650 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
193. Id. at 1101.
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affidavit of indigency and, if represented by counsel, a certificate from
counsel indicating, among other things, that counsel had made an investiga-
tion to ascertain the truth of the affidavit and believed it to be true. 94 The
amended statute eliminates the requirement of an affidavit if the attorney
files a certificate certifying that the attorney has made an investigation to
ascertain the financial condition of the client and has found the client to be
indigent.19
5
The court rejected the contention that in light of the change, the trial
court was no longer required to make a determination of indigency.' 96
The court pointed out that although the old version of the statute did not
specify where the determination of indigency should be made, the court in
Chappell v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,197 had
concluded that a party seeking to obtain a waiver of appellate court fees
must file a motion in the lower tribunal, along with the affidavit and
certificate required by the statute.198  The court then stated that "[t]he
amendments to the statute reflect a change in the requirements an indigent
person must meet in order to be exempt from payment of charges,"' 99 not
the question of "where such a determination must be made.' ' °
This determination, the court continued, is procedural in nature and is
therefore governed by the procedural rules promulgated by the supreme
court.20' Among those rules, the court noted, are Florida Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 9.430, which requires a party who has the right to seek
review without the payment of costs to file a motion in the lower tribunal,
and Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.040(b)(3), which states that
fees will be paid as provided by law except when a party has been
194. FLA. STAT. § 57.081(1) (1980). Counsel was also required to certify that he or she
had investigated the nature of the applicant's position, that, in counsel's opinion, the position
was meritorious as a matter of law, that counsel had not been paid or promised payment of
any remuneration for services, and that counsel intended to act as attorney for the applicant
without compensation.
195. Schwab, 650 So. 2d at 1101-02 (citing FLA. STAT. § 57.081 (Supp. 1994)). The
revised statute retains the additional requirements for the certificate that are set forth in the
preceding footnote.
196. Id. at 1102.
197. 391 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
198. Schwab, 650 So. 2d at 1101.
199. Id. at 1102.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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"adjudicated insolvent."2°  Each of these rules, the court concluded,
contemplates some action being taken by the lower tribunal.20 3
Citing to Schwab and to the two above-noted rules, the Fourth District,
in McFadden v. West Palm Beach Police Officer,2" indicated that it found
no authority for appellate courts to sua sponte determine the issue of
indigency in direct appeals.2 ' The court contrasted this fact with the its
authority in original proceedings to issue orders of indigency.2" The court
then stated:
A welcome change in the rule to allow the clerks of the appellate court
to determine indigency from the affidavit, providing for a remand to the
trial court for a hearing on indigency where indicated by the circum-
stances of the case or the affidavit, would allow indigents more
expeditious access to the court without a significant burden.2'
In Keene v. Nudera,°8 the Second District set forth the "procedures
for filing appeals and original proceedings for indigent clients in civil
cases."2" With regard to appeals, the court stated:
An attorney who plans to appeal an order for an indigent client must
timely file a motion in the trial court requesting an order of indigency
for purposes of appeal. That order must be obtained either before filing
the notice of appeal or shortly thereafter. If the indigency order is not
obtained prior to the commencement of the appeal, the attorney should
advise this court in writing concerning the status of that order. Attor-
neys should be aware the rules of appellate procedure do not require the
lower tribunal to automatically send this court a copy of such an order.
It is the appellant's responsibility to provide this court with a copy of
the order of indigency. This court will normally dismiss an appeal after
thirty days' notice if the filing fee is not paid or an order of indigency
is not filed.210
202. Id.
203. Schwab, 650 So. 2d at 1102.
204. 658 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
205. Id. at 1048.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1232 (2d Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1995).
209. Id at D1232.
210. Id. at D1233.
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With regard to original proceedings, the court noted that the great
majority of such cases "seek review of orders entered by circuit courts, as
'lower tribunals.""'21 In light of the language of Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.430, which states that a party who has a right to "seek review"
without payment of costs shall file a motion in the lower tribunal, the court
concluded that "a circuit court, as the lower tribunal, is authorized to enter
an order of indigency for an original proceeding, just as it must resolve that
issue for a direct appeal of a final or nonfinal order." '212
The court pointed out, however, that there are situations, such as cases
in which mandamus or prohibition is sought, in which it may not be feasible
to obtain an order from the lower tribunal.213 Additionally, the court
recognized that in some instances, an original proceeding is filed to
challenge the decision of a governmental entity that is defined as a "lower
tribunal," but is not a typical judicial forum. 2 4 In light of situations such
as these, the court stated: "To assure access to this court, we allow
petitioners to file their motion for an order of indigency, along with a
sufficient affidavit, in this court even when a 'lower tribunal' may ex-
ist."2
15
The court indicated that a motion filed in the appellate court should
accompany the petition and that, as with direct appeals, an original
proceeding will normally be dismissed after thirty days' notice if the filing
fee is not paid or if a sufficient motion and affidavit is not filed with the
court.2 16 The court also noted that neither the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure nor the most frequently used Florida practice manuals contain
forms useful in obtaining an order of indigency for appeal.21 7 Therefore,
the court appended to its opinion a form affidavit2 8 and a form order2'9
for use in such situations.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Keene, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D1234.
214. Id. at D1233-34.
215. Id. at D1234.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Keene, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D1234-35.
219. Id. at D1234.
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X. MOTIONS
In Sarasota County v. Ex,22° the Second District prefaced its discus-
sion of the merits of the case with some comments about the "tendency for
motions to proliferate because lawyers simply will not permit an adversary
to have the last word." 22' The court's concern grew from a series of
pleadings that included a motion to strike two notices of supplemental
authority, a reply to that motion, a motion to strike the reply, and a response
to the motion to strike the reply.22 The court pointed out that none of the
filings were necessary or helpful to the court22 3 and stated: "Lawyers
need to realize that appellate motion practice is not a game of ping-pong in
which the last lawyer to serve wins. 2 24 The court went on to say: "In
most cases, motions to strike motions and other similar pleadings are simply
unauthorized responses that demonstrate an attorney's lack of self-disci-
pline.225
XI. TRANSCRIPTS
A number of cases dealt with the absence of a transcript as a part of
the record on appeal. The manner in which such absences were dealt with
varied depending upon the facts of the case and the nature of the issues
raised. In some instances, courts relied upon the principle that when an
error is apparent on the face of the judgment, reversal is appropriate despite
the lack of a transcript.226 Similarly, other cases concluded that when the
record provided was sufficient to review a legal issue on the merits, the
absence of a trial transcript,27 or a portion of the transcript, did not
require affirmance.228 " Other factual situations, however, led to conclusions
that cases should be affirmed because of the lack of a transcript. Such
conclusions were reached in cases in which appellants failed to provide
220. 645 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
1995).
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 8.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 7-8.
225. Sarasota County, 645 So. 2d at 8.
226. Sugrim v. Sugrim, 649 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Hirsch v.
Hirsch, 642 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
227. In re Estate of Smith, 644 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
228. Velez v. State, 645 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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transcripts of evidentiary hearings that formed the basis for factual findings
by a trial court229 or an appeals referee.230
In Selig v. Sandier,231 the Third District affirmed trial court orders
striking a complaint as a sham pleading when the appellant failed to provide
the court "with a transcript of the evidentiary hearing or a proper substi-
tute.
232
In two other cases, courts found that items offered by appellants in lieu
of transcripts did not constitute substitutes that were sufficiently proper to
allow for review of either the entire case or of certain issues. In All
American Soup and Salad, Inc. v. Colonial Promenade,233 the Fifth
District found to be without merit the appellant's contention that its written
closing argument was a "proper substitute" for a transcript of a non-jury
trial." In Travieso v. Golden,235 the appellant submitted nine video-
tapes of deposition testimony as a substitute for a transcript. The Fourth
District noted its "disapproval of this procedure,2 36 and stated:
The use of videotapes on appeal in lieu of a written transcript is
not authorized by any rule and would be counterproductive to efficient
review by the court. We judges can digest a transcript covering a day's
worth of trial with far more dispatch than we can watch the same events
unfold on eight hours of videotape. While video may eventually
provide useful supplements to a written record, efficient use of appellate
court time requires the submission of a written transcript of trial
proceedings.237
XII. BRIEFS
A. Cross-References
In its consideration of two separate death penalty appeals taken by the
same defendant, the supreme court discussed issues relating to the practice
229. Huey v. Huey, 643 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
230. Wolfson v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 649 So. 2d 363, 363 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
231. 642 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.
1995).
232. Id. at 766.
233. 652 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
234. Id. at 912.
235. 643 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
236. Id. at 1136.
237. Id.
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of referring in a brief to briefs and records in other cases. In Johnson v.
State,23 the court stated that "cross-referenc[ing] a brief from a separate
case is impermissible under any circumstances because it may confuse
factually inapposite cases, it leaves appellate courts the task of determining
which issues are relevant (which is counsel's role), and it circumvents the
page-limit requirements. 239 The court went on to hold that the proper
method of bringing before the court matters that are contained in separate
records of pending cases is by way of a motion to supplement the record,
not by a request for the taking of judicial notice.2' The court stated that
"any attempt to cross-reference separate records of pending cases will
constitute grounds for the opposing party to move to strike the cross-
reference. '2 41 Further, the court indicated that "[a]ny order striking a cross
reference shall constitute automatic notice to counsel that the record must
be supplemented" and that the failure to supplement under such circumstanc-
es will work a procedural bar as to the matters at issue in the improperly
cross-referenced material.242
In the same defendant's companion appeal, Johnson v. State,243 the
court addressed the defendant's request that the court consider issues raised
in his other case.2"4 Concluding that "it clearly is not proper for counsel
to attempt to cross-reference issues from a brief in a distinct case pending
in the same court," the court found that all available issues not raised in the
briefs filed in the case were barred.245
B. Cross-Reply Briefs
In The Katz Family Partnership v. Placenti,246 the Third District
acknowledged that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 on its face
gives the impression that a cross-reply brief may be filed as a matter of
course in an appellate proceeding,247 but concluded that such briefs may
only be filed if there is a cross-appeal.241 The issue apparently arose from
238. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S347 (July 13, 1995).
239. Id. at S348.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S343 (July 13, 1995).
244. Id. at S345.
245. Id.
246. 648 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
247. Id. at 296.
248. Id. at 297 n.1.
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the wording of rule 9.130(e), which establishes the time for the filing of
appellants' initial briefs in appeals from non-final orders, but which goes on
to state that "[a]dditional briefs shall be served as prescribed by rule
9.210.,,249 Rule 9.210 establishes the general time requirements for
serving briefs and includes such a requirement for the service of cross-reply
briefs.250  As noted and relied upon by the Third District,21 however,
the 1977 committee note to rule 9.210 refers to the fact that a cross-reply
brief may be filed "if a cross-appeal or petition has been filed. 252
XIII. ORAL ARGUMENT BY VIDEO TELECONFERENCE NETWORK
The First District broke new ground by establishing a procedure to
conduct oral arguments by the use of a video teleconferencing network. 53
In its administrative order governing such arguments, the court indicated that
video teleconferencing equipment was being installed in Jacksonville,
Orlando, West Palm Beach, Miami, Ft. Myers, and Tampa. 54 The court
stated that "all requests for oral argument from attorneys located in or near
these cities will be deemed to request oral argument by use of the video
teleconference network unless the request explicitly specifies that the oral
argument be held in the courtroom at Tallahassee, Florida,' 255 where the
court is located. The court further indicated that, "[i]nitially, argument by
video teleconference network will be granted only when all the attorneys
expected to present argument are located near a single remote facility," but
that, in the future, "the court expects to schedule attorneys at two or more
remote facilities.2 56 The administrative order requires the party request-
ing argument to submit to the clerk of the court, within ten days of the order
granting oral argument, a fee in the amount specified in the order to cover
the costs of the video teleconference for that argument.257 Failure to
submit the fee, which will be taxable as costs in favor of the prevailing
party, will be deemed a waiver of the request for oral argument. 58 Fees
249. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(e).
250. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(f).
251. Katz Family Partnership, 648 So. 2d at 297 n.1.
252. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210 (1977 comm. notes).
253. In re Oral Argument By Video Teleconference Network, 648 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
254. Id. at 763.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Oral Argument, 648 So. 2d at 763.
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will be nonrefundable if oral argument is canceled at the request of the
parties, but they will be refunded if oral argument is canceled by the
courtL5 9 The court also noted that it may, on its own motion, require that
oral argument be conducted in Tallahassee,2' 6 and that it will also continue
to schedule oral arguments throughout the district as provided in section
35.11 of the Florida Statutes.261
XIV. CERTIORARI REVIEW OF A DECISION OF A CIRCUIT COURT
ACTING IN ITS APPELLATE CAPACITY
The supreme court, in Haines City Community Development v.
Heggs,262 clarified the standard of review for a district court to apply when
reviewing a decision of a circuit court acting in its appellate capacity. After
discussing the history of the common law writ of certiorari in Florida,
2 63
the court focused its attention on two of its previous decisions that had used
different language in setting forth the appropriate standard.2"
In Combs v. State,26' a case in which the circuit court had reviewed
by appeal a county court conviction for driving while intoxicated, the
supreme court had concluded that "a district court's review of an appellate
circuit court decision should determine whether there was a 'departure from
the essential requirements of law.""'2 The court "emphasized that there
must be 'a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a
miscarriage of justice."'267
Subsequently, in Educational Development Center v. City of West Palm
Beach,261 a case in which the circuit court had reviewed by certiorari a
decision of an administrative agency, the supreme court, relying on City of
Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant,269 concluded that "a district court's review of
an appellate circuit court's decision which reviewed an administrative
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995).
263. Id. at 525.
264. Id. at 528-29.
265. 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983).
266. Haines City, 658 So. 2d at 529 (quoting Combs, 436 So. 2d at 95).
267. Id. (quoting Combs, 436 So. 2d at 96).
268. 541 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1989).
269. 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982).
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agency decision should consider whether the 'circuit court afforded
procedural due process and applied the correct law.""'27
The question the court addressed in Haines City was "whether these
two standards are different, and, if so, whether a difference is justified."27'
The court answered by indicating that "'appl[ying] the correct law' is
synonymous with 'observing the essential requirements of law"' and that,
"[t]herefore, when the Combs and EDC standards are reduced to their core,
they appear to be the same. 272 Thus, the court found that the standard for
a district court is the same regardless of whether the circuit court reviewed
a matter by appeal or by certiorari. As set forth in Haines City, the standard
is as follows: "The inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded
procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law.
As explained above, these two components are merely expressions of ways
in which the circuit court decision may have departed from the essential
requirements of the law. 273 The court went on to give some insight into
the nature of the standard:
This standard, while narrow, also contains a degree of flexibility
and discretion. For example, a reviewing court is drawing new lines
and setting judicial policy as it individually determines those errors
sufficiently egregious or fundamental to merit the extra review and
safeguard provided by certiorari. This may not always be easy since the
errors in question must be viewed in the context of the individual case.
It may also be true that review of administrative decisions may be more
difficult, since care must be exercised to determine the nature of the
administrative proceeding under review, and to distinguish between
quasi-judicial proceedings and those legislative in nature. There is no
complete catalog that the court can turn to in resolving a particular
case.
274
XV. STANDING
Lack of standing has caused the appellate courts to refuse to reach the
merits in several cases. In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services
v. B.S.,275 the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services sought
270. Haines City, 658 So. 2d at 529.
271. Id. at 529-30 (footnote omitted).
272. Id. at 530.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 530-31 (footnote omitted).
275. 640 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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certiorari review of an order adjudicating a minor delinquent and detaining
him pending disposition 6 The minor neither appealed nor sought release
by way of habeas corpus.2' The court denied certiorari27 because it
concluded that the claimed procedural problems and statutory violations
"would have to be raised by someone with standing to argue on the minor's
behalf."279
In O'Neal v. Sun Bank,280 the court concluded that individuals against
whom a foreclosure action was brought lacked standing to appeal an order
allowing settlement between two creditors of a dispute as to the priority of
certain portions of receivership funds, when the individuals claimed no
entitlement of those funds.281
In Bodenstab v. Department of Professional Regulation,8 2 the court
dismissed an appeal from an order reconsidering an earlier negative
determination and finding the appellant, a physician, eligible for licensure
by endorsement in Florida.283 On appeal, the appellant argued that the
Board of Medicine had repudiated a stipulation by failing to incorporate in
its order certain new evidence that was favorable to him.28 The court
concluded that since the appellant had been granted licensure, he was not
"adversely affected" by the Board's order,28 5 and therefore, not entitled to
seek review pursuant to section 120.68(1) of the Florida Statutes,286 which
governs appeals of the sort presented by the case.
XVI. IMPACT OF PRIOR DETERMINATIONS
A. Law of the Case
In State v. Owen,28 7 the Fourth District dealt with a situation in which
a criminal defendant faced a retrial after the Supreme Court of Florida
276. Id. at 1175.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1176.
279. Id. at 1175.
280. 644 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
281. Id. at 178.
282. 648 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1085 (Fla.
1995).
283. Id. at 742.
284. Id. at 743.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1995).
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reversed his conviction due to its conclusion that the defendant's confession
was improperly admitted into evidence. 2"8  After the reversal, but before
the retrial, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision that
demonstrated that the confession was admissible as a matter of federal
constitutional law.2 9  The trial court refused a request by the State to
reconsider the admissibility of the confession in light of the new prece-
dent29 and the State sought certiorari review.291
After noting concern about whether certain precedent might compel the
conclusion that the confession would be inadmissible under the Florida
Constitution, the court found that it was the law of the case that the
confession was inadmissible.2 2 The court pointed out that the Supreme
Court of Florida could revisit the issue because appellate courts have "the
power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings notwithstanding that such
rulings have become the law of the case.2 93 The court therefore denied
certiorari, 2" but provided an opportunity for the issue to be reopened by
certifying a question of great public importance that asked whether the
principles of the federal case were applicable in light of the precedent
dealing with the question under the Florida Constitution.295
The law of the case doctrine was also applied in White v. State,296
when a criminal defendant attempted to raise on a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, an issue that had been previously raised in a direct appeal
that had been decided without an opinion by a per curiam affirmance. 297
The Fifth District stated: "A per curiam decision even without opinion
establishes the law of the case on the same issues and facts which were
raised or which could have been raised. 298
B. Res Judicata
In Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco v. McKesson Corp.,99
which, for reasons which will soon become apparent, will hereinafter be
288. Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990).
289. State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d at 201.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 202.
293. Id. (quoting Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1984)).
294. State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d at 201.
295. Id.
296. 651 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
297. Id. at 726.
298. Id.
299. 643 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
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referred to as McKesson IV, the court wrote the latest, and possibly final,
chapter to a saga that began when two alcoholic beverage distributors,
McKesson and Tampa Crown, separately challenged certain statutory
provisions that provided for preferential tax treatment to distributors of
alcoholic beverages made from products grown in Florida.3"
In each case, the trial court entered a final and partial summary
judgment invalidating the taxing scheme on Commerce Clause grounds, but
made its ruling prospective in nature and thus denied each distributor's
request for a tax refund."' In each case, the Division of Alcoholic
Beverages and Tobacco appealed the Commerce Clause ruling and the
distributor cross-appealed the prospective application ruling.3" The First
District consolidated the two appeals and certified the case to the Supreme
Court of Florida, 3 which affirmed the trial court's rulings in Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corp. ("McKesson ")."0
McKesson alone sought review in the Supreme Court of the United
States, which, in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco ("McKesson II"),301 struck that portion of McKesson I which had
granted only prospective relief.3°6
Following remand to the Supreme Court of Florida, the division
announced a proposed remedy and the court, in Division of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco v. McKesson Corp. ("McKesson III"),3"7 remanded
the case to the trial court to determine whether the chosen remedy satisfied
minimum constitutional requirements.08
Tampa Crown then filed a petition before the trial court seeking to
appear in the proceeding." 9 The division opposed the petition, asserting,
among other grounds, that because Tampa Crown had not pursued the case
to the Supreme Court of the United States, McKesson I was res judicata
insofar as Tampa Crown's claim for relief.310 The trial court granted
300. Id. at 18.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), rev'd, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), on remand to 574 So. 2d
114 (Fla. 1991), on remand to 643 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
305. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
306. Id. at 31.
307. 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991).
308. McKesson IV, 643 So. 2d at 18.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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Tampa Crown's petition, and the First District was called upon to review the
propriety of that ruling.31'
The court concluded that because Tampa Crown did not seek review
of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in McKesson I in the Supreme
Court of the United States, Tampa Crown "must be considered to have
accepted that decision and, therefore, to have no interest in any remaining
litigation."31 2 Given that fact, the court found the decision in McKesson
I to be res judicata as to Tampa Crown.313
The court rejected Tampa Crown's contention that it continued to have
an interest in the case because United States Supreme Court Rule 12.4
provides that all parties to the proceeding in a lower court are deemed
parties in the Supreme Court unless the petitioner notifies the clerk of the
Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the
parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition.1 4
The court acknowledged that rule 12.4 offered "superficial support"
315
to Tampa Crown's position and that it had found no cases directly on
point.31 6 'The court nonetheless concluded that Tampa Crown "was
required to take some affirmative act before the United States Supreme
Court,, 3 1  such as "filing either a notice informing the clerk of its continu-
ing interest in the case or a brief adopting McKesson's brief' 31 for its
refund request to survive.
XVII. MOOTNESS
Cases deemed moot by the appellate courts included the following:
James Mitchell & Co. v. Gallagher.319 The court found that state-
ments made by an individual, as the state insurance commissioner, could
have served as the basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
disqualify him from issuing a final order, but went on to hold that the issue
311. Id.
312. Id. at 20.
313. McKesson IV, 643 So. 2d at 20.
314. Id. at 18-19.
315. Id. at 19.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. McKesson IV, 643 So. 2d at 19.
319. 651 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.
1995).
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was rendered moot by the fact that the individual involved no longer held
that office.32
Future Medical Technologies International, Inc. v. Sanders.32' A
case seeking certiorari review of an order requiring production of informa-
tion claimed to be privileged was deemed moot when the trial court stayed
its order of production to allow for appellate review, but before such review
was completed, the case went to trial without the information being
provided.31 The court found that by proceeding to trial without produc-
tion, the respondent had waived the right to have the information pro-
duced.32
Metropolitan Dade County v. Knight.3 An appeal from an order to
a county to pay costs in a criminal case was considered moot, because the
county had paid the costs at issue.3
XVIIL. PER CURIAM AFFIRMANCE WITHOUT OPINION
In Elliott v. Elliott,3 the court entered a per curiam affirmance
without opinion. 27 The appellant's counsel filed a motion for rehearing
that the court characterized as "rearguing the merits of the case in an effort
to persuade the court to change its mind,"328 and as "express[ing] displea-
sure with and chastis[ing] the lower court, the appellee and this court. 329
The court indicated that the tone and tenor of the motion was perhaps best
reflected by the following language in the initial statement made by the
appellant:
After a Judgement (sic) that was a travesty; an Answer Brief filled with
hyperbole and falsehood; and this Court's superficial and shallow
review, the appellant can now only pray for simple fairness and
equity.330
320. Id. at 701.
321. 651 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
322. Id. at 250.
323. Id.
324. 640 So. 2d 90 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
325. Id. at 90.
326. 648 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1994).
327. Id. at 135.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
19951
41
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
Noting that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330 commands that
motions for rehearing not reargue the merits of the court's order,33 ' the
court found the motion to be "a personification of the very conduct found
by the appellate courts to constitute a flagrant violation of the rule. 332
The court thus denied the motion for rehearing and ordered counsel to show
cause why sanctions should not be imposed.333
In his response to the order to show cause, appellant's counsel
expressed his apologies, and indicated that he intended no disrespect to the
court, the lower court or opposing counsel.334 The court indicated that
"[h]ad counsel simply ended there (leaving well enough alone), the matter
would have been adequately addressed and put to rest. 335 Counsel went
on, however, "to explain what prompted his argumentative and overzealous
motion for rehearing, namely, the fact that the court's opinion 'was a simple
per curiam affirmance of the trial court's Final Judgment, and the under-
signed attorney found it impossible to discern the Court's reasoning. '336
The response also stated that "'the undersigned attorney was extremely
surprised at this Court's per curiam affirmance and presumed that his
argument had been overlooked by this Court.' ' 337
The court found this to be "a most disturbing revelation, 338 and
stated: "The notion that an appellate practitioner would view a per curiam
disposition, without opinion, as lacking in meaningful review is absolutely
astounding. '339 The court opined that "[p]erhaps appellate counsel should
not be faulted for this misconceived view of a per curiam affirmance,
without opinion.,,3' Rather, the court stated:
Perhaps the fault lies with the law school curriculum, the continuing
legal education programs offered by the Florida Bar, or by the appellate
courts themselves, in not engendering a sense of confidence that the
absence of a written opinion is not akin to a superficial treatment, and
331. Elliot, 648 So. 2d at 135.
332. Id. at 136.
333. Id.
334. Elliot v. Elliot, 648 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Elliot II, 648 So. 2d at 138.
340. Id.
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in leaving the bar with the unfounded notion that the court "did not read
the briefs." 34
"Perhaps," the opinion went on to say, "the court needs simply to restate the
fundamental proposition that each and every appeal receives the same degree
of attention and that a per curiam affirmance without opinion is not an
indication of any kind of lesser treatment. 342 The court concluded its
discussion by accepting counsel's apology and declining to impose
sanctions.343
XIX. REHEARING
In 3299 N. Federal Highway, Inc. v. Board of County Commission-
ers,3" the Fourth District dealt with the issue of whether an opinion
denying a motion for rehearing becomes effective immediately or whether
there is some period of time provided for the filing of a second motion for
rehearing or clarification.345 The issue arose after the court entered an
initial opinion and the appellants filed motions for rehearing. The court
denied the motions in an opinion that certified a question of great public
importance on the court's own motion and that corrected a factual error
from the original opinion.3 6 The second opinion "did not change the
substance or effect" of the original opinion. 47
The finality of the second opinion became an issue in two respects.
First, two days after the second opinion was filed, arrests were made under
the ordinance at issue in the case.348 A stay of enforcement had precluded
such arrests during the pendency of the case, but the initial opinion had
vacated that stay.349 Second, the appellants filed a motion for clarification
directed to the second opinion.
The court noted that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(b)
allows a party to file just one motion for rehearing or for clarification of a
341. Id.
342. Id. at 139.
343. Id.
344. 646 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
345. Id. at 215.
346. Id. at 227-28.
347. Id. at 228.
348. Id.
349. 3299, 646 So. 2d at 228.
350. Id.
1995]
43
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
decision,351 and stated that "[a]n exception to the rule has been recognized
where on the first motion for rehearing, the court changes its previous
ruling." '352 The court found that since it did not change the result or
reasoning of its initial opinion, the portion of the initial opinion vacating the
stay became final and enforcement of the ordinance became appropriate.353
The court did consider the motion for clarification, but only because the
second opinion was erroneously rubber stamped by the clerk with a standard
indication that the opinion was not final until the expiration of the time to
seek rehearing or until the disposition of any such motion.3" Clearly, the
lesson of 3299 is that absent such a stamp, a motion for rehearing or
clarification under similar circumstances would be inappropriate.
XX. ADMINISTRATIVE APPELLATE PRACTICE
A. Review of Non-Final Administrative Orders
In Florida Leisure Acquisition Corp. v. Florida Commission on Human
Relations,355 the appellant sought review of a non-final order rejecting a
recommendation of a hearing officer who had concluded that the appellant
had not engaged in a racially discriminatory employment practice .356 The
order in question remanded the matter to the hearing officer for a hearing
on damages.357 The court recognized that "jurisdiction lies in the district
court to immediately review a non-final administrative order if review of the
final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy. 358 It conclud-
ed, however, that the appellant in the case under consideration would not be
deprived of an adequate remedy if appellate review was delayed until after
the final order determining all issues. 9 The court stated: "The necessity
of trying a case to conclusion before obtaining redress on appeal from an
erroneous interlocutory ruling of the lower court does not make the remedyinadequate. ' '31°
351. Id.
352. Id. at 228-29 (citing Dade Fed. Say. & Loan v. Smith, 403 So. 2d 995, 999 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
353. Id. at 229.
354. 3299, 646 So. 2d at 229.
355. 639 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
356. Id. at 1028.
357. Id.
358. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(2); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(a),(c)); FLA. STAT.
§ 120.68(1) (1993).
359. Id. at 1029.
360. Florida Leisure, 639 So. 2d at 1029.
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The court was not swayed by the fact that interlocutory appeals can be
taken in civil cases from orders determining liability. The court pointed out
that the supreme court interpreted such appeals as being specifically
authorized by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), and
that non-final administrative orders are not reviewable under that rule.
61
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Berkowitz v. City of Tamarac,362 the City sold to the appellant
property on which it was operating some of its public works.363  The
property was leased back to the City until it could move the public works
into a new facility, which was not yet completed. 36' The lease provided
that the City would repurchase the property if, during the term of the lease,
the City effectuated either an adverse change in zoning to the premises, the
imposition of any additional governmental restrictions, or requirements
which would prohibit or materially and adversely affect the appellant's
intended development so that such development would become economically
unfeasible.365
The appellant filed a complaint which alleged that the City adopted a
comprehensive land use plan that contained restrictions that made his
intended development economically unfeasible.3' He sought money
damages and rescission.367 The trial court dismissed the case because the
appellant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not seeking
relief from the restrictions.368
The Fourth District reversed, concluding that because the appellant was
seeking money damages and rescission, which could not be obtained in an
administrative proceeding, he was not required to exhaust administrative
remedies.369
361. Id.
362. 654 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
363. Id. at 982.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Berkowitz, 654 So. 2d at 982.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 983.
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C. Timeliness of Notice of Appeal
In Allen v. Live Oak Ford Mercury,370 the court rejected a claim that
Florida Administrative Code Rule 38E-2.003(3), which states that appeals
filed by mail shall be considered to have been filed when postmarked by the
United States Postal Service, could be relied upon to breathe life into a case
in which the notice of appeal that was mailed to the court was received after
the expiration of the time within which an appeal could be instituted.371
The court stated: "The administrative rule to which the appellants refer
concerns an administrative appeal in an unemployment compensation
proceeding and [this] rule is clearly not applicable in appeals taken to this
CoUrt"
37 2
D. Water Management District Emergency Orders
In West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority v. Southwest Florida
Water Management District,373 the Fifth District found that it had no
jurisdiction to review emergency orders of a water management district that
were issued pursuant to the emergency powers authority of section
373.119(2) of the Florida Statutes. The court noted that under the statute,
any person to whom an emergency order is directed is required to comply
immediately, but may also obtain a hearing before the district's governing
board "'as soon as possible.' 374 The court held that only after the evi-
dence adduced at such a hearing provides the record to support the
emergency order or cause it to be quashed is the administrative action
subject to review.375
XXI. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPELLATE PRACTICE
A. Appeals from Non-Final Orders Which Determine That a Party
Is Not Entitled to Workers' Compensation Immunity as a
Matter of Law
In Breakers Palm Beach, Inc. v. Gloger,3 6 the defendant appealed an
order denying its motion for summary judgment which was grounded on
370. 647 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
371. Id. at 1060.
372. Id. at 1061.
373. 646 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
374. Id. at 766.
375. Id.
376. 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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workers' compensation immunity. The trial court had denied the motion
because it concluded that there were issues of fact to be resolved.3" The
appeal was taken pursuant to the Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi), which permits appeals from non-final orders which
determine "that a party is not entitled to workers' compensation immunity
as a matter of law.'
378
The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the rule permits
review only of orders determining once and for all that there is no workers'
compensation immunity,379 and does not permit review of orders merely
determining, as did the order in the case, that the issue of workers'
compensation immunity is an issue of fact.380
The Fourth District employed a grammatical analysis in denying the
motion to dismiss. It found that if the words "as a matter of law" had been
placed at the beginning of the above-cited rule provision, the appellee's
argument would have been persuasive.381 Under that scenario, the court
concluded, the rule would permit review of non-final orders which
determine "'as a matter of law that a party is not entitled to workers'
compensation immunity."' 382 The words "'as a matter of law,"' the court
continued, would modify "'determine.'' 383 Since the key words were
placed at the end of the rule provision, however, the court found that they
modified the word "entitled" and that the provision therefore had a broader
meaning.384 That meaning, the court determined, encompassed the order
under review.385
B. Emergency Matters
In Bradley v. Hurricane Restaurant,3 6 an appeal was taken from an
order of a judge of compensation claims granting in part and denying in part
a claim for benefits found to involve an emergency.3 7 The appellees
moved to dismiss, asserting that the order was not a non-final order that can
377. Id. at 238.
378. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Breakers, 646 So. 2d at 237-38.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 237.
384. Id. at 238.
385. Id.
386. 652 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
387. Id. at 443.
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be appealed under Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.160,
and that the order was not appealable as a final order because a claim for
post-surgical attendant care alleged in the original claim remained pending
and undisposed of by the appealed order.388
The court pointed to the fact that section 440.25(4)(h), Florida Statutes,
as amended by the legislature in its 1993 special session, provides that a
judge of compensation claims may have an "emergency conference when
there is a 'bona fide emergency involving the health, safety, or welfare of
an employee,"' and that "[a]n emergency conference... may result in the
entry of an order or the rendering of an adjudication by the judge of
compensation claims. '389  Given the "direct and unambiguous langu-
age"3" of this statutory provision, and the fact that the judge of compensa-
tion claims found a bona fide emergency to exist, the court concluded that
the order under review was "a final order subject to appellate review in this
CoUrt.
39 1
C. Orders Taxing Costs
In Employer's Overload of Dade County v. Robinson,392 the court
dismissed an appeal from an order taxing costs, but reserved jurisdiction to
determine entitlement to attorney's fees. The court stated: "As long as any
other matter is pending before a judge of compensation claims, an order
taxing costs is not reviewable, unless appealed as part of an adjudication on
the merits."' 3 In dismissing the case, however, the court noted that it did
not "in any way depart from the rule that a judge of compensation claims
may, in an order adjudicating the merits of a claim for benefits, reserve
jurisdiction to award attorney's fees, without affecting the finality of the
order adjudicating the merits (which may include an award of costs). 394
388. Id.
389. Id. at 444 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4)(h) (Supp. 1994)).
390. Id.
391. Bradley, 652 So. 2d at 444.
392. 642 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
393. Id. at 73.
394. Id.
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XXII. CRIINAL APPELLATE PRACTICE
A. Custody during State Appeal of Order of Dismissal
In Fontana v. Rice,395 the supreme court dealt with a certified
question that asked whether a trial court is authorized, upon a showing of
good cause, to continue a defendant on bond pending a state appeal from an
order dismissing criminal charges, or whether such a defendant must be
released on recognizance. 396  The court held that defendants must be
discharged from custody when a trial court has dismissed all criminal
charges and no new indictment or information is filed against the defen-
dant.397 The court stated that this rule applies even if the State appeals the
dismissal unless some other charge justifies a continuation of custody.39 8
The court found the issue to be controlled by Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.190(e), which states in pertinent part:
If the motion to dismiss is sustained, the court may order that the
defendant be held in custody or admitted to bail for a reasonable
specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information.
If a new indictment or information is not filed within the time specified
in the order, or within such additional time as the court may allow for
good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged
therefrom, unless some other charge justifies a continuation in cus-
tody.39
B. Self-Representation on Appeal in Capital Cases
In Hill v. State,4" the public defender was appointed to represent the
defendant on the appeal of his conviction for first-degree murder and
sentence of death. 4 1  The defendant moved for leave to discharge the
public defender and to represent himself on appeal.4°2  Pursuant to
appointment by the supreme court, a circuit judge conducted a hearing on
the motion and determined that the defendant comprehended his constitu-
tional right to assistance of counsel in the appeal process and that he
395. 644 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1994).
396. Id. at 502.
397. Id. at 503.
398. Id.
399. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(e).
400. 656 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1995).
401. Id. at 1272.
402. Id.
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knowingly and voluntarily waived that right.4°3 The circuit judge recom-
mended that the defendant be allowed to represent himself, but that the
public defender continue in the case as "'next friend of the court."'
The supreme court noted that the right to self-representation at trial, as
recognized by Faretta v. California," is not applicable to appeals.'
The court pointed to the fact that the case was a capital appeal and indicated
that it was "concerned that it cannot properly carry out its statutory
responsibility to review Hill's conviction and sentence of death without the
skilled adversarial assistance of a lawyer acting on Hill's behalf, particularly
as it concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to convict and the proportion-
ality of the death sentence." 7 Accordingly, the court denied the appel-
lant's motion but stated that because the case was a capital case, it would
allow the appellant to file a pro se supplemental brief. 8
C. Death of Defendant during Pendency of Appeal
In Clements v. State,4" the defendant's criminal conviction was
affirmed.410 Prior to the expiration of the time for filing a motion for
rehearing, the defendant's counsel filed a motion for abatement of the appeal
ab initio on the ground that the defendant had died.4" A subsequently
filed death certificate indicated that the defendant was found dead on a date
subsequent to the affirmance and prior to the filing of the motion.42
The State responded to the motion, acknowledging the line of cases
entitling the defendant to the relief requested,413 but representing that the
supreme court, in a recent case presenting similar circumstances, Rodriguez
v. State,14 denied a motion to abate an appeal ab initio and instead
dismissed the appeal.4 1 5 The court in Clements did abate the appeal ab
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
406. Hill, 656 So. 2d at 1272.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. 652 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
410. Id. at 1295.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 648 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Bagley v. State, 122 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
414. 645 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1994).
415. Clements, 652 So. 2d at 1295.
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initio,416 but it went on to certify to the supreme court the following
question as one of great public importance:
DOES THE DEATH OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT AFTER JUDG-
MENT AND SENTENCE, BUT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
APPEAL THEREFROM, REQUIRE THE PROSECUTION TO BE
PERMANENTLY ABATED AB INITIO IN THE TRIAL AND
APPELLATE COURTS?417
The court also certified the same question in Thomas v. State,"8 a case in
which it appears that the defendant died prior to the court reaching a
determination of the case.
D. Absence of Defendant
In Jarrett v. State,419 the defendant failed to appear for a pretrial
conference and a capias for his arrest was issued.' Several days later,
with the defendant still missing, a jury was selected and sworn and the case
proceeded to trial in the absence of the defendant.42 After a conviction
on one of two charges, the defendant's counsel filed a motion for a new
trial.4 While the motion was pending, the defendant was appre-
hended.4u
After the motion was denied, an appeal followed and the First District
addressed the issue of whether it should decide the case. The court found
that unlike a situation in which an escape is from restraint after a conviction,
the defendant's absence "did not delay judgment, sentence, or time for
appeal."'4 The court thus concluded that the escape did not burden the
court system in a manner that would justify dismissal.425
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. 654 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
419. 654 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
420. Id. at 973.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 973-74.
423. Id. at 974.
424. Jarrett, 654 So. 2d at 974.
425. Id.
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E. Appeals from Rulings on Motions to Correct Illegal
Sentences
In Wright v. State,426 the Fourth District dismissed an appeal as
untimely, applying a well-settled line of precedent427 concluding that the
pendency of a motion for rehearing does not toll the time for appealing from
a trial court's ruling on a motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a) for correction of an illegal sentence.428
Judge Farmer wrote a specially concurring opinion. He noted that he
concurred because he was bound to do so by stare decisis, but stated that if
he "were writing on a clean slate in this court," he did not think he would
join in a dismissal of the case.429 Judge Farmer pointed out that rule
3.800(a) is unique in that it allows a court "to correct an illegal sentence at
any time," and that its purpose is to provide any convicted person who "is
suffering under a sentence that is illegal" to have a "ready, expeditious and
effective tool at hand to test the illegality. 4 30 He then stated, "I do not
understand why the circuit court's denial of rehearing should not be treated
as itself an order denying relief from an illegal sentence, which is fully
appealable to us if the notice of appeal is filed, as here, within 30 days of
the court's order., 431
Judge Farmer went on to indicate that he did not believe that the court
"should shrink from considering whether a sentence may be illegal merely
because the prisoner made two attempts to persuade the trial judge, one of
them by motion for rehearing. '432 "The alternative," he said, "is for the
prisoner to continue serving a putatively illegal sentence while being barred
from having appellate review of the trial court's decision to deny such
relief. 433 Judge Farmer concluded his thoughts by stating, '"This alterna-
tive is so directly antagonistic to the plain meaning and purpose of rule
3.800(a) that I cannot believe this is what the drafters truly intended. 434
426. 643 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
427. See Campbell v. State, 637 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. State,
635 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Newman v. State, 610 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
428. Wright, 643 So. 2d at 1157.
429. Id. at 1157 (Farmer, J., concurring specially).
430. Id. at 1158 (footnote omitted).
431. Wright, 643 So. 2d at 1158 (Farmer, J., concurring specially) (footnote omitted).
432. Id.
433. Id. at 1158-59.
434. Id. at 1159 (footnote omitted).
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F. Special Assistant Public Defenders
Several cases addressed the issue of whether special assistant appellate
public defenders would be required to provide their clients with the records
and transcripts from their cases at the conclusion of their appeals.
In Pearce v. Sheffey,435 the Second District reaffirmed the conclusion
it reached in Thompson v. Unterberger,436 that "an indigent defendant is
entitled to possession of a transcript which was provided at public expense
to his court-appointed counsel, without being required to pay for photocopy-
ing the transcript."'43
7
The Third District, in Coates v. McWilliams,4 3 however, refused to
require a special assistant public defender to furnish his client with copies
of requested documents. The court pointed to the fact that no funds were
provided to reimburse the attorney for the cost of duplicating and forwarding
the copies to the client439 and the fact the attorney was required by an
administrative order to maintain the original documents for a period of three
years from the closing of the case.' The court stated, "[b]y accepting an
appointment as special assistant public defender, counsel does not become
obligated to bear the cost of furnishing documents to an indigent defendant,
even though a duly constituted public defender's office, which is properly
funded for such cost items, may be so required.""'
The Third District did require a special assistant public defender to
furnish his client with documents and transcripts in Beaubrum v. Rolle. 2
There, despite the court's request, the attorney failed to respond to the
client's petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought production of the
items. 3 The court noted the failure to respond and stated that "it appears
that there is no impediment in granting the relief sought."'
435. 647 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
436. 577 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
437. Pearce, 647 So. 2d at 333.
438. 650 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
439. Id. at 695.
440. Id. at 696.
441. Id.
442. 654 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
443. Id. at 560.
444. Id.
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G. Attorney's Fees and Costs in Criminal Cases
1. Attorney's Fees
In Zelman v. Metropolitan Dade County,4 5 the Third District ad-
dressed the issue of what hourly fee should be paid to an attorney for his
successful court-appointed representation of a defendant in a capital
appeal." 6  The court had previously quashed an initial award upon a
holding, in part, that the hourly rate was not limited to the $40 per hour for
out-of-court services and $50 per hour for in-court services established by
a trial court administrative order. 7  After a hearing for the purpose of
establishing a reasonable hourly rate, the trial court fixed the rate at the
same level, $40 per hour for out-of-court services and $50 per hour for in-
court services. 448 The Third District also quashed this order, remanding
for a new hearing to set a reasonable rate using the factors contained in Rule
of Professional Conduct 4-1.5. 449 That hearing resulted in an identical
award.450
On review of that order, the Third District concluded that based upon
the record and the court's own expertise, it was apparent that the award was
"not close to a reasonable fee for the difficult and uncommonly burdensome
services Zelman performed so well.,,451 The court went on to say: "In
view of the prior unfortunate history of this case, in which we seem to have
been so unsuccessful in making ourselves understood, we decline to require
still another hearing on the issue in the court below. '452 Rather, the court
determined that the attorney would be awarded $100 per hour for out-of-
court services and $125 per hour for in-court services rendered.453
445. 645 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
446. The appeal had resulted in the reversal of the defendant's two first-degree murder
convictions and the vacation of his two death sentences. Garcia v. State, 564 So. 2d 124
(Fla. 1990).
447. Zelman v. Metropolitan Dade County, 586 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991), appeal after remand, 622 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), appeal after remand,
645 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
448. Zelman, 645 So. 2d at 57.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 57-58.
451. Id. at 58.
452. Id.
453. Zelman, 645 So. 2d at 58.
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2. Costs
In a series of cases, the Fourth District found that it was improper to
include, either as a provision in a judgment of conviction, or as a condition
of probation, the prospective imposition of appellate costs. 4 As noted by
the court in Anderson v. State,55 such costs "may be taxed in favor of the
prevailing party, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a),
which 'explicitly provides for taxation of costs by the lower tribunal on
motions heard within 30 days after issuance of the mandate-but not be-
fore."' 456
H. Transcripts in Criminal Cases
In Brown v. State,457 following the procedure set forth in Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(2), the appellant's attorney served a
photocopy of the certified trial transcript on the office of the Attorney
General.5 8 The Attorney General's office refused to accept the uncertified
photocopy, explaining in a letter that it would not accept any transcript
unless it was prepared and certified by an official court reporter because
doing so would place upon that office the burden of checking the photocopy
pages against a certified copy filed with the appellate court.4 9 The
Attorney General relied upon Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(d),
which states that in criminal cases the clerk of the lower court shall provide
the trial transcript and the record on appeal to the Attorney General.4 °
The Fifth District found that rule 9.200(b)(2), which set forth the
procedure utilized by the appellant's counsel, "is applicable to criminal
appeals only to the extent that it does not conflict with rule 9.140(d)," 461
the rule relied upon by the Attorney General. Therefore, the court found
that the procedure employed by the appellant's counsel could not be used
454. See McDonald v. State, 649 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Davis v.
State, 641 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Anderson v. State, 632 So. 2d 132 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
455. 632 So. 2d at 132.
456. Id. at 133 (quoting Boyer v. Boyer, 588 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991), review denied, 599 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1992)).
457. 639 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
458. Id. at 634-35.
459. Id. at 635.
460. Id. In pertinent part, the rule states, "The clerk shall retain the original of the
record and shall forthwith transmit copies thereof to the court, to the attorney general, and
to the office of a public defender appointed to represent an indigent defendant." FLA. R. APP.
P. 9.140(d).
461. Brown, 639 So. 2d at 635.
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in criminal cases and held "that appellants in criminal cases must file a
certified copy of the trial transcript with the clerk of the lower court for
transmittal to the office of the Attorney General."462
I. Belated Appeals in Criminal Cases
1. Procedure for Obtaining Belated Appeals
In Stephenson v. State,463 the supreme court declined an invitation to
change the procedure it established in State v. District Court of Appeal, First
District" for obtaining a belated appeal. In District Court of Appeal, the
court had concluded that a claim for a belated appeal based on ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to file a timely notice of appeal must
be raised in the trial court in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.465 In Stephenson, the court addressed the certi-
fied question of whether the district courts of appeal have the authority to
grant belated appeals when the record on appeal indisputably reflects that
trial counsel, through neglect, inadvertence or error, filed an untimely notice
of appeal and thus rendered ineffective assistance as a matter of law.4 s5
The question arose in a case in which the Second District dismissed an
appeal as untimely, but directed the trial court to grant a belated appeal if
one was sought by a legally sufficient motion.467 The court found it
"incongruous for us to dismiss Stephenson's direct appeal while at the same
time providing him with the remedy of a belated appeal, thereby delaying
a review of the merits of his case at the expense of judicial economy. 468
Nonetheless, the court recognized that it was not at liberty to cast aside the
process established by District Court of Appeal.469 The court indicated
that it would prefer to "dispense with the cumbersome procedure we have
fashioned, treat the notice of appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
and grant Stephenson belated review of the merits of his appeal."'47
462. Id.
463. 655 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1995).
464. 569 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1990).
465. Id. at 442.
466. 655 So. 2d at 86.
467. Stephenson v. State, 640 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd, 655
So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1995).
468. Id.
469. Id. at 119.
470. Id.
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After discussing the proceedings in the lower courts and its decision in
District Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida, in approving the
Second District's decision, concluded that the district courts of appeal do not
have the authority to grant belated appeals resulting from ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.4" The court did give some indication that it
might be willing to revisit this question at some point in the future. The
court stated that "[flor now,"4' it was adhering to the principle established
in District Court of Appeal, and noted that the issue was "currently under
review by this Court and the Committee on Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure.24
73
The decision in Stephenson does not appear to have any effect on that
portion of District Court of Appeal which indicates that claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel should be raised by petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed in the appellate court.474
2. Due Process and Right to Counsel
In Moment v. State,475 the Fourth District, in one opinion, both
granted a belated appeal and reversed the order belatedly reviewed. The
case involved a situation in which, at a hearing on the defendant's motion
for post-conviction relief, filed about a month after sentencing, the trial court
ordered the defendant to pay $12,800 in restitution.476 The appellate court
found several problems with the proceedings at the trial level. The
defendant was not given notice of the hearing. 4' The defendant was not
represented by counsel at the hearing."7 No evidence was presented as
to restitution, the trial court relying instead on the prosecutor's statement
that she had received a phone call from the victim telling her the amount of
damages. 479 Finally, the defendant was not informed of his right to
appeal.480
The defendant did not appeal from the restitution order. Instead, he
moved to vacate restitution and appealed from the order denying that
471. Stephenson, 655 So. 2d at 87.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 87 n.1.
474. 569 So. 2d at 442 n.1.
475. 645 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
476. Id. at 503.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Moment, 645 So. 2d at 503.
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motion.481 The State argued that all of the defects could have and should
have been raised in a direct appeal from the order of restitution.4 2 The
court found that "because this case is so fundamentally and thoroughly
flawed in its most basic constitutional guarantees of due process and right
to counsel, we consider this an exceptional case and treat this as a petition
for a belated appeal of the restitution order, which we grant.
4 83
3. Belated Institution of a Belated Appeal
In Lofton v. State,484 the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
post-conviction relief that sought a belated appeal, and appointed a public
defender to pursue the appeal.485 Inexplicably, the appeal was not institut-
ed until twenty months after the entry of the trial court's order.486
Noting that under Mack v. State,487 a belated appeal must be instituted by
the filing of a notice of appeal within thirty days of rendition of the order
allowing the proceeding, the Fifth District dismissed the appeal.488 The
court concluded that the defendant would have to return to the trial court
with another motion for post-conviction relief, showing, if he could, that the
last delay was due to a legally cognizable excuse, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel, for failing to pursue the belated appeal.4 89
4. Other Cases
In Love v. State,4 ° the First District concluded that a defendant was
not precluded from obtaining a belated appeal by the fact that he had pled
guilty. 491
In Nava v. State,49 the Fourth District found that in the absence of
specific prejudice, the doctrine of laches does not bar a claim of entitlement
to a belated appeal.493
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. 639 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
485. Id. at 1134.
486. Id.
487. 586 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
488. Lofton, 639 So. 2d at 1134.
489. Id.
490. 638 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
491. Id. at 1063.
492. 652 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
493 Id. at 1265.
Vol. 20
58
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Musto
In Keller v. State,494 the Fifth District granted a belated appeal to a
defendant who had already had an unsuccessful pro se appeal. The
defendant had requested counsel for his initial appeal and had been found
insolvent for purposes of appeal at that time.495 Despite that fact, no
appointment was made and the defendant consequently instituted his own
appeal and filed a brief, in which he again requested counsel. Categorizing
the defendant's efforts as "a futile attempt to muster an effective appeal,"
the court found that a belated appeal was appropriate.496
J. Review of Orders Waiving Juvenile Jurisdiction
In State v. Del Rey,497 the State appealed from, and sought certiorari
review of, a non-final order waiving juvenile jurisdiction over the respon-
dent and authorizing the State to prosecute the respondent as an adult.498
The challenged portion of the order: 1) reduced the three filed charges of
manslaughter by culpable negligence with a weapon to manslaughter by
culpable negligence, and 2) precluded the State from filing an information
charging the respondent as an adult with an offense other than the offenses
on which the court waived juvenile jurisdiction or any lesser included of-
fenses thereof.
499
The Third District dismissed the appeal, finding that "[t]here is no
Florida Supreme Court rule of procedure which authorizes the State to
appeal from a non-final order in a juvenile delinquency case, as here, and,
accordingly, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the State's ap-
peal.,,5°°
The court also dismissed the certiorari proceeding, finding that, under
the facts of the case, the State had failed to establish irreparable injury."'
The court noted that despite the existence of the challenged order, the State
had filed an information charging the respondent as an adult with three
counts of manslaughter by culpable negligence with a weapon and that the
respondent had moved to dismiss those counts.5 2 The court reasoned that,
if the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, the issue would become
494. 652 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
495. Id. at 1278.
496. Id.
497. 643 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
498. Id. at 1147.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 1148.
502. Del Rey, 643 So. 2d at 1148.
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moot, and that if the circuit court granted the motion, the State would have
the right to appeal from that order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A).503
K. Orders Reviewable in Criminal Cases
Numerous cases dealt with the question of whether certain orders were
reviewable and, if so, what type of proceeding was appropriate. These cases
included:
State v. Lewek.5 4 An order severing charges is neither appealable nor
an appropriate subject for certiorari." 5
State v. Riley.5° A sentence within the guidelines is not illegal even
if the trial court commits error by refusing to make habitual offender
findings on timely request by the State.5° Such a sentence therefore
cannot be appealed, 08 nor can the State obtain relief by mandamus or
certiorari." 9
Kolker v. State.5 10 "Certiorari is the appropriate means by which to
seek review of an order disqualifying a defendant's attorney. '51
State v. Fudge.512 The State may not appeal from a directed verdict
of acquittal as to a particular charge when the directed verdict is entered
after a jury deadlock on the charge." 3 Because of the deadlock, there is
no verdict, and section 924.07(1)(j) of the Florida Statutes, which allows the
State to appeal from a ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal
after a jury verdict, does not apply. 4
State v. Bradford.5  Certiorari is appropriate to review a trial court's
order excluding testimony as to the victim's state of mind before her murder
503. Id.
504. 656 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
505. Id. at 269.
506. 648 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
507. Id. at 826.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 826-27.
510. 649 So. 2d 250 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 658 So. 2d 991 (Fla.
1995).
511. Id. at 251 n.1.
512. 645 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
513. Id. at 24.
514. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 924.07(1)0) (1993).
515. 658 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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when the evidence is "crucial evidence" and thus, "there would be a
miscarriage of justice"5 6 if the 'evidence is not admissible.
XXIII. FAMILY LAW APPELLATE PRACTICE
A. Belated Appeals from Orders Terminating Parental Rights
In T.D. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,517 the First
District discussed the procedure to be used in obtaining belated appeals from
orders terminating parental rights."1 8 When the case first reached the
appellate court, it was dismissed because the notice of appeal was not timely
filed.5" 9 The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant's right to
file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court pursuant to the
procedure outlined by the supreme court in In the interest of E.H.120 In
E.H., the supreme court had concluded that when there is a claim that an
attorney's error precluded a parent from appealing an order terminating
parental rights, the parent, in a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial
court, may seek a belated appeal . 2'
Subsequent to the First District's dismissal in In the interest of T.D., a
petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the trial court. The petition,
however, was directed to the merits of the termination order containing a
brief explanation of the circumstances which occasioned the late filing of the
notice of appeal.5' The order denying the petition set forth no findings
relating to the question of whether a belated appeal was appropriate, but was
instead a reaffirmation of the merits of the order terminating parental
rights. 513
On appeal from that order, the First District pointed out that "the trial
court and respective counsel misconstrued the remedy authorized by the
supreme court in E.H."524 That remedy, the court stated, "is analogous to
that available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding to seek a belated
appeal predicated on ineffective assistance of counsel."5"
516. Id. at 574.
517. 639 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
518. Id. at 705.
519. In the interest of T.D., 623 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
520. Id. at 852-53. See In the interest of E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1992).
521. E.H., 609 So. 2d at 1290-91.
522. T.D., 639 So. 2d at 705.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id. n.1.
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Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the cause with directions
to the appellant to file a petition setting forth the grounds which demonstrate
the entitlement to a belated appeal. 26 The court further stated that the
"trial court's order should set forth such findings of fact as are necessary to
support the grant or denial of a belated appeal. 527
B. Premature Appeals
In State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Skin-
ner,528 the trial court entered three orders limiting the amount of retroac-
tive child support collectible in three proceedings in which the Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Services and the mothers sought a determination
of paternity and child support.529 The court determined that the orders
were non-final and not subject to review, and stated that in similar situa-
tions, it would normally dismiss the appeals.5 3' The court indicated,
however, that it had discovered that while the appeals were pending, final
orders had been entered in the cases and that the time for appealing from
those orders had expired.5 31 Noting that if it dismissed the appeals, the
department and the mothers would lose all chance for review, the court
treated the notices of appeal as premature appeals of the final orders,532
and considered the merits of the case.
C. Contempt for Failing to Pay Child Support
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 the appellant was found in contempt of
court for failing to meet his child support obligations. He then failed to
either pay the purge amount established by the court or to surrender himself
to serve the alternative sentence imposed by the court. 34 On appeal from
the contempt order, the Third District pointed out that when an "appellant
has disobeyed an order of the trial court, the appellate court may, in its
discretion, either entertain or dismiss an appeal.5 35 The court noted that
although an appellate court should ordinarily provide a grace period prior
526. Id.
527. T.D., 639 So. 2d at 705.
528. 649 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
529. Id. at 281.
530. Id. at 282.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. 640 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
534. Id. at 134.
535. Id. (quoting Gazil v. Gazil, 343 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 1977)).
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to dismissing the appeal within which the appellant may comply with the
violated order and prevent dismissal, such a grace period is not necessary
when the appellant has absconded from the court's jurisdiction.536 Since
the appellant in Rodriguez had failed to surrender himself, the court applied
this principle and dismissed the appeal.537
XXIV. SANCTIONS
A. Parties
In Lowery v. Kaplan,538 the Fourth District dealt with a pro se
petitioner who was proceeding in forma pauperis.539 The petitioner had
filed twenty-eight petitions for extraordinary relief and twenty-one final and
non-final appeals within the preceding three years.5'4 None had met with
success.54' Noting that it has the "inherent authority to prevent abuse of
the judicial system,"'542 the court dismissed the pending petition as a
sanction for abusive filings543 and ordered the prospective denial of in
forma pauperis status for the petitioner's future petitions unless they are
presented by a member of The Florida Bar who represents the peti-
tioner.54
The Fourth District imposed similar sanctions in Martin v. Marko.545
There, as in Lowery,546 the court acted on its inherent authority.547 It
noted, however, that the Supreme Court of the United States had adopted a
specific rule authorizing the denial of a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis when the Court is satisfied that a case is "frivolous or mali-
cious." 548 The court went on to suggest that "[a]lthough Florida does not
presently have a similar rule, it would be prudent for our supreme court to
consider adopting a similar provision. 549
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. 650 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
539. Id. at 114.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 115.
543. Lowery, 650 So. 2d at 116.
544. Id.
545. 651 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
546. 650 So. 2d at 114.
547. Martin, 651 So. 2d at 820.
548. Id. (quoting U.S. Sup. Cr. R. 39.8).
549. Id.
1995]
63
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
In Isley v. State,5 ° the Fifth District indicated its frustration with a
petitioner who had come before the court nine times since 1990, when the
court affirmed his conviction and sentence for second degree murder. Judge
Sharp's opinion begins with the following statement: "This case reminds
me of my grandmother's final warning and admonition to me and my
siblings as children, when we had exhausted her patience with our doings.
'Enough is enough,' she would say. And that was the end of it."
551
The opinion goes on to prohibit the petitioner from filing any further
pro se pleadings with the court concerning the conviction and sentence in
question, and concludes by echoing the words of Judge Sharp's grand-
mother: "Enough is enough. 552
In Scott v. State,53 a case described by the Fifth District as "another
successive and repetitive proceeding," the court stopped short of imposing
the sanction it imposed in Isley, but warned that the appellant was
"approaching an abuse of process and an exhaustion of this court's
patience. 554
Likewise, in Skinner v. State,555 a per curiam affirmance without
opinion, Judge Sharp wrote a specially concurring opinion to state her belief
that while the petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner lacked
substantive merit, the primary reason why it should be denied was that it
constituted "an abuse of process." 5 6 She noted that the petitioner's claims
could have been raised in a previous petition he had filed, and that the
petitioner had made no showing that the second set of claims were not
known or could not have been discovered when the first petition was
filed.557 Writing in the hope to "forestall such petitions Skinner may
contemplate filing in the future," she stated that the failure to make such a
showing made the second petition, "and any future ones similarly drafted,
an abuse of process. 558
550. 652 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
551. Id. at 410.
552. Id. at 441.
553. 656 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
554. Id. at 204.
555. 656 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
556. Id. at 282.
557. Id.
558. Id.
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B. Attorneys
In Keene v. Nudera,"9 a petition requesting certiorari review was
filed with the Second District, and neither a filing fee nor an order of
indigency accompanied the petition.5" The court gave the petitioner's
counsel an opportunity to prove his client's indigency status, but counsel
failed to either obtain an order from the trial court or to file a sufficient
motion and affidavit with the district court.5 The court noted that on at
least ten occasions in the preceding twenty-five months, the attorney had
filed appellate proceedings in the Second District without a fee or an order
of indigency.562 The court stated that it was apparent from the attorney's
presentation at the hearing on the order to show cause that the attorney was
not willfully disobeying the court's orders, but that he did not understand
the basic procedures for establishing indigency status in an appellate
proceeding.563 Accordingly, the court concluded that a fine would not be
the most productive solution to the problem.564 Instead, the court ordered
the attorney to obtain, within twelve months, a minimum of ten hours of
continuing legal education in appellate practice or procedure, in addition to
the continuing legal education required of attorneys by rule 6-10.3 of the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.5 65
In Beaubrum v. Rolle," the Third District directed an attorney, who
had acted as a special assistant public defender, to deliver to the petitioner
all documents and transcripts in his possession that related to the circuit
court and appellate proceedings in the case. 67 When he failed to do so,
the court appointed a commissioner to take testimony and to make findings
and recommendations as to whether the attorney should be disciplined by
way of determination that he was in contempt of court.56' The commis-
sioner concluded that the attorney had been negligent, but noted that some
mitigating factors existed. 69 He recommended that the attorney be found
in contempt of the Third District, that he be fined an amount to be
559. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1232 (2d Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1995).
560. Id. at D1232.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id. at D1232-33.
564. Keene, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D1233.
565. Id. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 6-10.3.
566. 654 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
567. Id. at 560.
568. In re Rolle, 654 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
569. Id. at 560.
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determined by the court and that he be required to pay a court reporter fee
of $113.570 Based upon this recommendation, the court ordered the
attorney to show cause why he should not be fined $500 and required to pay
the $113 court reporter fee.57' When the attorney failed to respond to the
order, the court found him in contempt and imposed the above-noted
sanctions.572
In State v. Davis,573 the court "reluctantly" granted a motion to
reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed because the appellant's counsel
did not timely file a brief or move for an extension of time.5 74 The court
accepted counsel's grounds for reinstatement, which were not set forth in the
opinion, but stated that it was writing the opinion "as a reminder that such
noncompliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure will not be tolerat-
ed. 575 The court "further caution[ed] that orderly and timely appellate
practice can also be assured by fines, costs, reprimand and contempt against
an attorney. 576
Similar language was used in Hastings v. State,577 when the Second
District quashed a circuit court order dismissing an appeal from a county
court judgment due to the untimely filing of the appellant's initial brief.578
In opposing the petition for writ of certiorari filed in the district court, the
circuit judge argued that tardiness in prosecuting appeals is a continuing
problem in his court and that denying him the right to dismiss the appeal
would be "emasculating the appellate rules and destroying the efficiency of
his court 'for there is no other sanction that the Circuit Court can impose
upon negligent appellate counsel that is as effective. ' '5 79
The district court, while expressing its appreciation for the exasperation
of the judge, disagreed, concluding that "fines, costs, reprimand, and
contempt against the attorney will insure an orderly and timely appellate
practice in circuit court."5
80
570. Id. at 560-61.
571. Id. at 561.
572. In re Beaubrum, 654 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
573. 19 Fla. L. Weekly D2399 (4th Dist Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1994).
574. Id. at D2399.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. 640 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
578. Id. at 116.
579. Id. at 117.
580. Id. (emphasis added).
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XXV. STAYS
Receding from its prior precedent, the Fourth District, in Florida
Eastern Development Co. v. Len-Hal Realty,5"' found that Title 11 of the
United States Code, section 362(a)(1), which provides for an automatic stay
of all legal proceedings "against" a debtor who has filed a suggestion of
bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, is applicable to
appellants in the district court in cases in which the original trial proceed-
ings were "against them."582
The court had previously held, in Marine Charter & Storage v.
Underwriters,5 3 that the provision did not apply to debtors who were
appellants because appeals are proceedings brought by, not against,
appellants.584 The court in Florida Eastern, however, was swayed by the
fact that all federal courts that have considered the issue have found that the
stay applies whenever the original proceedings were against the debtor,
regardless of whether the debtor was an appellant or appellee on appeal.58
The court therefore receded from Marine Charter,86 and acknowledged
the applicability of the stay to appellants when the trial level proceedings
were against them.587
XXVI. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
A. Attorney's Fees
1. Timeliness of Award of Appellate Attorney's Fees
In Judges of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. Janovitz,88 the supreme
court held that "when a motion for appellate attorney's fees has been timely
filed, the court may enter an award of attorney's fees within a reasonable
time after the issuance of the mandate." '89 The court further noted that
there is no requirement that the award be made in the same term of court so
long as it is entered within a reasonable time." ° The court thus upheld an
581. 636 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc).
582. Id. at 757. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994).
583. 568 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
584. Id. at 946.
585. 636 So. 2d at 757.
586. Id. at 758.
587. Id. at 757.
588. 635 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1994).
589. Id. at 20.
590. Id.
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award of appellate attorney's fees that was entered by a circuit court acting
in its appellate capacity fifty-four days after it had issued its mandate.591
The court disapproved of the Third District's decision in Dyer v. City of Mi-
ami Employee's Retirement Board,592 which had concluded that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order on attorney's fees after its
mandate had issued.593
2. Application of a Multiplier to Appellate Attorney's Fees
In Stack v. Lewis, 59 4 the trial court applied a multiplier in awarding
attorney's fees due to "'the substantial uncertainty of prevailing, the
substantial uncertainty of collecting and because the result obtained was the
maximum possible result."'5 95 On review, the appellant argued that the
multiplier should not apply to the fees earned from the appeal.596 The
appellant reasoned that the appeal process began a new case and that the
appellee's likelihood of success on appeal was high since he won in the trial
court. 597 The First District disagreed, noting that the moment for deter-
mining the likelihood of success is "'at the outset' or "'at the time the case
was initiated,' ' 598 and that the appellee employed the same attorneys from
the beginning of the litigation through appeal.599 In light of these factors,
and the fact that both the trial and appellate work were governed by a
contingency arrangement, the court concluded that there was "no reason to
treat the appellate hours differently from the trial hours."
60°
3. Appellate Attorney's Fees Pursuant to Section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes
In Mark C. Arnold Construction Co. v. National Lumber Brokers,
Inc.,6"' the trial court awarded fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79(1)
of the Florida Statutes, because the judgment was "'at least 25 percent
591. Id.
592. 512 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
593. Janovitz, 635 So. 2d at 20.
594. 641 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
595. Id. at 970.
596. Id.
597. Id.
598. Id. (citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1151
(Fla. 1985)).
599. Stack, 641 So. 2d at 970.
600. Id.
601. 642 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Vol. 20
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Musto
greater than"' the pretrial demand for judgment.' After affirming the
judgment per curiam without opinion,"°3 the First District aligned itself
with the Fourth' and Fifth' 5 Districts in granting, on the same grounds
as the trial court, the appellee's motion for an award of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees incurred in successfully defending the judgment on ap-
peal.6°6
4. Appellate Attorney's Fees in Eminent Domain Matters
In Department of Transportation v. Gefen,' 7 the supreme court held
that a landowner claiming inverse condemnation is only entitled to appellate
attorney's fees if the claim is ultimately successfl. 608  Thus, the court
found that a landowner who prevailed in the district court was not entitled
to attorney's fees when the supreme court quashed the district court
decision.09
5. Review of Orders Determining the Right to Attorney's Fees
but Not Setting the Amount
Each of the district courts of appeal have recently ruled that orders
determining the right to attorney's fees, which do not set the amount of such
fees, are not appealable.
610
B. Costs
In Lee County v. Eaton,61 the trial court entered an order requiring
Lee County, a nonparty to a civil action between two individuals, to pay the
cost of a transcript used on appeal by a successful appellant. 612 The trial
602. Id. at 576.
603. Id.
604. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1043 n.10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
605. Williams v. Brochu, 578 So. 2d 491, 495 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1991).
606. Mark C. Arnold Construction, 642 So. 2d at 576.
607. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994).
608. Id. at 1347.
609. Id.
610. See Wometco Enters. v. Cordoves, 650 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Trans Atlantic Distribs., L.P. v. Whiland & Co., S.A., 646 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994); Mcllveen v. Mcllveen, 644 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gonzalez Eng'g,
Inc. v. Miami Pump & Supply Co., Inc., 641 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
611. 642 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
612. Id. at 1126.
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court concluded that because the appellant was indigent, she was entitled to
certain court services without charge under section 57.081 (1) of the Florida
Statutes (1993).613
The Second District reversed the order, stating: "Although an indigent
person is entitled to receive some services of the court system without
charge, this statutory right has never been interpreted to require a county to
pay for a transcript in a typical civil action filed by an indigent person in
that county's circuit court.' 614 The court also stated that although section
57.081(1) specifies that an indigent person is entitled to free services from
"'the courts, sheriffs, and clerks, ' 615 no reference is made in the statute
"'to county-subsidized services from the official court reporter, nor is there
any reference to free transcripts in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.430. ' ' ,616 Further, the court continued: "There is no constitutional right
to a free transcript in such an appeal. 617
XXVII. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
In the upcoming year, the Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee,
pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.130, will submit its
four-year cycle report to the supreme court, recommending changes to the
appellate rules. The court will likely ask for comments on the committee's
report in the spring of 1996 and adopt such changes as it deems appropriate
that fall. Also in the upcoming year, the First District is expected to set up
an appellate mediation program. Such programs have the potential to have
significant impact on the appellate process. Of course, the courts this
coming year will provide answers to many of the questions raised by the
cases discussed in this article. The answers, as they usually do, will likely
generate new questions. Those questions, and others, will continue to
produce the large number of court decisions that shape the field of appellate
practice.
613. Id.
614. Id. at 1126-27.
615. Id. at 1127.
616. Eaton, 642 So. 2d at 1127.
617. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses Supreme Court of Florida decisions in the area
of substantive criminal law handed down between July 1, 1994 and July 1,
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1995.1 As with past survey articles on criminal law, this one does not
discuss issues regarding the death penalty as that topic is so specialized that
it deserves special treatment on its own. Likewise, the application of
Florida's sentencing guidelines is also a special topic excluded from this
article's discussion. Cases from Florida's district courts of appeal are
mentioned in the footnotes to the extent that their inclusion supplements the
textual discussion. Similarly, new legislation is mentioned when it relates
to the continuing importance of a discussed case.
Even after cases mainly involving the death penalty and the sentencing
guidelines are eliminated, the survey still does not discuss every Supreme
Court of Florida case. Those cases which merely discuss the application of
standard, or fairly standard, fact situations to a well-settled rule of law have
also been eliminated. This article is divided into two main parts. The first
part discusses Supreme Court of Florida cases concerning major questions
of substantive criminal law that do not involve constitutional questions. The
second part discusses supreme court cases concerning constitutional
challenges to some of Florida's substantive criminal law statutes.
II. NONCONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. Felony Petit Theft
Florida Statutes section 812.014 defines the crime of theft.2
1. The author has chosen for his cut-off point decisions reported up to, and including
655 So. 2d. Thus, some Supreme Court of Florida cases decided before July 1, 1995 are not
included in this article.
2. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1) (Supp. 1994) defines theft as:
knowingly obtain[ing] or us[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obtain or to use, the
property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom.
(b) Appropriate the property to [the accused's] own use or to the use of any
person entitled thereto.
Id.
This subsection's language makes it clear that section 812.014 is intended to be an
omnibus theft statute. Thus, the definition of theft not only includes the former common law
offense of larceny but also includes such former offenses as embezzlement. See, e.g., State
v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523, 524 (Fla. 1986) (finding that a bookkeeper who stole her
employer's business assets would now be guilty of theft under section 812.014(1)). The
definition also includes what would otherwise be considered attempted thefts as well as
completed thefts. State v. Sykes, 434 So. 2d 325, 327 (Fla. 1983). Thus, there is no crime
of attempted theft in Florida. Id.
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Section 812.014 also establishes various degrees of this offense A
convicted defendant can be guilty of as low an offense as a second-degree
misdemeanor and as high an offense as a first-degree felony for grand theft.
The offense degree depends on the value of the property stolen or on the
presence of special aggravating factors.
Theft of property worth less than $300 is a second-degree misdemean-
or unless special factors exist to raise the offense's degree.4 Generally,
proof of the value of a stolen item, or items, is essential to establishing more
than a second-degree misdemeanor petit theft,' unless a special aggravating
factor exists.
There are two types of special aggravating factors: repeated thefts by
the same person and the type of property stolen. While theft of property
worth less than $300 is usually a second-degree misdemeanor, the crime
becomes a first-degree misdemeanor if the offender has committed one
previous theft, and becomes a third-degree felony if the offender has
committed two or more previous thefts.'
Questions have arisen as to whether the circumstances making a theft
more than a second-degree misdemeanor must be specifically alleged in the
charging document. While the general answer to this was "yes," doubt still
remained as to whether the state's failure to allege the prior theft convictions
relied upon to aggravate a petit theft to a felony made raising the offense
level impossible. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
3. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(a)-(d). These subsections do not establish separate theft
definitions but merely set the degree of the theft offense involved. For further discussion on
the degrees of theft offenses, see Johnson v. State, 597 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1992).
4. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(d).
5. E.g., M.H. v. State, 614 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
proof that stolen property worth $100 was insufficient to make the crime a grand theft
because § 812.014(1)(c)I made $300 the statutory dividing point between grand and petit
theft); S.M.M. v. State, 569 So. 2d 1339, 1341 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding proof
of value essential to degree of theft offense); F.W. v. State, 459 So. 2d 1129, 1129 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding the State's failure to prove value required reducing a grand
theft conviction to a petit theft conviction).
6. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(d). Until 1992, the previous conviction which would
increase the degree of an otherwise second-degree misdemeanor petit theft was statutorily
limited to previous petit thefts. Thus, in State v. Jackson, 526 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 1988), the
court found that two prior grand theft convictions could not be used to reclassify Jackson's
petit theft. However, in 1992 the language of § 812.014(2)(d) was changed from "conviction
for petit theft" to "conviction of any theft," thus indicating the legislature's intent to overrule
Jackson. Ch. 92-79, §, 1992 FLA. LAWS 741, 742 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(d)
(1993).
1995]
73
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
Phillips7 held that a charge entitled "Felony Petit Theft" citing to the statute
which defines the substantive crime and reciting facts which would support
a conviction under the statute was not fundamentally defective for failing to
allege the prior theft convictions which made the offense a felony when the
defense had not moved to dismiss or object to the charge. 8 However, six
years later in State v. Rodriguez,9 while discussing the offense of felony
DUI, the supreme court considered "whether a charging document must
specifically allege ... [the needed] prior convictions ... when charging a
defendant with felony DUI to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court and to
comply with due process of law."' Since the State conceded that prior
DUI convictions were essential elements of felony DUI, the court found that
"it necessarily follows that the requisite notice... [of them] must be given
in the charging document."" The Rodriguez court noted that the sole issue
in Phillips was whether the charging document was so defective that it
deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction over the case, not whether the
charge was so defective that it could not support a conviction." The court
in Rodriguez agreed that a charging document, titled "Felony Petit Theft"
and merely citing the appropriate subsection of section 812.014, was
sufficient to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction. 3  Thus, when the
defense did not object to the court's jurisdiction beforehand, there was no
defect in proceeding to trial. However, the court found that when the
defense was not notified of any alleged prior convictions, the prior
convictions could not be used afterwards to make the petit theft a felony.'
4
7. 463 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1985).
8. Id. at 1137-38. Phillips arose in connection with a post-conviction objection to the
circuit court's jurisdiction over the charge. Id. at 1137. Although the state did not allege
the two prior theft convictions in the charge itself, the state gave written notice at the
defendant's arraignment of its intention to enhance his offense to a felony based upon the
two prior petit theft convictions. Id. While it was not specifically mentioned in the court's
holding, this written notice appears to be a significant factor distinguishing the result in
Phillips from later decisions.
9. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991).
10. Id. at 1263.
11. Id. at 1265.
12. Id. at 1264.
13. Id.
14. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1266-67. Unlike Phillips, the state in Rodriguez did not
give pre-trial notice to the defense concerning any details of the accused's alleged prior
convictions. Id.
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Despite Rodriguez, there was still conflict among the district courts of
appeal' 5 over whether prior theft convictions must be alleged in the
charging document itself to charge an accused with felony petit theft.
During this past year, the Supreme Court of Florida appears to have
conclusively resolved this issue with its decision in Young v. State. 6
There after his conviction for petit theft, the state moved successfully to
enhance Young's offense to a felony. 7 The effect of this was to change
Young's prison sentence from five to ten years. 8 The Second District
Court of Appeal affirmed, 9 but the Supreme Court of Florida reversed.2"
The court noted that felony petit theft had long been considered a substan-
tive offense in Florida.z1 Thus, the court found that to be consistent with
Rodriguez, "precedent ... require[d] that the elements of the felony petit
larceny statute be alleged in the charging document."'2 In the short term,
Young will no doubt lead to reversals in those cases where the state made
no attempt at all to initially charge the elements of felony petit theft.23
Even in the long run, Young, unfortunately, may not have provided as many
answers as one would expect and desire. First, the court did not explicitly
require that the state specifically allege the date and place of an accused's
prior theft convictions. However, the opinion implies this is necessary. 4
Second, the court did not address whether Young also applies to those cases
15. Compare State v. Crocker, 519 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (not
requiring such allegations of prior convictions) with Clay v. State, 595 So. 2d 1052, 1053
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding such allegations required based on Rodriguez).
16. 641 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1994).
17. Id. at 402.
18. Id. Young received the ten-year sentence as a habitual offender. Id.
19. Young v. State, 630 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted,
634 So. 2d 629 (Fla.), and quashed by 641 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1994).
20. Young, 641 So. 2d at 403.
21. Id. at 402. E.g., State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1978).
22. Young, 641 So. 2d at 403.
23. E.g., Gallon v. State, 648 So. 2d 309, 309 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing
a felony petit theft conviction where the elements of this offense were not specifically
charged).
24. The Young decision requires the state to "include language to the effect that..
[should] the defendant [be convicted] ... of petit theft, the defendant is also charged with
felony petit theft under section 812.014(2)(d) by reason of the previous convictions of two
or more thefts as thereafter described." 641 So. 2d at 403 n.4. (emphasis added).
This language appears to demand three things in a charging document alleging felony
petit theft: 1) notice of the state's intent to increase any petit theft conviction; 2) an express
citation to the subsection allowing such increase; and 3) descriptions of the prior convictions
that will be relied upon to increase the offense.
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where the state wishes to increase a petit theft conviction from a second-
degree misdemeanor, to a first-degree misdemeanor due to the accused
already having one theft conviction. Finally, the requirement in Young will
be easy to satisfy where only petit theft offenses are being charged but what
about those cases where grand theft or some other offense is involved?
When the state wishes to retain the possibility of convicting a defendant of
felony petit theft if the accused is found guilty of petit theft as a lesser
included offense, must it charge in the alternative to satisfy Young?
25
Young does provide the answer to one situation which has concerned
the courts. The state will not have to prove the existence of the prior
convictions during a trial itself. Young recognized that allowing such a
procedure would present a high likelihood of unfairly prejudicing an
accused. Instead, even in a jury trial, the state must prove the existence of
the accused's previous theft convictions in a separate post-trial hearing
before the trial court.2 6 Indeed, in a jury trial all possible steps must be
taken to keep the previous theft convictions from the jury, so that the
accused's presumption of innocence is preserved. 7
25. Two cases illustrate that this scenario is possible and the barrier Young may raise
to securing felony petit theft convictions. In Crocker, 519 So. 2d at 33, the accused was
charged with resisting an officer with violence and grand theft. Crocker was convicted of
the resisting charge and of petit theft. The district court of appeal held the petit theft
conviction could be reclassified to felony petit theft despite the State's failure to allege the
prior theft convictions. Id. at 33-34. The court reasoned that otherwise "the state would
have to charge ... felony petit theft, in the alternative, in every case that a jury could find
the defendant guilty of petit theft as a lesser included offense of the crime actually charged."
Id. at 33.
However, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected Crocker in Young. 641 So. 2d at 403.
Even when theft charges are not initially involved, Young may cause later problems. Theft
is considered a lesser included offense of robbery. Thus, when robbery is charged, the state
sometimes does not separately allege a theft. However, if an accused is acquitted of robbery
and merely found guilty of petit theft, no enhancement would be possible unless the state
alternatively alleged first-degree misdemeanor or felony petit theft.
26. The court noted with approval that such a process was mandated in Rodriguez,
which itself cited with approval the court's earlier decision in Harris, on this point.
Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1264-65. Both Harris and Rodriguez were once again approved
in Young. 641 So. 2d at 402-03.
27. Thus, if a charging document is allowed into the jury room, all mention of a
felony petit theft charge and of the prior convictions must be excised from it. Young, 641
So. 2d at 403 n.4.
Although Young does not explicitly say so, its decision suggests that where prior theft
convictions are the sole basis for increasing a theft charge, neither the court nor the
prosecutor should refer to the charge as "felony petit theft" in the jury's presence.
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B. Robbery
Robbery at common law was a combination of two other common law
offenses: larceny and assault. The distinguishing feature between a larceny
and a robbery was force. Larceny was a theft accomplished without force,
while robbery was a theft accomplished by force or the threat of force. The
Florida statutory codifications of these two offenses have retained this
common law distinction.28 Under present Florida law, a mere wrongful
taking cannot be a robbery. The present definition of robbery contains two
act requirements: 1) there must be a taking of another's property from that
person's custody, and 2) during this taking there must be "the use of force,
violence, assault, or putting in fear."29 Prior to 1987, a series of Florida
cases reversed robbery convictions based upon the conclusion that while the
defendant used force, this force was not used to gain possession of the
property involved so only a theft had occurred. Florida courts consistent-
ly found that use of force in an escape, or an attempt to escape after a
wrongful taking, did not make the taking a robbery.3 In so doing, the
courts rejected the argument that former Florida Statutes section 812.13(3),
now section 812.13(3)(a), broadened the definition of robbery in section
812.13(1).32 The 1987 Florida Legislature remedied this situation by
28. Since the Florida statutory definition only requires that an assault, and not an
actual battery accompany the taking, a defendant can be convicted of both robbery and
battery for the same incident in Florida without creating double jeopardy problems. FLA.
STAT. § 812.13(1). For a recent case holding that such multiple convictions are possible, see
Hamrick v. State, 648 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
29. FLA. STAT. § 812.13(1).
30. E.g., Royal v. State, 490 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1986). The Royal court found that
defendants, who pushed aside a store detective and then pointed a gun at another employee
during their escape, could not be convicted of robbery since they had already obtained
wrongful possession of the goods involved before these acts occurred. Id. at 45-46. The
court held that the statutorily required "'force, violence, assault, or putting in fear' must
occur prior to or contemporaneous with the taking of property." Id. at 45. -
31. E.g., Milam v. State, 505 So. 2d 34, 34 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that force used in an attempted escape from a store after goods have been taken came too
late to make the crime a robbery). See also Walker v. State, 493 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the act of violence outside of the store following actual
theft did not support a robbery charge).
32. Royal, 490 So. 2d at 46 (citing FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(a) (1983)). Florida
Statutes section 812.13(3)(a) states that "[a]n act shall be deemed 'in the course of
committing the robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the
attempt or commission." FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3) (1983). Rather than broadening the
definition of robbery in section 812.13(1), the Supreme Court of Florida found that section
812.13(3) was only intended to broaden the scope of robbery for purposes of deciding the
degree involved under section 812.13(2). Royal, 490 So. 2d at 46.
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passing section 812.13(3)(b) which broadened the traditional scope of a
common law taking to include an act occurring after the taking "if it and the
act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events. 33  Under
such language, force used immediately after a wrongful taking occurs
appears to be sufficient to convert the theft into a robbery.34
Jones v. State35 recently settled any question about the sufficiency of
this language to produce such a result. There, among other issues raised
about his convictions and sentences, the defendant claimed that the force
involved was not sufficient to sustain his two convictions for armed robbery.
The jury had found Jones guilty of the first-degree murders and armed
robberies of his former employer and the employer's wife. Both victims
were found stabbed to death in their place of business, where Jones was
found suffering from a bullet wound. Besides Jones there was no eye-
witness to the homicides. From the evidence it appeared that one victim
had been stabbed from behind and that the second victim had been stabbed
in the chest. Jones claimed that he should have been acquitted of the two
armed robbery charges since the victims never perceived the use of force or
violence in connection with the taking of their property. Jones further
contended that the evidence was only sufficient to establish a "posthumous
theft" rather than a robbery as both victims could have been dead at the time
he actually took their property. In an important decision, the Supreme Court
of Florida rejected both arguments and affirmed Jones' armed robbery
convictions.36
The court first focused on the language in section 812.13(3)(b),
defining what constitutes "in the course of the taking" for purposes of a
33. FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b) (1987).
34. E.g., Santilli v. State, 570 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that a defendant who shoplifted from a store and then tried to hit the store's security guard
with his car when confronted about the theft used force "in the course of taking" and thus
committed robbery). Santilli rejected the argument that as long as the accused does not
abandon the stolen property, there will always be a sufficient nexus between the wrongful
taking and later force to convert the theft into a robbery. Id. at 401-02. Instead, the court
suggested that an examination be made of the time and space between the theft and the use
of force. Id.
If a defendant abandons the stolen property and only then tries to use some force or
threat to escape, some courts have held that there is not "a continuous series of acts or
events" between the taking and the force or threat to constitute a robbery. E.g., Garcia v.
State, 614 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Simmons v. State, 551 So. 2d 607 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Baker, 540 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
35. 652 So. 2d 346 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 202 (1995).
36. Id. at 353.
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robbery. According to the court, this language meant that a "taking of
property that otherwise would be considered a theft constitutes robbery,
37
when the necessary element of force is present. This force or violence
element under the added statutory language could occur before, contempo-
raneously with, or even after the taking of the property, "so long as both the
act of violence or intimidation and the taking constitute a continuous series
of acts or events. 38
The court also rejected the argument that a victim has to know that
force or violence is being used upon the victim's person in order for there
to be a robbery.39 Looking at the statute's plain language, the court found
that the basic definition in section 812.13(1) only requires the use of force
during the taking and does not require that the victim be aware of the use
of force.40  As the court stated, "where the defendant employs force or
violence that renders the victim unaware of the taking, the force or violence
component of the robbery statute is satisfied."'" Thus, even if the two
victims here were unaware that Jones was attacking them to take their
property, the force element needed for robbery was met. The court found
that the murders and the taking of the property were clearly part of one
continuous series of events and thus the accused had been properly
convicted of robbery.42
C. Sexual Offenses Involving Children
The Supreme Court of Florida handed down four important decisions
concerning sexual offenses involving children in the past year. Two of
these decisions concerned constitutional challenges to sections of the Florida
Statutes, while the two other decisions involved issues of statutory
37. Id. at 349.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Jones, 652 So. 2d at 349.
41. Id at 350.
42. Id. Jones also argued that he had been improperly convicted of one of the
robberies because there was no evidence the property involved in that crime had been "'taken
from ... [the victim's] person or from ... [the victim's] immediate custody or control."'
Id. The court rejected the argument that the property taken must be on the victim's person
or in the victim's presence. Id. If the property was "sufficiently under the victim's control
so that the victim could have prevented the taking if... not ... subjected to violence or
intimidation by the robber," then the requirement in § 812.13(1) that the property be taken
"'from the person or custody of another"' is met. Jones, 652 So. 2d at 350.
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construction. The latter two decisions are discussed below, while the others
are discussed later in this survey.43
The two decisions that did not involve constitutional challenges both
involved questions concerning former Florida Statutes section 794.041,
which relates to "[s]exual activity with child by or at solicitation of person
in familial or custodial authority; penalties. 4 Both decisions were handed
down on the same date. One decision, Thompson v. State,4 5 addressed the
issue of whether a defendant could be convicted of both sexual activity
while in custodial authority of a child and of sexual battery on a physically
incapacitated victim46 based on evidence of a single sexual act. Thompson
had been convicted of both offenses and sentenced to two concurrent nine-
year terms based on a single sexual act. The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed these convictions but noted possible conflict with other district
courts of appeal's decisions. 47 In a short opinion, the Supreme Court of
Florida reversed a finding that the prohibition against multiple punishments
had been violated.48 In earlier decisions, the court had found "multiple
punishments impermissible [when] based on a single act if the various
offenses are distinguished only by degree elements. '49  The court found,
43. See discussion infra part III.B. for the two cases involving the constitutional
challenges.
44. The Florida Legislature repealed this section in 1993. Ch. 93-156, § 4, 1993 Fla.
Laws 907, 911. However, the provisions of this former section were replaced by present
section 794.011(8)(a)-(b). FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994).
45. 650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994).
46. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (4)(0. Unlike § 794.041, this section has not been amended
or repealed.
47. Thompson v. State, 627 So. 2d 74, 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), quashed by
650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994). The court noted possible conflict with the decision in George
v. State, 488 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding only one sexual battery
conviction was proper once the evidence established only one unlawful penetration).
Thompson, 627 So. 2d at 74.
48. Thompson, 650 So. 2d at 969.
49. Id. The supreme court relied on its decisions in Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153
(Fla. 1994) and Goodwin v. State, 634 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1994), for its decision in Thompson.
Id. In Sirmons, the court held that an accused could not be convicted of both grand theft
auto and robbery with a weapon based on a single taking of an automobile at knifepoint.
634 So. 2d at 154. The court found that only one base offense, theft, was factually involved
and that both charges were merely varying degrees of this base offense. Id. In Goodwin,
the court relied on Sirmons to find that convictions for both vehicular manslaughter and for
unlawful blood alcohol level ("UBAL") manslaughter, stemming from one death, was not
permissible. 634 So. 2d at 157.
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without discussion, that such was clearly the case here.' Thus, two
convictions and punishments, even when they were to run concurrently,
were not permissible.5
The second case provided a much more intensive and important
discussion of Florida Statutes section 794.041. In Hallberg v. State,"2 the
Supreme Court of Florida decided what it means for a person to be "in a
position of ... custodial authority."53 Hallberg had been convicted of five
counts of lewd acts upon a child and three counts of engaging a child in
sexual activities by a person in a position of familial or custodial authority.
For each of the lewd acts he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and
for each of the sexual activities by a custodial authority, he received twenty-
seven years imprisonment. All sentences were to run concurrently.
Hallberg appealed his convictions of sexual activity by a person in a
position of familial or custodial authority contending that he did not stand
in such a relationship to the victim here. Hallberg was clearly not a parent
or other relative of the victim, thus the State conceded that he could not be
in a position of "familial" authority. The question remained whether he
could be in a position of "custodial" authority at the time of the sexual
activity involved.
Hallberg was employed as a junior high school teacher, and his victim
was enrolled in one of his honors classes during her eighth grade year.
Following the eighth grade year, the victim planned to take another honors
class with Hallberg the next year. During the summer recess, Hallberg went
to the victim's home where he committed the sexual acts involved. This
particular visit to the victim's home occurred at a time when Hallberg had
no teaching or other supervisory responsibility over the student-victim. As
the court noted in its opinion, "[iut is undisputed that these events did not
occur during the school year and that they did not occur in connection with
Hallberg's assigned teaching responsibilities or a recognized extracurricular
event. 54  The State still raised three arguments to support Hallberg's
50. Although the opinion does not state such, the supreme court must have found that
both convictions were merely aggravated forms of one base offense, sexual battery.
51. Both Sirmons and Goodwin had cited FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(2) in
concluding that the dual convictions were impermissible in those cases. Sirmons, 634 So. 2d
at 153-54; Goodwin, 634 So. 2d at 157. In Thompson, the court did not cite the present
version of § 775.021, but instead cited directly to article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitu-
tion. 650 So. 2d at 969.
52. 649 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1994).
53. Id. at 1355 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.041(2) (1987)). Similar language is now
found in FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8).
54. Id. at 1356.
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convictions. First, the State argued that as a teacher, Hallberg always stood
in a position of in loco parentis over his students and thus was legally
responsible for their welfare. Secondly, the State contended that the
victim's parents consented to Hallberg's visit and thus vested him during
that time with custodial authority over her. Finally, the state argued that the
close relationship between Hallberg and the victim placed him in a custodial
status over her. The court rejected these arguments and found that "teachers
are not, by reason of their chosen profession, custodians of their students at
all times, particularly when school is recessed for the summer., 55 Instead,
the court agreed with the analysis set forth in Judge Altenbernd's dissent to
the Second District Court of Appeal's affirmance of Hallberg's convictions.
Judge Altenbemd, after first noting the events did not occur during the
school year or on school property, nor in connection with any sort of school
extracurricular activity, noted that the victim's parents, while aware that the
defendant wanted the victim to help him prepare for an upcoming class over
the summer, did not consent to his visits to their home, nor did they have
knowledge of such. Judge Altenbernd turned to the dictionary definition of
custodian. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary, the
definition of "custodian" was "someone who has custody of another,,
56
custody implies a duty or obligation to care for the other person. As there
was no school activity going on and the victim's parents had not placed the
defendant in a custodial authority over her, Judge Altenbemd believed this
was not satisfied. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with this reasoning
finding that "the term 'custodial,' absent a statutory definition, must be
construed in accordance with the commonly understood definition as one
having custody and control of another."57 The court found that if the
state's broad definition of custody were agreed to, it would be possible that
an accused might not even know that he had custody over a child when
engaging the child in sexual activity.58 Based upon the rule of leniency
that a criminal statute should be construed most favorably to the accused,
55. Id. at 1357.
56. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 559 (1986) (quoted in
Hallberg v. State, 621 So. 2d 693, 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Altenbernd, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Hallberg, 649 So. 2d at 1357).
57. Hallberg, 649 So. 2d at 1358.
58. Id.
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the court found that such a broad construction should be rejected and a
narrower one as urged by Judge Altenbernd accepted.59
Justice Shaw, in an extensive dissent, argued that the court's definition
ignored the plain language of section 794.041.' Justice Shaw focused on
the language in section 794.041(2) stating, any person "who stands in a
position of [familial or] custodial authority.' In his view, a teacher
stands in the position of custodial authority over a student at all times, even
during the summer.6' Thus, in Justice Shaw's view, one need not have
actual custodial authority over a child victim as long as one stands in such
a potential position. Since teachers hold the power position over their
students, he believed that this was enough to violate section 794.01 and
would have affirmed Hallberg's conviction.63 Indeed, in this particular
case, Justice Shaw found that a direct connection between the accused's
position as a teacher and the victim's position as a student led to the victim
giving in to the teacher's sexual demands, thus, in his view, violating
section 791.041. 64
The Florida Legislature repealed Florida Statutes section 794.041, the
main section discussed in both these cases, in 1993.65 However, in so
doing, the legislature added a new subsection, section 794.011(8), to section
794.011, which discusses sexual battery.66 Sexual battery by a person in
a position of familial or custodial authority has thus even more clearly been
made a degree of the basic offense of sexual battery. This would seem to
show legislative agreement with the decision in Thompson and demonstrate
that decision's continued applicability. The supreme court's decision in
Hallberg will be of even more importance. Various subsections of Florida
Statutes section 794.011(8) make it a third, first, or life felony, for a "person
who is in a position of familial or custodial authority to a person less than
18 years of age"67 to solicit or actually commit a sexual battery on a
minor. Like former section 794.041, section 794.011(8) does not define "in
59. Thus, Hallberg's three convictions for sexual activity with a child by a person in
custodial authority were reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings. Id. The
obvious practical result for Hallberg will be a resentencing where he will most likely receive
a substantially shorter sentence.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 794.041(2) (1987)) (emphasis omitted).
62. Hallberg, 649 So. 2d at 1360-61.
63. Id. at 1358.
64. Id.
65. Ch. 93-156, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 907, 911.
66. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8).
67. Id.
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a position of familial or custodial authority." Thus, Hallberg will be looked
to for guidance and authority on this subject.
D. Leaving an Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury
This year, the Supreme Court of Florida handed down an important
decision regarding Florida Statutes section 316.027, which discusses
accidents involving death or personal injuries. In State v. Mancuso,6"
Dennis Mancuso was charged with leaving the scene of an accident
involving death or personal injury under section 316.027 of the Florida
Statutes.69 Mancuso had allegedly struck two pedestrians in the early
morning hours of December 6, 1992. Later that day, he went to the local
police department and reported his car had been involved in an accident.
Mancuso claimed he did not know his vehicle had hit anything or anyone.
Instead, he told the police that his windshield had suddenly cracked while
he was driving but that no debris or other signs of an accident were visible
when he pulled over to inspect the damage to his car. Mancuso eventually
left his car near the scene and walked home. One of the victims died and
the other was seriously injured. Therefore, the State criminally charged
Mancuso for leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal
injury.
At trial, Mancuso requested that the jury be instructed that the State
must prove he knew he was involved in an accident resulting in personal
injury to another and then willfully left the scene and willfully failed to aid
68. 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995).
69. Id. Florida Statutes section 316.027(1)(a) states:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of
any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or
as close thereto as possible, and shall forthwith return to, and in every event
shall remain at the scene of, the accident, until he has fulfilled the requirements
of s. 316.062.
FLA. STAT. § 316.027(1)(a) (1991).
Subsection (2) provided that any person willfully failing to comply with the require-
ments of subsection (1) was guilty of a third-degree felony. Id. § 316.027(2). Florida
Statutes section 316.062 requires a driver involved in an accident to stop and exchange
certain information and to render aid to persons injured in the accident. FLA. STAT. §
316.062 (Supp. 1994). Florida Statutes section 316.027 was amended in 1993. Ch. 93-140,
§ 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 805, 806. However, the only major change was to make leaving the
scene of an accident involving death a second-degree felony. FLA. STAT. § 316.027(1)
(1993). Willfully leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury but not death
remains a second-degree felony. FLA. STAT. § 316.027(2) (Supp. 1994).
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the victims.7" The trial court denied this instruction and instead gave an
instruction that omitted any requirement concerning knowledge of the injury.
The jurors were told that they only had to find Mancuso was involved in an
accident resulting in death or injury, that he knew or should have known
that he was involved in an accident, and that he willfully failed to stop at
the accident scene. Mancuso was convicted of violating section 316.027 and
appealed his conviction.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed Mancuso's conviction,
because the jury instructions did not contain any instruction on "constructive
knowledge" of the death or injury of the victims. 71 The State contended
the jurors were properly instructed as they only needed to determine that
Mancuso knew, or should have known, that he was involved in an accident
and that an injury or death had resulted therefrom. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal briefly examined cases from other jurisdictions agreeing
with the State's argument that knowledge of the injury is not a separate
element which the jury must be instructed upon. The court noted that those
decisions involved the interpretation of statutory language significantly
different from Florida's. Specifically, the court noted that Florida Statutes
section 316.027 contains a "willfulness" requirement that these other states'
laws did not.72 Thus, the other states' laws were "strict liability laws"
while Florida's was not. Although it found that Mancuso's conviction
should be reversed, the district court of appeal certified this issue to the
Supreme Court of Florida as one involving a question of great public
importance.73
70. The exact instruction Mancuso requested was as follows:
3. That Dennis Mancuso knew that he was involved in an accident which
resulted in personal injury to another;
4. That Dennis Mancuso, knowing he was in an accident which resulted in
personal injury to another:
a. Willfully left the scene; and/or
b. Willfully failed to give... [certain information to the others] involved
in the accident ... or to a police officer at the scene....
c. Willfully failed to render aid to any injured person at the scene.
Mancuso v. State, 636 So. 2d 753, 754 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd, 652 So. 2d 370
(Fla. 1995). "'Willfully' is defined to mean that Dennis Mancuso intended to leave the scene
of an accident knowing it resulted in personal injury to another." Id.
71. Id at 754. In so doing, the district court of appeal found that neither the
defendant's requested instruction, nor the one the trial court gave, was correct.
72. Id at 756.
73. The exact question certified was as follows: "IN A PROSECUTION FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 316.027, FLORIDA STATUTES (1991), MUST THE STATE
SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE
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In a short, but instructive opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the district court's decision.74 The supreme court first noted that
section 316.027 was modeled after the Uniform Vehicle Law." The court
also noted that previous Florida decisions construing the section's "willful-
ness" requirement have held that knowledge of the accident is an essential
element under section 316.027.76 The question presented to the court in
this case was whether knowledge of the injury, in addition to knowledge of
the accident, was a separate essential element of section 316.027." Since
there were no previous Florida decisions on this point, and the court was
dealing with a statute modeled after a uniform law, the court looked to deci-
sions in other jurisdictions construing statutes modeled after the same law.
In so doing, the court found that most of these decisions had found either
that "actual or constructive knowledge of injury" 7 was necessary to make
a person criminally liable.
The court in Mancuso found two reasons for such an interpretation. 9
First, statutes criminalizing hit-and-runs from personal injury scenes
generally impose more severe criminal penalties than those involving hit-
and-run incidents involving only property damage. 0  Secondly, the
language of section 316.027 requires the driver to take affirmative action.8'
The court found that in fairness before one can be required to act in a
certain fashion, the driver must be aware of the facts which give rise to this
affirmative statutory duty. 2 Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
"criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the driver
charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death
or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that
the jury should be so instructed.8 3
The Mancuso decision will have an impact in at least two ways. First,
and most importantly, whenever an accused is charged with the same
offense in the future, the jury will have to be instructed that knowledge of
the death and/or personal injury is required to convict. The supreme court
INJURY OR DEATH; AND THE JURY BE SO INSTRUCTED?" Id.
74. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 372.
75. Id. at 371.
76. Id. See Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1980).
77. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 370-71.
78. Id. at 371.
79. Id. at 372.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 372.
83. Id.
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did not specify what the exact language of such an instruction should be.
Instead, this matter was referred to the Supreme Court Committee on
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases.84 Second, there will be some
reversals in other cases involving charges under section 316.027 where the
juries were not instructed about this knowledge requirement.8 5
84. Id In July 1995, the Committee forwarded the following proposed instruction
to the Supreme Court of Florida for its approval:
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Leaving the scene of an
Accident, the state must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable
doubt:
1. (Defendant) was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in [injury to] [death of] any person.
2. (Defendant) knew or should have known that [he] [she] was
involved in an accident.
3. (Defendant) knew or should have known of the [injury to] [death of]
the person.
4. (Defendant) willfully failed to stop at the scene of the accident or
as close to the accident as possible and remain there until [he] [she] had given
a. to the [injured person] [driver] [occupant] or [person attending the
vehicle] and
b. to any police officer at the scene of the accident or investigating the
accident the following information:
a. [sic] [his] [her] name,
b. [his] [her] address,
C. registration number of vehicle [he] [she] was driving, and license
plate number of vehicle [he] [she] was driving, and
d. if available, and requested, the exhibition of [his] [her] license or
permit to drive.
5. (Defendant) willfully failed to render reasonable assistance to the
injured person if such treatment appeared to be necessary or was requested by
the injured person.
"Reasonable assistance" includes carrying or making arrangements to carry
the injured person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical
treatment.
"Willfully" means intentionally, knowingly and purposely.
Telephone Conversation with chambers of the Hon. Fredricka Greene Smith, Circuit Court
Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida (Oct. 6, 1995). However, the court
returned the proposed instruction to the Committee for further study. As of October 6, 1995,
the Committee had not recommended another proposed instruction.
Judge Smith chaired the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in
Criminal Cases at the time of the supreme court's action.
85. See, e.g., Cordier v. State, 652 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Reeves
v. State, 647 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Both cases were decided during this
survey period. In both cases, the district courts reversed convictions under Florida Statutes
section 316.027, because the jury was not told that knowledge of the death or personal injury
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E. Manslaughter
Criminal homicide is a general offense often distinguished among its
various types and degrees by different gradations of intent. Thus, delineat-
ing when certain acts clearly constitute one type and degree of homicide
offense from another is sometimes difficult to do. One common definition
of manslaughter at common law declared that this offense existed when
there was an unlawful killing of one human being by another, without
malice aforethought, upon a sudden impulse or heat of passion, and without
any legal justification or excuse. The term "malice aforethought" was a
legal term of art used to recognize a number of different situations in which
a person would be guilty of murder. Absent one of these situations, an
unlawful killing would generally be considered a manslaughter.
Florida has retained this notion that manslaughter generally is a lesser
included offense of murder. The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized
that manslaughter "is a residual offense, defined by reference to what it is
not. 86 Thus, the supreme court has consistently required that when an
accused is charged with manslaughter or a greater homicide offense not
more than one step removed from manslaughter, the jury must also be
instructed on what constitutes a justifiable or excusable homicide under
Florida law.87 The need for such instruction on justifiable or excusable
was an essential element of the offense. Cordier, 652 So. 2d at 505; Reeves, 647 So. 2d at
995. In each case, the defendants had not objected to the failure of giving such an
instruction. However, both decisions found that this did not matter as the failure to instruct
a jury concerning an element of a crime charged constitutes fundamental and reversible error.
Cordier, 652 So. 2d at 505; Reeves, 647 So. 2d at 995.
86. Stockton v. State, 544 So. 2d 1006, 1007-08 (Fla. 1989). In this case, the trial
court correctly instructed a jury on manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second and
third-degree murder. Id. at 1007. This original set of jury instructions also included
instructions about what would be considered justifiable or excusable homicide. However,
when the court reinstructed the jury, at its request, on second and third-degree murder, the
trial court on its own also decided to reinstruct on manslaughter but refused defense counsel's
request to reinstruct on excusable and/or justifiable homicide. The supreme court found this
refusal to be reversible, as "[a]n instruction on manslaughter which omits the definitions of
justifiable and excusable homicide is ... incomplete." Id. at 1008.
The court did indicate that if the trial court had limited the reinstruction to the jury's
specific requests and had not included its own reinstruction on manslaughter, there would
have been no error. Id.
87. See Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965). However, if defense counsel
specifically requests a limited form of the standard instruction on justifiable and excusable
homicide and the trial court gives the instruction requested, then the defense has waived its
claim to raise on appeal the argument that the instruction as given was erroneous. Armstrong
v. State, 579 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1991). Likewise, it is not fundamental error for the court
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homicide is evident from the statutory definition of manslaughter.88 Des-
pite the supreme court's apparently clear mandate that a complete instruction
on manslaughter also requires an instruction as to what constitutes justifiable
and/or excusable homicide, Florida's trial courts continue to struggle with
this requirement.
The Florida trial courts' continued failure to adequately instruct juries
on manslaughter was recently demonstrated by the supreme court's decision
in State v. Lucas.89 There, David Lucas was charged with attempted
second-degree murder and various other offenses. At his trial, Lucas
admitted that the criminal acts had occurred but claimed that he was not the
perpetrator. Defense counsel requested, and the trial court gave an
instruction on attempted manslaughter as a category one lesser included
offense of attempted second-degree murder. Unfortunately, the trial court
failed to explain that Lucas could not be convicted of attempted manslaugh-
ter if the evidence showed that the attempted homicide was either justified
or excused. The defendant did not request such a charge and did not object
to the omission. After the jury found him guilty of all charges, Lucas
appealed his attempted second-degree murder conviction claiming that the
court's exclusion of justifiable and excusable homicide from its definition
of attempted manslaughter was fundamental error requiring reversal.
On appeal, the State claimed that the failure to give jury instructions
on the definition of justifiable and excusable homicide should not constitute
fundamental error which would be per se reversible. The First District
Court of Appeal agreed the defense at trial conceded that there was a
second-degree murder and only disputed identity.9" Thus, there really was
no factually contested issue regarding attempted manslaughter, justifiable
homicide, or excusable homicide. However, the district court found itself
bound by earlier supreme court decisions and reversed the attempted second-
to give a short-form instruction, instead of a long-form instruction, on excusable homicide
where there is no objection from the defense. State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 310 (Fla.
1990).
88. Florida Statutes section 782.07 states in part that:
The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence
of another, without lawful justification according to the provisions of chapter
776 and in cases in which such killings shall not be excusable homicide or
murder, according to the provisions of this chapter, shall be deemed manslaugh-
ter ....
FLA. STAT. § 782.07.
89. 645 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1994).
90. Lucas v. State, 630 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 645 So.
2d 425 (Fla. 1994).
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degree murder conviction anyway.9 The court certified this question to
the supreme court as one of great public importance.92
Despite the lack of evidence to support a finding of excusable and
justifiable homicide, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the failure to
give a complete instruction here constituted per se reversible error.93 In so
doing the court appears to hold fast to its bright-line rule regarding the
necessity of complete instructions when defining the crime of manslaughter
for a jury in Florida. The court held that "failure to give a complete initial
instruction on manslaughter constitutes fundamental reversible error when
the defendant is convicted of either manslaughter or a greater offense not
more than one step removed."94 The court found only one exception to
this requirement, that being the situation where defense counsel has
affirmatively agreed to, or even requested, the incomplete instruction.95
Lucas will hopefully bring an end to the problem of having homicide
cases reversed in Florida due to a trial court's failure to give complete
instructions on manslaughter. The moral of the Lucas decision for both
prosecutors and trial judges is simple. Whenever an accused is charged with
manslaughter or a homicide offense one step removed, the jury should
always be given correct instructions as to what constitutes justifiable and
91. Id. at 600-01.
92. Id. at 600. The question certified to and decided by the supreme court was as
follows:
WHEN A DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF EITHER MAN-
SLAUGHTER OR A GREATER OFFENSE NOT MORE THAN ONE STEP
REMOVED, DOES FAILURE TO EXPLAIN JUSTIFIABLE AND EXCUS-
ABLE HOMICIDE AS PART OF THE MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION
ALWAYS CONSTITUTE BOTH 'FUNDAMENTAL' AND PER SE REVERS-
IBLE ERROR, WHICH MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL AND MAY NOT BE SUBJECTED TO A HARMLESS-ERROR
ANALYSIS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE EVIDENCE COULD
SUPPORT A -FINDING OF EITHER JUSTIFIABLE OR EXCUSABLE
HOMICIDE?
Id.
93. Lucas, 645 So. 2d at 427.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court cited Armstrong, for approval of this exception. For a recent case
after Lucas applying this exception to affirm a second-degree murder conviction, even where
no instructions on excusable or justifiable homicide were given, see Abbarno v. State, 654
So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Lucas did not indicate that the situation suggested in Stockton, where the jury requests
reinstruction on second or third-degree murder, and the judge only instructs on these
homicide offenses and not on manslaughter, would also be an exception to the general rule
in Lucas. Thus, the continued viability of Stockton is in doubt.
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excusable homicide in Florida, even when the evidence would not support
such a finding. Prosecutors who follow this simple rule should have no
difficulty living with the Lucas decision. If the evidence would definitely
not support a finding of justifiable or excusable homicide, the instruction
will just be superfluous and the jury will merely ignore it. Prosecutors and
trial judges will have to be careful of defense "sandbagging" after Lucas.
The lack of requested instructions or an objection to the lack of instructions
about excusable or justifiable homicide made no difference as to the
defense's ability to raise the issue on appeal. Thus, defense counsel will no
longer feel an urgency to request such instruction. Prosecutors will have to
remain constantly alert to make sure manslaughter instructions are appropri-
ately complete.
9 6
F. Felony Offense Reclassification
Substantive criminal law recognizes that offenses can be committed by
a variety of means. Some means used to commit a criminal offense actually
or potentially increase the harm, or threat of harm, stemming from the
offense committed. Sometimes the substantive criminal law explicitly takes
this into account. Thus, when a theft is committed by force or threat of
force, the offense becomes a robbery. Likewise, Florida substantive criminal
law has long distinguished among various degrees of batteries and assaults,
depending upon the means used to perpetrate the offense.97 However,
given the wide variety of crimes existing in Florida, explicitly providing for
changes in each individual offense's nature or degree whenever force or
threat of force is used would be practically impossible. Instead, to partially
alleviate the difficulty of providing a degree increase in each individual of-
96. The need to remain alert to make sure correct jury instructions are given exists
when the jury is reinstructed on a point as well as initially instructed about that matter. Even
if counsel points out that initial instructions are erroneous and the court attempts to cure this
deficiency, mistakes will sometimes occur.
For a recent case illustrating this point, see Cummings v. State, 648 So. 2d 166 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), where counsel drew the trial court's attention to a mistake made
in initially instructing the jury about excusable homicide and the trial court erred again, but
in a different way, when reinstructing the jurors about excusable homicide. The court noted
that the lack of evidence to support excusable homicide made no difference. Id. at 168.
97. Thus, simple assault becomes aggravated assault when a deadly weapon is used
without the intent to kill. FLA. STAT. § 784.021(l)(a). Likewise, simple battery becomes
aggravated battery when a deadly weapon is used. FLA. STAT. § 784.945(1)(a)(2).
Of course the change from an assault to a battery once actual force is used, as opposed
to threat of force, is another illustration of how substantive criminal law distinguishes
between kinds of offenses due to the harm that actual use of force causes or may cause.
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fense's sections, the legislature promulgated a general reclassification statute
for most felony offenses when a firearm or weapon is used to perpetrate
them.
Florida Statutes section 775.087(1) provides, in part that, when during
a felony an accused "carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any
weapon or firearm, or ... commits an aggravated battery""s the felony is
reclassified to the next highest degree. This reclassification section does not
apply to felony offenses where the use of a weapon or firearm is an
essential element of the crime that the defendant committed.99 Within the
survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two important cases
concerning the construction of section 775.087(1).
The first case, State v. Tripp,"°° involved the certified question of
whether an accused's conviction may be reclassified under section
775.087(1) without the jury explicitly finding that the defendant had a
weapon during the commission of the felony involved.1"' Tripp had
entered a convenience store and had repeatedly struck the store clerk with
a claw hammer. After he was unsuccessful in opening the cash register, he
again beat the clerk with the hammer, causing her serious physical injuries.
Tripp was charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, robbery
with a deadly weapon, and attempted first-degree murder. The charging
document specifically alleged that he had a premeditated design to cause the
98. FLA. STAT. § 775.087(1).
99. For a recent Florida case finding upward reclassification of a felony impermissible
under Florida Statutes section 775.087(1), see McNeal v. State, 653 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The McNeal court found that an accused's attempted aggravated
battery conviction could not be reclassified from a third-degree to a second-degree felony
when the charging document had alleged that the aggravated battery was committed by use
of a deadly weapon. Id. at 1123. The court acknowledged that use of a deadly weapon was
not "an essential element of the offense of aggravated battery in all cases." Id. at 1123
(quoting Brown v. State, 583 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1991)). However, the
McNeal court found that weapon's use became an essential element of the offense due to the
charging document's language. Id. at 1124.
100. 642 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1994).
101. Id. at 729. The certified question the supreme court considered was as follows:
"MAY A TRIAL COURT RECLASSIFY A FELONY CONVICTION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 775.087(1) ABSENT A SPECIFIC FINDING ON THE JURY'S VERDICT
FORM THAT A DEFENDANT CARRIED, DISPLAYED, USED, ETC. ANY WEAPON
OR FIREARM OR THAT HE COMMITTED AN AGGRAVATED BATTERY DURING
THE COMMISSION OF THE FELONY SUBJECT TO RECLASSIFICATION?" Id. This
certified question was a rephrased version from the one originally certified by the district
court of appeal. Tripp v. State, 610 So. 2d 1311, 1313 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992), af'd,
642 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1994).
Vol. 20
92
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Dobson
victim's death while involved in a felony, namely the robbery, and did so
by attempting to murder her by hitting her in the head with a weapon, the
claw hammer. The jury found Tripp guilty of these three offenses.
Following his conviction, the State successfully sought to have his offenses
reclassified pursuant to section 775.087(1)."°
The First District Court of Appeal reversed the reclassification of
Tripp's first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery convictions. 3
The attempted armed robbery conviction reclassification was reversed,
because use of a weapon is an essential element in this offense."° As for
the attempted first-degree murder charge, the district court agreed with the
State's argument that use of the weapon was not an essential element of this
offense, thus the offense could be subject to reclassification. 5 The court
found that the charging document and the proof at trial supported the
determination that both a weapon had been used and an aggravated battery
had been committed during the attempted first-degree murder offense.' °6
However, the court noted that the verdict form contained no specific jury
finding that Tripp had used a deadly weapon or committed an aggravated
battery while committing the attempted first-degree murder. 7 Without
this explicit jury finding, the district court found that reclassification of the
attempted first-degree murder conviction from a first-degree felony to a life
felony was improper.'0 8
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a short but important opinion,
affirmed the First District Court of Appeal's decision."°  The supreme
court noted that the jury had found Tripp guilty of "charges made against
him in the Information"" and that the information had alleged Tripp used
a weapon when committing the attempted first-degree murder. However, the
supreme court found that "the jury did not make a sufficient finding that
Tripp used a weapon because there was no special verdict form reflecting
102. This reclassification resulted in the attempted first-degree murder being raised
to a life felony, instead of a first-degree felony.
103. Tripp, 610 So. 2d at 1313.
104. Id. at 1312.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Tripp, 610 So. 2d at 1313.
109. Tripp, 642 So. 2d at 730.
110. Id. The supreme court quotes this language in its opinion. However, it is not
clear where the wording came from. As this wording does not appear in the First District
Court of Appeal opinion, this author assumes that it came from the jury verdict form.
1995]
93
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
a separate finding to this effect.""' Since the court considered this
question a factual one for the jury, and not for the court to decide, without
such a special verdict form, reclassification was improper. Thus, Tripp
could only be sentenced for a first-degree felony, not a life felony.
Both the district court and the supreme court relied upon, and noted
with approval, the supreme court's earlier decision in State v. Overfelt, 12
also involving the proper construction of section 775.087. There, the
question was whether there had to be a jury finding that an accused
possessed a firearm before the trial court could reclassify a felony pursuant
to section 775.087(1)."' As with Tripp, the supreme court had found that
this was a factual finding for the jury and not for a trial court.'"' After
Tripp and Overfelt, prosecutors who plan to ask for reclassification of a
felony conviction pursuant to section 775.087(1) must make sure that the
jury receives special verdict forms or else reclassification will not be
possible. Given the Tripp and Overfelt decisions, all three factors which can
enhance a felony reclassification must be submitted to a jury for a specific
determination of their presence.!1 5
Despite the broad holding in Tripp, that whether a defendant used a
weapon during the commission of a felony is a jury question, a second
recent Supreme Court of Florida case construing section 775.087(1) shows
that there are some limits on this decision's scope. In State v. Houck,' 6
the defendant was accused of banging the victim's head against the
pavement, thus causing him serious head injuries which resulted in his
death. The State charged the defendant with second-degree murder alleging
that the pavement had been used as a weapon to injure the victim's head.
The jury instead found the defendant guilty of manslaughter with a weapon.
The State sought reclassification under section 775.087(1), and the trial court
adjudicated Houck guilty of a first-degree felony. Unlike Tripp and
Overfelt, the jury had apparently been explicitly presented with the specific
question whether a weapon was used during the commission of the
111. Id.
112. 457 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1984).
113. Id. at 1386.
114. Id. at 1387.
115. Although the charge in Tripp only alleges the presence of one of the sentencing
enhancing factors of Florida Statutes section 775.087(1), the certified question the supreme
court answered included all three factors.
116. 652 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1995).
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felony.' 7 Thus, if this were purely a jury question as a broad reading of
these two cases implies, Houck's conviction and reclassification should have
been affirmed. However, that was not the case.
One difficulty with section 775.087(1) is that neither it, nor any section
of chapter 775, defines what should be considered a "weapon" for felony
reclassification purposes. This problem is not unique to this particular
statute. Other sections of the Florida Criminal Code using the term
"weapon" also lack a specific definition for it. Given the absence of a
statutory definition of "weapon" in chapter 775 the supreme court had two
apparent choices: adopt the definition of weapon found in chapter 790 as
had been done in other cases," 8 or give the word "weapon" its common
or ordinary meaning. In this case, both the supreme court and the district
court of appeal chose to resort to dictionary definitions for the meaning of
"weapon."... 9 Something would be considered a weapon if it is commonly
used as an "instrument for combat against another person."' 20 Pavements
are not such instruments. The supreme court rejected the State's argument
that whether something was a weapon was a matter for the jury and not for
117. Neither the district court of appeal's decision nor the supreme court's decision
say that the jury was presented with this question via a special jury form. The author infers
that this was the situation from the supreme court's opinion which does not mention Tripp.
The court's failure to cite Tripp, decided the same day as Houck, indicates that the error
which caused reversal there was probably not present in Houck. Whether this deduction is
correct or not, there would still be the same result in Houck, given the supreme court's
reasoning for the reversal there.
118. E.g., Arroyo v. State, 564 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding it appropriate to use definitions in chapter 790 to determine what is a "dangerous
weapon" for purposes of deciding if an armed burglary has occurred under Florida Statutes
section 810.02(2)(b)); Gust v. State, 558 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding it appropriate to look to the definition in chapter 790 of "weapon" to determine
when a person commits armed robbery, a first-degree felony, rather than unarmed robbery,
a second-degree felony).
In Houck, both the district court and the supreme court used means other than looking
to chapter 790 for help in deciding what should be considered a weapon under Florida
Statutes section 775.087(1). Houck, 652 So. 2d at 360; Houck v. State, 634 So. 2d 180, 182
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 642 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1994). The district court of
appeal's decision indicated that even if the definition of "weapon" in section 709.001(13) had
been used, there would still have been a reversal of the felony reclassification. Houck, 634
So. 2d at 182.
119. The district court used the definition of weapon from Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary. Houck, 634 So. 2d at 182. However, the supreme court chose the definition in
the American Heritage College Dictionary. Houck, 652 So. 2d at 360.
120. Houck, 652 So. 2d at 360.
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the court.' The court found that allowing something as passive as a
pavement to be considered a weapon for sentencing enhancement would
allow all sorts of objects not otherwise considered inherently dangerous to
enhance convictions."22 Secondly, both the supreme court and the district
court of appeal recognized that allowing such a broad definition of weapon
might implicitly go against one of the purposes of the felony reclassification
statute.123 Both courts agreed that "the obvious legislative intent reflected
by 775.087 is to provide harsher punishment for, and hopefully deter, those
persons who use instruments commonly recognized as having the purpose
to inflict death and serious bodily injury upon other persons.' 24  If
virtually anything could be considered a "weapon" under this section, the
deterrence value of such a classification scheme would be lowered, as most
felonies would automatically be subject to reclassification."
Is Houck in conflict with Tripp and Overfelt? If Tripp is read broadly,
conflict between the two supreme court decisions is inevitable. However,
another reading of Tripp shows that no conflict exists. Under Houck
whether something can be considered a weapon, as a matter of law, remains
for the court to decide. However, under Tripp and Overfelt, whether
something can be legally considered a weapon for purposes of section
775.087(1) when used during the commission of a felony is a factual matter
for jury consideration. Read this way, there is no conflict between the two
decisions. 26
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Houck, 634 So. 2d at 184.
124. Houck, 652 So. 2d at 360 (quoting Houck, 634 So. 2d at 184).
125. If the State's argument had been accepted, the deterrence value of Florida
Statutes section 775.087(1) would be lowered in another way. Deterrence assumes that
persons to be deterred have some knowledge or likelihood of knowledge of what it is they
are hopefully being deterred from doing. If "weapon" is given its common meaning, then
an ordinary person knows what he is being deterred from using. If what is a "weapon" is
left totally and completely up to a jury, an ordinary citizen can never know when harsher
punishment is likely.
126. The supreme court would obviously not want to render conflicting decisions
construing the same statute. When one remembers this fact, plus the fact that the decisions
were rendered the same day, this strongly suggests that there is no conflict between the two
opinions. Furthermore, Houck may not really have as broad an effect on the state's ability
to enhance felony convictions as one would expect. The Fifth District Court of Appeal noted
that the state had passed up another way to possibly have Houck's conviction reclassified
under Florida Statutes section 775.087(1). Houck, 634 So. 2d at 184. The court noted that
the state might have been able to prove Houck committed an aggravated battery during the
homicide. Id. at 183. The Fifth District Court of Appeal implies that this would have been
Vol. 20
96
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Dobson
G. Attempted Felony Murder
Perhaps no part of homicide law has generated more controversy than
the felony murder doctrine. The doctrine is based upon the belief that when
a defendant commits or attempts to commit a felony during or immediately
after which a homicide occurs, the felon should also be held liable for the
homicide as well as the underlying felony. The purpose of the felony
murder doctrine is twofold: 1) to deter potential felons from committing the
underlying felony in the first place; and 2) to urge felons who commit
felonies to commit them in the least dangerous fashion. In Florida, a felony
murder will be either first, second, or third-degree murder depending upon
the underlying felony 27 and upon who the person is who actually does the
killing.' The intent necessary for the killing is supplied through the legal
fiction of the homicide occurring during the course of the underlying felony.
Twice within the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court of Florida has
affirmed the notion that there is a crime of attempted felony murder. In
Fleming v. State,129 the court upheld the validity of the accused's guilty
plea to attempted first-degree felony murder for the shooting of a police
officer. The defendant had asserted that there could be no factual basis for
his plea because the officer was accidentally shot during a struggle for the
defendant's gun. The supreme court rejected that notion finding that the
inchoate crime of attempt consists of two essential elements: "(1) a specific
intent to commit the crime, and (2) a separate overt, ineffectual act done
toward its commission."' 30 Although the first requirement would seem to
have required the specific intent for a death to result, the Fleming court
a proper basis for reclassification. Id. The supreme court's opinion does not discuss this
suggestion. One issue arising under the district court's suggestion is whether aggravated
battery would be considered a lesser included offense of manslaughter, and if so, would
enhancement still be possible under Florida Statutes section 775.087(1) or would double
jeopardy prohibit this?
127. When the homicide is committed by someone perpetrating or attempting any one
of thirteen statutorily enumerated felonies, then a first-degree felony murder has been
committed. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(2) (1994). When the homicide is committed by
someone perpetrating or attempting any felony other than one of the thirteen statutorily
enumerated felonies, then the homicide is a third-degree felony murder. Id. § 782.04(4).
128. When someone other than a person engaged in perpetrating or attempting one
of thirteen statutorily enumerated felonies actually commits the homicide, the felony murder
is a second-degree felony. Id. § 782.04(3).
129. 374 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1979).
130. Id. at 955 (citing Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Robinson v. State, 263 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Grouneau v. State,
201 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967)).
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noted that under the felony murder doctrine, unlike in other homicide
offenses, "[s]tate of mind is immaterial for the felony is said to supply the
intent."'' The Fleming court held that there is such a crime as attempted
felony murder in Florida based upon the finding that "where the alleged
"attempt' occurs during the commission of a felony ... the law presumes
the existence of premeditation, just as it does under the felony murder
rule."'
' 32
Five years after Fleming, in Amlotte v. State,133 the Supreme Court
of Florida reaffirmed that there is such a crime as attempted felony murder
in Florida.134 Relying in part on its decision in Fleming, the Amlotte court
described the essential elements of attempted felony murder as: 1) attempt
to perpetrate an enumerated felony; and 2) an intentional overt act, or the
aiding or abetting of such an act, which could, but does not cause the death
of another.135 Under the Amlotte two-part definition, it would be easy to
discern whether there was an attempt to perpetrate or an actual perpetration
of an enumerated felony. Instead, the more difficult question is whether
there has been a sufficient overt act toward the commission of a felony
which could, but does not, cause the death of another. Thus, under the
attempted felony murder doctrine, the key issue is discerning which acts
could have caused the death of another but did not.
Recently, in a short but major opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
in State v. Gray136 receded from its holdings in Amlotte and Fleming and
found that the crime of attempted felony murder does not exist.'37 In
Gray, the defendant and two codefendants robbed a restaurant and fled in
a car. During a chase with the police, the car's driver went through a red
light and hit another car. The other car's driver was ejected and seriously
injured. Gray was convicted of the underlying robbery offense and of
attempted felony murder. On appeal, Gray questioned whether there was a
separate overt act which could, but did not, cause the death of another. The
Third District Court of Appeal found that the State had presented insuffi-
cient evidence to present a jury question of whether the alleged overt act of
131. Id. at 956 n.1.
132. Id. at 956 (citing Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976); Adams v. State,
341 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1976)).
133. 456 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1984).
134. Id. at 449.
135. Id. at 449-50.
136. 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995).
137. Id. at 552-53.
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running a red light could have caused the victim's death.13 As a result,
the court reversed Gray's conviction for the crime of attempted felony
murder. 39 However, the District Court of Appeal certified the question
of whether there was a sufficient overt act which could have caused the
death of another."
In a surprising decision, the supreme court did not answer the certified
question but instead receded from its holding in Amlotte and held that there
was no such crime as attempted felony murder at all."' Instead, the court
agreed with Justice Overton's dissent in Amlotte, which reasoned that
attempted felony murder is a logical impossibility. 42 The court recog-
nized that under Florida substantive law, an attempt requires that there be
proof of a specific intent to commit a specific crime. 43 The court
reasoned that since felony murder is based upon a legal fiction that supplies
the malice necessary through the commission of the underlying felony,
attempting to commit such a crime is logically impossible.'
Gray is certainly a major case with a significant effect. Under the
felony murder doctrine, as applied in Florida, some of the harshest
consequences were possible. Unlike other jurisdictions which had
recognized limits upon the application of the felony murder doctrine,"
138. Id. at 553.
139. Id.
140. The exact question certified was as follows: "WHETHER THE 'OVERT ACT'
REFERRED TO IN AMLOTIE v. STATE, 456 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 1984), INCLUDES
ONE, SUCH AS FLEEING, WHICH IS INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED BUT IS NOT
INTENDED TO KILL OR INJURE ANOTHER?" Id. at 552.
141. Gray, 654 So.2d at 554.
142. Id. at 553.
143. Id. (citing Amlotte, 456 So. 2d at 450 (Overton, J., dissenting)).
144. Id. (citing Amlotte, 456 So. 2d at 450-51 (Overton, J., dissenting)).
145. E.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965), where the Supreme Court
of California refused to extend the felony murder doctrine to a situation where an accomplice
had been killed by an intended victim during the course of a robbery. Id. at 133-34. The
court's opinion rests partially on two theories which were used to limit the felony murder
rule. The first theory is the "protected persons" rule. Under this rule, the felony murder
doctrine only exists to protect the innocent, not felons; so that if a co-felon is killed, the
doctrine should not be used to prosecute the remaining felons for the death of someone who
was not intended to be "protected" to begin with. The second theory is the agency theory.
Under this theory, only when the act of killing is actually performed by the accused or a co-
felon should the doctrine apply. Here, since the victim could not in any way be considered
the agent of the remaining felon, the felon could not be prosecuted for the victim's actions
resulting in the one robber's death. Id.
At least one state has "limited" the felony murder doctrine by abolishing it completely.
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980).
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Florida applied the felony murder doctrine not only to acts of co-felons but
also to the acts of police officers and/or bystanders if these acts resulted in
death. Florida appeared to follow the per se application of the felony
murder doctrine. Thus, whenever a homicide occurred during a statutorily
enumerated felony, all felons were most likely to be considered to be guilty
of murder, no matter who caused the death or who the victim was.'46
Since the statutory definition of many crimes extend the life of the
underlying felony to the flight stage,'47 use of the felony murder doctrine
as a vehicle to prosecute for homicide can be extremely widespread. Use
of the felony murder doctrine to prosecute felons and co-felons for
attempted felony murder, when death did not occur, also had potentially
great consequences. Thus, under Gray abrogation of the crime of attempted
felony murder will greatly lessen the potential harshness of the felony
murder doctrine itself.148  Moreover, the courts will not be required to
decide the question of which overt acts could result in death. 149
H. Voluntary Intoxication and Mental Disease
Florida criminal law recognizes a number of defenses not explicitly
noted in the Florida Statutes. Two of these defenses are voluntary
intoxication and insanity. Under Florida criminal law, an accused charged
146. For example, under Florida law, aiders and abettors of the underlying felony
could be guilty of felony murder when the killing was done by one of their accomplices
during the felony even if the accused was not present at the time. E.g., Christie v. State, 652
So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Also, the killer does not have to be the accused
or an accomplice. Even a killing resulting from a bystander's acts can support a felony
murder conviction. See Currelly v. State, 644 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
147. See, Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 369, 378 (Fla. 1994), wherein the supreme court
upheld the defendant's felony murder conviction that occurred during flight from a robbery.
The court stated that "[t]here is no merit to ... [the] claim that a killing during flight from
the commission of a felony is not felony murder." Id. at 376.
148. For example, after Gray, several Florida courts had either vacated convictions
for attempted felony murder or noted in their opinions that such a crime no longer exists in
Florida. E.g., State v. Grinage, 656 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1995); Ward v. State, 655 So. 2d 1290
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
149. Thus, the supreme court in Grinage did not have to decide the certified question
about whether certain acts alleged in the charge were sufficient predicates for an attempted
felony murder conviction, as the crime no longer exists in Florida. Grinage, 656 So. 2d at
458.
For a recent article praising the Gray decision but cautioning that "it is too early to
ascertain whether Gray will result in a major shift away from the application of the felony-
murder doctrine" see J. Rafael Rodriguez, Attempted Felony Murder - An Improbable Legal
Fiction Meets Its Demise, 69 FLA. BAR J. 63, 65 (1995).
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with a specific intent defense, should be found not guilty if the accused's
voluntary intoxication negated the ability to form the specific intent needed
for the crime. As for the insanity defense, Florida follows the McNaghten
rule. Under this rule, at the time of the act or acts alleged, the accused must
be suffering from such a mental disease or defect as to not know the nature
and quality of the act done or to not know that what was done was wrong.
Both defenses have been very strictly construed. Mere intoxication alone
is not a defense unless it would negate the ability to form specific intent
needed for a crime. Likewise, having a mental disease or defect alone is not
enough unless it precludes the accused's ability to know what he was doing
or to know that what he was doing was wrong. Florida has explicitly
rejected the defense of diminished capacity although it is recognized in other
jurisdictions.15
In State v. Bias'5' the supreme court was presented with the interest-
ing question of what happens when a person who raises the defense of
voluntary intoxication also has a mental disease or defect. Bias was charged
and convicted of first-degree murder and robbery. At trial, Bias raised the
defense of voluntary intoxication alleging that he had consumed eleven beers
before the commission of his crimes. Bias sought to have psychiatric
testimony from a forensic psychiatrist and a forensic psychologist that, in
their opinion, Bias was too intoxicated to form the specific intent needed
when the crimes occurred. Both experts would have relied on the fact that
Bias was suffering from schizophrenia and had brain damage. They claimed
that it was necessary to consider an individual's underlying psychiatric or
psychological condition when forming an opinion about how intoxicated that
person would become after consuming a given amount of alcohol. The
psychiatrist contended that the alcohol would have a more dramatic effect
150. Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1989). The defense of diminished
capacity allows an accused to offer evidence of any mental abnormality to show that the
defendant could or did not have the specific intent needed for the crime charged. Under this
defense, if the crime the accused is charged with has a lesser included offense not requiring
the same mens rea level as the crime charged, the accused can still be guilty of this crime.
If the specific intent crime charged did not have a lesser included offense or had one which
was also a specific intent crime, the accused would theoretically be acquitted. Sometimes
the diminished capacity defense is termed partial responsibility or partial insanity. For a
short, but detailed discussion of this defense, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnN W. ScoTr,
JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 4.7 (2d ed. 1986).
151. 653 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1995).
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on someone who was schizophrenic or had brain damage. 52 However, the
State objected to this testimony claiming that this was nothing more than the
defense of diminished capacity and that a person would have to claim
insanity before any testimony about schizophrenia would be relevant. The
trial court agreed with this objection and the experts then testified they could
not give an opinion as to Bias's intoxication without also considering his
schizophrenia. Thus, their testimony was precluded. The district court of
appeal found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Bias's convic-
tions.'53 However, the court found that the trial court had erred in
precluding the expert testimony pertaining to his voluntary intoxication
defense. 54 The district court of appeal certified the question of whether
exclusion of the experts' testimony in this case was appropriate to the
supreme court as one of great public importance.
55
The supreme court agreed with the lower court's reversal of Bias's
conviction, and set forth specific guidelines for handling situations such as
these. 5 6  The Bias court found that when a defendant who raises the
defense of voluntary intoxication also has a mental disease or defect, the
trial court cannot exclude expert testimony about the combined effect of the
alleged mental disease and intoxication on the accused's ability to form a
specific intent if an expert cannot adequately express an opinion about the
defendant's intoxication without explaining that one of the factors used to
form the opinion is the defendant's mental disease.157 However, the
supreme court put three limitations on its holding to ensure that voluntary
intoxication defenses do not become diminished capacity defenses in
disguised forms. First, the court declared that "the focus of the expert's
testimony must be upon the defendant's intoxication, and the mental disease
or mental defect must not be the feature of the testimony."'158 Secondly,
the mental disease or defect alleged must be one "recognized by authorities
generally accepted in medicine, psychiatry, or psychology."' 59 Third, the
152. Bias v. State, 634 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), af'd, 653
So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1995). This psychiatrist also would have testified that he believed Bias had
used alcohol as a form of self-medication, since schizophrenics commonly did this. Id. The
expert would also have testified that this aggravates the psychotic symptoms, rather than
helping them. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Bias, 634 So. 2d at 1121.
156. Bias, 653 So. 2d at 382.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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trial court must make a preliminary determination that the proffered expert
opinion about intoxication from the combination of the intoxicants and the
recognized mental disease or defect is also "based upon authorities, studies,
and experience which have general acceptance in medicine, psychiatry,
psychology, or toxicology."''
The first limitation is clearly geared to making sure that a voluntary
intoxication defense does not become that of diminished capacity. The
second two requirements are consistent with Florida's approach to expert
testimony in other areas. Florida has long followed the Frye6' test for the
admissibility of expert testimony.1 6 Unlike the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States regarding admissibility of novel
scientific evidence and testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence,1 63
the Frye test requires that the expert testimony being proffered must be
generally accepted in a relevant scientific field or fields." Without such,
the testimony is inadmissible even though it may be the personal opinion of
the expert involved. The general acceptance needed to support an expert's
testimony can be found in published studies, text and reports.
Although Bias is clearly a conservative opinion, the court's holding
should be considered clearly correct. All individuals are not the same, and
intoxicants will affect different people in different ways. A person who
already suffers from a mental disease or defect is more likely to have his/her
mind affected by intoxicants than a person who does not have such a defect.
By limiting its holdings to factual situations where there is a recognized
mental disease or defect, the Supreme Court of Florida has attempted to
ensure that claims purporting that a less intelligent person. would be more
easily affected by intoxicants than a more intelligent person will not be
raised. Also, the effect of the mental disease or defect on the allegedly
intoxicated person must be generally recognized by some respected scientific
authorities. Personal opinion of an expert alone is not enough. Thus, while
the Supreme Court of Florida recognized "that an expert may need to
explain why a certain quantity of intoxicants causes intoxication in the
160. Id.
161. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
162. E.g., Kaminiski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1952).
163. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). In
Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993), the court rejected the more lenient
approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence as established in Daubert, and reaffirmed
its commitment to the more traditional approach as set forth in Frye.
164. During this survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida handed down a major
evidence decision discussing a four-step approach to admission of novel scientific testimony
under Frye. Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
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defendant whereas it would not in other individuals,"' 6 5 the limitationt
under Bias should ensure that this situation will not lead to a free for all
exposing factors about the individual that would, in effect, resurrect the
defense of diminished capacity.
Two important issues were not considered in Bias. The defense in Bias
was voluntary intoxication and the question was the effect of the accused's
mental disease or defect upon his potential level of intoxication, but what
if the defense was insanity? Would evidence of a defendant's intoxication
be admissible to support the claim that this person suffering from a mental
disease or defect did not know, at that particular time, what he was doing,
or that what he was doing was wrong? Moreover, what if both defenses
were raised at trial? Bias holds that the jury could properly consider
evidence of the mental disease or defect on the voluntary intoxication
defense. Could the jury similarly consider evidence of the intoxication on
the ability to form the requisite knowledge of right from wrong or
knowledge that what tle person was doing was wrong? And if not, then
how can a jury be expected to block out evidence of intoxication when
discussing the insanity defense and then consider evidence of a mental
disease or defect when considering intoxication? 66 Neither of these
questions were answered in the Bias opinion.
Looking at these questions, perhaps what the Bias decision shows is
how difficult it is to limit the scope of expert opinion when defenses like
voluntary intoxication and insanity are raised. If the Supreme Court of
Florida should find, in a case where the insanity defense is raised, that the
defendant's level of intoxication is relevant to that question, then the
voluntary intoxication defense could be surreptitiously resurrected for certain
defenses for which it is not currently available. 67 Clearly these questions
165. Bias, 653 So. 2d at 383.
166. Theoretically, one way to do this would be with detailed, carefully crafted jury
instructions. Yet, many lawyers would argue that juries cannot be expected to compartmen-
talize their thinking to such a degree when deliberating.
167. For example, since arson is considered a general rather than a specific intent
crime, voluntary intoxication is not available as a defense to arson charges. See generally
Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985). However, insanity should still be available
as a defense here.
For an article discussing the district court's opinion in Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), which also held that arson was a general intent crime, see
James H. Peterson, III, Note, The Voluntary Intoxication Defense in Florida: A Question of
Intent, 13 STETSON L. REv. 649 (1984). This article provides helpful background regarding
the voluntary intoxication defense in Florida.
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are important issues which the Supreme Court of Florida will ultimately
have to address.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA CRIMINAL LAWS
A. Vagueness
During this survey period, several Supreme Court of Florida opinions
have addressed due process challenges to Florida criminal statutes based
upon allegedly vague language.1 6 Criminal statutes must give a reason-
able person sufficient notice of what conduct is likely to be proscribed.
Such notice is required for a number of reasons. First, the criminal law
expects that citizens will conform their conduct so as to avoid violating the
law. Without knowing exactly what conduct violates the law, reasonable
people cannot possibly be expected to govern their actions or inactions
accordingly. Second, vague statutes allow the police undue freedom to
interpret what actions violate the law. This potentially allows the police to
arrest, search and charge citizens in an inconsistent and potentially
discriminatory manner. Third, if the statute is so vague that the conduct
which violates it is unclear, citizens can find themselves being charged at
the whim of a prosecutor. Finally, without sufficient standards as to what
conduct violates a statute, jury decision-making as to when individuals are
guilty of violating the criminal laws is not likely to be sufficiently consistent
to merit the public's confidence. Thus, vague statutes are general risks to
the rights of individual citizens and to the confidence of the general public
in the criminal system. The individual Supreme Court of Florida cases
addressing challenges to Florida Statutes based on vagueness are discussed
below.
168. In addition to these supreme court cases which discuss vagueness challenges to
some of Florida's criminal statutes, a number of district court of appeal decisions have also
dealt with vagueness challenges. No doubt by the end of next year's survey period, the
supreme court will also have rendered decisions in some of these same cases.
For further discussion on Florida caselaw concerning the issue of vagueness, see
generally State v. Bley, 652 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Mitchell, 652
So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Sailer, 645 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); Habie v. Krischer, 642 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied,
651 So. 2d 1194 (Fla.), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2003 (1995); Newberger v. State, 641
So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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1. Open House Parties
In State v. Manfredonia,69 the Supreme Court of Florida considered
arguments that Florida Statutes section 856.015(2), concerning open house
parties, was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Under subsection (2) of
the statute, it is a second degree misdemeanor for an adult, in control of an
open house party, to allow the party to continue where the adult knows that
a minor is in possession of drugs or is consuming alcohol or drugs, and the
adult fails to take reasonable steps to prevent such. 170 The statute defines
such terms as "drug," "open house party," and "residence;" however, the
statute does not provide a definition or explanation of what would constitute
"reasonable steps" in the prevention of the possession or consumption of the
alcoholic beverage or drug.' 7 ' Based on the vagueness of the statute's
terms the appellants in Manfredonia claimed that section 856.015(2) was
unconstitutionally vague and should be stricken. 72 Manfredonia was not
the first time that a constitutional challenge had been made to section
856.015. In an early case, State v. Alves,173 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal had found the same section to be unconstitutionally vague.174
Although the Alves court had recognized that other Florida statutes
incorporating a reasonableness standard had been found constitutional, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal found that such a standard would only be
constitutional when more specific directives were impossible. 75 Conse-
quently, the Alves court found that "[t]he actions that are available to an
observing adult in control of a residence [where the forbidden action is
occurring] are not numerous and can be selected by the legislature rather
than imposing criminal sanctions upon one who is placed in a position of
169. 649 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1995).
170. FLA. STAT. § 856.015(2) (1991). The language of Florida Statutes section
856.015(2) reads as follows:
No adult having control of any residence shall allow an open house party to take
place at said residence if any alcoholic beverage or drug is possessed or
consumed at said residence by any minor where the adult knows that an
alcoholic beverage or drug is in the possession of or being consumed by a minor
at said residence and where the adult fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the
possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage or drug.
Id.
171. Manfredonia, 649 So. 2d at 1389 n.1 (citing FLA. STAT. § 856.015(1) (1991)).
172. Id. at 1389.
173. 610 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
174. Id. at 594.
175. Id.
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guessing what is reasonable." '176 The Alves court found the legislature so
obligated and declared that its failure to provide guidelines in section
856.015(2) made the statute unconstitutionally vague.177
In addressing the question of whether section 856.015(2) was
unconstitutional in Manfredonia, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that
the section "is not a paragon of legislative drafting.' 178 However, looking
to Supreme Court of the United States decisions discussing vagueness of
criminal statutes, the supreme court found that mere lack of precision alone
would not offend due process. 179 The Manfredonia court found that all
the Supreme Court of the United States required was that a statute's
language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices . . . .""' The
court found that section 856.015(2) gave such definite warnings. Analyzing
this section's elements, the Supreme Court of Florida found that to secure
a conviction, four elements must be satisfied:
1) An adult controlling certain premises must know there is a social
gathering there; 2) a minor must possess or consume alcohol or
controlled substances during this gathering; 3) the adult must have
actual knowledge of the minor's acts; and 4) the adult in control must
both (a) allow the party to continue and (b) fail to take any reasonable
steps to prevent the possession or consumption."'1
According to the Supreme Court of Florida, these requirements put a heavy
burden on the state to prove that the adult in charge took no steps whatsoev-
er to prevent the consumption or possession of the alcohol or drugs.182
The court suggested that an adult controlling such a party could avoid
criminal charges by simply stopping the party or taking some other
reasonable action to prevent the consumption or possession after learning
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Manfredonia, 649 So. 2d at 1390.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1957)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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thereof. 83 Unfortunately, the Manfredonia decision did not give any
concrete examples of what would constitute reasonable action.'84
2. Exploitation of Aged Persons or Disabled Adults
In Cuda v. State,'85 the Supreme Court of Florida sustained a vague-
ness challenge to former Florida Statutes section 415.111(5) which
prohibited the exploitation for profit of a disabled person or adult.'86 This
section made it a third-degree felony for anyone to exploit an aged or
disabled adult "by the improper or illegal use or management" of such
person's property. 87 The accused had been charged with one count of
exploitation of an aged person for profit. At the trial court level, Cuda
successfully argued that the words "improper or illegal" were unconstitu-
tionally vague. The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that the word
"improper" did not provide sufficient warning of the prohibited conduct and
was unconstitutionally vague. 88 However, the court found that the use of
the word "illegal" was specific enough to satisfy constitutional stan-
dards. 89 The Supreme Court of Florida, in a short but important decision,
reversed the appellate court's decision and agreed that the term "illegal" was
also vague, thus making the entire subsection unconstitutionally vague.19°
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court had to distinguish
between two earlier cases in which it held similar language to be constitu-
tional. In State v. Rodriguez,19' the court had upheld a statute which
contained a proscription against acts "not authorized by law."' 92 Florida
Statutes section 409.325(2)(a) criminalized certain acts regarding the food
183. Manfredonia, 649 So. 2d at 1391.
184. Id. The Manfredonia court also declined to comment on whether the appellants'
actions, which were not mentioned in either the district court or supreme court opinion,
violated Florida Statutes section 856.015(2) (1991). Id.
185. 639 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1994).
186. Id. at 25.
187. Florida Statutes section 415.111(5) reads as follows: "A person who knowingly
or willfully exploits an aged person or disabled adult by the improper or illegal use or
management of the funds, assets, property, power of attorney, or guardianship of such aged
person or disabled adult for profit, commits a felony of the third degree ...." FLA. STAT.
§ 415.111(5) (1991).
188. State v. Cuda, 622 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 626
So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1993), and quashed by 639 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1994).
189. Id. at 504-05.
190. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 23-24.
191. 365 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1978).
192. Id. at 160.
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stamps program when the acts done were "not authorized by law."193
Despite such broad language, the supreme court found that because of the
program's peculiar nature and because chapter 409 itself gave notice that
there were federal regulations governing the program, these words actually
meant "not authorized by state and federal food stamp law."194 Thus, the
court felt that constitutional notice problems were alleviated when this
particular section was read in conjunction with the rest of the chapter.
However, in Locklin v. Pridgeon,95 the supreme court had struck down
a statute containing the exact same language. Former Florida- Statutes
section 839.22 made it unlawful for any officer of the federal government
to "commit any act under color of authority .. .[of their position] when
such act is not authorized by law ... .",196 This statute was considered
unconstitutionally vague, because it required every governmental employee
to determine what acts where authorized by law and what acts were not
authorized by law." 7 Failure to do so could result in a criminal offense.
The "law" in Locklin was not limited to an narrow area; like the "law" in
Rodriguez. Thus, people could mean any and all laws, civil or criminal.
Even if a public officer violated a law in good faith, he could be prosecuted.
Thus, one could never know how to govern their conduct in order to avoid
violating the section without having all encompassing knowledge of all the
laws-something which was definitely an impossible task. 98
The Supreme Court of Florida found that the statute in Cuda was more
like the unconstitutional one in Locklin than the one upheld in Rodri-
guez.'99 The Rodriguez case's statute had the federal laws as a back drop,
thus providing the needed notice to make the statute' constitutional.
However, in Locklin, section 415.111(5) had no specific laws as a back
drop. Instead, the statute criminalized any "illegal" act in using or
193. Rodriguez dealt with a challenge to Florida Statutes section 409.325(2)(a) (Supp.
1976). Id. at 158. Present Florida Statutes section 409.325(2)(a) still contains this
challenged statutory language. FLA. STAT. § 409.325(2)(a) (1994).
194. Rodriguez, 365 So. 2d at 159.
195. 30 So. 2d 102 (1947).
196. Id. at 103 (citing FLA. STAT. § 839.22 (1945)).
197. Id.
198. The court did not specifically note this as the reason for finding the section
constitutionally infirm, but its opinion implies this was so. There also appears to be another
vagueness problem with the section. Did "law" mean Florida law, federal law, or any state's
law? The section did not make this clear.
199. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 23-24.
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managing the funds of a criminal person. This statute was thus found too
vague to give sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct involved.200
The Supreme Court of Florida did suggest methods for drafting a
similar statute so that challenges to its constitutionality could be avoided.
First, the court noted that there were at least seven other states with similar
statutes to those in Florida.20 ' However, it also noted that none of the
statutes which were worded similar to Florida's statute inflicted criminal
sanctions.21 One state, Illinois, did impose criminal sanctions for finan-
cial exploitation of the elderly.203 However, the Illinois statute was quite
specific in defining the conduct prohibited. This statute made it a crime
when a person "knowingly and by deception or intimidation obtains control
over the elderly or disabled person's property with the intent to permanently
deprive . . . [that person] of his property. 2t 4  The statute specifically
defined what constituted "intimidation" and "deception., 25 Additionally,
the Illinois statute provided that someone who made a good faith effort to
manage an elderly or disabled person's property could not be subject to
criminal liability under this law.2° The Supreme Court of Florida noted
that in contrast to the Illinois law, Florida's law "contains no clear
explanation of the proscribed conduct, no explicit definition of terms, nor
any good faith defense. 20 7  Thus, this statute was unconstitutionally
vague.
20 8
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this discussion was the supreme
court's criticism of section 415.111(5) for its failure to provide a good faith
defense. The court seems to be clearly suggesting that any such law, to be
constitutional, must contain a specific, instead of a general, intent require-
ment.209 Evidently, without such a requirement, the Supreme Court of
Florida feared that such a criminal provision would be a strict liability law.
Thus, a guardian who failed to manage the funds of a disabled person in a
200. Id. at 24.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, (Smith-Hurd 1993)).
204. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 24 n.3 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/16-1.3
(Smith-Hurd 1993)).
205. Id. at 24.
206. Id. at 24-25.
207. Id. at 25.
208. Id.
209. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 23. The Illinois law not only contained a statutory "good
faith" exemption, but it also was clearly a specific intent law as it required "the intent to
permanently deprive." Id. at 24 n.3.
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manner required by law could find him or herself criminally liable even
though there was no intent to injure the ward in any manner. Clearly, the
intent of this law seems to protect elderly or disabled persons from
intentional financial abuse by their guardians or other individuals in charge
of them or their property. One of the statute's obvious goals is to protect
elderly or disabled persons against the theft or deprivation of their property.
Thus, in a way, former section 415.111(5) could be viewed as a special kind
of theft statute. The Supreme Court of the United States has previously held
that statutes comparable to common law theft crimes must contain a specific
intent requirement in order to be constitutional.21 Although the Supreme
Court of Florida does not say this explicitly in Cuda, any legislative attempt
to rewrite section 415.111(5) would be wise to contain such a requirement.
During the 1995 legislative session, the Florida Legislature attempted
to deal with the effects of this decision. The legislature first repealed the
language in section 415.111(5) which was found unconstitutional in
Cuda 1' The legislature then created a new chapter, chapter 825, to
address the problems found in Cuda.2" 2 New Florida Statutes section
825.103(1)(a) makes it a crime for anyone who "[s]tands in a position of
trust and confidence, or has a business relationship, with the elderly person
or disabled adult and knowingly"2 3 uses deception or intimidation to
obtain that person's property for the temporary or permanent use of the
offending person or a third person. The offense can be either a first, second
or third-degree felony depending upon the value of the property in-
volved.214 The language of section 825.103(1)(a) is very similar to that
of the Illinois statute noted with approval in Cuda. While the Illinois statute
only dealt with permanent deprivation, Florida criminal law recognizes that
even a knowing temporary deprivation of another's property for the benefit
of someone other the owner is theft. Additionally, section 825.101
specifically defines "deception," "intimidation," "position of trust and
210. See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
211. Ch. 95-140, §4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 104, 105 (West).
212. Ch. 95-158, §§ 2-8, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1263, 1264 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 825.101-825.106, 39.0001).
213. Id. § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1266 (to codified at FLA. STAT. §
825.103(1)(a)).
214. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.103(2)(a)-(c)). If the property is valued
at $100,000 or more, the crime is a first-degree felony. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
825.103(2)(a)). If the property is less than $100,000 but at least $20,000, the crime is a
second-degree felony. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.103(2)(b)). If the property's
value is less than $20,000, the offense is a third-degree felony. Ch. 95-158, § 4, 1995 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. at 1266 (to be codified at FLA.. STAT. § 825.103(2)(c)).
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confidence," and "business relationship," thus following the Illinois example.
Finally, Florida Statutes section 825.105, addresses the last problem noted
in Cuda. Good faith efforts which do not result in effective assistance or
management of property are not subject to criminal sanctions. In short,
chapter 825 clearly seems to have been drafted and passed with the Cuda
decision in mind. Indeed, given the supreme court's decision in Cuda,
vagueness challenges to Florida Statutes section 825.103(1)(a) should be
swiftly and correctly rejected.215
B. Right to Privacy Challenges to Crimes Involving Sexual
Relations with Children
As previously noted, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two cases
concerning the constitutionality of statutes involving sexual relations with
children. Surprisingly, the court arrived at diametrically opposed results.
The first case, Jones v. State,2 16 involved the constitutionality of Florida
Statutes section 800.04, concerning a lewd, lascivious or indecent assault or
act upon or in the presence of a child.217  The second case, B.B. v.
State,2" 8 involved the constitutionality of section 794.05, concerning carnal
intercourse with an unmarried person under eighteen years,219 when
applied to consensual sexual relations between minors. Both constitutional
challenges in these cases were predicated upon the right to privacy
amendment of the Florida Constitution.220  Both defendants argued that
the supreme court's decision in re T. W.,221 which struck down statutory
barriers to a minor's right to have an abortion without parental approval,
mandated that both section 800.04 and section 794.05 be declared unconsti-
215. Florida Statutes section 825.103(1) actually establishes two offenses against
elderly or disabled adults. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.103(1)(a), (b)). Section
825.103(1)(b) makes it a crime to obtain the property of an elderly or disabled person for
someone else's benefit, when the person obtaining "[k]nows or should know" that the victim
"lacks the capacity to consent." Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.103(1)(b)). "Lacks
capacity to consent" is specifically defined in section 825.101(9). Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. at 1264 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 825.101(9)). This offense is a felony
whose degree depends on the value of the property involved. Although this offense was not
discussed in Cuda, section 825.103(1)(b) also appears to have been drafted with the Cuda
decision in mind. Vagueness challenges to its constitutionality should also be easily rejected.
216. 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
217. Id. at 1085 (citing FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991)).
218. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
219. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1991)).
220. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
221. 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989).
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tutional. In T.W., the challenged statutory provision allowed the minor to
consent, without parental approval, to any medical procedure except an
abortion.2 2  In declaring this statutory prohibition unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the Florida constitutional right to
privacy is extremely broad and applies to both adults and minors.223 Since
minors enjoyed the constitutional right to privacy as well as adults, the court
in T.W. considered whether the State had an overriding state interest that
could restrict the minor's right to an abortion.224 Finding no such compel-
ling interest, the court found that the statute in question there unconstitution-
al.2
25
1. Lewd, Lascivious, or Indecent Assault Upon a Child
Florida Statutes section 800.04 criminalizes various sexual acts with
children under sixteen. In Jones v. State, the defendant was charged under
section 800.04(2) for having sexual relations with a minor under six-
teen. 26 Jones argued that based upon the expansive right to privacy for
minors announced in T.W., that portion of section 800.04 providing that
consent is not a defense to sexual relations with minors must also be
considered unconstitutional.227 Jones admitted to having sexual relations
with a person under sixteen but was denied at trial the right to raise this
person's consent as a defense. The district court of appeal framed the issue
as "whether a minor under sixteen years of age has a right, protected by
Florida's constitutional right of privacy, to engage in consensual sex. 228
If so, this right could not be denied by prosecuting a person with whom the
minor had sexual relations, thus mandating that the particular language of
section 800.04 be considered unconstitutional. Jones argued that in this
case, the minors had not been harmed and that they had wanted to engage
in personal sexual relations. Therefore, the minors did not want any of the
222. Id. at 1189-90.
223. Id. at 1193.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1194.
226. See Jones v. State, 619 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted,
629 So. 2d 133 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Rodriguez v. State, 629 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1993), and
affid, Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
227. Id. at 419. The specific language Jones challenged was that "[n]either the
victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crime proscribed by this
section." FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991).
228. Jones, 619 So. 2d at 420.
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protection offered by the statute. The district court found this irrelevant and
upheld the section's constitutionality.229
The Supreme Court of Florida found that the purpose of the law was
to protect minors from "sexual exploitation, physical harm, and sometimes
psychological damage, [stemming from sexual relations], regardless of the
child's maturity or lack of chastity. 230  The court noted an important
distinction between the statute involved in T.W. and the section involved
here. In T.W., the pregnant minor could consent to any number of surgical
medical procedures except an abortion. Thus, she had been statutorily
granted the right to consent with respect to certain procedures and was only
denied the right to have an abortion. As the supreme court noted, "[In re]
T.W. did not transform a minor into an adult for all purposes.,,23' The
court noted that the right of privacy granted to minors did not vitiate all
legislative authority to protect minors from the conduct of others, especially
when the conduct involves an adult, as opposed to a minor.232 As a result,
the court found a compelling state interest in protecting children from sexual
activity and exploitation before they physically and mentally reach
23323
maturity. Therefore, section 800.04 was declared constitutional.2 4
2. Carnal Intercourse with Unmarried Person Under
Eighteen Years
Following the decision in Jones, the Supreme Court of Florida in B.B.
v. State2 35 considered a similar constitutional attack on section 794.05.
This attack was once again predicated on the In re T.W. decision and the
Florida Constitution's privacy amendment. Factually, there appears to be
one significant difference between the two cases. In Jones, the consensual
sexual relations occurred between an adult and a minor under sixteen years
of age. In B.B., the consensual sexual relations occurred between two
sixteen-year-olds. Also, unlike section 800.04 in Jones, section 794.05
protects only previously chaste minors under eighteen, and not all minors in
general. Thus, the supreme court found that the issues in the two cases
were very different. The court phrased the issue as "whether a minor who
229. Id. at 422.
230. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994).
231. Id. at 1087.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258-59.
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engages in 'unlawful' carnal intercourse with an unmarried minor of
previous chaste character can be adjudicated delinquent of a felony of the
second degree in light of the minor's right to privacy guaranteed by the
Florida Constitution.236
As in Jones, the court found that the defendant here had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in carnal intercourse.237 Thus, the question again
was whether there could be a compelling state interest restricting this
expectation. The court, as in Jones, recognized that a minor's right to
engage in sexual intercourse is not absolute and can be restricted.238
However, unlike the decision in Jones, the court found that, as applied to
the facts of this case, the state had failed to carry its burden to adjudicate
the minor delinquent as a second-degree felon.239 The court found that a
much different situation exists when there are minor/minor sexual relations
as opposed to adult/minor sexual relations.2' In the adult/minor situation,
as in Jones, prevention of the adult's sexual exploitation of the minor is the
compelling reason for the statute's constitutionality. 24' However, in the
minor/minor situation, the State has an interest in protecting both minors
from sexual activity for reasons of health and quality of life.242 Thus,
since the interest of both minors were involved in B.B., prosecuting one of
them was not considered the least intrusive means of furthering the State's
compelling interest.243
The B.B. court also criticized the statutory language of Florida Statutes
section 794.05. The court found that this section only applied to previously
chaste minors, and not all minors.2' Thus, the purpose of the statute
could not be to protect all minors from sexual activities, since it only
applied to those who had not previously engaged in sexual activities.
Instead, the court found that the statute, as applied here, was being used "as
a weapon to adjudicate a minor delinquent. 245  Thus, the statute was
declared unconstitutional.246
236. Id. at 258.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 259.
239. Id.
240. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 259-60.
245. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260.
246. Id.
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Despite some misleading newspaper headlines,247 the decision in B.B.
does not legitimize all consensual sexual relations between minors. As
Justice Kogan pointed out in his concurring opinion, section 800.04 might
serve, in certain situations, to provide a vehicle for prosecution.24 Under
that statute neither the victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is
a defense. Admittedly, Jones did not consider a minor/minor sexual relation
situation. However, the court could possibly find that sexual relations
between a sixteen-year-old or a seventeen-year-old minor and one under the
age of sixteen are much different than the situation confronting it in B.B.
In the former situations, the older minor clearly could be statutorily
presumed as being the more mature party, thus meriting prosecution despite
the consent of his/her sexual partner. At any rate, the supreme court did not
rule on this particular question in B.B., so it remains to be settled in future
cases.
C. Improper Delegation of Powers
During this survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida had a rare
opportunity to discuss the delegation of powers doctrine in the context of a
criminal case. The delegation doctrine is based upon the principle of
separation of powers. Under this principle, one branch of government
cannot exercise the powers of another branch. In B.H. v. State,24 9 the
Supreme Court of Florida, in an interesting discussion of apparent first
impression, addressed the issue of how extensive a role an administrative
agency may take in defining the elements of a crime.
Former Florida Statutes section 39.061, which is part of the Florida
Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990,250 made it a third-degree felony to
"escape from any secure detention or any residential commitment facility of
restrictiveness level VI or above . .,."" Former Florida Statutes section
39.01(61)252 defined "restrictiveness level' 253 and required the state
247. See Mark Silva, Sex Between Youths Ruled Legal, MIAMI HERALD, June 30,
1995, at 5B.
248. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260 n.2 (Kogan, J., concurring).
249. 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2559 (1995).
250. Id. at 987 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.0205 (Supp. 1990)).
251. FLA. STAT. § 39.061 (1991).
252. Id. at 989 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.01(61) (1991)). The definitions contained
in Florida Statutes section 39.01 apply to chapter 39 as a whole.
253. "Restrictiveness level" was defined as: "[The identification of broad custody
categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and secure
residential." B.H., 645 So. 2d at 989 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.01(61) (Supp. 1990)).
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Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") to establish
various restrictiveness levels, as long as no more than eight such levels were
established. Pursuant to this authority, the department had established four
restrictiveness levels, numbered two, four, six, and eight. B.H. had pled
nolo contendere, with leave to challenge the constitutionality of former
section 39.061 on appeal, involving a charge of escaping in March, 1992
from a level six juvenile facility. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
rejected the claim that this law represented an unconstitutional delegation of
power.254 The Supreme Court of Florida granted review due to the
conflict between this and another district court of appeal decision.255
Before deciding this precise question, the supreme court reviewed what
the delegation doctrine is based upon. Under the Florida Constitution, all
political power belongs to the people,26 and it is for them to say how
these powers may be exercised. The court noted that Florida has established
a three-part government based upon the separation of powers doctrine.
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution expressly divides the state
government into three branches; legislative, executive, and the judicial.5 7
This article and section expressly provide that "[n]o person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches
unless expressly provided herein. 258 Thus, the Florida Constitution has
textually adopted a strict separation of powers doctrine. If any state statute
attempts to give to one branch power assigned to another branch by the
Florida Constitution, then that statute represents an unconstitutional delega-
tion of powers. Under the Florida Constitution,5 9 the legislature has the
power to pass laws and to declare what these laws are. Any delegation of
this power violates the constitution. The supreme court found that this
legislative power encompasses the ability to define criminal defenses. In the
area of criminal law, the court noted that the concept of separation of
powers in the non-delegation doctrine is also linked to the constitutional
guarantee of due process. This due process guarantee is found in article I,
section 9 of the constitution and requires that a criminal statute reasonably
254. B.H. v. State, 622 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 632 So.
2d 1025 (Fla.), approved in part, 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2559 (1995).
255. D.P. v. State, 597 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
256. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
257. Id. art. II, § 3.
258. Id.
259. Id. art. III, § 1.
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apprise citizens of the acts that it prohibits.2 ° When the legislature by
statute delegates to another branch of government the power to define what
a criminal offense is, both the non-delegation and the due process doctrine
are violated. Under these doctrines, the attempt to give an administrative
agency the authority to define what is criminal would be clearly unconstitu-
tional.
The Supreme Court of Florida in B.H. found that both the due process
and the non-delegation doctrines were violated by former Florida Statutes
section 39.061.261 The statute declared that escape from a residential
commitment facility of restrictiveness level six or above was a felony.
However, the statute did not attempt to define what such residential
commitment facilities were. Instead, the legislature gave to HRS the ability
to define restrictiveness levels in terms of broad custody categories based on
the needs of the children. The only limitation on this authority was that
there could be no more than eight such restrictiveness levels. The court
found that while this delegation may have created a minimum standard, it
did not create a maximum standard beyond which HRS could not go.262
While B.H. did not address the general issue of "how much of a role may
administrative agencies take in defining the elements of crime,"' 63 the
supreme court did state that any delegations "must expressly articulate
reasonably definite standards of implementation that do not merely grant
open-ended authority, but that impose an actual limit-both minimum and
maximum -on what the agency may do."2" Here, former section 39.061
imposed a minimum limit but did not impose any maximum restriction on
the ability of HRS to define restrictiveness levels. In essence, HRS was
improperly delegated the ability to define an essential element of what
constituted juvenile escape in Florida, thus causing that part of the statute
to be unconstitutional.
Former Florida Statutes section 39.061 not only criminalized escape
from a juvenile commitment facility, but it also made it a crime to escape
from a secure detention facility. While there was no improper delegation
of legislative authority as far as the definition of what constituted a secure
detention facility the supreme court felt that it could not sever the unconsti-
260. Id. art. I, § 9.
261. B.H., 645 So. 2d at 993-94.
262. Id. at 994.
263. Id. at 990. The court did note that it believed that "[ilt clearly is impossible to
adopt a single bright-line test to apply to all alleged violations of the nondelegation doctrine."
Id. at 993.
264. Id. at 994.
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tutional part of section 39.061 from the rest of the statute. If such a
severance was performed, it would be a crime to escape from a pretrial
secure detention facility, but not from a post-trial commitment facility. This
situation created an absurd situation which the legislature could not have
intended. Thus, the entire statute was found unconstitutional.265
Although the B.H. decision provides an instructive and interesting
discussion of the delegation doctrine, as applied to the criminal law, its
result is of little practical effect for two reasons.26 First, the court's
conclusion that former section 39.061 was unconstitutional did not help B.H.
in any way. In addition, the supreme court in B.H. decided that declaring
former section 39.061 unconstitutional did not automatically leave Florida
without a statute governing an escape from a juvenile commitment facility.
Instead, the court found that under the doctrine of statutory revival, former
Florida Statutes section 39.112267 was automatically revived. This section
was the immediate past predecessor of the unconstitutional section 39.061
and was itself constitutional. Thus, Florida still had a juvenile escape law
under which B.H. was found delinquent.2 68  Second, and even more
importantly, the Florida Legislature amended section 39.061 well before the
supreme court decided this case.269 Present section 39.061 makes it a
crime to escape from either a secure detention facility or from any
residential commitment facility defined in section 39.01 (58).270 These two
definitions do not delegate to HRS or any other administrative agency the
task of defining what constitutes such facilities. Instead, the two sections
265. B.H., 645 So. 2d at 994.
266. During this survey period, one district court of appeal did cite B.H. in its
decision finding that the language in former Florida Statutes section 790.001(4) partially
defining a "destructive device" for purposes of chapter 790 as including "any device declared
a destructive device by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms" was an improper
delegation of authority to an administrative agency. State v. Mitchell, 652 So. 2d 473, 478
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 790.001(4) (1991)). However, the court
found that this language could be severed from the rest of section 790.001(4). Id. When this
was done, the remaining definitions in this part met constitutional standards and survived.
Id. at 478-79.
267. FLA. STAT. § 39.112 (1989).
268. See also S.W.M. v. State, 647 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(upholding a conviction for escape from a halfway house in 1992). This case noted that B.H.
had declared former Florida Statutes section 39.061 unconstitutional but also noted that B.H.
had found the previous escape statute automatically by its decision. Id. Thus, the delinquen-
cy adjudication in S.W.M. was affirmed. Id.
269. See 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-287.
270. Ch. 95-152, § 12,1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1229, 1243 (West) (amending FLA.
STAT. § 39.061).
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provide criteria for establishing which children should be placed in these
facilities and examples of what kinds of programs fall within the parameters
of HRS authority. Thus, the unconstitutional delegation problems found in
B.H. do not exist under the present version of section 39.061.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida yearly decides a number of important
cases in the field of substantive criminal law. Certainly this statement was
true for the period covered by this survey. The majority of the court's
opinions settled more issues than they raised. Unfortunately, even after
Young27 and Bias,272 there still remain serious issues to explore regard-
ing both felony petit theft charges, and the voluntary intoxication and
insanity defenses.
In the decisions addressing constitutional challenges to some of
Florida's substantive criminal laws, the supreme court's detailed opinions in
both Cuda,273 regarding exploitation of the elderly and disabled, and in
B.H.,274 regarding escape from juvenile commitment facilities, provided
extensive guidance on how to correct the constitutional deficiencies found
there. Thus, the Florida Legislature was able to respond quickly and
effectively to pass new laws in these areas which should withstand future
constitutional challenges.
271. 641 So. 2d at 401.
272. 653 So. 2d at 380.
273. 639 So. 2d at 22.
274. 645 So. 2d at 987.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past, "domestic violence" meant violence within the home which
causes death or injury to another. Past policy assumed the victim to be a
wife and the perpetrator to be a husband,' and depended upon preconceived
notions of gender roles and unexamined assumptions about the structure and
nature of the family. In many domestic violence cases, the traditional
family has changed or disappeared. Often, violence occurs between people
who live together but who are not married. The genders of the victim and
perpetrator also are not necessarily fixed. In fact, the gender of the parties
may be the same. Accordingly, the notions of "victim" and "perpetrator"
have thus evolved.
If alignments of gender, victim, and perpetrator have changed, so has
our understanding of domestic violence. Traditionally, violence has been
understood to mean physical death or injury. However, violence, as now
addressed in the Florida Statutes, takes several forms and is to be viewed
in light of its potential social consequences. Domestic violence affects the
stability and success of marriages, and a variety of familial and economic
relationships. Domestic violence also alters psychological growth patterns
in children. Family ties become dysfunctional and torn, which jeopardizes
long-term relationships. While physical injuries may seem short-lived, the
mental and emotional effects of domestic violence often cause long-term
psychological harm, which impacts on existing and future generations.
Children have always been participants in domestic violence as both
victims and witnesses of what occurs. Not only do children become victims
of direct physical violence, they become victims of indirect physical
violence by experiencing the effects of physical violence upon a parent or
caretaker. Children also become victims of direct and indirect emotional
violence, as well. Violence resulting in the collapse of families affects
children in multiple ways, including their development into psychologically
healthy adults.2 Moreover, we now know that young victims of domestic
violence often become abusers themselves.
1. LEwis OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 3 (1986).
2. RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 91 (1988)
[hereinafter GELLES & STRAUS].
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Physical forms of domestic violence rely upon and exalt brute strength.
Accordingly, physical forms of domestic violence send dangerous messages
that: 1) physical strength and brute force are appropriate communicators in
resolving conflicts; 2) whoever is physically strongest prevails; and 3)
whatever the dispute or circumstances, violence is an acceptable means of
resolving disputes. In such cases, physical strength defines roles and
capabilities. Children, the elderly, and women often lack physical strength"
commensurate with the abuser. Lack of physical prowess marks and
measures the vulnerability of victims. In domestic violence situations, the
stronger individual is superior.
These messages and public tolerance of domestic violence degrade the
social fabric and undermine public understanding that reason should be the
basis for decision making and dispute resolution. Reason is one of the
principal bases of the law. In addition, public tolerance or silence about
domestic violence leads to profound economic and social costs, including
disregard for the law. Many victims and perpetrators who are arrested lose
days of work. As a result, families lose income. Furthermore, physical and
mental injuries increase medical costs to victims and the nation. The loss
of even one productive person, whether adult, elderly, or child, is high.
In response to the social and economic costs of domestic violence,
Florida enacted legislation in 1992 which addressed a range of domestic
violence issues and problems. These laws were later amended in 1994 and
1995. In making these changes, the Florida legislators attempted to amelio-
rate prior laws that did not adequately protect victims. Thus, to achieve this
end, Florida's new legislation placed additional responsibilities on judges,
police officers, prosecutors, and clerks of the court.
It is the legislature's intent that domestic violence be treated as an
"illegal act" rather than a "private matter."3 As a result of this policy, the
legislature also expanded and altered the traditional view of what constitutes
domestic violence as well as who may be regarded as a victim or perpe-
trator.
The time has come to test the efficacy of the new language in Florida's
domestic violence statutes. Do the new statutes effectively communicate the
legislature's goals to those charged with administering and interpreting
them? Do those affected by the new statutes understand them and feel
capable of enacting and obeying them? This article examines these
questions both analytically and empirically. Specifically, this article
proposes that although the legislature may have attained its goal in passing
3. FLA. STAT. § 741.2901(2) (Supp. 1994).
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laws protecting victims in domestic violence situations, the legislature failed
to effectively communicate those aims to its many audiences.
This article further asserts that the term "domestic violence" is both
inadequate and deceptive, and as such, lessens the significance of the crimes
it purports to designate. Such crimes should be taken seriously and should
be classified under standard language used to describe violent acts. The
term "domestic violence" is unnecessarily soft and distinguishes assault and
battery in the home from traditional assault and battery. Finally, this article
suggests that Florida's statutes should be further refined to assist those who
must comply with its provisions.
Part II of this article presents an historical survey of how women and
other victims of domestic violence have been treated from ancient times to
the present. Part III offers a close study of Florida's domestic violence
statutes by comparing the 1991 statutory language with changes enacted
between 1992 and the present, a period during which sweeping reforms
occurred in Florida. In addition, Part III analyzes the language of individual
statutes, paying close attention to structure, form, and style.
To detehmine the clarity of Florida's statutory language, this article
considers elements of structure and style, including the use of nouns, verbs,
qualifiers, nominalizations, powerful speech, powerless speech, hypercor-
rectness, complex syntax, direct syntax, motifs, values, and morals. This
section also defines how the new statutory provisions impact those affected
most: namely, victims, judges, police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, clerks
of the court, and society in general. Specifically, Part III tests the effective-
ness of the new statutes on its intended audiences.
Part IV of this article advocates the elimination of the term "domestic
violence" because it seems to separate crimes of domestic violence from
other crimes such as assault and battery. Including battery upon one's
spouse within the realm of domestic violence, rather than under the general
battery provisions of the Florida Statutes, suggests that the crime is different
and less serious. In truth, however, the crimes are one and the same. Thus,
this section proposes either a change in, or an elimination, of the statutory
title of "domestic violence."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The word family, for many, represents warm memories, a safe haven,
and the American dream. For others, however, this dream has become a
nightmare. Family violence is a serious and seemingly intractable problem
in the United States which transcends race, religion, age, gender, and socio-
economic strata. Its occurrence is nondiscriminatory, frequent, and
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widespread. What once was shrouded in secrecy is now reported daily by
the media. Violence exists not only among strangers, but among family
members.
The term "domestic violence" summarizes, includes, and supersedes
expressions like wife beating, battered woman, intimate violence, physical
violence, spouse abuse, and family violence. Collectively, these terms
describe domestic violence between spouses, family members, and opposite
sex partners. Domestic violence is not a private matter protected from
society's views of the sanctity of the home. Rather, it involves crimes
where the victim either knows, or is related to, the perpetrator.
Because family violence is both personal and subjective, it is frequently
unreported. Shame often prevents the victim from seeking assistance.
Denial sometimes causes a victim to interpret acts of aggression as typical
rather than criminal. For example, Gilda Berger, author of Violence in the
Family, writes that "national statistics give only incomplete estimates of the
incidence and extent of family violence. 4 In 1984, the Attorney General's
Task Force on Family Violence Final Report disclosed that "[r]oughly 20
percent of all murder victims in the United States are related to their
assailants;"5 and "[a]bout 1.5 million children are seriously abused each
year by their parent, guardian, [or some other person]."6 Likewise, in her
book The War Against Women, Marilyn French states that a man beats a
woman every twelve seconds.7 Ann Jones, author of Next Time, She'll be
Dead, chronicles the alarming escalation of violence against women in
Massachusetts. Her statistics indicate that in 1989, a woman was slain by
her husband or boyfriend every twenty-two days.9 In 1990, this number
decreased to one slaying in every sixteen days, and one in every nine days
in 1992.10 Regrettably, violence between family members is on the
increase.
To address the present needs of families ravaged by domestic violence,
one must understand the history of domestic violence. Violence in the home
is not a new or recent phenomenon, particularly violence against women.
For centuries, men were encouraged to beat their wives and children as a
4. GILDA BERGER, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 10 (1990).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 11.
7. MARILYN FRENCH, THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN 187 (1992).
8. ANN JONES, NExT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING AND How TO STOP IT 7
(1994).
9. Id.
10. Id.
1995]
125
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
right of entitlement by gender, for social, economic, political, and psycho-
logical power." Physical beating was an accepted corollary of male
dominance.
A. Spouse Abuse
1. Violence Against Women
According to Lewis Okun, author of Woman Abuse: Facts Replacing
Myths,1 2 abuse of women can be traced back to 753 B.C. to the reign of
Romulus. 13 Romulus established rules making the husband the sole head
of the household and his wife his possession. A wife had no legal rights
and was not viewed as a separate entity. A wife's misbehavior could,
therefore, result in punishment by her spouse because husbands were held
accountable for their wives' actions. In an effort to insure conformity,
Roman law gave the husband the legal right to punish his wife physically
for various infractions. These laws were known as the "Laws of Chastise-
ment." Roman law further mandated inequalities in sentencing. If a wife
committed adultery or drank wine, for example, she faced the death penalty.
However, if her husband did the same thing, he would go unpunished. 4
Okun states further that after the Punic Wars in 202 B.C., conditions
in the family changed and afforded some freedom to women.' 5 Widows
who previously had no rights became property owners. In addition, wives
were allowed to sue their husbands if they had been unjustly beaten. While
the laws of Rome regarding the treatment of women relaxed slightly over
time, the rise of Christianity reaffirmed male dominance and soundly
supported patriarchal authority. 6 Okun points out that while the teachings
of Jesus Christ support equality in marriage, the early church fathers did
not.'7 The New Testament is replete with statements that encourage female
11. LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIvEs 251 (1988).
12. OKUN, supra note 1.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3.
17. OKUN, supra note 1, at 3. The church's support of wife abuse is clearly outlined
in the Rules of Marriage, written by Friar Cherubino Siena in the second half of the fifteenth
century. Okun quotes Siena:
When you see your wife commit an offense, don't rush at her with insults and
violent blows .... Scold her sharply, bully and terrify her. And if this still
doesn't work ... take up a stick and beat her soundly, for it is better to punish
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servitude. For example, in I Peter 3:1, the apostle said "ye wives, be in
subjection to your own husbands[.]' 8 Religion continued to influence the
treatment of women throughout the sixteenth century.19
The Laws of Chastisement remained firmly intact for centuries,
spanning through several cultures. Wives were considered chattel and
remained legally deprived of the rights possessed by men. For example, the
"Rule of Thumb" tenet, a part of British common law, allowed beatings of
one's wife with a stick no greater in circumference than her husband's right
thumb.2" Maria Roy, author of Children In the Crossfire, states that "[t]his
regulation was considered to be a lenient piece of legal reform."" Linda
Gordon states that the Rule of Thumb is evidence of the extremes in
women's suffering, humiliation, and powerlessness in prior years.22 At that
time, there were no restrictions limiting brutality against women. Women
were at the mercy of men. Opposition to the Rule of Thumb came from
women themselves and through the support of the patriarchal community.23
The patriarchal community did not defend the legitimate issue of women's
rights, rather it supported its long-established practice, considered to be
unwritten law, through its customs and bargaining aimed at regulating social
issues within their community.24 Even the modifications which resulted,
however, encouraged the brutality to continue.
It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that reform began to
produce changes in the treatment of women in both England and America.
In 1861, English philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote The Subjection of
Women which resulted in tremendous controversy. Mill's words, even
the body and correct the soul. . . . Readily beat her, not in rage but out of
charity... for [her] soul, so that the beating will redound to your merit and her
good.
Id. at 3 (quoting Friar Cherubino Siena, Rules of Marriage).
18. Id. (quoting I Peter 3:1).
19. Id. at 3-4. This influence stemmed from the rise of Protestantism in 1517 in
Wittenberg, Germany, and England, and in 1536 during the rise of Calvinism in Switzerland.
20. MARIA Roy, CHILDREN OF THE CRossFiRE 38 (1988).
21. ldi
22. GORDON, supra note 11, at 256.
23. Id The enforceability of the "Rule of Thumb" was challenged by women willing
to defend themselves and who were supported by their allies within the patriarchal
community. The patriarchal community is defined as a system larger than any individual
family having established regulations followed by all members. Patriarchal fathers controlled
their households but were subject to sanctions-social control-by the community. Id.
24. Id.
25. OKUN, supra note 1, at 5.
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though written over a century ago, have "lost little of their relevance" in
today's society.26 Mill wrote:
When we consider how vast is the number of men, in any great country,
who are little higher than brutes, and that this never prevents them from
being able, through the law of marriage, to obtain a victim, the breadth
and depth of human misery caused in this shape alone by the abuse of
the institution swells to something appalling.
The vilest malefactor has some wretched woman tied to him, against
whom he can commit any atrocity except killing her, and if tolerably
cautious, can do that without much danger of the legal penalty.'
Seventeen years following Mill's scathing commentary on the plight of
battered women, Frances Cobbe wrote Wife Torture in England.28 Cobbe
condemned the brutality of blue collar husbands in Liverpool and labeled
their community a "kicking district."29 The writings of these advocates,
plus Queen Victoria's rise to power, resulted in the enactment of new laws
that raised the status of women in England. 0
In the United States, wife beating was effectively illegal in most states
by the year 1870, with the exception of Mississippi.3" Wife beating had
become a disreputable, seamy practice. Women began seeking protection
from child abuse agencies and by the late nineteenth century, women sought
protection in small campaigns that fought for increased criminal prosecutions
and severe sentences for wife beaters, including corporal punishment. The
awareness of wife beating was masked by the growing concern over child
abuse. Both forms of abuse, however, simultaneously made substantial
progress toward becoming less tolerable and illegal although spanking a
child was still acceptable. Domestic violence was a source of concern
throughout the nineteenth century women's rights movement. It was
indirectly addressed through temperance, child welfare, and social purity
campaigns, and only marginally addressed through direct lobbying for
legislation or judicial reform.32
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 63-65 (1861)).
28. Id. (citing FRANCES COBBE, WIFE TORTURE IN ENGLAND (1878)).
29. Id. (citing EMERSON R. DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES
(1979)).
30. OKUN, supra note 1, at 5.
31. GORDON, supra note 11, at 254.
32. Id.
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Unfortunately, socialization in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century witnessed a lack of progress and concern for the
victimized woman. By 1910, most states granted divorce for physical
abuse.33 In the 1930s, women had to allege child abuse in order to get
agency help.34 However, subsequent investigations revealed that the actual
abuse was against the wife.3" This treatment continued throughout the
1930s. During that time, women were more likely to be protected by the
court system on issues such as nonsupport than for physical violence.36
Women believed in the support offered through social services. 7 These
agencies sent messages that the court system offered more protection on
issues of support than protection from physical abuse.38 Ironically, after
women's suffrage, the issue lay dormant for five decades.39 Spouse abuse
flourished behind closed doors and remained a private matter between a
husband and a wife.4' For some, the marriage license was a license to beat
or even to kill.
History confirms that the single most important factor influencing
renewed interest in the-plight of battered women was the emergence of the
women's liberation movement during the 1970s and the associated changes
in media coverage.4 Only when countless women found courage to
defend themselves did the nation become aware of the devastating scope of
domestic violence. Media attention focused first on rape victims and then
on battered women.4' By 1976, high circulation newspapers and maga-
zines began printing articles detailing wife abuse.43 In addition, broadcast
journalists reported nightly on incidents of wife abuse. These broadcasts
were particularly compelling because the words were enhanced by graphic
visual images of brutality. Thereafter, television talk shows and television
movies began exploring the issue of domestic violence.
Arguably, the most effective media messages concerning domestic
violence were two movies which told the stories of Francine Hughes and
Tracey Thurman. Together, these films left an indelible mark upon society's
33. OKUN, supra note 1, at 6.
34. GORDON, supra note 11, at 259.
35. Id at 259-60.
36. Id at 258.
37. Id at 258-59.
38. Id
39. OKUN, supra note 1, at 6.
40. Id at 6-7.
41. Id at 7.
42. JULIE BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INJUSTICE 10 (1989).
43. Id
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collective consciousness. In 1987, viewers watched the torture of a
Michigan housewife named Francine Hughes in the television movie titled
The Burning Bed based on the book by Faith McNulty." The film was
widely seen and garnered much praise for its graphic depiction of domestic
violence. A second television movie titled A Cry for Help: The Tracey
Thurman Story aired in October 1989. 4" Thus, media attention immeasur-
44. FArTH MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED (1980). Hughes' story differed from others
that the public had previously seen and heard. After years of agonizing torment, Francine
stopped the abuse. On March 9, 1977, she poured kerosene on the floor surrounding the bed
where her ex-husband Mickey was sleeping. She then lit a match, dropped it, and fled her
home with her children. Later, she drove to the local sheriff's office and confessed to
burning her husband. Both her house and her ex-husband were destroyed in the fire.
Gelles and Straus, authors of Intimate Violence, note that "the Francine Hughes case
unfolded just as feminists across the country were striving to define wife battering as a major
social problem." GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 2, at 134. Furthermore, the Hughes story
set legal precedent. First, Hughes killed her ex-husband as he slept, not during a beating or
rape. JONES, supra note 8, at 102. Second, her defense was temporary insanity, which
Hughes claimed resulted from years of her ex-husband's abuse. Id. Third, the jury was
permitted to hear evidence that Hughes had been seriously and routinely beaten. Finally, and
most importantly, Francine Hughes was acquitted. Id. at 103.
45. A Cry for Help: The Tracey Thurman Story (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 2,
1989). The movie claimed that Thurman's case was distinctive because the Torrington,
Connecticut Police Department apathetically responded to Thurman's telephone calls for help.
Separated for eight months from her husband, Charles "Buck" Thurman, who had beaten her
violently over a period of a year, Tracy lived at a friend's home with her young son.
Repeatedly and publicly, her husband threatened to kill her. Because of these threats, Tracey
repeatedly asked the Torrington police to enforce her court order. The police ignored her
requests.
On June 10, 1993, Tracey called for help for the last time. She begged police to arrest
Buck, who was standing outside her home and screaming to see her. Before responding to
the call, however, the officer dispatched to the scene stopped at the police station to use the
bathroom. JONES, supra note 8, at 50. Twenty-five minutes later, the officer sat in his patrol
car and watched as Tracey fled from Buck as he chased, beat, and stabbed her 13 times with
a knife. The officer finally left his vehicle and disarmed Buck, but did not arrest him.
Instead, the officer watched Buck kick his wife, break her neck, and then seize their child.
More officers arrived at the scene and watched. It was not until Buck tried to attack Tracey
as she was being lifted into the ambulance that he was arrested, 45 minutes after Tracey had
placed the call. Id. at 51.
Miraculously, Tracey survived, though she is disfigured and permanently paralyzed on
the right side of her body. Courageously, she testified against Buck who received a 15 year
sentence. In 1985, Tracey sued the City of Torrington for violating her constitutional right
to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. This landmark case settled for 1.9
million dollars in damages against 24 police officers for negligently failing to protect Tracey
Thurman and her son from the violent acts of her husband. As a result of Tracey Thurman's
ordeal, officers in Connecticut, pursuant to the "Thurman Law," are now mandated to arrest
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ably enhanced public awareness of the widespread social problem of
domestic violence.
2. Husband Abuse and Partner-to-Partner Assault
An historical discussion of spouse abuse would not be complete without
examining husband abuse and partner-to-partner assault. While the number
of such incidents is small compared to wife battering, husband abuse and
partner-to-partner assault are just as violent and devastating. Instances of
husband abuse are "much harder to trace" and "not written into law
throughout Western history."46 The only known historical reference to
husband beating is Charivari, a ceremony popular in France during the
Middle Ages.47 Charivari was a means of publicly ridiculing a husband for
allowing his wife to abuse him.48 The husband's punishment for becoming
a victim was to be further victimized through the sneers and derision of his
community.49
Some believe that the negative stigma associated with husband battering
is due to a lack of reporting these incidents. The perception is that a
husband's masculinity diminishes or is questionable, while his wife's
abusive behavior increases her power and control. Others simply choose to
ignore the existence of husband abuse. In 1975, however, the National
Family Violence Survey confirmed that a "substantial number of women hit
and beat their husbands."'5  Studies done since that time support this
finding. Another 1975 survey found that "nearly three-fourths of the
violence committed by women is done in self-defense.""1  Gelles and
Straus state that "more often than not a wife who beats her husband has
herself been beaten. Her violence is the violence of self-defense., 52
Partner-to-partner assault also exemplifies violence between intimates.
The term "partner" is gender neutral and generally refers to violent
homosexual relationships. In homosexual relationships, blows are no less
painful to the victim and the drama is no less devastating to the child who
offenders in "cases of probable domestic violence." Jeanie Park & Susan Schindehette, et
al., Thousands of Women, Fearing for Their Lives, Hear a Scary Echo in Tracey Thurman's
Cry for Help, PEOPLE WKLY., Oct. 9, 1989, at 112, 113.
46. OKUN, supra note 1, at 1.
47. Id.
48. Id
49. Id at 1-2.
50. GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 2, at 90.
51. Id
52. Id
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witnesses it. Ann Jones writes that "the cultural repression of homosexuals
trivializes violence within the homosexual community and writes off its
victims, presenting immensely complicated problems to those who need help
and must seek it from public authorities. 53 As with most abuse, partner-
to-partner assault is typically under reported. Fear of nonacceptance, or fear
of a homophobic response, prevents many victims from reporting.
However, much is yet to be learned about domestic violence in same
sex relationships. To date, the most interesting aspect of lesbian and gay
domestic violence is that it questions the widespread belief that violent
behavior is a matter of gender and largely attributable to males. Domestic
violence in same sex relationships supports the theory that violence is an
issue of power and not of gender or sexual orientation.
B. Child Abuse
Similar to abuse against women, child abuse is rooted in history. In
ancient times, children were considered the property of their fathers.54 As
such, they could be killed, sold, or abandoned. Infanticide, defined as the
murdering of infants, was seen as a means of birth control and was encour-
aged by ancient cultures. In some groups, babies were slaughtered to
appease the gods for famines or diseases. 6 Abandonment was another
common practice for those seeking to rid themselves of children. Babies
were left at designated drop-off sites "where they could be rescued by
childless couples or sold off to slavery or beggarhood.'57
It was not until the 1960s that child abuse was recognized in America
as a social problem of national proportions.58  Experts agree that the
publication of C. Henry Kempe's The Battered Child Syndrome was
responsible for focusing legal, social, and ethical attention upon the plight
of American children. 9  Kempe's words shocked his readers when he
likened "child abuse to other diseases as a common killer of children."' 6
Author Maria Roy attributes the public outcry against child battery to
television, whose "[p]ictures had enormous impact on our social and moral
53. JONES, supra note 8, at 84.
54. ROY, supra note 20, at 32.
55. Id. at 33.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 35.
59. BERGER, supra note 4, at 26-27.
60. Id. at 27 (citing C. HENRY KEMPE, THE BATrERED CHILD SYNDROME (1962)).
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conscience." 61 Public outcry on behalf of America's battered children
amplified with the rise of the women's movement in the late 1960s.62 As
advocates spoke out, public awareness heightened.63 Despite this new
vision, however, the problem nevertheless persists today. Child abuse and
spouse abuse too often are seen as separate social problems.
While spouse abuse and child abuse are the two most common types
of intrafamily violence, sibling and elderly abuse are also common forms of
violence. Gelles and Straus describe violence between siblings as the "most
common and most commonly overlooked form of family violence."'
While society perceives fighting among children as the norm, surveys show
that "[t]hree siblings in one hundred used weapons. '65 Experts interpret
this to mean that nationally, "more than a hundred thousand children
annually face brothers or sisters with guns or knives in their hands. 66
Regardless of whether the victim is an adult or a child, violence in the
home continues to claim countless families each year. Lifetimes of abuse
are endured in the false hope of a brighter tomorrow. For some, tomorrow
never comes. The effects of family violence are so far-reaching that no
member of society remains untouched. Absenteeism from jobs and loss of
productivity are common among victims in the work force. Low school
attendance or inappropriately aggressive behavior in the classroom often are
characteristics of child abuse victims.
Only when society has zero tolerance for domestic violence will it
cease being the pervasive destroyer it is. It is incumbent that the stronger,
members of society empower the weaker, thereby strengthening society as
a whole. When one child is beaten in body or spirit, when one grandparent
is derided or duped, or when one wife is battered or broken, we all share the
pain.
Il. FLORIDA'S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATUTES
The Florida Legislature enacted domestic violence statutes in 1984 and
1991. Since 1991, multiple changes to the statutes have occurred providing
victims of domestic violence with new protections and rights. The
following discussion focuses on eight domestic violence statutes. Each
61. ROY, supra note 20, at 35.
62. Id. at 35-37.
63. IML at 36-38.
64. GELLES & STRAUs, supra note 2, at 59.
65. l at 60.
66. IM.
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discussion recommends ways to strengthen the language of the new statutory
provisions.
A. Standards for Judges in Domestic Violence Cases
The purpose of section 25.385 of the Florida Statutes is to enable the
Florida Court Educational Council ("FCEC") to "establish standards for
instruction of circuit and county court judges" in handling domestic violence
cases. 67 The statute requires judges to receive education in the area of
domestic violence.68 The section also redefines the terms "domestic
violence" and "family or household member."69
Subsection 23.385(1) of this statute clearly contains mandatory
language. It requires that the council "shall establish standards ... and..
• shall provide such instruction on a periodic and timely basis."7 This
language compels judges to receive additional education, thereby strengthen-
ing Florida's law. However, a further revision should be to make time
tables specific and establish mandatory dates by which standards will be
created. Furthermore, the word "periodic" and the phrase "timely basis"
should be changed because these terms are too vague for a statute that
attempts to provide mandatory requirements.
In Florida, county judges also handle domestic violence cases.
Therefore the words "and county judges" were a necessary addition. The
concise wording of subsection 23.385(1) shows the legislature's intent that
all members of the judiciary who will hear domestic violence cases receive
special, uniform training provided by the FCEC.
Subsection 23.385(2) provides definitions of "domestic violence" and
"family or household member." To reduce excess verbiage, however, this
section could simply refer to section 741.28,71 which also defines these
terms. In a new and changing area of law such as domestic violence,
however, including definitions of these terms in each statute may aid the
reader who is new to this field of law, or a lay person. Therefore, including
these definitions would be beneficial.
67. FLA. STAT. § 25.385(1) (1993). Under subsection 23.385(1), "[t]he Florida Court
Educational Council shall establish standards for instruction of circuit and county court
judges who have responsibility for domestic violence cases, and the council shall provide
such instruction on a periodic and timely basis." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 25.385(2)(a)-(b).
70. Id. § 25.385(1).
71. FLA. STAT. § 741.28(1)-(2) (Supp. 1994).
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B. Availability of Judges for Hearings
Section 26.20 requires that in circuits with more than one circuit judge,
at least one judge in each circuit be available twenty-four hours each day of
the year to address domestic violence emergencies. 2 Such availability is
necessary to issue temporary injunctions in situations requiring them. Twen-
ty-four-hour availability is the judiciary's first line of defense between the
assailant and the victim. A judge can issue a temporary order prohibiting
any contact between the parties. This act may save a victim from further
injury or even death. From the assailant's point of view, judicial action may
prevent him or her from committing an act that could lead to criminal
sanctions.
It is certainly advantageous to the victim to always have available at
least one judge, whether it be a circuit or county judge, to hear motions for
ex parte temporary injunctions. Before the legislature enacted this change,
no judges were available to hear temporary injunctions on weekends, after
hours, or on holidays. Unfortunately, domestic violence does not keep a
schedule. Prior to any statutory revisions, a victim who could have turned
to the court after hours, would do so to no avail because judges could not
provide proper protection. It was absurd that victims could only receive
emergency aid from a judge if they were attacked during business hours.
Thus, the addition to the statute requiring judges to be available "around-
the-clock" was certainly necessary because the law now provides an
immediate remedy for battered victims. Nevertheless, the language of the
statute could be modified further to more precisely articulate that the number
of judges available is based on the size of the circuit.
The legislature thought time constraints were important enough to
include mandatory language in the statute. The statute states that "judges
shall be available . . . to hold and conduct hearings in chambers."73
Furthermore, "there must be at least one judge available.., to hear motions
.. . in domestic violence cases."74 The statute has numerous gaps that
72. FLA. STAT. § 26.20 (1993). The statute states that:
In circuits having more than one circuit judge, at least one of said judges shall
be available as nearly as possible at all times to hold and conduct hearings in
chambers. In each circuit, there must be at least one judge available on
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and after hours on weekdays to hear motions for
a temporary injunction ex parte in domestic violence cases. The chief judge may
assign a judge for this purpose.
Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
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could affect a potential victim. For example, the last sentence of the statute
fails to define who the available judge must be. The last sentence of the
statute further states that "[t]he chief judge may assign a judge for this pur-
pose."75 Unlike the first two sentences of the statute which use mandatory
language, this provision bestows upon the chief judge in each circuit the
discretion to decide which judge will be on call for domestic violence cases
that occur after hours. The word "may" is less definite than the word
"shall." Thus, by using weaker terminology in lieu of the stronger,
mandatory language, a gap occurs which could be unfavorable to a potential
victim of domestic violence.
Potential problems could arise where the chief judge in a circuit does
not assign a judge. The statute would have been more effective if it had
required that the chief judge assign a judge instead of making the decision
discretionary. Discretion should be left to deciding who the most qualified
judges are, or which judges have special training in domestic violence cases.
However, regardless of which factors affect the decision, the chief judge
should be required to make that decision. This requirement would
effectively strengthen the statute and would be more indicative of a statute
which the legislature clearly thought of as indispensable.
C. Definition of Domestic Violence
The 1994 version of section 741.28 of the Florida Statutes defines
domestic violence as "any assault, battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, or
any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of one family or
household member by another who is or was residing in the same single
dwelling unit. ' 76  The definition, however, fails to define the word
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (Supp. 1994). The entire section reads:
(1) "Domestic violence" means any assault, battery, sexual assault,
sexual battery, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of
one family or household member by another who is or was residing in the same
single dwelling unit.
(2) "Family or household member" means spouses, former spouses,
persons related by blood or marriage, persons who are presently residing
together as if a family or who have resided together in the past as if a family,
and persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been
married or have resided together at any time.
(3) "Department" means the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
(4) "Law enforcement officer" means any person who is elected,
appointed, or employed by any municipality or the state or any political
subdivision thereof who meets the minimum qualifications established in s.
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"residing." Thus, it is unclear whether a person must be at a residence for
a particular period of time in order to reside there or whether staying at a
residence only one day a week qualifies as "residing." It is also unclear
whether there are certain requirements that both the victim and the
perpetrator would have to comply with in order to satisfy the residing
requirement.
The 1995 amendments to this section also failed to define the term
"residing." However, the amendments extended the defimition of domestic
violence to clearly include an array of criminal acts." For example, the
1995 amendment changed the section to explicitly define specific conduct
or behavior that constitutes domestic violence, such as sexual assault, sexual
battery, and stalking.7 8 The terms "sexual assault, sexual battery, or any
criminal offense, resulting in physical injury or death . . . ."' are much
more inclusive and powerful. Domestic violence encompasses a wide range
of offenses. Therefore, it is different from acts that must involve sexual
behavior in order to constitute a crime. Sexual assault and battery are
crimes in and of themselves and should not be grouped under any other type
of heading, nor should they be limited to acts of domestic violence.
The legislature also failed to define the term "assault." If the spirit of
the legislative amendments is to make language powerful, then a powerful
definition of "assault" is necessary. For example, by defining the term
"assault" as the "fear of bodily harm," this would distinguish assault from
a less serious act, such as being screamed at by another. This definition
could help policymakers clear the muddy waters that often engulf defining
acts of domestic violence.
Subsection 741.28(2) defines "family or household member" as
"spouses, former spouses, persons related by blood or marriage, persons who
are presently residing together as if a family or who have resided together
in the past as if a family, and persons who have a child in common
regardless of whether they have been married or have resided together at
any time."' A definition of the term "residing" should also be included
943.13 and is certified as a law enforcement officer under s. 943.1395.
Id.
77. Recently, § 741.28 was amended to include aggravated assault, aggravated battery,
stalking, and aggravated stalking within the realm of domestic violence. Ch. 95-195, § 1,
1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1393, 1394 (West) (amending FLA. STAT. § 741.28(1) (Supp.
1994)) (effective July 1, 1995).
78. Id
79. FLA. STAT. § 741.28(1) (Supp. 1994).
80. FLA. STAT. § 741.28(2) (Supp. 1994).
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in this section. Nevertheless, the phrase "family or household member" is
all-encompassing in that it includes persons who have a child in common
regardless of whether they have ever "resided" together. The change from
"person's spouse" to "family or household member" reveals the Florida
Legislature's desire to protect all members of the home. In fact, it
recognizes that domestic violence is not limited to the marital relationship.
The language encompasses persons in the household such as nieces,
nephews, foster children, or children in temporary custody. The previous
statute left many people who were affected by domestic violence unprotect-
ed. The fact that the legislature left this definition intact in the 1994 and
1995 legislative sessions signifies its belief that this definition offers the
most protection.
D. Investigating and Reporting Incidents of Violence
1. Investigation Guidelines
Section 741.29 establishes new guidelines for law enforcement officers
who investigate domestic violence cases."1 This section ensures the rights
and remedies of the victim, while also concentrating on the victim's medical
needs. 82 The first sentence of the section states that "[a]ny law enforce-
ment officer who investigates an alleged incident of domestic violence shall
assist the victim to obtain medical treatment if such is required as a result
of the alleged incident to which the officer responds. 8 3 However, this
sentence is vague and raises a number of questions. First, the meaning of
the phrase "assist the victim to obtain medical treatment" is both unclear and
unspecific. The statute fai ls to specify: 1) who will pay for the ambulance,
hospital, and doctors if the victim cannot; 2) what happens when the victim
is afraid to seek the necessary medical attention; and 3) how much
discretion does the investigating officer have in assisting the victim. These
questions must be addressed. Nevertheless, the first three lines of this
subsection offer the victim bold, new, and humane medical assistance when
required.
The last sentence of subsection 741.29(1) also contains one of the finest
pieces of legislation to originate from the domestic violence statutes. It
requires that the notice to the victims, entailing their legal rights and
81. Id. § 741.29.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 741.29(1).
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remedies, provide a general summary in simple English or Spanish."4
There are approximately eighteen million Hispanics in this country, many
of whom either live in or visit Florida. In Florida alone, Hispanics comprise
almost fourteen percent of the national population of Hispanics. Thus, the
use of simple English and Spanish in the notice is significant since not all
victims of domestic violence have mastered the English language. Many
immigrants speak and understand limited English at best. Furthermore,
many people born and raised in the United States will also benefit from the
use of simple English rather than complex statutory language.
Ideally, a model notice form would guarantee that each victim receives
the same effective communication concerning his or her rights. Some law
enforcement agencies have dispensed with this standard model form, while
others have not. Thus, the change in the wording of the statute from "as a
model form to all law enforcement agencies" to "as a model form to be used
by all law enforcement agencies" should have the effect of creating the
desired uniformity among the various agencies.
Section 741.29 requires that the notice include a resource listing,
including the telephone number for the local domestic violence center
designated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
("HRS"). s5  This provision, however, raises several questions. For
example, does the resource listing requirement mean that the victim must go
through HRS first before going to another center, or does HRS merely give
the victim a listing of all abuse centers? By mandating that a resource
listing be provided to the victim, the legislature is attempting to induce the
victim to obtain the appropriate and necessary counseling.
Paragraph (1)(b) of section 741.29 requires that a copy of the following
statement be included in the notice. It states that:
IF YOU ARE THE VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, you may
ask the state attorney to file a criminal complaint. You also have the
right to go to court and file a petition requesting an injunction for
protection from domestic violence which may include, but need not be
limited to, provisions which restrain the abuser from further acts of
abuse; direct the abuser to leave your household; prevent the abuser
84. Id. The section states:
The [D]epartment [of Law Enforcement] shall revise the Legal Rights and
Remedies Notice to Victims to include a general summary of s. 741.30 using
simple English as well as Spanish, and shall distribute the notice as a model
form to be used by all law enforcement agencies throughout the state.
FLA. STAT. § 741.29(1) (Supp. 1994).
85. Ma § 741.29(l)(a).
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from entering your residence, school, business, or place of employment;
award you custody of your minor child or children; and direct the
abuser to pay support to you and the minor children if the abuser has
a legal obligation to do So.16
This section sets forth, in straightforward language, several important
rights of the victim. Nevertheless, additional punctuation would help clarify
the rights specified by the legislature. For example, a colon placed after the
phrase "but need not be limited to" would make the sentence more precise.
Moreover, successive numbers instead of semicolons would further clarify
the various rights. Clearer punctuation would enable the reader to better
perceive distinct breaks in the statutory language and would help the reader
(and potential victim) to understand that not every sentence necessarily
applies to them.
The last sentence, permitting the victim to "direct the abuser to pay
support to [the victim] and the minor children if the abuser has a legal
obligation to do so[,] T87 is also confusing. This sentence would be clearer
if it included a list of examples that constitute "legal obligations." The
provision concerning payment to minor children raises additional unan-
swered questions, such as, whether payment can be made directly to minor
children, 8 and how the children must be related to the abused person.
Once these questions are answered, an additional question arises as to whom
should the money go. Efforts to simplify this language will, in turn, help
victims of domestic violence.
2. Mandatory Written Police Reports
Subsection 741.29(2) requires investigating officers to file a written
police report, regardless of whether an arrest was made. 9 Furthermore, the
86. Id. § 741.29(1)(b).
87. Id.
88. The answer to this question is probably no.
89. FLA. STAT. § 741.29(2) (Supp. 1994). The statute reads as follows:
When a law enforcement officer investigates an allegation that an incident of
domestic violence has occurred, the officer shall handle the incident pursuant to
the arrest policy provided in s. 901.15(7)(a), and as developed in accordance with
subsections (3), (4), and (5). Whether or not an arrest is made, the officer shall
make a written police report as part of the field arrest and incident reporting
form and as prescribed by the department of the alleged incident which clearly
indicates that the alleged offense was an incident of domestic violence. Such
report must include:
(a) A description of physical injuries observed, if any.
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report must contain a description of physical injuries observed by the law
enforcement officer, the reasons why an arrest was not made, and a state-
ment indicating that a copy of the legal rights and remedies notice was
given to the victim.90 This last requirement, amended in 1994, is different
from the earlier version of the statute because it requires officers to make
a statement, in writing, signifying that the victim has received the notice of
his or her rights.91 This, in turn, ensures that the officer will remember to
give the victim the notice because the officer must do so in order to
properly complete the report.
The legislature revised subsection 741.29(2) to require investigative
officers to list the physical injuries observed on the victims.92  This
requirement serves several functions. First, it may later give the officer who
responded to the incident an opportunity to refresh his or her memory by
referencing certain facts. If a trial results from the incident, specific
memories may allow the officer to give specific testimony. Second, the
injury report may assist in a medical diagnosis. If a victim of domestic
violence refuses treatment for injuries, a detailed report as tQ the time and
cause of the injury may later assist the treating physician in arriving at an
accurate diagnosis. This injury report also protects a potential defendant
because the statute requires an officer to document the injuries, or the lack
(b) If an arrest was not made, an indication by the law enforcement
officer, in writing, of the reasons why an arrest was not made.
(c) A statement which indicates that a copy of the legal rights and
remedies notice was given to the victim.
Whenever possible, the law enforcement officer shall obtain a written statement
from the victim and witnesses concerning the alleged domestic violence. The
officer shall submit the report to the supervisor or other person to whom the
employer's rules or policies require reports of similar allegations of criminal
activity to be made. The law enforcement agency shall, without charge, send a
copy of the initial police report, which excludes victim/witness statements or other
materials that are part of an active criminal investigation and are exempt from
disclosure under chapter 119, to the nearest locally certified domestic violence
center within 24 hours after the agency's receipt of the report. The report
furnished to the domestic violence center must include a narrative description of
the domestic violence incident.
Id.
90. See id § 741.29(2)(a)-(c).
91. See Ch. 94-135, § 2, 1994 Fla. Laws 750, 752 (amending FLA. STAT. § 741.29(2)
(Supp. 1994)).
92. Id
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thereof, that result from the domestic violence incident.93 This prevents a
victim from linking an injury resulting from some other cause to the one to
which the police responded.
However, there are potential problems with the police documentation
requirement. First, a police officer has only his or her training and
experience to rely upon when documenting these injuries. Police officers
do not always have formal medical training which would allow them to
determine the cause of the injury. Second, if the police do not witness the
occurrence of the injury, the cause and the surrounding circumstances may
pass undetected. However, these potential problems are relatively minor.
The legislature has taken important steps to aid in the reporting of domestic
violence incidents by the police. Thus, these positives far outweigh any
potential negatives.
The practice of requiring officers to include reasons why an arrest was
not made serves to prevent any arbitrariness by the investigating officer in
handling incidents of domestic violence and to preclude any tendency to
treat domestic violence as private family matters. 94 The requirement serves
as a policy statement encouraging arrests.
Other positive changes to the law include obtaining written statements
from victims and witnesses, and furnishing copies of the initial police report
to the domestic violence center within twenty-four hours of the agency's
receipt of the report.95 Obtaining written statements from victims and
witnesses allows for better documentation of the incident. By gathering
information close to the time of the incident, the officers can more aptly
record details while they are still fresh in the minds of the victim and
witnesses. Moreover, if the incident leads to a trial, these reports may be
used to refresh recollection or even to impeach a witness who changes his
or her story.
By providing notice to the domestic violence center, the center can take
immediate action in accordance with its policies.96 The statute also
requires that the domestic violence center be provided with a narrative of the
incident. This requirement is a change from the previous version of the
statute which only required that the police submit a copy of the police report
to the center.97  The purpose behind the old provision was to ensure
93. See FLA. STAT. § 741.29(2)(a) (Supp. 1994).
94. See id. § 741.29(2)(b).
95. Id. § 741.29(2).
96. See id.
97. See FLA. STAT. § 741.29(2) (1991); see also Ch. 91-210, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws 2040,
2042.
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continued integrity of the investigation. However, the 1994 amendment is
an important addition because in requiring the narrative, the legislature
realized that the more information the centers have about the incident, the
more effective their assistance will be. Thus, the legislature appears to have
imparted to the police the need for swift action in domestic violence cases.
In 1991, the legislature adopted subsection 741.29(3).9' This was the
first indication of Florida's new pro-arrest stance on domestic violence. The
statute, which is unchanged from its original date of enactment, states that:
Whenever a law enforcement officer determines upon probable cause
that an act of domestic violence has been committed within the
jurisdiction the officer may arrest the person or persons suspected of its
commission and charge such person or persons with the appropriate
crime. The decision to arrest and charge shall not require consent of
the victim or consideration of the relationship of the parties.9
Prior to this addition, the prosecution was forced to accede to the
victim's decision not to press charges because any reason offered by the
victim for not pressing charges aborted the prosecution. Fear, intimidation,
hope of reconciliation, and countless other reasons offered by the victim
prevented the prosecution of perpetrators. The 1991 version, however, took
the ominous decision of whether to prosecute away from the victim.1" By
allowing prosecutors to go forward with the prosecution over the victim's
objections, the legislature is sent the message that the crime is against both
the state and the victim, and not just the victim alone.
However, this pro-prosecutorial stance is flawed. Realistically, if a
victim does not want to press charges or testify, a prosecutor may not
proceed very far because, often, the only witnesses to these actions are the
abuser and the victim. Assuming the abuser will not testify against himself,
the victim is the only remaining witness. Thus, the victim's refusal to
cooperate may thwart the legislature's attempt to initiate a pro-prosecutorial
stance.
Subsection 741.29(4) involves a probable cause determination before
making an arrest.'01 The section also raises questions because the lan-
guage is unclear. The statute states that "[w]hen complaints are received
98. Ch. 91-210, § 2, 1991 Fla. Laws at 2042 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.29(3)
(1991)).
99. FLA. STAT. § 741.29(3) (Supp. 1994).
100. See FLA. STAT. § 741.29(3) (1991).
101. FLA. STAT. § 741.29(4) (Supp. 1994).
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from two or more parties, the officers shall evaluate each complaint
separately to determine whether there is probable cause for arrest.""' 2
First, it is not clear whether the phrase "two or more parties" refers to
the parties' spouses, witnesses, or children. Second, it is equally unclear
which officers evaluate whether probable cause exists. Since the legisla-
ture's goal is to eliminate the deference given to the police, more specific
language should have been used. A better method would be to require a
supervisor or an individual with special experience or training in domestic
violence cases to make the probable cause determination.
Finally, subsection 741.29(5) refers to the potential liability of police
officers in domestic violence cases. 3 The section provides that "[n]o law
enforcement officer shall be held liable ... for an arrest based on probable
cause." Effective July 1, 1995, this section grants police officers civil
immunity for good faith enforcement of the court orders and service of pro-
cess.'" Therefore, this section encourages arrests where the situation war-
rants it. Without this immunity from suit, police officers might be reluctant
to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence, thus, rendering the legislature's
pro-prosecutorial stance ineffective.
E. Prosecuting Domestic Violence Cases
Section 741.2901 sets out certain guidelines that all state attorney
offices should follow in prosecuting domestic violence cases." The
section requires the state attorney's office to take a pro-prosecutorial stance
in all cases and to investigate the defendant's history." Subsection
741.2901(1) of this statute states that "[e]ach state attorney shall develop
special units or assign prosecutors to specialize in the prosecution of
domestic violence cases, but such specialization need not be an exclusive
area of duty assignment. These prosecutors, specializing in domestic
violence cases, and their support staff shall receive training in domestic
violence issues."'10 7
Structural changes to this section are necessary to clarify the vague and
ambiguous language. For example, the phrase "in smaller counties" could
be added after the word "assignment." Thus, larger counties with available
102. Id. § 741.29(4).
103. Id. § 741.29(5).
104. Ch. 95-195, § 2, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1394 (amending FLA. STAT. §
741.29(5) (Supp. 1994)).
105. FLA. STAT. § 741.2901 (Supp. 1994).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 741.2901(1).
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resources would be required to form special prosecutorial units specializing
in domestic violence. Smaller counties, on the other hand, could allocate its
prosecutors to cases involving domestic violence as well as other areas.
Section 741.2901(1) could also be modified to include specific criteria
for training. This would make training uniform throughout the state. For
example, after the word "training," the subsection could be revised to state
specific expectations during training, including the length of training
required, the degree of intensity, and the form of training necessary.
Subsection 741.2901(2) finally addresses the legislature's concern with
removing the historical belief that domestic violence is limited to the domain
of the family. The 1994 version of the statute provided that:
It is the intent of the Legislature that domestic violence be treated as an
illegal act rather than a private matter, and for that reason, indirect
criminal contempt may no longer be used to enforce compliance with
injunctions for protection against domestic violence. The state attorney
in each circuit shall adopt a pro-prosecution policy for acts of domestic
violence .... The filing, nonfiling, or diversion of criminal charges
shall be determined by these specialized prosecutors over the objection
of the victim, if necessary.10 8
The purpose of this section was to end the cycle of tolerance afforded
to domestic violence by law enforcement officers and victims alike. This
section attempted to abolish the mistaken belief that domestic violence
removes the sole provider or breadwinner from the home, effectively
breaking up the family and impairing it economically. The law now aims
to impart the view that laws are broken when a person takes it upon himself
or herself to strike someone or put another's life in jeopardy.
The most significant change to this section of the statute in the last year
is evidenced by the recent amendment reimplementing the indirect criminal
contempt provision." Section 741.2901(2) had previously prohibited use
of indirect criminal contempt as a means of enforcing compliance with the
protective injunctions.110 Under the 1994 version, a violation of an injunc-
tion for protection against domestic violence had to be handled by the state
attorney's office. Furthermore, it removed the judge's power to hold a
respondent in criminal contempt for violating an injunction for protection
108. Id. § 741.2901(2).
109. Ch. 95-195, § 3, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1395 (amending FLA. STAT. §
741.2901(2) (Supp. 1994)).
110. See FLA. STAT. § 741.2901(2) (Supp. 1994).
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against domestic violence.' However, the 1995 amendment restored the
indirect criminal contempt provision as a statutorily recognized enforcemeht
tool. As a result of this amendment, the power to enforce the injunction for
protection against domestic violence is once again in the hands of the
judiciary. Because the judiciary makes the initial determination of whether
an injunction is necessary, it is only natural that the judiciary be responsible
for enforcement as well.
Subsection 741.2901(3) requires the state attorney's office to conduct
a full investigation into a perpetrator's background specifically searching for
past criminal misconduct, including any instances of domestic violence."
2
A thorough investigation provides vital information for the court to
determine whether there is a pattern to the violence. The statute requires
that "It]his information shall be presented at first appearance, when setting
bond, and when passing sentence, for consideration by the court." 3
These procedural steps enable a judge to make an informed decision about
the disposition of the defendant. Accordingly, a judge will know the defen-
dant's history before she sets bond" 4 or passes sentence. Furthermore,
this knowledge may help a judge decide whether to depart from the
sentencing guidelines.
111. Id.
112. Id. § 741.2901(3). The statute now provides that:
Prior to a defendant's first appearance in any charge of domestic violence as
defined in s. 741.28, the State Attorney's Office shall perform a thorough
investigation of the defendant's history, including, but not limited to: prior
arrests for domestic violence, prior arrests for nondomestic charges, prior
injunctions for protection against domestic and repeat violence filed listing the
defendant as respondent and noting history of other victims, and prior walk-in
domestic complaints filed against the defendant. This information shall be
presented at first appearance, when setting bond, and when passing sentence, for
consideration by the court. When a defendant is arrested for an act of domestic
violence, the defendant shall be held in custody until brought before the court for
admittance to bail in accordance with chapter 903. In determining bail, the court
shall consider the safety of the victim, the victim's children, and any other
person who may be in danger if the defendant is released.
Ch. 95-195, § 3, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1395.
113. FLA. STAT. § 741.2901(3) (Supp. 1994).
114. The 1995 amendment requires that the defendant be brought before a judge and
then admitted to bail. The judge must consider the safety of the victim, the victim's
children, and anyone else who may be in danger if the defendant is released. Ch. 95-195,
§ 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1395.
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F. The Role of the Judiciary
Section 741.2902(1) now states that "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature,
with respect to domestic violence cases, that at the first appearance the court
shall consider the safety of the victim, the victim's children, and any other
person who may be in danger if the defendant is released, and exercise
caution in releasing defendants."' 1
5
This addition to Florida's domestic violence statute is a crucial change.
A judge must first consider the safety of the victim, his or her children, or
any other person who may be in danger, in determining whether to release
an abuser. It is clear from this language that the legislature intended to
enhance victim safety. Nevertheless, the sentence requiring courts to
"exercise caution in releasing defendants" raises significant questions. For
example, it is unclear whether this section was intended to be merely a
reminder or a directive to judges. The language would have been more
instructive if it had listed with specificity the type of caution required;
whether a domestic violence offender should be treated differently than any
other violent offender; or whether a trial court can deny pretrial releases in
domestic violence cases where one is charged with a misdemeanor battery,
detention for which is based on a threat of harm.
The court in Swanson v. Allison".6 was called upon to decide similar
questions involving this statute. In Swanson, the defendant was arrested for
"domestic violence battery," the statutory equivalent of simple battery." 7
During first appearance, the judicial officer detained the defendant and
ordered a domestic violence investigation. The defendant then filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus to obtain his pretrial release. The
defendant was subsequently granted this release."'
In making its determination, the court first looked at the Constitution
of Florida."9 The court held that:
The Constitution of the state of Florida provides that every person
charged with a non-capital offense not punishable by life imprisonment
is entitled to pre-trial release on reasonable conditions .... Before
denying pre-trial release because of the threat of harm to the communi-
ty, the court must make several findings, including that the present
charge is a "dangerous crime." Although the Legislature's definition of
115. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 741.2902 (Supp. 1994)).
116. 617 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
117. Id. at 1100.
118. ML
119. Id. at 1100-01.
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"dangerous crime" includes the felony offense of aggravated battery, we
find no constitutional or statutory authority for denying pre-trial release
to one charged with misdemeanor battery, where the detention is based
on a threat of harm finding. 20
The court further held that if section 741.2902(1) is being used to
detain those charged with simple batteries arising from domestic disputes,
"the statute is being unconstitutionally applied.'' The court was troubled
by the charge of "domestic violence battery" and the subsequent use of this
term.
122
[The defendant] was arrested and charged with "domestic violence
battery," there is no such statutory offense. It appears that certain law
enforcement officials, prosecution units, and courts have in effect
created the offense of "domestic violence battery" to place the burden
on those arrested to demonstrate that pre-trial release would pose no
threat of harm."3
The court drew a definite line between felony and misdemeanor pretrial
release." It failed to see any distinction between misdemeanor battery
resulting from domestic violence and misdemeanor battery resulting from
any other incident."5 The court stated that:
When a person is charged with a serious offense arising out of a
domestic dispute, such as aggravated battery, we have no qualms with
pre-trial detention if the state can prove the necessity for such action.
However, any policy authorizing the denial of pre-trial release for those
charged with simple battery based on a finding of potential harm is
unconstitutional. 126
This case seems to stand for the proposition that in the eyes of the
court, as far as pretrial release is concerned, a stricter standard does not
necessarily apply simply because an offense involves domestic violence.
120. Id. at 1100 (citations omitted).
121. Swanson, 617 So. 2d at 1101.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Swanson, 617 So. 2d at 1101.
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Subsection 741.2902(2) relates to protective injunctions in domestic violence
situations. 27
Paragraph (a) requires judges to first consider the safety of the victim
of domestic violence first." It allows the judge to remove the perpetrator
of the violence from the home, separating the parties and allowing the
victim to remain at home. Thus, it is the perpetrator who must find another
place to stay and not the victim. The recent amendments to this subsection
further emphasize the importance of the victim's safety by requiring the
judge to note the inherent danger in allowing the respondent even partial
access to the house.129
Paragraph (b), requiring the parties to understand the terms of the
injunction, is also important because it protects the rights of both the victim
and the perpetrator. In requiring the court to ensure that both parties under-
stand the terms of the injunction and the penalties for noncompliance, the
victim is better protected because she knows exactly what the perpetrator of
127. FLA. STAT. § 741.2902(2) (Supp. 1994). The subparts to subsection 741.2902(2)
now read as follows:
(a) Recognize that the petitioner's safety may require immediate removal
of the respondent from their joint residence and that there can be inherent danger
in permitting the respondent partial or periodic access to the residence.
(b) Ensure that the parties have a clear understanding of the terms of the
injunction and the penalties for failure to comply, and that the parties cannot
amend the injunction verbally, in writing, or by invitation to the residence.
(c) Ensure that the parties have knowledge of legal rights and remedies
including, but not limited to visitation, child support, retrieving property, and
counseling, and enforcement or modification of the injunction.
(d) Consider temporary child support when the pleadings raise the issue
and in the absence of other support orders.
(e) Consider supervised visitation, withholding visitation, or other
arrangements for visitation that will best protect the child and petitioner from
harm.
(f) Consider requiring the respondent to pay, to the clerk of the court
and sheriff, filing fees and costs waived pursuant to s. 741.30(2)(a), or to
reimburse the petitioner for filing fees and costs paid by the petitioner.
(g) Enforce, through a civil or criminal contempt proceeding, a violation
of an injunction for protection against domestic violence.
(h) Consider requiring the perpetrator to complete a batterers' interven-
tion program. It is preferred that such program be certified under section 16 of
this act.
Ch. 95-195, § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1395-96.
128. FLA. STAT. § 741.2902(a) (Supp. 1994).
129. See Ch. 95-195, § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1395 (amending FLA. STAT. §
741.2902(2)(a) (Supp. 1994)).
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the violence can and cannot do. This section also protects the perpetrator
by ensuring that he understands what the injunction means, and precludes
any subsequent arguments that one or more terms were misunderstood.
Another important provision within paragraph (b) is the recent amendment
prohibiting parties from amending "the injunction verbally, in writing, or by
invitation to the residence."1 3
0
Paragraph (c) requires the judicial system to ensure that all parties
involved are apprised of their rights.131  This is important because many
victims of domestic violence are not always informed of their rights and
may be too afraid to file charges in situations where the police were not
involved. The remainder of section 741.2902 mandates the court to consider
a number of factors before issuing an injunction. Namely, the court must
consider: 1) temporary child support for the children affected by domestic
violence; 32 2) visitation rights, focusing on the interests of the child; 33
and 3) who should pay the filing fees and court costs.13 4  The statute
recommends that the court either charge the respondent with responsibility
for any fees waived by statute or reimburse the petitioner for fees and costs
previously paid. 3
5
The recent amendments by the legislature reimplementing an indirect
criminal contempt provision also affected subsection 741.2902(2)(g). This
section provides judges with a powerful tool in enforcing protective
injunctions. The statute is further strengthened by the additional provision
suggesting that courts "[c]onsider requiring the perpetrator to complete a
130. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 741.2902(2)(b) (Supp. 1994)).
131. FLA. STAT. § 741.2902(2)(c) (Supp. 1994).
132. Id. § 741.2902(2)(d). Paragraph (d) makes sure that the children are supported and
provided for. Although children may not be direct victims of domestic violence, children are
certainly indirect victims. When one parent has to leave the home because of a court order,
the judge must consider and provide for the support of the children.
133. Id. § 741.2902(2)(e). Paragraph (e) accomplishes two things. First, the language
focuses on the safety of the children and victim by avoiding potentially high risk situations.
Second, the language provides for the safety of the victim and the children during visitation.
If the children's safety is in jeopardy, visitation can be denied. Visitation must take place
in such a way as to "best protect the child and the petitioner from harm." Id. This sentence
ensures that the victim will not be put in the same situation that led to the violence in the
first place.
134. Id. § 741.2902(2)(f).
135. FLA. STAT. § 741.2902(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). Paragraph (f) specifically requires the
court to consider whether the respondent should pay for all of the court filing fees. Id.
Since the court considers the financial status of both parties in making its determination, it
is logical to consider the economic burden carried by the victim, especially a victim with
children.
Vol. 20
150
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Rosman
batterers' intervention program." '136 These additions allow for stronger
enforcement of the protective injunctions.
G. Protective Injunctions
1. Statewide Procedures
Subsections 741.30(1)(a) and (b) previously defined terms contained
within this statute.137 However, the July 1994 amendments deleted the
definitions of both "domestic violence" and "family or household member"
and placed them in section 741.28 instead."' In deleting these definitions
from section 741.30, the legislature made reading the statute a bit cumber-
some. Because this statute is long and cumbersome, the omission of these
terms now requires the reader to turn repeatedly to another section to glean
their meaning.
In subsection 741.30(1), the legislature created a cause of action for an
injunction for protection against domestic violence.139 Paragraph (a) of the
section gives standing to the victim or potential victim of domestic violence
to petition the court for protection."4 So long as a petitioner has a cause
of action, the law mandates that the court hear the action.
Paragraph (e) of this section defines who may bring a cause of action.
The statute states that "[t]his cause of action for an injunction may be
sought by family or household members. No person shall be precluded
from seeking injunctive relief pursuant to this chapter solely on the basis
that such person is not a spouse. 14' Paragraph (e) is very important be-
cause it adds the phrase "by family or household members," which includes
unmarried persons. A broad interpretation of this section means that many
different categories of people will be allowed to seek injunctive relief.
Thus, the legislature recognized that people other than married couples live
136. Ch. 95-195, § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1396 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 741.2902(2)(h)).
137. FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (1991).
138. Ch. 94-135, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws at 751.
139. FLA. STAT. § 741.30(1)(a), (e) (Supp. 1994).
140. Id. § 741.30(1)(a). Paragraph (a) of the section states that:
Any person described in paragraph (e), who is the victim of any act of domestic
violence, or has reasonable cause to believe he or she is about to become the
victim of any act of domestic violence, has standing in the circuit court to file
a sworn petition for an injunction for protection against domestic violence.
Id.
141. Id. § 741.30(1)(e).
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together in domestic settings. This section demonstrates the legislature's
realization that many people may be victims of domestic violence and
should, therefore, be afforded proper protection.
The legislature, in its aim to protect victims of domestic violence, also
provides victims with the right to obtain an injunction for protection
regardless of whether they can afford it. Subsection 741.30(2)(a) provides,
in pertinent part, that:
In the event the victim does not have sufficient funds with which to pay
filing fees to the clerk of the court or service fees to the sheriff or law
enforcement agency and signs an affidavit stating so, the fees shall be
waived by the clerk of court or the sheriff or law enforcement agency
to the extent necessary to process the petition and serve the injunction,
subject to a subsequent order of the court relative to the payment of
such fees.'42
After the last word "fees" in this paragraph, however, the section
should state "pursuant to section 741.2902(2)(f)." Section 741.2902(2)(f)
requires the court to consider making the respondent pay the specified
fees. 143  By referencing to section 741.2902(2)(f, the reader will better
understand which fees the judge should consider.
In its July 1994 amendments, the legislature twice added the phrase "or
law enforcement agency" in section 741.30(2)(a)." Previously, the only
law enforcement officer mentioned in this section was the sheriff. Now all
law enforcement agencies are named or referenced. This addition is
important because by enhancing this section with "law enforcement agency,"
it means that any person who is elected, appointed, or employed by any
municipality meeting the minimum qualifications established in section
943.13, and who is certified as a law enforcement officer under section
943.1395, can waive fees. Before the July 1994 amendments, only the clerk
of the court or the sheriff had the authority to waive fees.
Subsection 741.30(2)(c), establishing duties of the clerk of the court,
was revised in 1995.145 The section provides new and expanded duties of
142. Id. § 741.30(2)(a) (emphasis added).
143. FLA. STAT. § 741.2902(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
144. Ch. 94-135, § 5, 1994 Fla. Laws at 755.
145. Ch. 95-195, § 5, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1396. Section 741.30(2)(c) now
provides:
1. The clerk of the court shall assist petitioners in seeking both
injunctions for protection against domestic violence and enforcement for a
violation thereof as specified in this section.
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the clerk of court in an effort to ease the process for the victim. For
example, this new section entitles petitioners to assistance in both seeking
146injunctions and enforcing violations of such injunctions. The new
section left unchanged the requirement that clerk must advise petitioners that
affidavits waiving filing fees are available in instances of insolvency and
indigence. 47 Without this knowledge, a victim might conclude that a lack
of money prevents them from getting assistance. However, the section fails
to offer examples of how the clerk might assist the petitioner. Thus,
language should be added to better define the clerk's role in assisting the
petitioner. The legislature should add the phrase "and assistance in their
completion, if necessary," at the end of the sentence in paragraph (1) so the
petitioner can be assured that assistance is available.
The remaining paragraphs within this subsection should also be
modified. To clarify the wording of the statute and reduce excess verbiage,
everything past the word "injunction" in paragraph (4) should be stricken.
The legislature should also define the phrase "privacy to the extent
practical." This phrase is vague because it fails to address how much
privacy the victim is to receive or whether the victim should be behind
2. All clerks' offices shall provide simplified petition forms for the
injunction, any modifications, and the enforcement thereof, including instructions
for completion.
3. The clerk of the court shall advise petitioners of the availability of
affidavits of insolvency or indigence in lieu of payment for the cost of the filing
fee, as provided in paragraph (a).
4. The clerk of the court shall ensure the petitioner's privacy to the
extent practical while completing the forms for injunctions for protection against
domestic violence.
5. The clerk of the court shall provide petitioners with a minimum of
two certified copies of the order of injunction, one of which is serviceable and
will inform the petitioner of the process for service and enforcement.
6. Clerks of court and appropriate staff in each county shall receive
training in the effective assistance of petitioners as provided or approved by the
Florida Association of Court Clerks.
7. The clerk of the court in each county shall make available informa-
tional brochures on domestic violence when such brochures are provided by local
certified domestic violence centers.
8. The clerk of the court in each county shall distribute a statewide
uniform informational brochure to petitioners at the time of filing for an
injunction for protection against domestic or repeat violence when such
brochures become available.
Id.
146. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.30(2)(c)l.).
147. FLA. STAT. § 741.30(2)(c)3. (Supp. 1994).
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closed doors while filing charges. The victim's privacy is very important.
Thus, an important step in ensuring the victim's privacy might be to enact
legislation specifically aimed at preventing the victim's name from
becoming public record.
Section 741.30(2)(c) also requires training for the clerk of the court and
the members of the staff to effectively assist petitioners. 14' However, the
legislature should define the phrase "effective assistance" as it is used in the
statute. For example, the statute should list whether a minimum standard
is to be applied in administering assistance. Paragraph (2)(c)(7) of section
741.30, which requires the availability of informational brochures on
domestic violence, should also be clarified. 149 The statute should specify
whether these brochures are the same as the Legal Rights and Remedies
Notice given out at the initial police call. If the documents are the same,
then it should be noted in the statute. If not, then the specific differences
between the two documents should be explicitly stated. Perhaps the biggest
criticism of the brochure requirement is the brochure's availability. The
statute states that brochures are provided "when such brochures become
available."'5 ° This is unacceptable because brochures should be provided
whenever the police encounter a victim.
2. The Petition for Injunction
Section 741.30(3)(b) exemplifies the form of the petition for injunction
for protection against domestic violence. 5' The statute's language in this
section should also be modified. Section 741.30(3), which presently states
that "[t]he sworn petition shall be in substantially the [same] form," could
be replaced with the provision "all petitions, throughout Florida, shall have
at least this much information and can have more, but not less," in order to
protect the victim's rights. This modification would leave no doubt as to
how much information would be required to be furnished in order for the
form to be complete. Because the word "shall" is directive, it implies that
the form's use should conform to that provided by the law.
In 1992, the legislature adopted a broader definition of "respondent" in
the petition. This definition remained unchanged in the 1994 and 1995
amendments. A respondent is defined as "a person with whom the
petitioner has a child in common, regardless of whether the petitioner and
148. Id. § 741.30(2)(c)6.
149. Id. § 741.30(2)(c)7.
150. Id. § 741.30(2)(c)8.
151. Id. § 741.30(3)(b).
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respondent are or were married or residing together, as if a family."'52
Consequently, this definition includes within the purview of domestic
violence, acts perpetrated on either a mother or a father by the other parent.
It is no longer relevant whether the petitioner and respondent lived together
or were married at any time. This section also provides protection for both
the victim and the children of the victim. The legislature recognized,
perhaps for the first time, that domestic violence can occur without two
people ever having lived together.
Section 741.30 also provides the court with the discretion to issue an
injunction based upon information contained in the petition. 153 The 1994
amendments added language invoking clarity of the court's decisions. Prior
to 1994, there was no difference between immediately restraining and
restraining the respondent. The 1994 amendment created the distinction
between whether the petitioner was seeking an injunction "immediately
restraining the respondent from committing any acts of domestic violence,"
and "[r]estraining the respondent from committing any acts of domestic
violence." Why would the defendant be immediately restrained in some
cases and not in others? The 1994 amendment answered this question by
providing that "[w]hen it appears to the court that an immediate and present
danger of domestic violence exists, the court may grant a temporary
injunction ex parte .... .""
Subsection 741.30(6)(a) provides ex parte relief for victims.'55 It
permits the court to award "to the petitioner the exclusive use and posses-
sion of the dwelling that the parties share or excluding the respondent from
the residence of the petitioner."' 6 The provision excluding the respondent
from the petitioner's residence should be stricken, however, because it is
unnecessary. Awarding the petitioner temporary exclusive use and
possession of the residence would achieve the same result.
The provision in subsection (6)(a)(4), "establishing temporary support
for a minor child or children or the petitioner," also needs to be modified.
The words "and/or" should be substituted for the word "or" directly before
the phrase "the petitioner.""1 7 This change would clarify that the support
is for both the child and the petitioner.
152. FLA. STAT. § 741.30(3)(b) (Supp. 1994).
153. lId § 741.30(3)(b).
154. Id. § 741.30(5)(a).
155. Id. § 741.30(6)(a).
156. Id. § 741.30(6)(a)2.
157. FLA. STAT. § 741.30(6)(a)4. (Supp. 1994).
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In addition to the above modification, the treatment of the respondent
should be more forceful than the statute currently provides. Section
741.30(6)(a)(5) states that the court may order the "respondent to participate
in treatment or counseling services." '158 This should be an automatic
requirement and not merely a factor for the court to consider.
The section addressing ex parte injunctions provides that:
Any such ex parte temporary injunction shall be effective for a fixed
period not to exceed 15 days. A full hearing, as provided by this
section, shall be set for a date no later than the date when the temporary
injunction ceases to be effective. The court may grant a continuance of
the ex parte injunction and the full hearing before or during a hearing
for good cause shown by any party, which shall include a continuance
to obtain service of process.159
This section is a modification of the 1992 version addressing ex parte
injunctions. The 1994 amendments changed the requirements of the section
by reducing the number of days from thirty to fifteen that a temporary
injunction may be effective. 16° This reduction allows for quicker review
of the petition and a faster ruling by the administering judge. Thus, the
legislature attempted to make the temporary injunction more equitable for
the respondent. The reduction in time in issuing a temporary injunction also
may create additional rights for the respondent.
For example, prior to 1994, a respondent could be forced to stay away
from his or her home for thirty days without a hearing. A month is a
significant period of time to be kept away from one's home. The sequence
of events also complicates matters. An injunction can be issued by a judge
without the respondent ever being present. The judge simply looks at the
affidavit and signs the order. Obviously, the affidavit would be written from
the petitioner's perspective. Consequently, the respondent may not get a
chance to present his side of the story until a hearing date is set thirty days
later. Thus, the fifteen-day requirement effectively relieves the respondent
of such inconveniences.
On the other hand, a strong argument exists in opposition to the
legislature's reduction in time. For example, the sheriff has the duty to
158. Id. § 741.30(6)(a)5. The section was recently amended to read "ordering the
respondent to participate in treatment, intervention, or counseling services." Ch. 95-195, §
5, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1399 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 1398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 741.30(5)(c) (Supp. 1994)).
160. Id.
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serve process upon the defendant. Often the sheriff is inundated with other
service requests, hence delaying the process further. Where a defendant is
elusive, further delay in locating him adds to the time needed to effect
proper service of process. Therefore, fifteen days may be too short a time
in which to serve a defendant. Once the fifteen days elapse, the injunction
terminates, leaving the victim unprotected. The reduction in time from
thirty days to fifteen days, therefore, might result in a gain of rights for the
respondent and a loss of rights for the victim. Thus, the legislature may
want to consider reinstating the thirty-day limit so as not to divest the victim
of any necessary protection. The 1995 amendments alleviate this problem
slightly because the statute now gives the issuing judge the discretion in
determining an applicable time period for continuance of the service of
process period. 6'
Another important provision of section 741.30 requires the clerk of the
court to furnish certain material to the respondent. Subsection
741.30(7)(a)(1) states that:
The clerk of the court shall furnish a copy of the petition, financial
affidavit, uniform child custody jurisdiction act affidavit, if any, notice
of hearing, and temporary injunction, if any, to the sheriff or a law
enforcement agency of the county where the respondent resides or can
be found, who shall serve it upon the respondent as soon thereafter as
possible on any day of the week and at any time of the day or night..
. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the chief
judge of each circuit, in consultation with the appropriate sheriff, may
authorize a law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction to effect
service. A law enforcement agency serving injunctions pursuant to this
section shall use service and verification procedures consistent with
those of the sheriff.62
The phrase "as soon thereafter as possible on any day of the week and
at any time of the day or night" is an excellent addition because flexibility
is always helpful when working within a prescribed period of time. The law
enforcement officer must serve the respondent within the allotted fifteen
days up to the time of the hearing. 63
The provision allowing the chief judge to authorize a specific law
enforcement agency to effect the service will help eliminate confusion as to
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1399 (amending FLA. STAT. § 741.30(7)(a)1. (Supp. 1994)) (emphasis added).
163. FLA. STAT. § 741.30(7)(a)1. (Supp. 1994).
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which law enforcement agency should administer the service. If one agency
handles all such service, it would streamline and speed the service process.
One change should be made, however. The chief judge should be required
to authorize an agency to administer the service. This would ensure
uniformity among the circuits. Furthermore, it would ensure that the new
approach adopted by the legislature would be carried out.
Subsection 741.30(7)(b) prioritizes domestic violence as a serious
offense. Of the many functions required of law enforcement officers, this
section significantly demonstrates the assistance provided to victims. For
instance, the law requires immediate service of the petition by law
enforcement officers. Furthermore, it orders law enforcement officers, upon
the victim's request, to accompany victims and assist them in obtaining
possession of or retrieving personal property from a dwelling.
The 1994 amendments changed section 741.30(7)(b) to read in part:
There shall be created a Domestic and Repeat Violence Injunction
Statewide Verification System within the Department of Law Enforce-
ment. The department shall establish, implement, and maintain a
statewide communication system capable of electronically transmitting
information to and between criminal justice agencies relating to
domestic violence injunctions and repeat violence injunctions issued by
the courts throughout the state. Such information must include, but is
not limited to, information as to the existence and status of any
injunction for verification purposes."6
This paragraph is extremely important because law enforcement
agencies will now have information at their fingertips about domestic
violence injunctions on a statewide basis. For example, an injunction issued
in Tampa can be quickly and easily verified in Miami.
Other additions to the statute include a twenty-four-hour time period
during which certain tasks must be accomplished. 165 For example, under
the 1995 amendments, the court may continue or extend an injunction.66
If it elects to do so, the clerk of court must forward a copy of the injunction
to the sheriff for service within twenty-four hours. 67 Once the respondent
has been served, the officer must forward written proof of service to the
164. Id. § 741.30(7)(b).
165. Id. § 741.30(7)(c).
166. Ch. 95-195, § 5, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1400. This is different from the
1994 law which specified that a copy of the injunction must be sent to the sheriff if the court
issues, vacates, or changes an injunction. See FLA. STAT. § 741.30(7)(c)l. (Supp. 1994).
167. Id.
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clerk. The sheriff is then required to make information relating to the
injunction available to all other law enforcement agencies electronically.
Once the respondent has been served, he or she is required to appear before
the court.
As a result of the 1995 amendments, courts are now required to enforce
a violation of an injunction for protection through either a civil or criminal
contempt proceeding.16 As a result of the amendments, there are three
enforcement options available to circuit court judges: 1) civil contempt; 2)
criminal contempt; and 3) prosecution for a criminal violation under section
741.30 or any other criminal statute.169 Paragraph (8)(a) of section 741.30
also directs the monies collected from a monetary assessment or fine
imposed by the court be placed in the state treasury for deposit in the
marriage license trust fund established in section 741.01.17O
3. Violation of Protective Injunctions
The 1994 and 1995 amendments to section 741.31 give a future
respondent notice as to what constitutes a violation of an injunction for
protection against domestic violence.' It makes it a violation of the
injunction if the perpetrator returns to the petitioner's residence, school, job,
or any other place frequented by the petitioner or a family or household
member.172 This section makes clear exactly what property is covered by
statute. Subsection (4)(c) of the statute makes committing an act of
168. Ch. 95-195, § 5, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1400 (amending FLA. STAT. §
741.30(8)(a) (Supp. 1994)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Under the 1995 amendments, subsection 741. 31(4) now reads as follows:
A person who willfully violates an injunction for protection against domestic
violence.., by:
(a) Refusing to vacate the dwelling that the parties share;
(b) Going to the petitioner's residence, school, place of employment, or
a specified place frequented regularly by the petitioner and any named family or
household member;
(c) Committing an act of domestic violence against the petitioner;
(d) Committing any other violation of the injunction through an
intentional unlawful threat, word, or act to do violence to the petitioner; or
(e) Telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the
petitioner directly or indirectly, unless the injunction specifically allows indirect
contact through a third party ....
Id. at 1401 (amending FLA. STAT. § 741.31(4) (Supp. 1994)).
172. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31(4)(d)).
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domestic violence against the petitioner a violation of the injunction.'73
This further enhances the ability of the court to punish an offender for
committing an act of domestic violence. Now the respondent who commits
a second act of domestic violence will not only face the initial charge of
domestic violence, but will also face a misdemeanor charge for violating the
injunction. Subsection (4)(d) also makes a respondent's threat of violence
toward a petitioner, who is already protected by an injunction, a viola-
tion.174
Section 784.046 of the Florida Statutes establishes a domestic violence
injunction statewide verification system, providing for a twenty-four-hour
time limit on certain actions by the clerk of the court and law enforcement
agencies."5 The 1995 amendments provide enforcement through civil or
criminal contempt proceedings for a violation of an injunction for protec-
tion. 176
H. Lawful Arrests without Warrants
Section 901.15 provides guidelines for arrests without warrants in
domestic violence cases. 177 The 1995 amendments to the section permit
law enforcement officers to make arrests where "[t]here is probable cause
to believe that the person has committed a criminal act ... which violates
an injunction for protection .. .over the objection of the petitioner...
178 The phrase "over the objections of the petitioner" is an improvement
because it protects other family members, as well as the victim. 79 In
addition, the new statutory language removes the gender biased pronoun
"he," which assumed that all police were male.
The 1995 amendments also changed the language in subsection (7)(a),
making an arrest permissible where:
173. Ch. 95-195, § 6, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1401 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 741.31(4)(c)).
174. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31(4)(d)).
175. FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (Supp. 1994).
176. Ch. 95-195, § 6, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1401 (amending FLA. STAT. §
741.31(2) (Supp. 1994)).
177. FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (Supp. 1994).
178. Ch. 95-195, § 20, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1408 (amending FLA. STAT. §
901.15(6) (Supp. 1994)). The amendment deleted the provision that the violent act create
"a threat of imminent danger to the petitioner or household members." Md.
179. See discussion supra part III.C.
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There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed an act
of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, or child abuse, as defined
in s. 827.04(2) and (3), or any battery upon another person .... and the
law enforcement officer reasonably believes that there is danger of
violence unless the person alleged to have committed the act of
domestic violence, or child abuse, or battery is arrested without
delay." 0
The phrase "[tihere is probable cause to believe that the person" shows
that gender bias has been stricken from the language of this section as well.
Moreover, this section broadens the arrest powers of the police because it
effectively allows law enforcement officers, upon finding probable cause, to
make an arrest without delay. A law enforcement officer no longer has to
observe actual bruises or have corroborating witnesses to make an arrest.
A comparison of subsections 901.15(6) and (7) of the statute demon-
strates a similar substantive quality in regard to the "probable cause" issue.
Subsection 901.15(6) surrounds the issue of "commit[ting] a criminal act.
, * which violates an injunction"'' whereas section 901.15(7) identifies
"that the person has committed an act of domestic violence ....""'
Subsection 901.15(8) was re-enacted by the 1994 legislative amend-
ments but was not changed by 1995 legislative enactments. Referring to
law enforcement officers, the statute states that "[h]e has probable cause to
believe that the person has knowingly committed an act of repeat violence
in violation of an injunction for protection from repeat violence ....""'
The 1994 amendment is inconsistent with the provisions in other parts of the
statute because it uses the gender biased word "he" when referring to police
officers. The legislature should remove the word "he" throughout the entire
statute to render all sections consistent.
I. Uniform Statewide Policies and Procedures
Section 943.1701 mandates the creation of uniform statewide policies
in the area of domestic violence and requires that they be implemented into
basic law enforcement training and continuing education programs." 4
180. Ch. 95-195, § 20, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1409 (amending FLA. STAT. §
901.15(7)(a) (Supp. 1994)).
181. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 901.15(6) (Supp. 1994)).
182. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 901.15(7)(a) (Supp. 1994)).
183. FLA. STAT. § 901.15(8) (Supp. 1994).
184. Id. § 943.1701 (1993). The statute requires that the statewide policies and
procedures include:
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This section is important because it requires the police to become familiar
with the many issues inherent in and raised by domestic violence. Although
the legislature writes the statutes, it is up to the police to enforce them. To
properly enforce domestic violence statutes, police must not only become
familiar with the statutes, but they must also become familiar with the topic
of domestic violence.
Although all of the provisions of this section are important, only a few
require mentioning. Subsection 943.1701(3) helps the officer to insure both
his or her own safety, as well as the safety of the victim. Domestic violence
situations may be volatile. Thus, responding officers require special skills
when responding to cases involving domestic violence.'85 This section
requires the officer to be educated in ways which will reduce the chance of
danger for everyone involved.
Subsection 943.1701(4) requires officers to learn about the extent of the
causes of domestic violence.186  Such an understanding may help the
(1) The duties and responsibilities of law enforcement in response to
domestic violence calls, enforcement of injunctions, and data collection.
(2) The legal duties imposed on law enforcement officers to make arrests
and offer protection and assistance, including guidelines for making felony and
misdemeanor arrests.
(3) Techniques for handling incidents of domestic violence that minimize
the likelihood of injury to the officer and that promote safety of the victim.
(4) The dynamics of domestic violence and the magnitude of the
problem.
(5) The legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of domestic
violence.
(6) Documentation, report writing, and evidence collection.
(7) Tenancy issues and domestic violence.
(8) The impact of law enforcement intervention in preventing future
violence.
(9) Special needs of children at the scene of domestic violence and the
subsequent impact on their lives.
(10) The services and facilities available to victims and batterers.
(11) The use and application of sections of the Florida Statutes as they
relate to domestic violence situations.
(12) Verification, enforcement, and service of injunctions for protection
when the suspect is present and when the suspect has fled.
(13) Emergency assistance to victims and how to assist victims in
pursuing criminal justice options.
(14) Working with uncooperative victims, when the officer becomes the
complainant.
Id.
185. Id. § 943.1701(3).
186. Id. § 943.1701(4).
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officer realize that a domestic violence problem he or she encounters is not
just an isolated "family situation," but is an epidemic that affects the
population at large. This insight into the causes of domestic violence is
very important because one cannot expect an officer to deal effectively with
a situation unless the officer first understands it. Subsection 943.1701(6)
mandates that officers understand the dynamics of documenting, reporting,
and evidence collection as they pertain specifically to the area of domestic
violence. 187 This subsection impresses upon the officer that management
of domestic violence cases requires special procedures.
Subsection 943.1701(9) addresses an important point about "the
subsequent impact on [children's] lives."'88 This is the first positive point
about children's issues raised in Florida's revised statutes. Subsection (9)
is one of the few statutes that addresses the uniqueness of children's needs
in domestic violence.
Finally, the importance of subsection 943.1701(14) must be impressed
upon law enforcement officers because under the state's new pro-prosecu-
torial policy, officers no longer need the cooperation of the victim to press
charges. This section requires police officers to work with uncooperative
victims when the officer becomes the complainant.189 Thus, if the state's
pro-prosecutorial policy is to be effective, it is imperative that the police
learn about this area in the event they become the complainant.' 9
J. Collection of Statistics on Domestic Violence
Section 943.1702 states that:
(1) In compiling the Department of Law Enforcement Crime in Florida
Annual Report, the department shall include the results of the arrest
policy ...with respect to domestic violence to include: separate
statistics on occurrences of and arrests for domestic versus nondomestic
violence ....
(2) Each agency in the state which is involved with the enforcement,
monitoring, or prosecution of crimes of domestic violence shall collect
and maintain records of each domestic violence incident for access by
investigators preparing for bond hearings and prosecutions for acts of
187. FLA. STAT. § 943.1701(6) (1993).
188. Id. § 943.1701(9).
189. Id. § 943.1701(14) (emphasis added).
190. The language of this subsection is a bit confusing. The legislature should clarify
when an officer becomes a "complainant."
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domestic violence. This information shall be provided to the court at
first appearance hearings and all subsequent hearings. 9 '
Subsection 943.1702(1) assists the authors of the Department of Law
Enforcement Crime in Florida Annual Report in analyzing statistics about
domestic violence. Specifically, the frequency of domestic violence crimes
can be compared and contrasted with other violent crimes. By comparing
the number of domestic violence cases reported, the number of domestic
violence arrests made, and the number of times the officer rather than the
victim is the complainant, the effectiveness of the new statutes can be
analyzed.
Subsection 943.1702(2) is also a positive step because it provides
relevant information to investigators and the court. One criticism of this
section, however, is that these statistics should be provided not only to law
enforcement agencies and investigators, but to anyone wishing to have
access to them. Statistics on domestic violence should become public
records. This would enable civilian specialists to analyze the material and
would, in turn, allow experts such as university professors the opportunity
to either comment on or criticize the statistics.
K. Children's Issues
Section 61.13 addresses the custody and support of children, visitation
rights, and the power of court in making orders.' 92 The statute provides
that:
The court shall consider evidence that a parent has been convicted of
a felony of the second degree or higher involving domestic violence.
• . as a rebuttable presumption of detriment to the child. If the
presumption is not rebutted, shared parental responsibility, including
visitation, residence of the child, and decisions made regarding the
child, shall not be granted to the convicted parent. However, the
convicted parent shall not be relieved of any obligation to provide
financial support.
93
The language in this section is a strong addition to the statute because
it provides additional protection for children. The legislature recognizes that
children do not belong with parents convicted for acts of domestic violence.
191. FLA. STAT. § 943.1702 (1993).
192. Id. § 61.13 (Supp. 1994).
193. Id. § 61.13(2)(b)(2).
Vol. 20
164
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Rosman
It is unconscionable to think that a person charged with abusing another
adult could be awarded custody of a child. Accordingly, the court must now
consider any domestic violence offenses when determining the custody of
a child. Furthermore, the legislature provided for the financial welfare of
the child through the addition of the last sentence denying the convicted
parent relief from his or her obligations to provide financial support."9 a
A child should not have to forego basic necessities.
L. Stalking
Section 784.048(4) relates to stalking. The statute states that:
Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat
violence.., or an injunction for protection against domestic violence
.. or after any other court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the
subject person or that person's property, knowingly, willfully, mali-
ciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the
offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree .. 
This section further protects victims of domestic violence. Instead of
merely violating the injunction, the respondent can also commit a felony by
stalking the petitioner. Additionally, even if the respondent does not make
actual contact with the petitioner's person or property, the respondent may
still be guilty of stalking. This stalking provision should provide for even
more distance between the victim of domestic violence and his or her
assailant.
IV. ELIMINATING THE TERM "DoMESTIc VIoLENcE"
The Florida Legislature defines "domestic violence" as "any assault,
aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery,
stalking, aggravated stalking, or any criminal offense resulting in physical
injury or death of one family or household member by another who is or
was residing in the same single dwelling unit. ' 96 Language is the ability
to communicate thoughts and feelings through vocal sound.197 Does the
combination of the words "domestic violence" effectively communicate and
194. Id.
195. Id. § 784.048(4).
196. Ch. 95-195, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1394.
197. WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICrIoNARY 759 (3d college ed. 1994).
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identify its expressive intent? Or, is the phrase "domestic violence" merely
a contradiction in terms? 98
Collectively, domestic violence almost seems to suggest "good
violence" or, at the very least, "better violence." Thus, the term is an
oxymoron. The combination of the positive term "domestic" with the
negative word "violence" lessens the negative connotation of the phrase. It
is a euphemism since the phrase is now less distasteful and less offensive.
Perhaps the term captures an American need to avoid domestic violence and
treat hard topics euphemistically. For many years in our country, domestic
violence was thought of as something within the family. In fact, it often
went unreported by its victims. Even the police and the courts treated
domestic violence differently than violence committed on strangers.
In order to do the victim justice and properly define the role of the
perpetrator, the term "domestic violence" must be changed or eliminated.
Domestic violence encompasses too many different types of violence. By
giving domestic violence a label different from other forms of violence, it
is thought of and treated differently than other types of violent crimes. The
label "domestic violence" has diluted the seriousness of the crimes involved.
To strengthen the charge of "domestic violence" and accurately
describe what it is, the legislature should return to the plain legal definition.
The term "domestic violence" minimizes the impact of the brutality that
often takes place within domestic relationships. Terms such as murder,
aggravated battery, and aggravated assault clearly describe the action and
impact the seriousness of the criminal misconduct and resulting harm.
Moreover, domestic violence could be redefined as a battery, aggravated
battery, or an attempted battery. These simple, though descriptive labels are
198. Webster's New World Dictionary defines the word "domestic" as:
1. having to do with the home or housekeeping; of the house or family 2. of
one's own country or the country referred to 3. made or produced in the home
country; native 4. domesticated; tame: said of animals 5. enjoying and
attentive to the home and family life.
Id. at 405. This word has almost a positive connotation. By contrast, the word "violence"
means:
1. physical force used so as to injure, damage, or destroy; extreme roughness of
action 2. intense, often devastatingly or explosively powerful force or energy,
as of a hurricane or volcano 3.a) unjust or callous use of force or power, as in
violating another's rights, sensibilities, etc. b) the harm done by this 4. great
force or strength of feeling, conduct, or expression; vehemence; fury 5. a
twisting or wrenching of a sense, phase, etc., so as to distort the original or true
sense or form [to do violence to a text] 6. an instance of violence; violent act
or deed.
Id. at 1490.
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legal terms; terms that courts have spent hundreds of years defining. So
why is the term "domestic violence" used instead of a standard legal term?
It could be a result of our society's need to label actions and expressions
before it attempts to discuss and understand them.
Webster's New World Dictionary does not include or define the term
"domestic violence."1 99 However, simply because there is no definition
in the dictionary for domestic violence, does not mean that an analysis of
the term is warranted. It is remarkable to see the other words that are
included in the dictionary.2' Domestic violence would be perceived
differently if it were called battery, aggravated battery, or assault. Black's
Law Dictionary defines battery as an "[i]ntentional and wrongful physical
contact with a person without his or her consent that entails some injury or
offensive touching."'
Black's further defines aggravated battery as "[a]n unlawful act of
violent injury to the person of another, accompanied by circumstances of
aggravation, such as the use of deadly weapon, great disparity between the
ages and physical conditions of the parties, or the purposeful infliction of
shame and disgrace."2' Finally, Black's defines assault as:
Any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon the person of
another, when coupled with an apparent present ability so to do, and
any intentional display of force such as would give the victim reason to
fear or expect immediate bodily harm... [a]n assault may be commit-
ted without actually touching, or striking, or doing bodily harm, to the
person of another.20
3
These standard definitions would cover almost every possible scenario of
domestic violence.
Changing the language used to describe domestic violence would
impose stiffer sentences for the convicted abuser. The legislature could
simply make any act of battery, aggravated battery, or assault against
199. Id. at 405.
200. For example, on the very page where "domestic violence" should appear, the term
"domestic relations court," appears defined as a "court with jurisdiction over cases involving
relations within the family or household, as between husband and wife or parent and child."
Id. Thus, in terms of the evolution of the phrase "domestic violence," it is inconceivable that
a court of jurisdiction handling domestic violence matters was labeled as such prior to
attaching the phrase "domestic violence" to the matters which it heard.
201. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 152 (6th ed. 1990).
202. Id. at 153.
203. Id. at 114.
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someone in the "domestic" sense an aggravating factor to be considered
when sentencing. Linguistic changes might also accomplish the special goal
the legislature has in more severely punishing a person guilty of such vio-
lence. The statute could still mandate the special reporting requirements of
the police, the procedures used in administering domestic violence cases,
and background checks. Furthermore, the presiding judge could still be
required to consider any history the lawmakers feel is relevant in domestic
violence cases.
If domestic violence must have a special label to be recognized, I
suggest the following alternatives. Select a term that fits the seriousness and
injurious nature of the act; a term that would correctly define the particular
form of abuse. For example, an appropriate term might be "violence on a
loved one" or "interrelationship violence." Because violence is committed
on someone the perpetrator supposedly knows and loves, the language
should express and communicate to people that the action is worse than a
random act of violence. In these cases, the perpetrator has committed
violence on someone who trusted him or her and someone who was more
than likely living in their own home at the time. This way, society would
be faced with the truth of what domestic violence really means.
By eliminating the term "domestic violence," society would be exposed
to terminology that would better describe these serious and dangerous
crimes. To some, domestic violence connotes conduct that is within the
realm of the family and is, therefore, less serious than a "real" battery or
assault. Crimes should be defined by the conduct and not by marital status
or relationship. An aggravated battery or assault should be defined as such
in order to communicate the seriousness of the conduct. A term which
lessens the significance of the conduct or the societal response to that
conduct should not be utilized.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The main claim of this article is that although the legislature attained
its goal in passing legislation which protects victims in domestic violence
situations, it has failed to effectively communicate those aims to its many
audiences. Furthermore, the term "domestic violence" is inadequate or
deceptive, and lessens the significance of the crimes it purports to designate.
Crimes should be defined by the conduct and not by marital status or
relationship. The public awareness of the seriousness of incidents of
domestic violence needs to be heightened.
Florida's domestic violence statute has undergone sweeping reform
since 1992. The Florida Legislature set standards of education for members
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of the judiciary who hear cases in the area of domestic violence. In
addition, new laws mandate that judges be available twenty-four hours a day
to hear cases and that victims be provided with knowledge of their rights,
protection, and opportunities.
These new laws also effectively respond to the needs of victims and
their minor children by awarding victims temporary exclusive custody of the
children and temporary exclusive use of the marital dwelling. A perpetrator
can be required to pay temporary support for the victim and children, as
well as filing fees for injunctions. In some situations, the court can order
the abuser to seek counseling. Law enforcement officers can arrest
perpetrators on probable cause, without a warrant, regardless of whether the
victim consents to the arrest. The police must also assist victims in
receiving medical attention. The economic barriers that once prevented
victims from seeking an injunction for protection against domestic violence
no longer exist. Domestic violence is no longer a "behind closed doors"
issue.
However, it is at the local level where society should attempt to put
into practice the wishes of lawmakers in removing the pernicious blight of
domestic violence from our society. In the past, domestic violence was
thought of as something that was dealt with behind closed doors. Today,
domestic violence has come to be recognized as a serious crime that often
leads to physical and psychological injury or death. Assaulting one's spouse
and maiming or killing one's child has serious consequences in today's
society.
Many local enforcement agencies are forming "domestic violence"
squads which "demonstrat[e] a newborn sensitivity to such problems in
scattered areas." 2 4  Local communities and providers of services for
victims now work with law enforcement agencies to make officers aware of
the risks to victims in violent family situations. Generally, abusers are not
likely to change their ways without intensive counseling. Programs for
batterers have made some headway in effecting behavioral change, but
success is relatively limited. In addition, restraining orders have only had
minor success in separating the batterers from the battered. Similar to
maxim that paper cannot stop a bullet, restraining orders, alone, cannot stop
the violence.
The pro-arrest policy of Florida should help alleviate the problem with
prior arrest policies. Law enforcement officers understand that abused
204. Sandy Rovner, Violence Hits Home: When the Abused Child Grows Up, WASH.
POST, Aug. 11, 1987, at Z12.
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persons have a cyclical tendency to return to their abuser. Accordingly,
lawmakers hope that the pro-arrest policy will be the single, most effective,
weapon against domestic violence by stopping spouses and children from
continuing to form relationships with abuser type personalities.
It is encouraging to note that reportings of abuse are rising. This does
not implicate a rise in the actual incidents of domestic violence. It indicates
that an increase in public awareness of the problem has helped bring
domestic violence out into the open. Perhaps we can measure our success
in reducing violence by counting the increased safety of our men, women,
and children.
Society benefits when domestic violence is diminished. Death, injury,
and the destruction of relationships all lead to an unhealthy society. Acts
of domestic violence need to be taken seriously to avoid degradation of
society. The need to address such harm has been recognized by the Florida
Legislature in its recent alterations in the language of Florida's domestic
violence statutes. Better training, increased sensitivity, taking a pro-arrest
and pro-prosecutorial positions, all indicate the legislature's desire take
domestic violence seriously.
These new laws place increased importance on domestic violence.
Although the statutory language is clear and effective, a large percentage of
the population is unaware of the legislative changes. Therefore, the justice
system must educate the public about their increased rights under the new
laws. In accomplishing this goal, the justice system should enlist the media
to help educate the public. Only then will society become aware of its
rights and remedies and confidently trust our system of justice to properly
handle acts of domestic violence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cases for this year's Survey of Florida Evidence demonstrate some of
the same similarities as in previous years. Criminal evidentiary cases
outnumbered civil evidentiary cases, and relevancy and hearsay issues were
the most prolific topics. During the survey period, the Supreme Court of
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Florida resolved some outstanding conflicts between the district courts of
appeal on issues regarding expert testimony and hearsay; however, with the
exception of these cases there were only a few noteworthy cases. The
legislature added in a new evidentiary privilege and a new hearsay exception
this year and made the language of the evidence code gender-neutral.
II. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
Section 90.104' of the Florida Evidence Code requires a timely
objection in order to preserve a point for appeal.2 Objections which are not
timely made are waived. The appellate courts are unable to consider an
assertion of error in the admission of evidence, made in the trial court, if
counsel fails to make a contemporaneous objection at trial.4 Only if the
error is fundamental will an appellate court consider the issue on appeal.'
The Supreme Court of Florida has indicated that fundamental error will be
found infrequently.6 However, as the following case indicates, the appellate
courts of Florida occasionally turn this simple rule on its head in a pell-mell
effort to correct what they perceive to be an injustice from the reading of a
cold record.
In a case that arose from a certified question regarding the child
hearsay exception of section 90.803(23) 7 of the Florida Statutes, the
Supreme Court of Florida followed the old adage that "'hard cases make bad
law.' ' '8 In Anderson v. State,9 the defendant was charged with lewd and
lascivious assault upon a child. 0 Prior to trial the State gave notice that
it intended to introduce testimony at trial that the child victim told two
1. FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (Supp. 1994).
2. See Holley v. State, 523 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
3. See Roundtree v. State, 350 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 362
So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1978).
4. A proper objection has two ingredients, both of which are needed to preserve
objections for appellate review. First, the objection must be timely. If counsel does not
promptly object the problem is waived. Second, the objection must be specific. See, e.g.,
Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 407 (1989). Failure
to state the correct grounds for objection will waive it. The appellate courts have strictly
monitored this rule.
5. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(3) (Supp. 1994).
6. Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970) (citations omitted) ("The appellate
court should exercise its discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error very guardedly.");
see also CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE, § 104.6 (5th ed. 1994).
7. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1991).
8. Anderson v. State, 655 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1995).
9. Id. at 1118.
10. Id. at 1119.
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adults that the defendant touched her with his penis." There was no other
corroborating eyewitness or physical evidence tying the defendant to the
crime. The State contended that the testimony fell within the exception to
the hearsay rule for statements made by child victims set forth in section
90.803(23).12
At trial the hearsay was entered and there was no objection by the
defendant, nor was there a hearing held as was contemplated by section
90.803(23)."3  Additionally, the trial court ruled that the child was not
competent to testify as the child could not give consistent answers regarding
whether she knew what it meant to tell the truth.14 The defendant's motion
for judgment of acquittal was denied and the jury returned a guilty
verdict. 5
On appeal to the district court the defendant argued that his conviction
was based solely upon hearsay that was never determined to be reliable nor
corroborated. 6 The district court affirmed the conviction finding that there
was no objection at trial to the testimony.17 The Supreme Court of Florida
reversed the district court of appeal, despite finding that: 1) where there are
no objections made to hearsay the evidence is admitted and the issue is
barred from appellate review;" 2) the trial court's failure to make sufficient
findings under section 90.803(23) of the Florida Statutes is not fundamental
error; 9 3) and finally, and most disturbing, had an objection been made,
the Supreme Court of Florida indicated that the statement might have been
11. Id,
12. Anderson, 655 So. 2d at 1119.
13. I The competency of the defending trial attorney must surely be questioned given
the facts of the case. The evidence code specifically requires a hearing before the hearsay
statement can be utilized in court. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)(1) (1991). To ask what type
of trial strategy was being used when crucial damning testimony is let in without the required
hearing or even an objection boggles the imagination. However, poor lawyering is fostered
when the appellate courts bail out an incompetent attorney, instead of having the conviction
collaterally attacked for ineffective assistance of counsel under Rule 3.850. See FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.850. Based on the facts reported in the opinion the issues were not preserved for
appeal and should not have been reversed by the Supreme Court. The proper procedure was
a collateral attack of the conviction for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
14. Anderson, 655 So. 2d at 1119.
15. Id
16. Id.
17. Id
18. See Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1983
(1995).
19. See State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
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admissible as an excited utterance. 0 The supreme court spent much of the
opinion stating that their holding "should be specifically limited to the facts
of this case.",2' As well it should, since section 90.104 of the Florida
Statutes requires a specific and timely objection.22 It seems that the
supreme court is already forgetting their prior rulings, in a host of other
cases, that have come down hard on predicating a reversal when a
contemporaneous objection is lacking and the error is not fundamental. 23
The only guidance this case offers is the extent that the appellate courts will
sometimes go to prevent a perceived injustice.
The better procedure would have been to uphold the conviction, since
the issue was not preserved. The conviction could then be collaterally
attacked under Rule 3.85024 for ineffective assistance of counsel. Only in
this way will the courts of Florida foster proper lawyering while preserving
the rights of the accused. Throwing in a "hard case makes bad law"
decision, that is directly contrary to dozens of other decisions, offers neither
guidance nor enlightenment for those attorneys who diligently read the
appellate opinions for direction to competently try their cases and uphold the
rights of their clients.
IlI. INTRODUCTION OF RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED
STATEMENTS
Section 90.10825 of the Florida Evidence Code allows a party to
contemporaneously introduce a writing or recorded statement after a similar
writing or recorded statement has been introduced by the opposing party.
When a writing or recorded statement is introduced at trial, a misleading
impression may be created by taking the matters contained in it out of
context. Therefore, section 90.108 allows the adverse party to require the
20. An excited utterance under § 90.803 of the Florida Statutes is a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, whose reliability and trustworthiness is grounded in the fact that "[a]
person who is excited as a result of a startling event does not have the reflective capacity
which is essential for conscious misrepresentation; therefore statements that are made by the
person who is in a state of excitement are spontaneous and have sufficient guarantees of
truthfulness." EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 803.2.
21. Anderson, 655 So. 2d at 1119.
22. See Dale A. Bruschi, Evidence: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV.
255, 257 (1992).
23. See Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1992); Glendening v. State, 536 So.
2d 212 (Fla. 1988); Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978); Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.
2d 134 (Fla. 1970); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Shouse, 91 So. 90 (Fla. 1922).
24. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850.
25. FLA. STAT. § 90.108 (1993).
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remainder of the writing or document to be introduced if fairness requires
that it be considered contemporaneously with the original writing or
document. This principle is often called the "rule of completeness."
Section 90.108 has been greatly expanded by the decisional case law
over the years.26 The strict interpretation of section 90.108 only allows
introduction of the related writing or document at the time the original
writings or documents are offered into evidence. The provision may not be
utilized during cross-examination or during the party's own case.27
However, the decisional case law has expanded this section by allowing not
only written statements, documents, and "recorded statements ' 28 but it also
has been applied to testimony regarding part of a conversation.29 Addition-
ally, some decisions have applied section 90.108 to questions asked during
cross-examination, rather than requiring that the additional evidence be
admitted at the time the witness testifies on direct examination.30
A good example of the expansion of section 90.108 is seen in Johnson
v. State.31 In Johnson, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. When
the defendant was arrested he told the police officer that he had been in a
fight with the victim over a broken watch and that he hit the victim with a
stick.32 Later at the police station the defendant gave a formal statement
26. See Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1992); Morrison v. State, 546 So. 2d 102
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
27. In other words, opposing counsel cannot wait until his cross-examination of the
witness or until his case-in-chief to enter the related writings or documents under this section.
In civil trials the use of § 90.108 is often confused with the use of Rule 1.330(a)(4) and
1.340(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules state that when portions of
depositions and interrogatories are not offered by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction of any other part that in fairness ought to be considered with the part introduced.
Section 90.108 extends the right beyond depositions and interrogatories to any writing or
recorded statement offered as evidence during the course of a trial.
There is another difference between § 90.108 and rule 1.330(a)(4). Rule 1.330(a)(4)
provides that any other party may introduce any other parts of the deposition. Unlike §
90.108, rule 1.330(a)(4) does not require that the portion of the deposition explain or clarify
the portions originally offered.
28. A statement which is recorded by a court reporter or by a tape-recording is a
"recorded statement' and is subject to § 90.108.
29. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1982).
30. See Johnson v. State, 653 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Somerville v.
State, 584 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
31. 653 So. 3d at 1074.
32. Id. at 1075.
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asserting that he hit the victim only after the victim threatened him and only
after the victim hit him first.
33
During trial the State introduced the defendant's first statement. The
trial court refused to allow the defense to cross examine the officer
concerning the second statement.34 The defendant was convicted at trial
and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction. The district
court cited section 90.108 as a basis for its finding that the State opened the
door by eliciting testimony as to part of the conversation.35 Therefore, the
defendant was entitled to cross-examine the witness about other relevant
statements made during the conversation.
The district court reasoned that the "rule is not limited to segments of
one conversation, but also allows admission of 'other related conversations
that in fairness are necessary for the jury to accurately perceive the whole
context of what has transpired between the two.' ' 3 6 The defendant should
have been allowed to cross-examine the officer regarding the second
statement, since the second statement qualified or explained the first
statement. By itself the first statement standing alone left the jury with an
allegedly incomplete picture of the defendant's behavior.
IV. IMPEACHMENT
In Peterson v. State,37 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
a witness may be asked about prior convictions if the attorney has a good
faith basis for asking the questions even though the certified copies of
conviction are not in hand. Though this area of the evidence code would
seem to be well-settled in Florida, it is actually far from that.
In Peterson, the defendant testified at trial regarding his claim that he
acted i n self defense when he stabbed the victim.3" By taking the stand the
defendant placed his credibility in issue and was thus open to impeachment
regarding his prior convictions. After the State closed its case, the
defendant moved in limine to exclude any questioning regarding the
defendant's prior convictions when the defendant testified. Defense counsel
acknowledged that the prosecution had supplied him with copies of reports
33. Id.
34. Id. Generally, the defendant's self-serving exculpatory statement is inadmissible.
It is hearsay that does not fall within an exception.
35. Id.
36. Johnson, 653 So. 2d at 1075 (citations omitted).
37. 645 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 272 (Fla.
1995).
38. Id. at 11.
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from the State of New York regarding the defendant's criminal record. In
addition, the prosecution had supplied the defense with an N.C.I.C.39
printout of the defendant's convictions. The defense contended that the
prosecution could not inquire into the defendant's criminal record since
these "rap sheets" were not certified copies of conviction.'
During a hearing regarding the use of the impeachment material, the
trial court reviewed the rap sheets with counsel. The prosecutor stated that
he had a good faith belief that the defendant had at least three felony
convictions. The trial court agreed to allow the prosecutor to ask the
standard two questions: 1) Have you ever been convicted of a felony?; and
2) How many times?" The defense on redirect examination asked the
defendant how long ago the convictions were. The defendant stated they
were twenty years ago.42  The district court found that the procedures
utilized by the trial court were sufficient to allow the impeachment without
having the certified copies of conviction in hand.43
On appeal, the defendant cited Cummings v. State,44 for the "rule"
prohibiting questions regarding prior convictions unless the prosecutor has
certified copies of conviction in hand to introduce as impeachment. The
district court noted that this was neither the Cummings court's "holding in
the case nor an absolute proscription requiring reversal in every case where
the suggested procedure is not followed. 45 The district court correctly
posited that Cummings only addressed the proper form of the questions to
be asked on impeachment under the newly enacted Florida Evidence
Code.46 The Cummings court did not develop a blanket rule of law that
certified copies of conviction must be in hand to allow impeachment.
39. This is an acronym for "National Crime Index Computer" printout. The printout is
for law enforcement eyes only and it is improper to give this type of printout to anyone
outside of law enforcement.
40. Peterson, 645 So. 2d at 11. The defense did not challenge the accuracy of the "rap
sheets" since the defense did not think that the State could inquire into his client's criminal
records without certified copies of conviction.
41. Ia During the actual cross examination the prosecutor asked the standard questions
but when the defendant stated that he had one less felony than the rap sheets indicated the
prosecutor followed up his questioning by asking if the defendant had "ever been convicted
of a misdemeanor involving dishonesty" to which the defendant answered "yes." This was
the proper question to ask under the Florida Evidence Code. See EHRHARDT, supra note 6,
§ 610.6.
42. Peterson, 645 So. 2d at 11.
43. Ia at 11-12.
44. 412 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
45. Peterson, 645 So. 2d at 12.
46. Ia
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The district court realized that had the defendant in Peterson denied his
prior convictions, the only way the prosecution could impeach him was by
entering certified copies of his prior convictions in their rebuttal case. The
"rap sheets" would not have been admissible for such a purpose and further
questioning on the subject would not be allowed.47 Without the certified
copies of conviction the prosecution would have been stuck with the
defendant's denial of his prior convictions.4"
Florida evidence writers have generally acknowledged that before the
prosecution can ask about prior convictions, the prosecution must have
certified copies of conviction in hand. No per se "good faith" exception has
technically existed. The reasoning is simple: if the prosecution asks the
defendant if he's ever been convicted of a felony, and the defendant denies
the question,49 the jury could be left with the indelible impression that the
defendant has prior criminal convictions. This could mislead the jury if the
defendant was, in fact, charged but never convicted or was merely arrested
but never convicted. Without the ability to prove up the prior convictions,
the state has the immutable advantage of misleading the jury regarding the
defendant's prior criminal record. Therefore, "good faith" has never
technically existed.50
However, in the situation that existed in Peterson the trial court had a
very strong argument for allowing the impeachment questions to be asked.
Both of the State's "rap sheets" indicated convictions and defense counsel's
argument to the trial court indicated that his client had been previously
convicted of felonies. Since a trial is a search for the truth, the defendant
has no constitutional right to lie under oath." The defense attorney's
47. See Irvin v. State, 324 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d
608 (Fla. 1976).
48. Of course the defendant's statement denying his prior convictions could later be used
against the defendant in a perjury charge if the defendant, in fact, lied under oath during trial.
49. Or, likewise if the defendant denies the number of convictions.
50. But see Alvarez v. State, 467 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 476
So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1985), where the Third District Court of Appeal attempted to establish a
"good faith" exception.
51. Peterson, 645 So. 2d at 11. Defense counsel stated that at least one of the
defendant's three prior felony convictions was not true and the defendant would deny that
one. Id. This indicated that the defendant did, in fact, have two valid felony convictions that
he would not deny. Id.
52. When the prosecution does not have certified copies of conviction, but has some
indication that the defendant/witness may have prior convictions, the proper procedure should
be for the defendant to be questioned under oath, outside the presence of the jury. Since the
defendant/witness does not have a constitutional right to lie under oath, the prosecution has
some indication of prior felony convictions (or misdemeanors involving dishonesty or false
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argument to the court impliedly acknowledged that the defendant had prior
convictions, and the prosecution had a strong good faith belief of the
defendant's prior convictions through two "rap sheets." Therefore the
impeachment was properly allowed.53  The Fourth District Court of
Appeal's withdrawal from an inflexible rule of impeachment to a more
flexible rule will not violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial
and will insure that a trial will still be a search for the truth.54
statement) because a trial is a search for the truth and the credibility of the defendant/witness
is often a crucial point of the trial, this procedure should be utilized.
If the defendant/witness admits the prior convictions outside of the presence of the jury,
then the questions should be allowed to be asked in the presence of the jury. If the
defendant/witness then denies the prior convictions in front of the jury, the prosecution can
prove up the prior statements by calling the court reporter to testify to the defendant/witness'
prior statements regarding his prior convictions. The defendant/witness could also be charged
with perjury. See Alvarez, 467 So. 2d at 455. Alvarez was later disapproved by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Riechmann v. State, 581 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
405 (1992), but only to the extent that it allowed the trial court to determine that a conviction
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law of this country
and not the country were the conviction occurred. The proper procedure is to establish that
the law was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law of the
foreign country where the defendant was convicted, before it can be used for impeachment.
53. Peterson, 545 So. 2d at 13. The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted a conflict
with Peoples v. State, 576 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), affjd on other grounds,
612 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1992). The Peoples case followed Cummings in excluding impeachment
evidence when the certified copies of conviction are not in hand. But as noted, supra note
45, the Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized that Cummings did not reach such a
holding. Therefore, the Fifth District Court of Appeal's reliance on Cummings for this
proposition is inaccurate.
54. The procedure outlined in note 51, supra, is the proper and correct way to proceed
when there are no certified copies of conviction in hand, but there is a "good faith" belief
that the defendant/witness has convictions. The "good faith" belief will foster judicial
economy, since precious judicial resources will not be spent sending the jury out if there is
no basis for the prosecution to even ask the question. This procedure will guard against the
prosecution asking about criminal convictions when it cannot prove them up, and therefore,
leave an improper impression on the jury. If the prosecution gets a denial to the questions
and does not have certified copies of conviction, it will not be allowed to repeat the questions
before the jury.
This procedure will safeguard the integrity of the trial court as a search for the truth,
since an acknowledgment of the prior convictions should be allowed to be repeated in the
presence of the jury even though certified copies of conviction are not in hand. The jury will
then be able to properly evaluate the defendant/witness' testimony. However, an improper
denial by the defendant/witness will not allow the individual to subvert the system to his own
end, since such a denial could subject him to a prosecution for perjury even if the individual
is successful in the original trial. No individual has the constitutional right to subvert justice
and the search for the truth by being fortunate enough to have his convictions in a distant
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V. EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
A. Scientific Evidence
During the survey period the Supreme Court of Florida delved into the
area of expert testimony on scientific evidence under section 90.702 of the
Florida Evidence Code." Ramirez v. State56 is of value because the
supreme court discusses the procedure to use when utilizing novel scientific
principles under the Frye standard.57 In Ramirez, testimony revealed that
the murder victim was stabbed twelve times. The State introduced into
evidence a knife linked to the defendant. During trial the expert gave an
opinion that the defendant's knife was the only knife that could have been
used in the murder. 8
Prior to trial, the State requested a special hearing to present testimony
and evidence to the trial judge relating to the reliability of knifemark
comparison evidence.5 9  The hearing was held and the State presented
evidence regarding the theory, practice, and procedures involved in
knifemark comparisons.60  After the State's presentation at the pretrial
hearing, the defense offered an expert to testify, against the scientific
reliability of knife mark comparisons. 6' The trial judge refused to allow
the defense expert to testify, stating that such testimony was for the jury and
not relevant to the issue of basic admissibility. 2
The supreme court analyzed the factors needed when expert testimony
concerns a new or novel principle:
The admission into evidence of expert opinion testimony concerning a
new or novel scientific principle is a four-step process. First, the trial
jurisdiction that has a poor or slow record keeping system.
55. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (Supp. 1994).
56. 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
57. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
58. Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1166. The State could have avoided this second appeal and
reversal, by simply following the supreme court's advice in the first appeal and reversal to
present testimony that the wounds on the victim were consistent with the defendant's knife.
Id. However, the State decided that it would be wiser to prove that this was the only knife
that could have been used in the murder. They will now, of course, get to try this case for
a third time.
59. Id. This was done in response to the supreme court's request after this case was
reversed in the first trial. See Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989), appeal after
remand, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
60. Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1166.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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judge must determine whether such expert's testimony will assist the
jury in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.
Second, the trial judge must decide whether the experts testimony is
based on a scientific principle or discovery that is "sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs." This standard, commonly referred to as the "Frye
test," was expressly adopted by this court in Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d
9, 18 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986) and Stokes v. State,
548 So. 2d 188, 195 (Fla. 1989). The third step in the process is for
the trial judge to determine whether a particular witness is qualified as
an expert to present opinion testimony on the subject in issue. § 90.702,
Fla. Stat. (1993). All three of these initial steps are decisions to be
made by the trial judge alone. Fourth, the judge may then allow the
expert to render an opinion on the subject of his or her expertise, and
it is then up to the jury to determine the credibility of the expert's
opinion, which it may either accept or reject.63
The supreme court found the second inquiry to be especially important
to the process.64 Basically, when a novel type of scientific opinion is
offered, the party offering the evidence must demonstrate the requirements
of scientific acceptance and reliability in the particular field in which it
belongs.65 The burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the
general acceptance of the underlying scientific principle, and the testing
procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case. The trial
judge will determine this question. The issue of general acceptance under
the Frye test is established by a preponderance of the evidence.
A hearing on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence is ad-
versarial. Both sides may present conflicting evidence to the trial judge as
the trier of fact. The testimony of both parties is needed, otherwise the trial
judge is denied a full presentation of the relevant evidence. The supreme
court found that it was impossible to determine whether the evidence
presented by the State was sufficient to prove the reliability of knifemark
comparisons because the defendant was denied the right to present any
evidence to the contrary at the pretrial hearing.66 Therefore, the case was
reversed and remanded.67
63. Id. at 1166-67 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 1167.
65. See, EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 702 at 500; MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF
FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 702, at 517 (ed. 1987).
66. Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1168.
67. Id
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In a somewhat related case the Second District Court of Appeal dealt
with the Frye standard from the standpoint of DNA statistical analysis. In
Brim v. State,8 the issue presented to the district court was whether,
in considering a request for admission of the statistical consequences of
the analysis of matching DNA samples, a court must exclude all or part
of that analysis if the court is presented with evidence of two differing
but generally accepted views within the scientific community concerning
the proper population frequency statistics to be applied.69
The statistical analysis is critical to DNA testing for the extremely persua-
sive probability estimates (one in a billion) that are associated with the
testing.
In analyzing the statistical probabilities in Brim, two divergent views
emerged. First, the statistical probabilities would change depending on
which sample populations database was utilized.7" This essentially means
that use of one database would demonstrate that one in one billion had the
same genetic DNA code as the defendant, while utilization of another
population database would yield a figure of one in nine thousand.7'
In Brim, both statistical theories were presented. It was argued that both
theories are generally accepted in the scientific community.72 The concern
is whether a disagreement regarding the deductions of a scientific theory
makes the theory itself inadmissible in evidence. The Brim court, citing to
the Ramirez decision, found that where there are two differing, but two
generally accepted deductions that can be made from generally accepted
scientific evidence, they may both be admitted, provided that the underlying
scientific evidence satisfies Frye.73
The district court, finding an anomaly in the Ramirez decision, stated
[w]e conclude that the issue before us, the admissibility of expert
testimony using comparison statistics to provide evidence regarding the
relevant force of a generally accepted scientific procedure, is encom-
68. 654 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
69. Id. at 184.
70. Id. at 185. These sample populations were taken from the field of human population
genetics. The statistical significance is measured by the frequency with which a particular
DNA pattern would be observed in a sample population.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Brim, 654 So. 2d at 188.
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passed in steps three and four of the analysis in Ramirez and does not
require application of the Frye test to those steps.7 4
In other words, the deductions can be admitted as long as the scientific
theory satisfies Frye. However, language in the Ramirez decision indicates
that deductions drawn from an accepted scientific theory must also satisfy
Frye.75 The Brim decision conflicts with Vargas v. State,76 in finding that
DNA population statistics do not need to meet the stringent Frye test.
7 7
The district court certified conflict between the two cases.78
B. Testimony by Experts
The Supreme Court of Florida settled a conflict among the district
courts regarding the use of expert testimony in the case of Angrand v.
Key.79 Angrand arose out of a wrongful death suit. During the course of
the trial, the plaintiff introduced expert testimony on the issue of grief and
bereavement.80 The trial judge was reluctant to admit the testimony, since
the expert did not testify to anything that was outside the common
experience of the jury."1 However, the trial judge admitted the evidence
based on Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne.
82
74. Id
75. Ramirez, 651 So. 2d at 1168.
76. 640 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 659 So. 2d 273 (Fla.
1995). The district court in Vargas found that the method used to arrive at probabilities was
not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
77. Brim, 654 So. 2d at 187.
78. Id
79. 657 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1995).
80. Id at 1147.
81. Id
82. 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 589 So. 2d 291 (Fla.
1991). Shelburne allowed the testimony of an expert on grief and bereavement. Doctor
Platt, who testified in Angrand, was also the expert witness in Shelburne. In Shelburne, Dr.
Platt testified about grief and bereavement and how the plaintiffs, whose son had been killed,
worked their way through the grief process. The testimony included where the plaintiffs
were in the grief process at the time of trial, what factors had affected their response to their
son's death, and what grief they would experience in the future. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal upheld the trial courts ruling that the testimony was not outweighed by any
prejudicial effect, and that this testimony assisted the jurors in understanding an area that was
not within a person's normal everyday comprehension.
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the expert did
not testify to anything that was outside the common experience of the
jury. 3 The district court felt that most of the jurors had experienced the
death or loss of a loved one.84 Additionally, the district court found that
close family relationships and the loss of loved ones could be demonstrated
adequately with lay witness testimony.85 The district court concluded that
expert testimony on grief and bereavement was unduly prejudicial, since a
jury might give this testimony undue weight because it came from an expert
witness.86 In Angrand, the Third District Court of Appeal noted direct
conflict with the Shelburne case.87
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved the conflict between Angrand
and Shelburne by narrowing the Shelburne decision. The supreme court
found that a trial court is afforded broad discretion in determining the
subject matter on which an expert may testify.88 The Shelburne decision,
however, limited the trial court's discretion by making a general determina-
tion that the subject matter of that case, grief and bereavement, is not within
the juror's everyday understanding.89 The supreme court found that the
trial judge's discretion should not be so limited.9"
The trial court should exercise its discretion so that only expert
testimony which will assist the trier of fact will be admitted. Expert
testimony cannot be admitted to put otherwise inadmissible evidence before
the jury, to relay matters that are within the jurors common understanding,
or to summarize lay witness testimony.9 The supreme court concluded
that the trial judge in Angrand should have been able to exercise his
discretion to exclude Dr. Platt's testimony on grief, since it was not outside
the jury's common understanding. Binding the trial judge's discretion in
this area was error.92 Because Shelburne foreclosed the exercise of the trial
court's discretion regarding the admission of expert testimony, the supreme
court properly limited its scope.93
83. Key v. Angrand, 630 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 645 So.
2d 450 (Fla. 1994), rev'd, 657 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1995).
84. Id. at 650.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Town of Palm Beach v. Palm Beach County, 460 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1984).
89. Shelbourne, 576 So. 2d at 335-37.
90. Town of Palm Beach, 460 So. 2d at 885.
91. Angrand, 657 So. 2d at 1148.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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In a wrongful death action, the statute does not designate "grief' as a
recoverable damage.94  However, the statute does allow for loss of
companionship and for mental pain and suffering.95 The relevant testimony
on these subjects comes from lay witnesses who are generally friends and
survivors. These individuals testify as fact witnesses, not as experts. Since
there is no objective standard to measure this kind of damage, precise
calculations are hard to make. The jury is generally guided by its common
understanding and everyday life experiences in determining this type of
damage. Therefore, expert testimony in an area generally guided by
common life experiences may lead to an unfair assessment of damages. The
supreme court recognized this pitfall and reversed the Angrand case on the
issue of damages.96 However, the supreme court felt that the expert
testimony was not so prejudicial as to require a reversal on the issue of
liability.97
VI. HEARSAY
A. The Postell Rule
In Trotman v. State,9" the district court reversed the case for violation
of the Postell Rule.9 9 The defendant in Trotman was convicted for armed
robbery and armed burglary. At trial, the investigating officer testified that
after speaking to an unidentified, nontestifying juvenile, the officer went to
the location of the victim's stolen car and arrested the defendant."° The
district court realized that the only inference a jury could draw from this
testimony was that the juvenile told the officer that the defendant committed
94. FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
95. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(2) (1993).
96. Angrand, 657 So. 2d at 1151.
97. Id This makes perfect sense, since expert testimony on grief would probably not
be an integral part of the liability aspect of the case. However, this holding should be
confined to the facts of this case, since improperly admitted expert testimony, even on
damages issues, could be so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial on the issue of liability.
98. 652 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
99. Id. at 507. The Postell rule is in reality a violation of § 90.801(2) of the Florida
Statutes. It allows what is essentially hearsay evidence to come before the jury without
falling within a proper hearsay exception. Postell v. State, 398 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1981). It occurs when testimony leads a jury to
believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police, or other witness, evidence of an
accused's guilt, even though the testimony of the non-testifying witness is hearsay and there
is no hearsay exception for it. Id
100. Trotman, 652 So. 2d at 507.
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the crime. 01 Since the juvenile was not subject to cross-examination as
required under section 90.801(2)(c), the statement of identification of the
defendant was improper."° Additionally, the statement did not fall under
another hearsay exception.
This situation almost inevitably arises when the prosecution has a gap
in their evidence. This gap is due, in part, to three possibilities: First, the
nontestifying witness may have simply disappeared; second, the
nontestifying witness may not have been identified by the investigating
officer in his police report, rendering the witness unknown; or third, the
attorney may have simply forgotten to subpoena the witness. In any case,
the prosecuting attorney must now try to fill the gap between the crime and
the defendant's arrest. This is done in an attempt to strengthen his or her
case, and lay it out in a logical manner. However, to avoid the hearsay
objection that occurs when the officer is questioned regarding what the
nontestifying witness told him, the prosecuting attorney usually resorts to
asking the officer what he did after he spoke with the witness.0 3 The
logical inference to be drawn from this is that the witness told the officer
that the defendant committed the crime.
Hearsay does not have to be verbal in order to be hearsay. When a
statement, belief, or assertion can be implied from the conduct or statement
of a person, the implied assertion is within the definition of hearsay."
Though the case does not add any new case law to this field, it is a good
reminder for attorneys that hearsay can take non-verbal as well as verbal
forms.
B. The Child Hearsay Exception
Section 90.803(23) of the Florida Statutes creates a limited exception
to the hearsay rule for statements by children eleven years of age or
younger. The statement must describe an act of sexual abuse in the
presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child." 5 During the survey
101. Id.
102. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(c).
103. The prosecutor generally tells the officer not to repeat any statements of the
nontestifying witness. He is instructed to tell just what he did after he spoke with this
witness. The argument to the trial court is that since no statements were given, there can be
no hearsay violation.
104. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.7 (3d ed.
1991); EHRHARDT, supra note 6, § 801.2 at 552.
105. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1994).
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period, the Supreme Court of Florida settled a conflict between the district
courts of appeal regarding this statutory provision.
In State v. Dupree,1" the defendant was tried for the first-degree
murder of two-year-old Jirisha Thompson. Before the trial, the State gave
the requisite ten days notice pursuant to its intention to rely on section
90.803(23) for statements made by the six-year-old brother concerning the
crime. The defense objected on th6 grounds that the hearsay exception did
not apply to a declarant who was not the victim of the crime in ques-
tion. 07
At trial, the six-year-old testified regarding what he had seen on the
night of the victim's death. Several adult witnesses testified to what the six-
year-old told the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)
investigator during an interview regarding the events leading up to the
victim's death.10 8 The witnesses observed this interview through a two-
way mirror with the help of an audio system. The defense objected to the
use of these hearsay statements made to the HRS investigator. 09
The defendant in Dupree was convicted at trial. On appeal, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction. The district court held that
the hearsay exception was not applicable to the child's statements because
the child was not the victim of the charged offense."'
In Russel v. State,"' the Fifth District Court of Appeal came to the
opposite conclusion, holding that "[s]tatements made by a child who
witnessed sexual battery and aggravated child abuse and who otherwise
meets the statutory criteria are not excepted from admissibility merely
because this child was not the object of the attack.'112 The Fifth District
reasoned that "[a] victim is a victim regardless of any charging docu-
ment.",
3
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the Dupree case and disap-
proved of the decision of the Russell court." 4 The Supreme Court of
106. 639 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 648 So. 2d 724 (Fla.
1994), aff'd, 656 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1995).
107. Dupree, 656 So. 2dat 431.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 572 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 583 So. 2d 1036
(Fla. 1991).
112. Id. at 942 (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Dupree, 656 So. 2d at 431.
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Florida followed prior rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States"'
and found that where statements do not fall within firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions, they are presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confron-
tation Clause purposes. 116  The Supreme Court of Florida declined to
expand child hearsay statements to statements made by children who were
not victims. Therefore, for hearsay statements of a child to be admissible
under section 90.803(23) of the Florida Statutes, "the prosecution of the
defendant must be based upon the victimization of the child whose
statements are being related."
'' 7
VII. AUTHENTICATION
In Macht v. State,"8 the Fourth District Court of Appeal attempted
to clear up a misconception regarding the use of transcripts when a tape
recorded conversation has been admitted into evidence. In Macht, the
arresting officer testified that he pulled the defendant's car over.1 9 The
officer was tape recording the conversation with the defendant from the
moment he stopped the defendant's car.'20 At trial, the tape of the
conversation was admitted into evidence through the arresting officer who
made the tape.' 2' However, the defendant claimed that the trial court
committed reversible error by allowing the jury to view the transcript, which
was not properly authenticated, of the tape recording that had been entered
into evidence."
The district court stated that the rule announced in Stanley v. State,123
prohibiting the use of transcripts of tapes when the tapes have been
introduced into evidence, has been superseded by the Supreme Court's of
Florida's ruling in Hill v. State. 24 Hill authorized a jury to view an
accurate transcript of an admitted tape recording as an aid in understanding
115. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543
(1990).
116. Dupree, 656 So. 2d at 431.
117. Id. at 432.
118. 642 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
119. Id. at 1138.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized that many jurisdictions cite the
case of Stanley v. State, 451 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), for the proposition
that trial courts should not allow the use of transcripts of tapes when the tapes have been
introduce into evidence. The district court attempted to clear up this misconception.
123. 451 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
124. 549 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1989).
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the tape so long as the unadmitted transcript does not go back to the jury
room or become a focal point of the trial."z
During trial, the defendant in Macht objected that the transcript of the
tape was not properly authenticated because the individual who prepared the
transcript did not testify. 126 However, the arresting officer who made the
tape recording testified at trial that the transcript was accurate.'27 Since
the arresting officer testified that the transcripts were an accurate reproduc-
tion of the tape recordings, no further authentication or proof was need-
ed." Additionally, the trial court clearly instructed the jury that if there
were any discrepancies between the tape and the transcript, the jury should
rely on the tape, since it was the tape that was in evidence.'29 Hopefully,
the district court's opinion will help clarify any further problems with the
use of transcripts at trial when a tape recording has been admitted.
VIII. ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA EVIDENCE
CODE
During the survey period, the Florida Legislature made various
additions and amendments to the Florida Evidence Code. The new Code
sections bear directly on the admissibility of evidence at trial.
A. Gender-Neutral Language
The Florida Evidence Code was rewritten in gender-neutral lan-
guage. 3' When possible, the Code employed the use of plural instead of
singular pronouns to avoid both gender-specific language and awkwardness.
Changes made for gender-neutral purposes were made throughout the Code,
and are not detailed in this article. No substantive changes were intended
by these amendments.
125. Id. at 182.
126. Macht, 642 So. 2d at 1138.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1138-39. The trial transcripts did not go back to the jury room and did not
become a focal point of the trial. Therefore, the use of the transcripts as an aid in
understanding the tape was proper. Hill, 549 So. 2d at 182.
130. See, e.g., Ch. 95-147, § 471, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 171, 538 (West) (amending
FLA. STAT. §90.105 (1993)).
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B. Domestic Violence Advocate-Victim Privilege
A new privilege was also added to the Florida Evidence Code.'3'
Section 90.5036 now allows communications between a domestic violence
131. Ch. 95-187, § 7, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1368, 1371-72 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 90.5036). The section reads as follows:
90.5036. Domestic violence advocate-victim privilege
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A "domestic violence center" is any public or private agency that
offers assistance to victims of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, and
their families.
(b) A "domestic violence advocate" means any employee or volunteer
who has 30 hours of training in assisting victims of domestic violence and is an
employee of or volunteer for a program for victims of domestic violence whose
primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling, or assistance to victims
of domestic violence.
(c) A "victim" is a person who consults a domestic violence advocate for
the purpose of securing advice, counseling, or assistance concerning a mental,
physical or emotional condition cause by an act of domestic violence, an alleged
act of domestic violence, or an attempted act of domestic violence.
(d) A communication between a domestic violence advocate and a victim
is "confidential" if it relates to the incident of domestic violence for which the
victim is seeking assistance and if it is not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than:
1. Those persons present to further the interest of the victim in the
consultation, assessment, or interview.
2. Those persons to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary to
accomplish the purpose for which the domestic violence advocate is consulted.
(2) A victim has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other
person from disclosing, a confidential communication made by the victim to a
domestic violence advocate or any record made in the course of advising,
counseling, or assisting the victim. The privilege applies to confidential
communications made between the victim and the domestic violence advocate
and to records of those communications only if the advocate is registered under
s. 415.605 at the time the communication is made. This privilege includes any
advice given by the domestic violence advocate in the course of that relation-
ship.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by:
(a) The victim or the victim's attorney on behalf of the victim.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the victim.
(c) The personal representative of a deceased victim.
(d) The domestic violence advocate, but only on behalf of the victim.
The authority of a domestic violence advocate to claim the privilege is presumed
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
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worker and a victim to be privileged.'32 The new section provides for
those persons to whom the communication can be disclosed without waiving
the privilege.'33 The new section also has a provision regarding the
confidentiality of records and who may claim the privilege.
3 4
C. Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation
During the survey period, the Florida Legislature altered subsection
three of section 90.612 of the Florida Statutes, which deals with the use of
leading questions.135 The section appears to merely codify parts of rule
1.450(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing with evidence and
the interrogation of witnesses. 36  Subsection three reiterates the use of
direct-examination questions on direct and leading questions on cross-
examination, with some caveats. The amendment to subsection three allows
leading questions on direct-examination when attempting to develop a
132. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.5036(1)(d)).
133. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.5036(1)(d)(1), (2)).
134. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.5036(2), (3)).
135. Ch. 95-179, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1307, 1308 (West) (amending FLA.
STAT. § 90.612(3) (1993)). The section was amended to read as follows:
90.612. Mode and order of interrogation and presentation.
(3) Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a
witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony.
Ordinarily, leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When
a party calls a hostile witness, and adverse party, or a witness identified with an
adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. Exeept as pr'ed
by, rale f eeurt or 'hen the inter sto of ju tiee ether.wise reqe'rc.
kmi t
ter- Fee-s
pat ma no skawtns fafigqetiea an diroot er redireet
party may ask a witness a leading Eluestien ont eress examinatien
:xaminatien.
Id.
136. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(a). This section reads as follows:
Rule 1.450 EVIDENCE
(a) Adverse Witness. A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile
witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership
or association which is an adverse party and interrogate that person by leading
questions and contradict and impeach that person in all respects as if that person
had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be
contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also and may
be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of that
witness' examination in chief.
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witness' testimony, when the witness is hostile, an adverse party, when the
witness is identified with an adverse party, or when the interests of justice
otherwise require it.'37
D. Hearsay Exception: Statement of Elderly Person or Disabled
Adult
During the survey period a new hearsay exception was added to the
Florida Evidence Code.'38 Section 90.803(24) now allows the statement
137. Ch. 95-179, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1308 (West) (amending FLA. STAT.
§ 90.612(3) (1993)).
138. Ch. 95-158, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1263, 1263-64 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)). The section reads as follows:
90.803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The provision of § 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding, the following
are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a
witness:
(24) HEARSAY EXCEPTION; STATEMENT OF ELDERLY PERSON
OR DISABLED ADULT.
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by
which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-
court statement made by an elderly person or disabled adult, as defined in s.
825.101, describing any act of abuse or neglect, any act of exploitation, the
offense of battery or aggravated battery or assault or aggravated assault or
sexual battery, or any other violent act on the declarant elderly person or
disabled adult, not otherwise admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil
or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
safeguards of reliability. In making its determination the court may consider the
mental and physical age and maturity of the elderly person or disabled adult, the
nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to the
offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the elderly person or
disabled adult, and any other factor deemed appropriate; and
2. The elderly person or disabled adult either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is corroborative
evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the
court that the elderly person's or disabled adult's participation in the trial or
proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental,
or physical harm in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10
days before the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception
pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall
include a written statement of the content of the elderly person's or disabled
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of an elderly or disabled person describing any act of abuse, neglect,
exploitation, battery, aggravated battery, assault, aggravated assault, sexual
battery, or any other violent act on the declarant into evidence in any civil
or criminal proceeding. 139  The statements are admissible if certain
prerequisites are met.
For this hearsay testimony to be admissible, the trial court must hold
a hearing regarding the time, content, and circumstances of the statement to
ensure its reliability."' The factors the court is to consider in this deter-
mination are the mental and physical age of the elderly or disabled adult, the
nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to
the offender, the reliability of the assertion of the elderly or disabled adult,
and any other appropriate factor. 41
In addition to the trial court's initial findings, the elderly or disabled
person must either testify or be unavailable." Unavailability includes a
finding that the trial or proceeding would result in severe emotional, mental
or physical harm, in addition to findings of unavailability which the court
must make under section 90.804(1).'43
In criminal proceedings, a notice provision has been added before any
hearsay statement falling under section 90.803(24) can be used.1" Since
any mention of civil actions was excluded from this notice provision section,
it naturally follows that the ten-day notice provision is not applicable to civil
adult's statement, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances
surrounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other
particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the
basis for its rulings under this subsection.
Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(1)).
141. Id.
142. Ch. 95-158, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1263 (West) (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(a), (b)). The prerequisite of § 90.803(24)(a), regarding unavailabili-
ty, will cause confusion with its inclusion in this section of hearsay since § 90.803 exceptions
do not require the declarant to be unavailable. The availability of the declarant is immaterial
to use of hearsay under § 90.803. Unavailability as a factor before the hearsay statement can
be used is more appropriately utilized in § 90.804. Perhaps the better procedure would have
been to split the new hearsay exception into two separate sections in the evidence code, one
in § 90.803 and one in § 90.804, to avoid confusion and keep the evidence code in proper
form. Availability immaterial under § 90.803; Declarant unavailable under § 90.804. It
appears that this simple solution was not considered.
143. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b)).
144. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(b)).
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actions.'45 However, the trial judge must make specific findings of fact
on the record whenever section 90.803(24) is utilized. This requirement
applies to both criminal and civil actions.
46
IX. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida's resolution of conflicts between
jurisdictions on expert evidence and child hearsay will help trial judges and
attorneys better prepare their cases. However, the supreme court's
occasional blatant disregard in overturning a lower court's decision when the
error has neither been preserved nor found to be fundamental, continues to
be an area of some consternation. The legislature's addition of yet another
hearsay exception and evidentiary privilege is sure to generate additional
case law in the coming year, and keep our appellate courts busy.
145. Id.
146. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(c)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This year marks a respite from the frenetic pace of recent legislative
efforts in Florida to respond to the perceived problems in Florida's juvenile
justice system.' This survey briefly highlights the legislative changes. On
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. B.A., 1967, Colgate University; J.D., 1970, Boston College. Professor
Dale is a member of the Arizona, Florida, New Mexico, and New York Bars. The author
thanks Gregg Abaray, Elysse Rispoli, and Todd Thurlow for their assistance in the
preparation of this article. This article covers cases decided through June 30, 1995.
1. For a discussion of legislative changes from 1989 through 1994, see Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOVA L. REV. 139 (1994) [hereinafter 1994
Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant Developments
in Florida Law, 18 NOVA L. REV. 541 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Leading Cases]; Michael J.
Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 335 (1992) [hereinafter
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the other hand, the appellate courts remained active, continuing a long-
standing process of correcting trial court excesses and blatant failures to
comply with the provisions of the juvenile code. Finally, the state supreme
court heard several cases on narrow issues of juvenile law, as well as one
significant case involving privacy and a minor's consensual sexual activity
and a second involving the liability of the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") for negligent allocation of services to
dependent and delinquent children.
II. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Previous survey articles in this law review have dealt with Florida's
changing approach to juvenile detention over the past fifteen years and have
studied the large number of recent appellate cases interpreting the detention
laws.' It is no different this year.
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes requires that an intake counselor
who receives custody of the child from a law enforcement agency review
the law enforcement report or probable cause affidavit to determine whether
detention of a child on delinquency charges is required.3 In doing so, the
counselor bases his or her decision on whether or not to hold the child in
secure or non-secure detention on an assessment of risk that the child will
not appear and/or will commit other offenses.4 The decision is premised
upon a risk assessment instrument ("RAI"), a procedure developed by the
Department of Juvenile Justice.5 The RAI is based upon statutory detention
guidelines including, most significantly, the charge against the child. Even
when the charge is not significant enough to securely detain the child, the
court still has discretion to securely detain the child if it finds clear and
1992 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L.
REV. 333 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of
Florida Law, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1169 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Survey]; Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 859 (1990) [hereinafter Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1159 (1989); see also THE FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACrICE (4th ed. 1995).
2. 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 150-51; 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 552-54;
1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 348-53.
3. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(1) (Supp. 1994).
4. See id. § 39.042(1).
5. See id. § 39.042(2)(b).
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convincing evidence that the minor is a clear and present danger to himself
or the community.
In T.L.W. v. Soud,7 the First District Court of Appeal was asked to
determine whether the trial court had properly applied its discretionary
standard to securely detain a child. After examining the facts, the appellate
court found that it did.8 In addition, the court held that a writ of habeas
corpus is a proper remedy for a minor held in secure detention, although
statutory language would appear to indicate otherwise.' However, the court
also held that rule 8.130 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
provides for trial court reconsideration of the issue through a motion for
rehearing. 0 The appellate court expressly held that in the future, a trial
court's reconsideration of a claim that secure detention is contrary to law
shall be required prior to filing a writ for habeas corpus in the appellate
court."
In S.A.M. v. Bessette,'2 a juvenile filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging illegal detention in violation of chapter 39. The juvenile
was charged with two counts of grand theft and was detained for failure to
appear on at least two previous occasions.13 The statute provides that a
child may be held in secure detention if he or she meets the detention
admission criteria. 4 A child may be placed in secure detention even when
not provided under the RAI computation system."5 However, as noted
above, the court must state in writing clear and convincing reasons for such
placement. 6 In the S.A.M. case, the child did not meet the statutory
detention criteria because she was not charged with a crime articulated in
the statute as warranting detention. 7 The only basis for detention articulat-
ed by the court was the allegation that the child was in contempt of court
6. Id. § 39.044(2).
7. 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
8. Id. at 1106.
9. Id. at 1104. See also FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(a).
10. T.LW., 645 So. 2d at 1105 n.2.
11. Id.
12. 641 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
13. Id. at 949.
14. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.044.
15. ldM
16. Id. § 39.044(2)(f, which states: "If the court orders a placement more restrictive
than indicated by the results of the risk assessment instrument, the court shall state, in
writing, clear and convincing reasons for such placement." Id.
17. S.A.M., 641 So. 2d at 949.
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for failure to appear.'8  Since the trial court failed to show grounds to
override the statute, the appellate court granted the writ and ordered the
discharge of the child.'9
B. Trial Issues
Following the Supreme Court of the United State's 1967 decision in re
Gault,2" Florida provided each child with a statutory right to counsel.2 '
In Washington v. State,2 z the Third District Court of Appeal was faced with
the question of whether the trial court could hold a detention hearing
pursuant to rule 8.305(b) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure in the
absence of counsel for the child. In an ill-considered opinion, devoid of
statutory authority, the court held that counsel was not necessary.23
Relying solely upon rule 8.305(b)(1), the court held that, "the rule does not
entitle defendant to counsel at this early stage in the juvenile adjudicatory
process. A detention hearing is merely an informal, non-adversarial
proceeding to inform defendant of the right to counsel in future proceedings
and determine whether probable cause exists to further detain defendant."'24
The court's decision is incorrect for two reasons. First, it apparently
failed to consider the Florida statute governing a child's right to counsel in
delinquency proceedings. Section 39.041 of the Florida Statutes provides
that a child is entitled to representation by legal counsel "at all stages of any
proceedings under this part. 25 By "part," of course, the legislature meant
chapter 39 of the juvenile code. Furthermore, this section provides that the
lawyer representing the child shall provide counsel "at any time subsequent
to the child's arrest, including prior to a detention hearing while in secure
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing the child's constitutional right to counsel, including
an attorney free of charge if indigent, right to notice, right to an opportunity to be heard, and
other protections in a juvenile delinquency case).
21. FLA. STAT. § 39.041 (1993).
22. 642 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
23. Id. at 63. It is interesting to note that the appellant appealed pro per for post
conviction relief pursuant to rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure from a
conviction as an adult on the charges, although the defendant was sixteen at the time of the
arrest. "Pro per" is short for propria persona, which means "in one's own proper person."
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 792 (6th ed. 1990). It is essentially the same as "pro se," or
representation without a lawyer.
24. Washington, 642 So. 2d at 63.
25. FLA. STAT. § 39.041.
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detention care. 26 The second fallacy in the court's reasoning is that the
detention hearing is, or ought to be, a serious adversary proceeding wherein
it is determined whether secure detention, in particular, is appropriate.
Detention away from home in a locked setting is a serious issue involving
a deprivation of liberty with due process ramifications and ought not be
cavalierly disregarded by the courts.27
Chapter 39 contains provisions for legal representation of the child, and
interim medical and mental health services to the youngster. It allows the
trial court to order psychological evaluations in delinquency cases and to
require treatment both for alleged and adjudicated delinquent children.28
However, the development of psychological evaluations on behalf of the
juvenile defendant by his or her lawyer in preparing a defense is separate
and distinct from the court's power to order services.
In H.A.W. v. State,29 the Public Defender's Office requested and paid
for a psychological evaluation of the child to aid in his defense. Apparently,
the evaluation was performed after the child admitted to the charges. The
evaluation was available to the defense before the dispositional hearing and
thus would have been available for use in arguing for various dispositional
alternatives. 0 The trial court ordered the defense counsel to release the
psychological evaluation to the HRS to aid in the child's treatment after
disposition. An appeal followed. The appellate court held that the
disclosure of information received from an expert retained to assist the
defendant's counsel in preparing a defense violated the child's attor-
ney/client privilege.31 According to the appellate court, the fact that the
child had been adjudicated and sentenced before the court ordered the
release of the evaluation was irrelevant.32 The adjudication did not
constitute a waiver of the child's privilege under Florida Statutes sections
26. IL § 39.041(1) (emphasis added).
27. Cf 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 343. For a discussion of the severity of secure
detention in Florida, see Michael J. Dale & Carl Sanniti, Litigation as an Instrument for
Change in Juvenile Detention: A Case Study, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 49 (1992). For a
comparison with other states that recognize a right to counsel during a detention hearing see
Baumer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 847 (Ark. 1989); In re Jesse P., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 321 (Ct. App.
1992); T.K. v. State, 190 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); People v. Giminez, 319 N.E.2d
570 (111. App. Ct. 1974); State ex reL M.C.H. v. Kinder, 317 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1984).
28. See FLA. STAT. § 39.046(1)-(3) (Supp. 1994).
29. 652 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
30. IU. at 949.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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90.502 and 90.503 which govern the attorney/client privilege in Florida.33
The court then quashed the order requiring counsel to provide the psycho-
logical evaluation to HRS.34
A difficult problem for the juvenile court is how to cope with a
delinquent child who has been determined incompetent to proceed with an
adjudicatory hearing because of his or her level of mental retardation. In
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. State,35 HRS appealed
from orders in four delinquency cases. In each case, the trial court found
the youngster incompetent, then ordered HRS to begin proceedings for
involuntary hospitalization and, if the child did not qualify, to place the
child in a long-term mental health treatment facility.36 In the interim, the
court ordered that the children be held by HRS. The trial court relied upon
Florida Statutes section 916.13, which governs procedures for court ordered
involuntary commitment of adult defendants who are determined to be
incompetent to stand trial or be sentenced. However, the appellate court
found that the statute did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings,
basing its opinion upon the language of section 916.13, which speaks of
"defendants," "standing trial," "sentencing," and "criminal court." 37 The
appellate court recognized that rule 8.095 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure is the only procedure that is expressly available for juveniles who
are incompetent to proceed in delinquency adjudicatory hearings. 38 The
appellate court found that the reference in the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure is to section 394, known as the "Baker Act" proceeding which
provides for involuntarily commitment of the severely retarded but does not
involve "hospitalization."39
However, the court noted that the juvenile rule had been amended to
allow for non-delinquent treatment including hospitalization and its effective
date was January 26, 1995.40 Thus, while the appellate court ruled that
section 916.13 was inapplicable and the trial court lacked the power to order
the involuntary commitment of a child alleged to be delinquent, the trial
court was directed to proceed under the juvenile rules.4' Under the new
33. Id.
34. H.A.W., 652 So. 2d at 949.
35. 655 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
36. Id. at 228.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 228-29.
40. HRS v. State, 655 So. 2d at 229.
41. Id.
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rule, the court may now order treatment for a period of up to two years.42
Thus, the court may now seek a section 393 and section 394 commit-
ment.43
C. Adjudicatory Issues
In an important decision affecting juveniles, the Supreme Court of
Florida in B.B. v. State' was asked to answer the question of whether
Florida's constitutional provision governing privacy makes Florida Statutes
section 794.05, governing unlawful carnal intercourse, unconstitutional as it
pertains to a minor's consensual sexual activity. The appellant was charged
under Florida Statutes section 794.05 and filed a motion to declare the
statute unconstitutional as violative of his right to privacy and to dismiss the
petition. The petition was granted and the State appealed. Specifically, the
court was asked to determine whether a minor who engages in unlawful
carnal intercourse with an unmarried minor can be adjudicated to have
committed a felony of the second degree in light of the minor's right to
privacy guaranteed by the Florida Constitution.45 In an opinion by Justice
Wells, the court relied upon In re T.W., in which the Supreme Court of
Florida had recognized that the right of privacy in article I, section 23 of the
Florida Constitution extends to minors.46 The B.B. court held that the
minor had a legitimate expectation of privacy in carnal intercourse because
it is by express definition an intimate act.47 In order to hold the child
criminally accountable, the court said that a compelling state interest must
be found to overcome the right to privacy.48 It was conceded by the court
that Florida does have an obligation and a compelling interest in protecting
children from sexual activity before they have sufficiently matured to make
appropriate decisions.49 However, in a minor-minor situation, unlike an
adult-minor situation, the prevention of exploitation rationale is non-
existent.50 In the minor-minor situation, the statute, according to the court,
is used as a weapon to adjudicate a minor delinquent rather than as a shield
42. IM
43. Id
44. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
45. I at 257.
46. Id. (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989)).
47. Id. at 259.
48. IM
49. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259.
50. Id
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to protect the minor. l The court therefore held the statute unconstitutional
as applied to the minor. 2
In B.H. v. State,53 the Supreme Court of Florida recently resolved a
conflict between the district courts of appeal over the constitutionality of the
juvenile escape statute.54 The First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal
were at odds over the constitutionality of section 39.061 of the juvenile
code, which is the statute governing escapes from juvenile facilities. In fact,
the more significant issue the court resolved dealt with the role that the
administrative agency, here HRS, could take in defining the elements of a
crime.5 After the court analyzed both federal and state precedent, it found
that the power to create crimes and punishments rests solely in the
legislative branch. 6 Further, the court held that administrative agencies do
not have the authority to create a criminal statute or its equivalent, nor can
they prescribe the penalty.57 The court concluded that the statute violated
two constitutional doctrines: the non-delegation doctrine, in which the
legislature authorized the administrative agency to decide exactly for which
categories of juvenile incarceration escape would be a felony and the
vagueness doctrine, resulting from the failure of the legislature to articulate
in the statute the activity for which escape would constitute a felony.5"
The latter failure was a violation of the due process rights of the child. In
other words, the statute failed to give notice of the prohibited act.59
Despite having concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, under the
doctrine of statutory revival, the court applied the predecessor statute,
holding it constitutional, and upheld the adjudication of escape. 6' In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Kogan argued that once the current statute was
rendered unconstitutional, the appellate court lacked the authority to review
the prior statute because doing so violated the child's due process rights due
to the lack of notice of prohibited conduct and the denial of the child's
opportunity to defend against the revised statute.6
51. Id. at 260.
52. Id.
53. 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2559 (1995).
54. Id. at 995.
55. Id. at 990.
56. Id. at 992.
57. Id. at 992-93.
58. B.H., 645 So. 2d at 994.
59. Id. at 994.
60. Id. at 995-96.
61. Id. at 997.
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D. Dispositional Issues
As noted in prior survey articles, chapter 39 contains a variety of
dispositional choices available to the juvenile court including restitution,
community control, and commitment to various facilities operated or
supervised by the Department of Juvenile Justice.62 Proper use of Florida's
restitution statute arises regularly in appellate case law.63 Defining the
limitations on the use of an order for restitution was recently before the
Supreme Court of Florida in C. W.v. State.64  The specific issue was
whether the grant of authority under the Florida juvenile code provision
governing restitution includes damage for pain and suffering. The appellants
pled no contest to charges of aggravated battery. The trial court placed the
appellants on community control and ordered them and their parents to pay
restitution, including services for a psychologist, dental surgeon, and
hospital, and then ordered payment for the victim's pain and suffering.
65
The court held that the language of the statute66 which referred to any
damage caused by the child's offense, by its plain language, should include
pain and suffering because such damages have long been recognized as
compensable damages in Florida.
67
However, ordering restitution is not without limitation under the Florida
statute. Thus, in K.M.G. v. State,68 a juvenile appealed a trial order
imposing $1500 in restitution to compensate a victim for damage to his car.
The appellant was not charged with the theft of the vehicle, but merely for
trespass in a conveyance.69 In other words, the appellant was simply riding
in the vehicle before the police attempted to stop the car. The appellant and
the driver both jumped out of the car at different points in time, and the
damage to the vehicle was caused by the resulting crash. After examining
the record, the court concluded that there was no evidence that the appellant
damaged the interior of the vehicle, that she encouraged the driver to
62. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054; 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 153-56; 1993 Leading
Cases, supra note 1, at 555-58; 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 358-61. Supervision of
delinquency services was transferred from HRS to the Department of Juvenile Justice on
October 1, 1994. See FLA. STAT. § 39.021.
63. See 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 154-53; 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at
556-57; 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 358-59.
64. 655 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1995).
65. Id. at 88.
66. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(f) (1993).
67. C.W., 655 So. 2d at 89.
68. 652 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
69. Id at 482.
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abandon the vehicle, that she was part of a joint venture under tort law, or
that there was a conspiracy, so as to hold the appellant vicariously liable.7"
The appellate court reversed the restitution award because the record did not
establish that the appellant was anything other than a passenger.7 '
In J.B. v. State,72 the issue was whether it was error to order restitu-
tion for lost wages attributable to the victims' attendance as witnesses at the
restitution hearing in a delinquency case. The First District Court of Appeal
held that it was not.73 The court concluded that strict construction must be
given to the juvenile restitution statute.74 There is no reference to lost
wages in the statute. Furthermore, the wages were not causally related to
the commission of the crime, but resulted from the witnesses' attendance at
the hearing. The court therefore reversed.75
Finally, in a technical holding, the Second District Court of Appeal, in
C.B. v. State,76 reversed a restitution order where the trial court neither
ordered restitution nor reserved jurisdiction to do so at the time of the
dispositional order. After the child pled guilty to the commission of a
battery, the trial court withheld adjudication and ordered the child to enter
and complete juvenile arbitration. The court did not order restitution or
reserve jurisdiction to do so. Four months later, the court held the
restitution hearing and assessed $127.47 in restitution.77 On appeal, the
court held that once the trial court entered its order at the jurisdictional
stage, it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution."
One dispositional alternative which is not available to the juvenile court
is to order deportation. Incredibly, one trial court in Collier County tried to
do so. In LH. v. State,79 the Second District Court of Appeal quickly
reversed the finding that while the trial court was permitted to recommend
deportation to the federal authorities, it did not have authority to order the
deportation. °
A recurring problem with juvenile dispositional rulings is the trial
courts' disregard of the requirement to provide specific written findings for
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 646 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
73. Id. at 809.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 647 So. 2d. 964 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
77. Id. at 964.
78. Id. at 965.
79. 656 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
80. Id. at 622.
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the imposition of an adult sentence, rather than a juvenile sentence as
provided by Florida Statutes section 39.059(7)(d)."' The leading case in
this area is Troutman v. State. 2 In Troutman, a juvenile pled nolo
contendere to charges of false imprisonment and grand theft. The trial court
found the sanction recommended in the predisposition report inadequate, and
decided to treat the juvenile as an adult.8 3 The court filed a conclusory
written order explaining the rationale for the child's sentence of three years
probation, three days after the sentencing occurred. 4 The Supreme Court
of Florida reversed and held'that the imposition of adult sanctions must be
considered by analyzing the specific circumstances in the case with the
statutory criteria before determination of the disposition. 5 Furthermore,
the court was required to provide an individualized evaluation of how the
juvenile fits within the enumerated statutory criteria contemporaneously with
the sentencing.86 Despite the clear statutory provision and the Troutman
decision, appellate courts continue to remand cases to the trial courts to
rectify their failure to provide the required written findings when sentencing
juveniles as adults. 7 This subject also has been regularly reviewed in prior
surveys.8
8
The problem continued this past year for cases still in the "pipeline,"
as noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Shaw v. State.89
However, by statute which became effective on October 1, 1994, the
legislature gave in, apparently recognizing either the unwillingness or
inability of the trial courts to carry out the law, and relieved the courts of
the burden of making written findings.9" The new section 39.059(7)(d)
provides that a decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing, but is
81. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (Supp. 1994).
82. 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993).
83. Il at 530.
84. Id
85. Id at 531.
86. Id. at 532.
87. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 657 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Pearson v.
State, 657 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Walker v. State, 656 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Knight v. State, 656 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Philmore
v. State, 656 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Gammage v. State, 655 So. 2d 183
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Wood v. State, 655 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995); Crain v. State, 653 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Satalino v. State, 652
So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Sales v. State, 652 So. 513 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
88. See 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 155-56.
89. 645 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
90. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d).
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presumed appropriate.9" The court is not required to state specific findings
or enumerate the criteria as a basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions
on a juvenile.92 The legislature's decision is unfortunate because it makes
the appellate court's obligation to determine whether the child's transfer was
appropriate more difficult. Now, the appellate court must look at the record
on appeal to determine the trial court's rationale. Were the trial court
simply to render a written opinion articulating its grounds, summary
appellate affirmance would be easier. Furthermore, the legislature's
capitulation is harmful to children because it may make the process of
transfer to adult court easier in cases where there may be counter-vailing
considerations which are now more difficult and time-consuming for defense
counsel to present on appeal. Finally, and most discouraging, the change in
the law demonstrates that the legislature recognized the seeming incapacity
of the trial courts to do what judges are usually thought competent to do -
make thoughtful written findings.
Like restitution, the proper use of community control is a recurring
issue of appellate review in Florida.93 Community control is Florida's term
for probation, and the trial court has great discretion in the choice of devices
available to correct juvenile behavior.94 In re D.S., 9' the Fourth District
Court of Appeal upheld an order requiring the child not to associate with
gang members as a condition of community control. However, the court
specified that any violation of probation must be supported by a showing
that the child knew that the individuals with whom he was associated were
gang members.9 6 In B.B. v. State,97 the same appellate court was faced
with the question of whether the requirement that a child obtain a General
91. Id.
92. Id. § 39.059(7)(d) states: "Any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in
writing, but is presumed appropriate, and the court is not required to set forth specific
findings or enumerate the criteria in this subsection as any basis for its decision to impose
adult sanctions." Id.
93. See 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 157-58; 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 55-
56; 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 358-59; 1991 Survey, supra note 1, at 349-52; see also
M.B. v. State, 655 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a sentence to
community control for an indefinite period must be reversed because it exceeds the maximum
sentence that can be imposed for the charge - a first degree misdemeanor).
94. See In re S.C., 645 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The trial court
placed conditions that the child must obtain a psychological evaluation, have a set curfew,
attend school every day, and perform fifty hours of community service, which could be
worked off by attending counseling. Id.
95. 652 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
96. Id. at 892-93.
97. 647 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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Equivalency Diploma ("G.E.D.") within one year, as a provision of
community control, together with fifty hours of community service, an
apology to the victim, and payment of $50 to the Florida Crime Compensa-
tion Fund, was unreasonable because it was unrelated to rehabilitation and
further, because the child could not comply within the time allowed.98 The
court held that the legislature recognized the correlation between delinquen-
cy and lack of education and gave the trial court the power to require
enrollment in school or other educational programs as a rehabilitative
component of community control.99
Another element of the dispositional stage of a delinquency case in
Florida involves payment of court costs. In J.L. v. State,"° the child
appealed from a finding of delinquency and an order to pay restitution and
court costs. Relying on a 1994 district court of appeal opinion, in J.A. v.
State,"01 the Second District Court of Appeal held that court costs may not
be assessed because the child's adjudication was withheld.1"
As part of its 1994 legislative effort to become tougher on juveniles,
the Florida Legislature changed its juvenile code in the dispositional area to
include the use of detention as a dispositional alternative in limited cases.
As a punishment alternative, a minor may serve a five-day mandatory period
of detention in a secure detention facility and perform 100 hours of
community service for a first offense that involves the use or possession of
a firearm. 03 In State v. R.F.,' °4 an appeal involving a particularly nar-
row question, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the term "day"
refers to a twenty-four hour period of time and not an "eight" hour work
day as interpreted by the trial court when it rendered the dispositional
order."05 The appellate court did note, however, that the trial court had
discretion to decide how the mandatory term was to be served."° The
court explained that where the youngster is in school or working, the trial
court may require the term be served on weekends."°
Under Florida law, a juvenile charged as a delinquent may not be
sentenced as an adult. Florida law provides that after a child has been
98. Id. at 269.
99. 1& at 270 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.053(2) (1993)).
100. 650 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
101. 633 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
102. J.L, 650 So. 2d at 220.
103. See FLA. STAT. § 790.22(9)(a).
104. 648 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
105. Id. at 294.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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transferred by demand of the child, a voluntary or involuntary waiver
hearing, based on a criminal information, or indictment, and has been
convicted for the offense underlying the transfer, the child must be handled
in every respect as if he or she were an adult "for any subsequent violation
of state law" unless, as discussed above, the court imposes juvenile
sanctions. In T.L.P. v. State,"°8 a juvenile admitted to the charges of bat-
tery, criminal mischief, and violation of community control, and was
adjudicated delinquent. Upon discovering that the juvenile was previously
sentenced to four years in prison on an unrelated offense for which he was
tried as an adult, the trial court sentenced the child to one year in county jail
for each offense." 9 The appellate court held that since the juvenile
offenses were committed before the child was convicted of the offense for
which he was tried as an adult, the juvenile offenses were not subsequent
violations under Florida law."' In order for a child to be subjected to
adult penalties, the youngster must be charged as an adult by information or
pursuant to a waiver hearing."' If the child has been adjudicated delin-
quent, the dispositional alternatives do not include incarceration in an adult
facility. 1
2
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed virtually the same issue
in an en banc review in Kazakoff v. State."1 3 In Kazakoff, all parties
involved in the sentencing believed that the juvenile's prior treatment as an
adult obviated the need to comply with the provisions of chapter 39
governing adult sentencing. In this case, as in T.L.P., the offense for which
the child was charged as a juvenile occurred before the commission of the
offenses for which he was charged as an adult.'14 Thus, the offenses at
issue in Kazakoff did not constitute subsequent violations of the law
subjecting the child to adult sentencing." 5 A second issue before the
court in Kazakoff was the proper application of Florida's transfer for adult
prosecution statute."6 The child claimed that the transfer order failed to
contain any findings of fact with regard to two of the mandatory statutory
108. 657 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
109. Id. at 49.
110. Id. at 50.
111. Id. at 49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(d) (1993)).
112. Id.
113. 642 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see also Thomas v. State, 657
So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (following Kazakoff).
114. Kazakoff, 642 So. 2d at 598.
115. Id. at 597.
116. Id.
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transfer criteria found in section 39.052(2)(c) and 39.052(2)(e)." 7 The
district court of appeal recognized that there was a prior conflict in the
appellate case law surrounding the effect of the trial court's failure to make
the required statutory findings in the waiver order.118 The appellate court
chose to side with those courts that do not treat the deficiency as invalidat-
ing the juvenile's subsequent conviction as an adult, but rather require
reversal and remand for the more limited purpose of entry of a proper order
while leaving the conviction intact.119
E. Appellate Issues
Questions of what constitutes an appealable order in delinquency cases
have come before the Florida courts on a number of occasions. 2 In State
v. Del Rey,"' the State filed a consolidated petition for writ of certiorari
and appealed, seeking review of a non-final order of the juvenile court. The
trial court waived jurisdiction over the child to adult criminal court, but first
reduced three filed charges and precluded the state from filing an informa-
tion charging the child as an adult for an offense other than those on which
the court waived jurisdiction." The appellate court dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction finding there was no supreme court rule of procedure
which authorizes the state to appeal from a non-final order in a juvenile
delinquency case."z The court concluded that the Florida Constitution
allows interlocutory appeals only to the extent provided by the Supreme
Court of Florida rules." 4 Case law indicates that the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure which allow non-final orders to be appealed do not
apply in delinquency cases."z The court dismissed the petition for a writ
of certiorari and held that certiorari lies only where the order to be reviewed
may cause significant injury in subsequent proceedings in which the remedy
by appeal will be inadequate.1 26 The court concluded that the State had
117. Id. at 598.
118. Id. at 599.
119. Kazakoff, 642 So. 2d at 599-600.
120. See 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 554-55; 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at
364-65.
121. 643 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
122. Id. at 1147.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing State v. M.G., 550 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 551 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1989)).
126. Del Rey, 643 So. 2d at 1148.
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since charged the youngster in an information which was the subject of
subsequent litigation. 7 The circuit court had not yet ruled on a motion
by the child challenging the information. 28 If the court were to allow the
information, the matter would be moot. If the motion were denied, it would
be immediately appealable because, even though it is a final order, it is one
dismissing the count of an information.' 29 For these reasons the appeal
and the certiorari petition were dismissed. 30
F. Legislation
As noted, the Florida Legislature did not concentrate its efforts in the
area of juvenile law this year. However, in an attempt to address the
growing concern about juvenile sexual offenders, the legislature established
a juvenile sexual offender statute.' After the adjudicatory hearing stage,
the court may determine whether placement in a juvenile detention facility
is in the best interest of the juvenile sexual offender and the public. 32
The court may require an examination of the juvenile by a psychologist,
therapist, or psychiatrist, and have that person submit a report with a
proposed plan of treatment for the child.'33 Accordingly, juvenile sexual
offenders may, at the court's discretion, be ordered to community-based
treatment as opposed to proceeding with a standard disposition hearing.'
34
Once a juvenile is adjudicated a sexual offender, the court may, subject
to funding, commit the juvenile to the Department of Juvenile Justice for
placement in a sexual offender facility or program. 35 At this point, the
juvenile sexual offender is committed for an indefinite period of time until
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. For a definition of juvenile sexual offender, see ch. 95-267, § 43, 1995 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. 1833, 1866 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(76)); see also, id. § 49,
1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1871 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 415.50165(7)).
132. Id. § 45, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1868 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.052(6)).
133. Id.
134. See id. § 45, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1868-69 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
39.052(6)).
135. Ch. 95-267, § 46, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1869-70 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 39.054(1)(j)). See generally id. §§ 52-53, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1874 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 415.504) (adding duties of the Task Force on Juvenile Sexual
Offenders and the Victims of Juvenile Sexual Abuse and Crimes, and establishing criteria for
mental health counselors).
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the treatment program is completed, but treatment may not exceed the length
of time an adult would serve for the same offense. 36 Also subject to
appropriation, the treatment program must provide educational and
psychological services to the juvenile, extending to aftercare counseling and
monitoring upon release.137 Once a juvenile sexual offender is placed in
detention, the detention staff must provide adequate supervision to the other
children in the facility, as well as notify school personnel and law enforce-
ment agencies of the sexual offender's release from detention.'38
The legislation' also authorized the Department of Juvenile Justice to
create secure juvenile assignment centers for committed youths who are, at
a minimum, a moderate risk level.'39 The centers will house youths after
the dispositional hearing pending placement in a residential commitment
program." At the centers the children will receive medical, academic,
mental health, psychological, behavioral, sociological, substance abuse, and
vocational testing.' The centers will determine the children's treatment
needs and develop necessary treatment plans. 42 While staying at the
center, the child shall be entitled to numerous short-term services, including
educational, vocational, physical and mental health, substance abuse
education, anger and impulse management training, and conflict resolution
training. 43  The centers' staff will place the child in a commitment
program based on the court ordered restrictiveness level, the evaluation by
the centers' staff, and the geographic location of the child's family so that
the family can participate in the rehabilitation."
136. Id. §§ 52-53, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1874 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.504).
137. See id. § 48, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1870 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.0571).
138. Id. § 44, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1868 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.044(1 1)(a)-(b)).
139. Ch. 95-267, § 41, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1866 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 39.0551).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Ch. 95-267, § 41, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1866 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 39.0551).
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III. DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Dependency proceedings are often used as tactical devices in what are
essentially divorce and custody disputes. 41 Clock v. Clock'46 is such a
case. A stepmother filed a petition for dependency in an effort to stop the
planned relocation of her stepson with the child's natural father from Florida
to Colorado. The petition was brought because the child wanted to stay in
Florida with the stepmother from whom the father had been divorced after
nine years of marriage. The child remained with the stepmother after the
divorce until the end of the school year when the father planned to move
back to Colorado with the child. The petition alleged, among other things,
that the father abandoned the child in Monroe County, Florida and that the
child was in risk of neglect, abuse, or abandonment if he returned to
Colorado with his father. 47 Finally, the petition alleged that the child did
not wish to relocate to Colorado. 48  After hearing testimony, the trial
court granted the petition for dependency despite an earlier finding that no
abuse, neglect, or abandonment by the natural parents occurred.
149
Ultimately, the trial court returned the child to the custody of his father, but
enjoined the father from relocating the child outside of Monroe County,
except for summer vacations. 150 The natural parents (the mother residing
in Colorado) appealed on the ground that the record did not support a
finding of dependency. The appellate court held that the legislature never
intended the dependency statute to subject an otherwise fit custodial parent
to a charge simply because the parent sought to relocate the child against the
child's wishes. 5' Thus, the court held that merely "relocating or separat-
ing a child from familiar surroundings by an otherwise fit and proper
custodial parent against the child's wishes" is not abuse under the dependen-
cy provisions of Florida's juvenile code.5 2
Under Florida law, when a court makes a dependency finding it must
prepare written findings of fact to support the order.'53 If a court fails to
145. See 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 369.
146. 649 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
147. Id. at 313.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 313-14.
150. Id. at 314.
151. Clock, 649 So. 2d at 314-15.
152. Id. at 315 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2), (10)(a) (1993)).
153. See FLA. STAT. § 39.409 (1993); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.330(g).
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do so, the case must be remanded for written findings of fact, as the court
held in Ash v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services. 4 Further,
as noted by the Ash court, written findings of fact are not rendered valid by
the filing of a notice of appeal if they are written after jurisdiction has been
lost. 155
B. Child Abuse Registry Reporting Issues
Florida's child abuse and neglect reporting statute contains provisions
for a central abuse registry and tracking system and due process controls to
protect alleged perpetrators. 5 6 Child abuse reporting systems, including
Florida's system, have generated substantial litigation. Cases involving
implementation of the reporting system continue to regularly come before
Florida's appellate courts. 7 In addition, a number of civil rights cases
have been brought throughout the country challenging reporting sys-
tems.158
In S.G. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,'59 an
appellant sought to have her name expunged from Florida's central child
abuse registry and tracking system, causing a statutorily mandated adminis-
trative review process to ensue. At an administrative hearing, HRS
introduced into evidence a dependency order entered by the circuit court in
a parallel proceeding, but failed to argue collateral estoppel or res judicata.
The hearing officer found that HRS did not satisfy its statutory burden of
proof and recommended expunction. HRS rejected the officer's findings
and the appeal followed."6 The appellate court found, inter alia, that the
agency incorrectly relied on a non-final dependency order which was the
subject of a pending appeal.16 1 In fact, two weeks after the agency's entry
of its final order, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded
the dependency order. Incredibly, HRS declined to file a brief in S.G.,
with the result of "leaving [the court] without any insight into the agency's
154. 649 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
155. Id.
156. See FLA. STAT. § 415.504(4) (Supp. 1994).
157. For a discussion of cases decided in earlier years, see 1993 Leading Cases, supra
note 1, at 551-52; 1991 Survey, supra note 1, at 366-68.
158. See, e.g., Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1189 (1994); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993).
159. 647 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
160. Id. at 243.
161. Id. at 243-44.
162. Id. at 244.
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present legal position." 63 The appellate court reversed and directed HRS
to "enter an order consonant with the conclusions of law reached by the
hearing officer."' 64
The constitutionality of the definitional language of the child abuse
reporting statute came before the Supreme Court of Florida this past year in
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. A.S.165 A single father
sought to have his name removed from the HRS central abuse registry
having been cited for neglect for leaving his six-year old son home alone for
at least six hours. The father, a fish and wildlife officer, elected to take part
in a stakeout to apprehend a suspect despite having no arrangements for
child care. A report was made to HRS and the father was cited. The father
challenged the statutory provision which provides that harm to a child's
health or welfare can occur based upon the failure to provide "'the child
with supervision or guardianship by specific acts or omissions of a serious
nature requiring the intervention of the department or the court.""' 66
The supreme court found that the legislature could not define with
complete specificity all acts or omissions which are serious enough to fall
within the act.' 67 According to the court, whether a particular act is
covered must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 6  However, the
court concluded that the definition provides sufficient standards to be
followed by HRS in carrying out its responsibility. 69 Finally, the court
held that the standards to be followed relate to the governmental purpose if
the goal is the prevention of harm to neglected children. 70 Although the
court upheld the statute as constitutional, it concluded that it was inapplica-
ble to the case at hand because the conduct of the father did not rise to the
level where he should be classified as a perpetrator of child neglect.'
C. Termination of Parental Rights Issues
Florida's juvenile code contains four distinct grounds for termination
of parental rights:
163. Id.
164. S.G., 647 So. 2d at 244.
165. 648 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1995).
166. Id. at 129 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(e) (Supp. 1990), amended by FLA.
STAT. § 415.503(1O)(e) (Supp. 1994)).
167. Id. at 131.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. A.S., 648 So. 2d at 131.
171. Id.
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1) voluntary execution of a written surrender of the child; 2) the
inability to identify or ascertain the location of a parent by diligent
search; 3) egregious conduct by the parent that endangers the life,
health, or safety of the child or the child's sibling; or 4) when the child
has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the
court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by
the parent.1
72
In a September 1994 opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida in re T.M., 73
was presented with the question of whether a termination of parental rights
case could go forward in a situation where there had been no provision for
a performance agreement or permanent placement plan with the parent prior
to the termination. Under the 1990 version of the termination statute, a
performance agreement or permanent placement plan need not have been
made available under section 39.464 in the situation of severe or continuing
abuse or neglect and egregious abuse.174 In T.M., the father, whose
parental rights had been terminated in the lower court, argued on appeal that
sections 39.464(3) and (4) conflicted with section 39.467, which articulated
the procedure for an adjudicatory hearing in termination of parental rights
cases. 75 Section 39.467 required proof that either a performance agree-
ment or permanent placement plan had been offered to the parent or that any
of the elements of section 39.464 were met, and that the parent offered the
agreement or plan has failed to substantially comply with it. 76  The
Supreme Court of Florida held that the two sections of the law were not
inconsistent.1 77  Section 39.467 should be read in the disjunctive, and,
therefore, termination could take place and be satisfied without offering a
performance agreement. 7 1
The appellant father also argued that termination of parental rights
without a plan or an agreement violated his constitutional right to family
integrity as articulated by the supreme court in Padgett v. Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Services.17 9 The supreme court held that perfor-
mance agreements or permanent placement plans are not required in all
172. FLA. STAT. § 39.464.
173. 641 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1994).
174. FLA. STAT. § 39.464(3)-(4) (1990).
175. T.M., 641 So. 2d at 411.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 412.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d
565, 571 (Fla. 1991)); see also 1991 Survey, supra note 1, at 368-73.
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instances and that the Padgett court used the term "ordinarily" to indicate
that there might be exceptions."' 0 This case is one of them.
As the listing above shows, one of the grounds for termination of
parental rights is a voluntarily executed written surrender of the child, giving
the youngster to HRS or to a licensed child-placing agency for subsequent
adoption. 81  In any termination situation, there must be proof that the
termination is in the manifest best interests of the child and that certain
notice requirements have been met.182 In Henriquez v. Adoption Centre,
Inc.,83 the Fifth District Court of Appeal was asked to revisit the issue of
the grounds for revocation of the voluntary surrender. The case concerned
a mother's appeal from a trial court decision terminating her parental rights
when she voluntarily surrendered her nine-month old child to the adoption
center, but when five days after doing so, she withdrew her waiver and
consent and sought to have her child returned. The mother claimed at trial
that termination was improper because the Florida statute governing
termination was unconstitutional. She argued that it did not provide for a
cooling-off period for parents who voluntarily execute a written surrender
of the child. The mother argued further that she had surrendered her child
under duress. On motion for rehearing en banc, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal held that the supreme court previously upheld the constitutionality
of the statute on due process and equal protection grounds in re Adoption
of Doe.'84 The court held that the failure to provide a cooling-off period
can only be remedied by the legislature. 8 5 The court also held that clear
and convincing evidence showed that the surrender had been freely and
voluntarily executed. 186
In a lengthy dissent, Chief Judge Harris argued that there was no
finding that termination was in the best interests of the child pursuant to the
then applicable statute.'87 Chief Judge Harris's second argument was that
In re Adoption of Doe did not consider a constitutional challenge to the
180. T.M., 641 So. 2d at 413.
181. FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(a) (Supp. 1994).
182. Id. §§ 39.4611(1)(c), 39.462.
183. 641 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 649 So. 2d 233
(Fla. 1994).
184. Id. at 89 (citing In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989)).
185. Id. at 89-90.
186. Id. at 90.
187. Id. at 96 (Harris, C.J., dissenting); see FLA. STAT. § 39.467 (1991). See also
id. §§ 39.4611-39.4612 (Supp. 1994) (reflecting the necessity of considering the manifest
best interests of the child in termination of parental rights cases).
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consent provision based upon the mother's fundamental liberty interest in
the care, custody, and management of her child.188 The chief judge argued
that the state should not be allowed to terminate parental rights "by barring
parents from changing their minds (even after a waiver and consent is
properly executed) when the change of mind occurs before the petition for
termination is even filed and before the rights of any potential adoptive
parents come into existence[.]"' 89 In his view, the statute ensures quick
and efficient resolution and disposal of such cases, but denying the mother
the right to make a case that she is a fit and deserving mother who is able
and willing to continue to care for the child "is both unfair and unreason-
able., ,190
The question of who has standing to bring a termination of parental
rights proceeding has been before the Florida appellate courts on a number
of occasions.' 9' Whether allowing a guardian ad litem to petition for
termination of parental rights violates the separation of powers clause of the
Florida Constitution was an issue considered by the Third District Court of
Appeal recently in Simms v. State.'92 The court held in an en banc
decision that there was no violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine. 93 The court ruled that the power to protect the welfare of children
and terminate parental rights was not an exclusive power of one branch of
government and, therefore, not subject to the separation of powers
clause.'94 The court found that there was power to protect children both
in the executive and in the judicial branch. The authority of the courts to
protect children was inherent and, according to the appellate court, extended
to the appointment of guardians ad litem for unrepresented children.9
This authority was codified by the Florida Legislature in 1975.196 At the
same time, the legislature created HRS and charged it with the protection of
dependent children. 9 7  Thus, the court could find no language in the
Florida Constitution nor historical precedent confining the power to a single
188. Henriquez, 641 So. 2d at 98-99 (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 99.
190. Id. at 101.
191. See 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 544-46; 1990 Survey, supra note 1, at
1201.
192. 641 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 649 So. 2d 870
(Fla. 1994).
193. Id. at 962.
194. Id. at 961.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1991)).
197. Simms, 641 So. 2d at 961.
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branch of government. Rather, it found that section 39.464 provides con-
current authority in HRS, guardians ad litem, and licensed child-placing
agencies to file petitions to terminate parental rights. 98 Finally, the court
concluded that there are situations where the best interests of the child and
HRS's interests may differ.199 Therefore, providing authority in both
branches of government furthers the State's interest in protecting chil-
dren.2 0
Chief Judge Schwartz dissented, arguing that it was a violation of due
process, in the context of the right to a fair trial, to permit the judiciary's
appointee, in the form of a guardian ad litem, to prosecute an action to
deprive a parent of the precious right to her child.20' In his view, it is
"profoundly wrong for any entity but the executive to seek and advocate the
deprivation of another's rights."202 Chief Judge Schwartz also noted that
the problem may have been rectified in 1994 by the legislature's change in
section 61.403,2o3 which now provides that "[a] guardian ad litem when
appointed shall act as next friend of the child, investigator or evaluator, not
as attorney or advocate but shall act in the child's best interest. '2°4
However, section 61.403 also provides that the guardian ad litem,
acting through counsel, may file pleadings for relief as the guardian deems
appropriate in furtherance of the guardian's function.20 5 Thus, whether the
guardian ad litem either individually or through counsel can file petitions to
terminate parental rights remains open to interpretation. If Chief Judge
Schwartz is correct, the child is left at the mercy of HRS to protect his or
her interests for filing purposes. An alternative approach, which Florida has
never followed, is to provide the right to counsel for a child in a dependen-
cy proceeding which would then allow for protection at the termination
stage. °6
Termination of the parental rights of parents who are in prison is a
common issue both in the appellate courts of Florida2 7 and throughout the
198. Id.
199. Id. at 962.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 963 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
202. Simms, 641 So. 2d at 963 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 963 n.1.
204. FLA. STAT. § 61.403 (emphasis added).
205. Id. § 61.403(6).
206. See Juvenile Law, supra note 1, at 888; see also MARK I. SOLER ET AL.,
REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 4-52 to 4-55 (Matthew Bender, 1994).
207. See, e.g., In re E.F., 639 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re C.M.,
632 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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country.' In re G.R.S.,2 9 a natural father appealed from an order
terminating parental rights for abandonment and failure to comply with a
performance agreement. The father had consented to dependency of the
child and entered into a performance agreement with the goal of reunifica-
tion.21 At the time, the father was in prison. The agreement obligated
him to comply with rules of the prison, participate in drug programs and
parenting classes, obtain adequate housing upon release, obtain a psycholog-
ical evaluation and, if necessary, therapy, and maintain biweekly contact
with HRS.2 The appellate court overturned the trial court's fact-finding,
concluding that "[t]he record reflect[ed] that [the father] substantially
performed all of the tasks that were offered in prison, but could not perform
certain tasks because they were not available to him." ' Furthermore, the
trial record was "devoid of any evidence of reasonable efforts by HRS to
reunify the family, communicate with the father or offer the father meaning-
ful assistance in completing any of the tasks required by the performance
agreement." 13 In fact, it was unrefuted that the father's correspondence
to HRS about his son and the case went unanswered. 14 The court also
rejected a claim of abandonment as grounds for termination, finding that the
relationship between the father and the natural grandparents with whom the
child resided "was strained at best. '215 The father wrote to the child and
only stopped correspondence because he received no return correspondence
from the grandparents. Additionally, they would not accept his collect calls.
The order of termination was reversed and the case was remanded to
provide time to the father to substantially comply with the performance
agreement.1 6
D. Government Agency Tort Liability
In a significant decision rendered in the summer of 1995, the Supreme
Court of Florida was asked to decide the question of whether an adjudicated
dependent juvenile may maintain an ordinary negligence claim against HRS
for the latter's alleged failure to provide the juvenile with services. In
208. SOLER, supra note 206, at 4-118.
209. 647 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
210. Id. at 1026.
211. Id. at 1026-27.
212. Id. at 1027.
213. Id.
214. G.R.S., 647 So. 2d at 1027.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1028.
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Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. B.J.M.,217 the Su-
preme Court of Florida, in an opinion by Justice Anstead, answered the
certified question in the negative. The case began when an adjudicated
dependent and delinquent minor, through its guardian ad litem, Legal
Services of Greater Miami, filed a mandamus action against HRS seeking
to compel the agency to place the child in a specific rehabilitative program.
Subsequently, the child amended his complaint to include a tort claim for
general damages based on negligence. Specifically, the child claimed that
HRS breached its duty to the child by not following recommended
psychiatric placement reports, failing to provide proper counsel, failing to
provide vocational training or educational services comparable to those
provided in non-residential settings, failing to generally meet the child's
emotional, developmental and placement needs, and by inappropriately
labeling the child. In response, HRS moved for summary judgment. The
trial court granted the motion. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed
and certified the question to the supreme court.218
After disposing of several procedural issues, including collateral
estoppel, the supreme court addressed the question of sovereign immuni-
ty.2 9 The court surveyed the historical analysis of sovereign immunity by
the Florida courts. It held that the parameters of governmental tort liability
are premised upon finding governmental activity in one of four categories:
1) legislative, permitting, licensing and executive officer functions; 2)
enforcement of laws and the protection of public safety; 3) capital improve-
ment and property control operations; and 4) professional, educational, and
general services for the health and welfare of the citizens.22° The court
explained that assuming a government action or function is not protected
under the first two categories, the court must determine whether conduct
within categories three or four amounts to a "'discretionary planning or
judgmental function"' as opposed to conduct which is purely operation-
al.22' If the challenged action is policy making, planning, or judgmental
activity, it is immune from tort liability. In other words, the question is
whether the function is policy making, planning, or judgmental as opposed
to routine operational level actions that are subject to tort liability. The
court cited Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Whaley 22
217. 656 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1995).
218. Id. at 909.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 911.
221. Id. at 912.
222. 574 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1991).
Vol. 20
220
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
1995]
for the proposition that operational level decisions expose a child to a
specific danger, such as physical placement of a child in a specific room in
an HRS detention center known to HRS to be occupied by dangerous
juveniles. ' The court also cited Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services v. Yamuni,224 to address the danger of negligently failing to
adequately protect the child from further physical abuse at the operational
level.'  Relying upon cases rejecting theories of educational neglect, the
court held that both placement decisions and decisions as to the provisions
of services are planning level activities and not operational ones.226 Thus,
the court concluded that decisions on how to properly plan for a dependent
child or rehabilitate a delinquent juvenile and to assess the need for
counseling, education, and vocational training are discretionary judgmental
decisions to be made pursuant to the broad discretion vested in HRS by the
legislature. 7 For these actions HRS is immune. •
Finally, the court held that its conclusion that the failure to provide
certain services to the child was shielded by sovereign immunity, was also
supported by Florida Statutes § 39.455V2 That statute immunizes social
workers who are carrying out a placement plan for dependent children. The
court noted that the law does create a duty on the part of HRS and its agents
and employees not to act with wanton or willful disregard of the interest of
the child. Thus, a claim based on willful and wanton conduct is action-
able.229 B.J.M. therefore holds that immunity protects HRS from tort
liability for judgmental decisions relating to the care of dependent and
delinquent children. HRS may only be sued for operational level acts of
negligence.
E. Legislation
This year the legislature expanded HRS's duty to report certain findings
to law enforcement during child abuse and neglect investigations, including
when HRS is aware that the family is likely to flee and when the immediate
safety or welfare of the child is in danger .2 " HRS must now make an
223. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d at 913 (citing Whaley, 574 So. 2d at 101).
224. 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988).
225. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d at 913 (citing Yamuni, 529 So. 2d at 260).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 916.
228. IM at 917.
229. Id.
230. See ch. 95-228, § 3, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1556, 1560 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 415.505).
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immediate report to law enforcement agencies, whereas previously, the
agency had up to three days before transmitting the report to law enforce-
ment.23 Also, the law which mandated certain persons with defined legal
duties to report abuse or neglect to HRS now extends to reporting an
abandoned child. 32
Previously, HRS could only take away an alleged dependant child upon
reasonable grounds that the child was abused, neglected, abandoned,
suffering from an injury, or in immediate danger.233 The legislature has
eased this burden. Now, HRS can justify taking an alleged dependant child
merely upon probable cause to support a finding of reasonable grounds for
the child's removal. 34 Further, the grounds for child removal now include
a lack of immediate adult supervision or care, in addition to the situation
where the child's custodian materially violates a condition of court imposed
placement (if the child was court placed).235 Once the child is taken into
custody by HRS, an emergency shelter hearing must take place within
twenty-four hours of the child's removal.236 During the pendency of that
hearing, relatives of the child will have priority consideration over custody
of the child as opposed to nonrelative placement.237
In adjudicatory hearings, the court must now possess independent
corroborative evidence of the dependency when the proceeding is based
solely on an anonymous report.238 In the past, courts, on the basis of stare
decisis, protected indigent parents or guardians of the child by requiring
counsel for them during a dependency action when the dependency could
form the basis for a subsequent termination of parental rights.2 39 Florida
law has been amended to comply with the prior case law and mandates that
indigent parents be appointed counsel in dependency actions when threa-
231. Id.
232. See id. § 44, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1611-12 (amending FLA. STAT. §
415.504).
233. See FLA. STAT. § 39.401.
234. Ch. 95-228, § 6, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1561-62 (amending FLA. STAT. §
39.401(1), (6)); see also id. § 7, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1562-64 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 39.402).
235. Id. § 6, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1561-62 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.401(b) (1993)).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Ch. 95-228, § 12, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1568 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 39.408).
239. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); In re D.F., 622 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320.
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tened with permanent loss of the child or when criminal charges underlie the
dependency petition. 24°
The legislature has expressed its intent to encourage relatives to care
for a child who is taken into foster care custody. 4 Further, the legislature
expressed its preference that adoptive placements take place as expeditiously
as possible after a termination of parental rights in order to avoid temporary
placements. 42  Long-term foster care placements are not generally
considered a permanent option, but may be considered a permanent option
when all the following conditions are met: the child is fourteen years or
older; the child lives in a licensed foster home and the foster parents and
child desire to live together on a permanent basis but do not wish to adopt;
the foster parents are committed to providing care to the child until age of
majority; the child has lived with foster parents for at least twelve months;
the foster parents and child view each other as family; and the child's
well-being is being promoted by the living arrangements.243 Long-term
placements, however, are not permanent, and are subject to court revocation
when a material change in circumstances exists, which makes it no longer
in the child's best interest to remain in the particular foster home.2 "
IV. FAMILIES IN NEED OF SERVICES AND CHILDREN IN NEED OF
SERVICES
As prior surveys have indicated, there is very little case law interpreting
the part of the 1987 juvenile code covering families and children in need of
services.245 However, one aspect of the Families in Need of Services and
Children in Need of Services ("FINS/CINS") statute that has generated
discussion is the proposition that a child who violates a CINS order may be
held in contempt of court and then have his or her liberty removed by
placement in secure detention.246  The ability of the court to punish a
240. Ch. 95-228, § 5, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1561 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.40
(1993)).
241. See id. § 13, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1568-69 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.45
(Supp. 1994)).
242. Id. § 14, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1569 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.47 (Supp.
1994)).
243. Id. § 62, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1635 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.41(2)(a)6.c.(I)-(V)).
244. Id. § 62, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1635 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.41 (2)(a)6.d.).
245. See 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 383-84.
246. FLA. STAT. § 39.444 (Supp. 1994).
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status offender by use of secure detention is not just an issue in Florida.
The Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act also provides
for the enforcement of valid court orders in status offender cases by
contempt and punishment and ultimately incarceration. 47
Indeed, the issue of punishment of children for violation of CINS
orders was recently before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department
of Juvenile Justice v. S. W.2 48 The Department of Juvenile Justice filed a
petition for certiorari on behalf of two children who had been adjudicated
children in need of supervision and who were ordered by the trial court to
complete certain educational requirements, although the appellate court
noted that the record was quite unclear on exactly what was ordered. 49
Four months after the initial order, the trial court issued an "Order to Show
Just Cause" to the two children to show why they should not be held in
indirect criminal contempt for failure to comply with the court's school
orders. The children appeared, waived counsel, and pled guilty to
contempt of court. They were adjudicated delinquent, placed in non-secure
detention and, after a disposition hearing, placed at restrictiveness level two,
and ordered to pay costs, restitution, and comply with other special
255provisions.
z5 All of this was done in clear contravention of the Supreme
Court of Florida's 1992 opinion in A.A. v. Rolle,52 which held that the
court may not adjudicate children delinquent and in contempt for violation
of the CINS order and place them in detention as punishment. The S.W.
court recognized this and granted the petition for certiorari.253 In fact,
current Florida law now provides for the secure detention for direct or
indirect criminal contempt for violation of the CINS order.25 The
legislature responded to the A.A. decision by amending the juvenile code to
allow for secure detention of CINS for five to fifteen days in a staff secure
shelter or residential facility. 255
Some minor statutory changes were made by the legislature concerning
status offenses. Students expelled from school are not guaranteed continu-
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5785 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
248. 647 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
249. Id. at 1056 n.1.
250. Id. at 1056.
251. Id.
252. 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
253. S.W., 647 So. 2d at 1056.
254. See FLA. STAT. § 39.0145 (1993).
255. Id. § 39.0145(2)(b).
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ing educational services25 6 Nonetheless, district school systems may set
up alternative site schools for disruptive or violent youths. 57 The alterna-
tive site schools are generally referred to as second chance schools.25
Students assigned to second chance schools must either be: habitually
disruptive, interfere with their own or other's learning, or commit a serious
offense which would normally warrant suspension or expulsion.259 If one
of these criteria exists, the school's local child study team will evaluate the
child to determine if placement into the second chance school is neces-
sry.26 The school boards should take into account the student's safety,
the school's ability to control the student, the appropriate educational
program in which to place the student, and how to maintain an educational
learning environment.261
V. CONCLUSION
The legislature had taken a hiatus from its prior efforts to respond to
public pressure involving the juvenile justice and child welfare systems.
The appellate courts have been diligent in hearing significant trial issues and
holding the trial courts accountable for compliance with the juvenile code.
It would be desirable for the legislature to allow the current juvenile code
to remain in effect so that all participants in the juvenile justice and child
welfare system have an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the law
and employ it over time. It is hard to evaluate the effectiveness of the
juvenile code when the legislature changes it in response to every change in
the political wind.
256. Ch. 95-267, § 63, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1877 (amending FLA. STAT. §
228.041 (Supp. 1994)).
257. See id. § 64, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1877-78 (amending FLA. STAT. §
230.02 (1993)).
258. See id. § 67, 1995 Fa. Sess. Law Serv. at 1880-81 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 230.2316).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See ch. 95-267, § 65, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1878 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 230.22).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past year' saw a number of interesting and innovative develop-
ments in Florida's professional responsibility jurisprudence. This article
reviews significant Florida court decisions, ethics rules, and advisory ethics
opinions handed down during the year that are likely to affect Florida
lawyers as they attempt to represent their clients zealously while complying
with the letter, if not always the spirit, of the Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct ("RPC").2
Today's lawyer may act in many different capacities, at times assuming
the role of advocate, advisor, counselor, fiduciary, intermediary, business-
person, or marketer. The lawyer must adhere to a host of sometimes-
* Florida Bar Ethics Director. B.S., Florida State University, 1977; J.D., University
of Texas at Austin, 1984. Member, Florida and Texas bars. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Kelly J. Wright and Kimberly A. Sessions.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July 15,
1994, through July 14, 1995.
2. The RPC are found in Chapter 4, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Although the
bulk of this article focuses on decisions concerning the RPC, it does mention an important
addition to Chapter 3, "Rules of Discipline," in the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. See
infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
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overlapping ethical obligations while operating within the framework of
these varied relationships. Using a functional approach, this article analyzes
effects that the cited authorities may have upon a lawyer's ethical duties in
several key relationships. After this introduction, Part II begins by looking
at some professional responsibility developments that can affect the lawyer-
client relationship. Specific areas reviewed include client identity,
communication with clients, business transactions with clients, and fees.
Next, Part III focuses on a lawyer's role as an officer of the justice system
and his or her relationships with, and duties to, that system. Part IV then
examines ethical duties attendant to a lawyer's relationships with various
third parties: prospective clients; opponents; other lawyers; and partners,
employers, and employees. Finally, Part V covers developments relevant to
the lawyer's relationship with the Supreme Court of Florida, The Florida
Bar, and Florida's lawyer disciplinary system, and reviews some significant
disciplinary cases handed down in the past year.3
II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
Most observers would agree that, of the many professional relationships
in which a lawyer may be engaged, the relationship between client and
lawyer remains paramount. In 1995 a number of cases, rules, and ethics
opinions addressed aspects of this most important relationship. Before a
lawyer can determine the substantive duties owed to a client by virtue of the
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer must first be certain that he or she has
accurately identified the client. While one might assume that it is unnece-
ssary to even address this basic point, a surprising number of callers to the
Florida Bar's "ethics hotline" 4 present scenarios that boil down to this
essential question: "Who is my client?" Echoing this theme, several 1995
court decisions revolved around client identity issues.
3. Key disciplinary cases are analyzed where appropriate in other sections of the article,
but the remainder are collected in Part V for the convenience of the reader.
4. Since 1985, the Ethics Department of the Florida Bar has operated a toll-free
telephone "hotline" for bar members. A Florida lawyer may call the Bar's Tallahassee office
at 1-800-235-8619 and obtain an informal oral advisory opinion concerning the calling
lawyer's own contemplated conduct. In 1995, Ethics Department lawyers answered about
17,000 calls. Timothy P. Chinaris (1995) (unpublished statistics on file with author,
Tallahassee, Florida). Rules governing the advisory opinion process are found in Florida Bar
Procedures for Ruling on Questions of Ethics, FLA. B.J., Sept. 1994, at 652-53. During his
tenure with the Bar, the author has talked to hundreds of lawyers facing client identity
dilemmas.
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Brennan v. Ruffner' concerned a legal malpractice suit brought by Dr.
Brennan, a disgruntled minority shareholder of a closely held corporation,
against lawyer Ruffner. Brennan had practiced in a three-doctor medical
group operated as a professional service corporation. Ruffner had prepared
the shareholder's agreement. Several years later, Brennan was ousted from
the corporation by the other two shareholders. In suing the others for
breach of contract and fraud, Brennan alleged that he had not been
represented by couinsel in negotiating the shareholder's agreement. After
settling that suit, however, Brennan then sued Ruffner for legal malpractice,
alleging that Ruffner had represented both him individually and the
corporation.
Ruffner defended by denying the existence of a lawyer-client relation-
ship with Brennan.' The undisputed facts showed that Ruffner had
represented the corporation and that there had been no privity of contract
between Brennan and Ruffner.7 Nevertheless, Brennan argued that Ruffner
owed a duty to him as a shareholder by virtue of Ruffner's representation
of the closely held corporation. Rejecting this contention, the court stated:
[W]e hold that where an attorney represents a closely held corporation,
the attorney is not in privity with and therefore owes no separate duty
of diligence and care to an individual shareholder absent special
circumstances or an agreement to also represent the shareholder
individually .... [A]n attorney representing a corporation does not
become the attorney for the individual stockholders merely because the
attorney's actions on behalf of the corporation may also benefit the
stockholders.8
It may be noted that, although RPC 4-1.13(a)9 expresses the client
5. 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
6. The three elements to a legal malpractice action in Florida are: the lawyer's
employment; the lawyer's neglect of a reasonable duty; and that the lawyer's breach of that
duty was the proximate cause of damages suffered by the plaintiff. Riccio v. Stein, 559 So.
2d 1207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 567 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1990).
7. Brennan, 640 So. 2d at 145.
8. Id. at 145-46.
9. RPC 4-1.13, "Organization as Client," provides in pertinent part:
(a) Representation of Organization. A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.
(d) Identification of Client. In dealing with an organization's directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, a lawyer shall
1995]
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identity principle actually applied in the case, the court did not cite this rule
in reaching its decision. Under RPC 4-1.13(a), the client of a lawyer who
represents an organization is deemed to be the entity rather than the entity's
individual constituents (e.g., officers, directors, shareholders).
Client identity was also determinative in the disciplinary case of
Florida Bar v. Nesmith.'° In Nesmith, a lawyer borrowed money from the
owner of a corporation that the lawyer was representing. The lawyer did not
comply with the provisions of RPC 4-1.8(a)," which govern lawyer-client
business transactions. The supreme court, however, found the lawyer not
guilty of unethical conduct because the loan was entered into by the owner
in his individual capacity.' 2 Without citing RPC 4-1.13, the court appeared
to strictly apply the rule's basic principle (i.e., that the lawyer represents the
entity rather than its individual constituents). Some courts in other
jurisdictions have been reluctant to automatically apply the general rule of
RPC 4-1.13(a) in representations involving closely held corporations.'3
explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing.
(e) Representing Directors, Officers, Employees, Members, Shareholders, or
Other Constituents of Organization. A lawyer representing an organization may
also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders,
or other constituents, subject to the provisions of rule 4-1.7. If the organiza-
tion's consent to the dual representation is required by rule 4-1.7, the consent
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the
individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.13.
10. 642 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 1994).
11. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.8, "Conflict of Interest; Prohibited Transactions,"
provides:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client. A
lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse
to a client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or expenses,
unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing
to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of inde-
pendent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.8(a).
12. Nesmith, 642 So. 2d at 1359.
13. See, e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re
Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655, 657 (Or. 1979); In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284, 289-90 (Or. 1978);
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These courts instead have examined the underlying circumstances, including
the reasonable expectations of the entity's constituents regarding the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship. In Nesmith, the Supreme Court of
Florida did not adopt this more expansive approach to client identity in
representations involving closely held corporations.
RPC 4-1.13(a) was directly addressed and applied, however, by the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Hilton v.
Barnett Banks, Inc. 4 In Hilton, a Florida law firm represented one Barnett
entity ("Barnett Pinellas") in one matter, then sued the Barnett holding
company (Barnett Pinellas' parent) and some of the holding company's other
subsidiaries in an unrelated matter. Responding to a motion to disqualify,
the firm asserted that, under RPC 4-1.13, the defendants were not its
"clients." The court agreed with the firm's RPC 4-1.13 analysis, but
disqualified the firm due to conflict of interest reasons because the firm's
pleadings sought relief against the holding company's affiliated banks and
other subsidiaries (which, of course, included Barnett Pinellas).15
After identifying one's client, a lawyer must be mindful that it is the
client, rather than the lawyer, who sets the ultimate objectives of the
representation. The disciplinary case of Florida Bar v. Giant16 underscored
this precept, which is codified in RPC 4-1.2(a). 7 In Glant, the supreme
court reprimanded a lawyer who, without the client's authority or knowl-
edge, filed a motion requesting that the client be given custody of four
children when the client wanted custody of only two of the children, and
wrote to a state agency and the governor requesting that the case be
investigated."8
Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (Utah 1985).
14. No. 94-1036CIV-T24(A), 1994 WL 776971, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1994).
15. Id at *3-4.
16. 645 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1994).
17. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.2, "Scope of Representation," provides:
(a) Lawyer to Abide by Client's Decisions. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to subdivisions (c),
(d), and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are
to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to make or
accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall
abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to
be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2(a).
18. Giant, 645 So. 2d at 965.
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Communication is a primary aspect of the lawyer-client relationship, as
recognized in RPC 4-1.4.19 The crucial importance of unfettered lawyer-
client communication, however, was not properly acknowledged by the court
in Taylor v. Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A.2° In
Searcy, a lawyer left a law firm, and some clients who had substantial
contingent fee cases wished to follow him. The lawyer and the firm
wrestled over several attractive cases, and a trial court granted the firm's
motion to enjoin the lawyer from "communicating with persons alleged to
be clients of the firm."2  After the lawyer engaged in some prohibited
communication, the trial court found him guilty of civil contempt and fined
him $1,700,000 for violating the injunction.22
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, setting
aside the finding of contempt and the fine on a procedural ground.23 The
court went on to emphasize that the $1,700,000 fine was excessive. Citing
to two disciplinary cases,24 the majority viewed the large fine as a penalty
that could preclude the client from effectively exercising her right to choose
her own counsel.2 Such a penalty would clearly violate public policy in
Florida.26 Senior Judge Mager, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
was quite disturbed that the majority failed to decide the case based on the
injunction's detrimental impact on "the fundamental first amendment right
of an individual to communicate with the attorney of that individual's
choice, whether it be'for the purposes of retention, continued representation,
19. RPC 4-1.4, "Communication," provides:
(a) Informing Client of Status of Representation. A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.
(b) Duty to Explain Matters to Client. A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.4.
20. 651 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
21. Id. at 100.
22. Id. at 98.
23. Id. at 99. The appeals court noted that the contempt hearing had been held after a
motion to substitute the lawyer for the firm in the case had been granted. Consequently, at
that point "the injunction was no longer effective and thus the purpose of the motion could
only have been punitive ... .- Id. at 98. The trial court therefore should have treated the
matter as one of indirect criminal contempt, rather than civil contempt.
24. Florida Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1992); Florida Bar v. Doe, 550 So.
2d 1111 (Fla. 1989).
25. Searcy, 651 So. 2d at 99.
26. Id.
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or termination."'27 He insisted that an injunction purporting to bar commu-
nications of the type at issue in the case was simply beyond the power and
authority of the court.28
In 1995, the Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee also ventured
into the area of lawyer-client communication in the context of lawyers
leaving firms. At issue in Florida Ethics Opinion 93-429 was the ethical
propriety of an employment agreement between a law firm and one of its
associates. The employment agreement prohibited the departing associate
from "seeking, directly or indirectly, any of the [firm]'s clients." The
committee decided, and the Bar's Board of Governors agreed, that this
prohibition on "indirect" solicitation would be unethical if it could be read
to limit a lawyer's duty, imposed by RPC 4-1.4,30 to notify clients of the
lawyer's departure from the firm.3'
The client-lawyer relationship is a fiduciary one of trust and confidence,
and for this reason lawyers must follow special rules when they undertake
to transact business with their clients. The ethical standards applicable in
this area are set forth in RPC 4-1.8(a). 2 In Florida Bar v. Reed,33 the
supreme court reprimanded a lawyer who became embroiled in a real estate
transaction gone awry and did not follow RPC 4-1.8(a). The lawyer acted
as the buyers' lawyer and realtor, represented the sellers to a limited extent,
acted as closing agent, and served as escrow agent. Problems arose,
including bounced checks and trust accounting problems. The court
imposed a six-month suspension, frowning on the lawyer's multiple
representation and failure to follow the business transaction rule.34
Even absent evidence of client harm, failure to follow RPC 4-1.8(a)
when transacting business dealings with clients can result in discipline. In
27. Searcy, 651 So. 2d at 103 (Mager, S.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Id. at 106.
29. FLA. B. NEws, Mar. 1, 1995, at 21. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 19.
31. FLA. B. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1995, at 21.
32. See supra note 11. Florida case law also imposes requirements upon lawyer-client
business transactions. See, e.g., Jordan v. Growney, 416 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (noting that "an attorney who self-deals with a client must demonstrate that the
transaction was as beneficial to the client as if conducted at arm's length between strangers");
Abstract & Title Corp. of Fla. v. Cochran, 414 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting that, when challenged, the burden is on the lawyer to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, the fairness of the transaction).
33. 644 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1994).
34. Id. at 1358.
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Florida Bar v. Rue,35 a lawyer was found guilty of selling automobiles to
clients without the written disclosures and consents required by the rule.
36
A related issue concerns a lawyer's provision of financial assistance to
clients during the course of representation. Traditionally, the rules of ethics,
as well as the legal doctrines of champerty and maintenance, have permitted
lawyers to assist clients financially only by advancing costs or expenses of
the litigation itself; payment of, or even advancement of, non-litigation
expenses has been strictly prohibited. This standard is expressed today in
RPC 4-1.8(e). 37 The supreme court, however, in the disciplinary case of
Florida Bar v. Taylor,38 appears to have carved out a limited "humanitari-
an" exception to this time-honored prohibition. In this case, the lawyer and
his firm provided an apparently needy client with some used clothing and
a $200 check, drawn on the firm's account, for basic necessities. The
referee39 assigned to the disciplinary case found the lawyer not guilty of
violating RPC 4-1.8(e), and the supreme court accepted this finding.40 The
court emphasized that this financial assistance was "essentially an act of
humanitarianism," was not given to induce the client to hire the lawyer or
continue the representation, and that there was no "expectation of repay-
ment" on the part of the lawyer.41
Although the court was placed in a very difficult position because of
the facts involved, Taylor seems to be based on unrealistic assumptions and
presents a strained application of the ethics rules. First, once a humanitari-
anism exception to RPC 4-1.8(e) has been recognized, it will inexorably
expand. If $200 was a permissible gift, how about $500, or $1000?
Furthermore, the Taylor court stressed that the gifts in question were not
35. 643 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1994).
36. Id. at 1081-82.
37. Subdivision (e) of RPC 4-1.8, "Conflict of Interest; Prohibited Transactions,"
provides:
(e) Financial Assistance to Client. A lawyer shall not provide financial assis-
tance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except
that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repay-
ment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.8(e).
38. 648 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1994).
39. The Supreme Court of Florida appoints a county or circuit judge to sit as "referee"
in the trial of disciplinary cases. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.6(a).
40. Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 1191-92.
41. Id. at 1192.
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made for the purpose of establishing or maintaining the lawyer's employ-
ment.42 Perhaps that was true for the initial payment, but human nature
teaches that a client who has received one such gift may expect more. At
the very least, the recipient is likely to tell others of her good fortune and
thus create expectations in the minds of those potential clients-expectations
that, to those persons, may act as an inducement to hire that lawyer.
Finally, there is no basis in RPC 4-1.8(e) for carving out a "humanitarian"
exception. A more forthright, and easier approach to apply would be to
change the rule to spell out the precise boundaries of the exception.
Overlooking the plain language of the rule merely breeds disrespect for this
and other rules.
While the court did not apply RPC 4-1.8(e) to bar the gift in Taylor,
it is clear that advances of living expenses are still considered unethical. In
Florida Bar v. Rue,43 a lawyer received a ninety-one day suspension for
this and other misconduct.44
In the lawyer-client relationship, few areas are of greater interest to
both sides than the matter of fees. The supreme court resolved a conflict
among district courts of appeal by announcing the proper standard to be
used for determining the quantum meruit recovery of a lawyer discharged
without cause prior to resolution of a client's contingent fee case. In
Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Polet, 45 the court
held that the "lodestar" method 46 of calculating fees should not be applied
in this context.47 The "lodestar" method is to be used in cases where the
fee will be paid by someone other than the client who received the services.
This method is deficient for determining the quantum meruit award to be
paid to the discharged lawyer by the client (or contracting party), because,
in contravention of Rosenberg v. Levin,48 it does not allow for consideration
of "the totality of the circumstances."49  All relevant factors, including
42. Id.
43. 643 So. 2d at 1080.
44. Id. at 1083. The lawyer was found guilty of: "sharing fees with non-lawyers;
providing [improper] financial assistance to clients; engaging in business transactions with
clients without the required disclosures; and seeking and collecting prohibited fees." Id. at
1082.
45. 652 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1995).
46. See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), as
modified by Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
47. Poletz, 652 So. 2d at 368.
48. 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
49. See id. at 1022.
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those set forth in RPC 4-1.5(b), 50 must be considered by the court in fixing
the actual value of the services rendered to the client. The supreme court
identified the following as examples of additional factors that could be
considered by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion: "the fee
[agreement] itself, the reason the attorney was discharged, actions taken by
the lawyer or client before or after discharge, and the benefit actually
conferred on the client."'" In a footnote, the supreme court expressly
recognized that the refusal of a discharged lawyer or law firm to make its
file available to successor counsel could affect the valuation of the
discharged lawyer's services.52 Poletz is significant because it sends a
message to trial courts that a quantum meruit determination should be based
on the totality of the relevant circumstances in each case, not simply a
mechanistic application of an hours-based formula.
In the disciplinary arena, the court in Rue5 3 reiterated its position,
earlier expressed in cases such as Florida Bar v. Gentry, 4 that the rule
50. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.5, "Fees for Legal Services," provides:
(b) Factors to Be Considered in Determining Reasonable Fee. Factors to be
considered as guides in determining a reasonable fee include:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for legal
services of a comparable or similar nature;
(4) the significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the
representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, and the results
obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances and,
as between attorney and client, any additional or special time demands or
requests of the attorney by the client;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the service and the skill, expertise, or efficiency of effort
reflected in the actual providing of such services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and, if fixed as to amount or
rate, then whether the client's ability to pay rested to any significant degree on
the outcome of the representation.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(b).
51. Poletz, 652 So. 2d at 369.
52. Id. at 369 n.5.
53. See text accompanying notes 35, 43-44.
54. 475 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 1985).
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against excessive fees55 will be strictly applied when lawyers charge for
recovery of personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits in accident cases.
Applicability of the lawyer-client confidentiality rule56 to lawyers'
trust accounting records was again recognized by the Professional Ethics
Committee in Florida Ethics Opinion 93-5.57 Consistent with its prior
55. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.5, "Fees for Legal Services," provides:
(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees. An attorney shall not enter
into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly
excessive fee or a fee generated by employment that was obtained through
advertising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar. A fee is clearly excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee for
services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear overreaching or an
unconscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of intentional
misrepresentation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party, or any court, as to
either entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(a).
56. RPC 4-1.6, "Confidentiality of Information," provides:
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client except as stated in subdivisions
(b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the client.
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client
specifically requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) Exhaustion of Appellate Remedies. When required by a tribunal to reveal
such information, a lawyer may first exhaust all appellate remedies.
(e) Limitation on Amount of Disclosure. When disclosure is mandated or
permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than is required to meet
the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule.
Id. 4-1.6.
57. FLA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1994, at 40.
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opinions,58 the committee concluded that a lawyer "who is an agent for a
title insurance company may not permit the title insurer to audit the
attorney's general trust account without consent of the affected clients."59
The opinion went on to state, however, that the "attorney . . . need not
obtain client consent before permitting the insurer to audit a special trust
account used exclusively for transactions in which the attorney acts as the
title or real estate settlement agent."60 Authorization for permitting access
to the records of this special trust account was found in subdivision (c)(1)
of RPC 4-1.6, which allows a lawyer to disclose confidential information "to
serve the client's interest unless it is information the client specifically
requires not to be disclosed.'
Finally, Florida Bar v. Niles62 underscored the importance of trust in
the lawyer-client relationship. There, a lawyer represented a defendant in
a high-profile murder case. The lawyer, unbeknownst to the client, was paid
$5000 by a television program to arrange for a videotaped interview with
the incarcerated client. The lawyer used deception to secure admittance of
himself and the camera crew to the prison. An incriminating interview was
obtained-and broadcast-without the client's authorization. The supreme
court reluctantly accepted the referee's recommendation that the lawyer be
suspended for just one year, but stated that its decision "is not to be read as
an indication that similar conduct will receive any discipline less than
disbarment. 63
III. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE TRIAL SETTING
A lawyer's duty to zealously represent clients is not unrestrained. A
lawyer is an officer of the court, and this relationship of the lawyer to the
justice system imposes certain obligations and constraints upon the lawyer's
advocacy, particularly in the trial setting. Perhaps the paramount duty owed
to the justice system is that of candor toward the tribunal. False or
misleading statements by a lawyer to a court undermine the integrity of the
entire legal system and are dealt with harshly when discovered. For
example, in Florida Bar v. Kleinfeld,64 a forum-shopping lawyer was
suspended for three years and placed on probation for another two years as
58. See Fla. Ethics Op. 72-3; see also Fla. Ethics Op. 77-25, 62-24.
59. Fla. Ethics Op. 93-5, FLA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1994, at 40.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 644 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1994).
63. Id. at 507.
64. 648 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1994).
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a result of falsely alleging in a sworn motion to disqualify a judge that the
judge had threatened and attempted to intimidate her counsel.65
Motions to disqualify lawyers from representing their clients at trial
remained popular in 1995. On a procedural note, in Arthur v. Gibson6 6 the
Fifth District Court of Appeal made it clear that a trial court must conduct
a hearing before ruling on such a motion.67
Turning to the substantive issues, most of the reported lawyer
disqualification cases were filed in connection with the "lawyer-as-witness
rule," RPC 4-3.7.68 In Swensen's Ice Cream Co. v. Voto, Inc., 69 the
appellate court quashed a trial court's order disqualifying a lawyer and his
firm from representing their client, Swensen' S.70 The lawyer had been
hired by Swensen's in a prior matter to help an assignee of a Swensen's
franchise in a dispute with the assignor. The lawyer wrote two letters
stating that the assignor had breached the franchise agreement. In the
present case, the lawyer and his firm represented Swensen's in a separate
matter in which Swensen's was adverse to the assignee. The assignee
moved to disqualify the lawyer and his firm, alleging that the lawyer would
be called as a witness due to his involvement in the prior suit. The trial
court granted the motion.
65. Id. at 701.
66. 654 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
67. Id. at 984.
68. RPC 4-3.7, "Lawyer as Witness," provides:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client
except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no
reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b) Other Members of Law Firm as Witnesses. A lawyer may act as advocate
in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as
a witness unless precluded from doing so by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9 [concerning
conflicts of interest].
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.7.
69. 652 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
70. Id.
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Reversing the order of disqualification, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal carefully analyzed each element of RPC 4-3.7. Because subdivision
(a) of the rule disqualified only a trial advocate who will also be a
"necessary witness on behalf of' a client, the court pointed out that the
lawyer "will not be testifying either against or on behalf of Swensen's. '' 7I
The two letters (and any testimony from the lawyer concerning them) were
not necessarily material to Swensen's case, nor would they prejudice it.
Moreover, the court stated that any factual information possessed by the
lawyer was also known to the assignee's principals with whom the lawyer
had dealt. Thus, the lawyer's testimony "would be cumulative at best."
72
In short, the movant failed to show that the lawyer would be a necessary
witness on his client's behalf. 73 Nor did the assignee show that the
lawyer's testimony would be adverse to his client's position. Finally, citing
subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.7, the court noted that the disqualification
imposed by subdivision (a) of the rule is a personal one-it can extend
beyond a testifying lawyer to reach the lawyer's law firm only if the lawyer
was disqualified because his or her testimony was adverse to, and thus in
conflict with, the client's interests.74
In City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 75 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal again relied upon RPC 4-3.7(b) in ruling that a trial
court departed from the essential requirements of law by disqualifying an
entire law firm where only one lawyer in the firm was to be called as a
71. Id. at 962.
72. Id. Florida case law and ethics opinions have long held that the "lawyer-as-witness
rule" is not to be used by opposing counsel as a tactical weapon when a lawyer's testimony
would be immaterial or cumulative. See, e.g., Devins v. Peitzer, 622 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Arcara v. Philip M. Warren, P.A., 574 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); Banco de Comercio v. Sun Banks, Inc., 488 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Williams v. Wood, 475 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Cazares v. Church
of Scientology of Cal., Inc. 429 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 438 So.
2d 831 (Fla. 1983); Hill v. Douglass, 248 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971), quashed
on other grounds, 271 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972); see also Fla. Ethics Op. 74-36, 72-2, 64-39.
73. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. English, 588 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
74. Swenson's, 652 So. 2d at 962; see In re Estate of Gory, 570 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). This concept of a testimonial disqualification being personal to the
lawyer and not imputed to the lawyer's firm was first adopted when the RPC superseded the
old Code of Professional Responsibility effective January 1, 1987. Under the prior Code of
Professional Responsibility, a testimonial disqualification did extend to the testifying lawyer's
firm. Calls to the Florida Bar ethics "hotline" indicate that many Florida lawyers and judges
remain unaware of this substantial change in the "lawyer-as-witness rule."
75. 654 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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witness and there was no showing that the lawyer's testimony would be
adverse to the client's position.
7 6
An interesting case concerning application of RPC 4-3.7 when a lawyer
is a party to the suit was Springtree Country Club Plaza, Ltd. v. Blaut.7
The lawyer represented his wife in a slip and fall action, and represented
himself on the accompanying loss of consortium claim. Reversing the lower
court's denial of a motion to disqualify the lawyer and his firm, the
appellate court stated that the lawyer's position as a party in interest, as well
as a party seeking damages, "could constitute a violation of Rule 4-3.7.
In view of fhe RPC 4-3.7 problem, as well as the fact that the lawyer's
partner had previously formed the opponent's partnership, the trial court was
directed to disqualify the lawyer and his firm from any representation in the
case.
79
Kusch v. Ballard" was a disqualification case concerning the difficult
and controversial issue of inadvertent disclosure of confidential documents
in litigation. A defendant's lawyer prepared a letter addressed to his client.
The lawyer's secretary, however, inadvertently faxed the document to
plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff's counsel began reading the letter, realized that
it had been mistakenly transmitted to him, and returned it to defense
counsel. Plaintiffs counsel then sought production of the document,
alleging waiver of any privilege. Defense counsel responded by moving to
disqualify plaintiff's counsel. The trial court determined that the document
was privileged, that the privilege had not been waived, and that, apparently
on the authority of General Accident Insurance Co. v. Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp.,81 lawyers for both plaintiff and defendant must be
disqualified.82 Predictably, writs for certiorari followed. 3
The Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered its decision in a one-
sentence per curiam reversal of the trial court's order.8 4 What is most
notable about this case is the fact that all three of the judges on the panel
wrote an opinion.85 This exemplifies the depth of disagreement over how
76. Id. at 646.
77. 642 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
78. Id at 28.
79. Il
80. 645 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
81. 483 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
82. Kusch, 645 So. 2d at 1038.
83. Id. at 1035.
84. See id
85. Judge Glickstein concurred specially, Judge Farmer concurred, and Judge Stevenson
concurred in part and dissented in part.
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to handle the inadvertent disclosure problem, 6 which undoubtedly will be
occurring more frequently due to fax machines, e-mail, and other new forms
of transmitting information. The only certainty in this area is that more
litigation can be expected.
One development to which trial lawyers must take heed is the trend
toward strict enforcement of rules against improper jury argument.
Appellate courts, particularly the Fourth District Court of Appeal, seem
more inclined to handle egregious violations by reversal-sometimes even
in the absence of objections.
Relying on RPC 4-3.4(e),87 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed based on improper argument in Bellsouth Human Resources v.
Colatarci.88 The court's forceful opinion was intended to send a message
to both lawyers and trial judges. 89 Arguments that violated RPC 4-3.4(e)
included statements by counsel regarding "[w]hat other lawyers have done,
what has occurred in other law suits, and what other corporations have
done.
' 90
The Fourth District Court of Appeal again reversed a case on the basis
of grounds that included argument outside the bounds of RPC 4-3.4(e) in
Dutcher v. Allstate Insurance Co.91 Trial counsel had disparagingly
commented regarding his personal opinion of chiropractors and made a
86. The Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee intensely debated the inadvertent
disclosure issue at its meetings for over a year, but simply could not agree on the ethically
proper course of conduct to be followed. Finally the committee issued a short advisory
opinion, Fla. Ethics Op. 93-3, concluding only that a lawyer who receives an inadvertent
disclosure of documents containing confidential information about an opponent is ethically
obligated to notify opposing counsel of the fact of receipt, but leaving any further action up
to the lawyers involved.
87. Subdivision (e) of RPC 4-3.4, "Fairness of Opposing Party and Counsel," provides
that a lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.4(e).
88. 641 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
89. "It is exasperating that, no matter how many times appellate courts cite this well-
known rule [RPC 4-3.4(e)], trial counsel and trial judges do not seem to get the message."
Id. at 430.
90. Id.
91. 655 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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statement, not supported by evidence, as to what other chiropractors have
done.92
The First District Court of Appeal weighed in with its decision in
Sacred Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Stone.93 The court reversed on the
basis of repeated argument in violation of RPC 4-3.4(e) and remanded for
a new trial, despite the fact that most of the improper argument had not
been objected to at trial.94 Improper comments included statements of
personal opinion by plaintiffs counsel (e.g., that the defense's theory of
fault was "ridiculous" and that one defendant presented "ridiculous"
testimony), references to matters outside the record (e.g., a comment
concerning alleged lying by an expert witness), and an invitation by
plaintiff's counsel in closing argument to deal harshly with defendants.95
Finally, during the past year the supreme court promulgated two rules
affecting a lawyer's ethical obligations in the trial setting. In amending RPC
4-3.4(b), the court specified the types of payments that ethically may be
made by counsel to witnesses. 96 Lawyers may reasonably compensate
witnesses for expenses actually incurred, or compensation actually lost, by
virtue of appearing as a witness in a proceeding. The second rule amend-
ment concerned what a lawyer permissibly may say about the lawyer's
pending case in public, extrajudicial statements. Not inspired by the
Simpson debacle, this change to RPC 4-3.69' actually resulted from the
92. Id at 1219.
93. 650 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1089 (1995).
94. Id. at 681.
95. lad at 680.
96. Amended subdivision (b) of RPC 4-3.4, "Fairness of Opposing Party and Counsel,"
provides that a lawyer shall not:
(b) fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness, except a lawyer may pay a witness reasonable expenses
incurred by the witness in attending or testifying at proceedings; a reasonable,
noncontingent fee for the professional services of an expert witness; and
reasonable compensation to reimburse a witness for the loss of compensation
incurred by reason of preparing for, attending, or testifying at proceedings.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.4(b).
97. Amended RPC 4-3.6, '"Trial Publicity," provides:
(a) Prejudicial Extrajudicial Statements Prohibited. A lawyer shall not make
an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dissemi-
nated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding due to its creation of an imminent and substantial
detrimental effect on that proceeding.
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decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gentile v. State Bar
of Nevada.98 Although intended to delete the "safe harbor" language in the
prior version of the rule that was held to be unconstitutionally vague in
Gentile,99 the amended version of RPC 4-3.6 still provides only the most
general guidance to a lawyer searching for the limits of what he or she may
say publicly about a pending case. Lawyers, however, may take some
comfort in the fact that there have been no reported Florida cases in which
a bar member was disciplined for violating the trial publicity rule.
IV. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAWYER'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH THIRD PARTIES
A lawyer's professional relationships, of course, extend beyond dealing
with clients and courts. The RPC interpose minimum ethical standards into
many of a lawyer's relationships with third parties. During the past year,
a number of decisions affected lawyers' relationships with persons and
entities such as prospective clients, opposing parties, other lawyers,
employers, employees, and the legal system.
The most significant lawyer advertising and solicitation decision in
years was rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc."°  A lawyer and a for-profit lawyer referral
service challenged Florida's RPC 4-7.4(b)(1)(A), l0' which requires that
(b) Statements of Third Parties. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another
person to make such a statement. Counsel shall exercise reasonable care to
prevent investigators, employees, or other persons assisting in or associated with
a case from making extrajudicial statements that are prohibited under this rule.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.6.
98. 501 U.S. 1030, 1047 (1991).
99. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282,
283 (Fla. 1994).
100. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
101. Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of RPC 4-7.4, "Direct Contact with Prospective
Clients," provides:
(b) Written Communication.
(1) A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on the
lawyer's behalf or on behalf of the lawyer's firm or partner, an associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communi-
cation to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional
employment if:
(A) the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the
person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person,
unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing
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Florida lawyers wait for at least thirty days following an accident or disaster
before sending targeted direct mail solicitation letters concerning personal
injury, wrongful death, or other actions relating to the accident or disaster
to accident victims or their families. This prohibition extends to lawyer
referral services under RPC 4-7.8(a)(1). 102
The court upheld the thirty-day waiting period rule after analyzing it
under the three-prong commercial speech test"3 articulated in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York."°  First, the Court agreed that the Florida Bar has "substantial
interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility" of potential recipients
against invasive, unsolicited contact by lawyers and in preventing the
erosion of public confidence in the legal profession that such conduct
engenders.'0 5 Second, the Bar effectively demonstrated that the challenged
rule advances these interests in a direct and material way. 6 The Bar
presented unrebutted evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, showing that
both targeted harms are real. Third, the Court concluded that the thirty-day
waiting period was a restriction "reasonably well-tailored" to achieve the
desired objectives.1 7 Went For It, Inc. was the first case since commer-
cial speech protection was extended to lawyer advertising in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona' to uphold a state's restrictions on lawyer advertising.
Undoubtedly this decision will inspire bar organizations around the country
to reexamine lawyer advertising and advertising regulations within their
jurisdictions.
Virtually all lawyers are aware that RPC 4-4.2'09 prohibits them from
of the communication.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.4(b)(1)(A).
102. Subdivision (a)(1) of RPC 4-7.8, "Lawyer Referral Services," provides:
(a) When Lawyers May Accept Referrals. A lawyer shall not accept referrals
from a lawyer referral service unless the service:
(1) engages in no communication with the public and in no direct contact
with prospective clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct if the communication or contact were made by the lawyer.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.8(a)(1).
103. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
104. 447 U.S. 557, 568-71 (1980).
105. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
106. Id. at 2378.
107. Id. at 2380.
108. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
109. RPC 4-4.2, "Communication with Person Represented by Counsel," provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
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communicating with a represented person concerning the subject of the
representation, unless the other person's lawyer consents. Difficulties often
arise, however, when a lawyer who represents a client against a corporate
entity attempts to apply this rule to possible contacts with current or former
employees of the opposing entity. The Professional Ethics Committee
concluded, in Florida Ethics Opinion 88-14, that it is not unethical for a
lawyer to contact former employees of a represented opponent, provided the
lawyer does not inquire into matters protected by the attorney-client
privilege."o But Florida lawyers must be aware that courts, both state and
federal, are moving to limit the broad range of action otherwise afforded by
Opinion 88-14.
In Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of America,"' a lawyer represented
a person who allegedly suffered damages while staying in a nursing home
operated by the defendant corporation. Upon motion by the defendant, the
trial court entered an order forbidding plaintiff's counsel from any ex parte
communication with former employees of the nursing home who cared for
or treated the plaintiff. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed this
order, taking care to note that the order was limited in scope-it did not bar
ex parte contact with all former employees, but only contact with "the very
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior consent,
communicate with another's client in order to meet the requirements of any
statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on an adverse
party, in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted to that
required by statute or contract, and a copy shall be provided to the adverse
party's attorney.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-4.2. The Comment to RPC 4-4.2 goes on to explain, in
pertinent part:
In the case of an organization, this rule prohibits communications by a lawyer
for 1 party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization and with any other person
whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may
constitute an admission on the part of the organization. If an agent or employee
of the organization is represented in the matter by the agent's or employee's own
counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for
purposes of this rule.
Id. 4-4.2 cmt.
110. Fla. Ethics Op. 88-14, reprinted in PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE FLA. BAR (2d
ed.) at 1302. This opinion was approved by the Florida Bar Board of Governors on March
7, 1989. Id. at 1299.
111. 656 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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persons whose actions or inactions form the basis for the complaint." '112
Therefore, the order precluded contact with former nursing home employees
who cared for or treated the plaintiff, since their actions or inactions form
the basis of the defendant's alleged liability. In a footnote, the court
specified that "there is no restriction on contact with former employees who
were merely witnesses to the care of [the plaintiff].'. 3
A federal court sitting in Florida also rendered a decision concerning
ex parte contact with former employees of an organizational opponent. In
United States v. Florida Cities Water Co.,114 lawyers for the government
sought an order allowing them ex parte contacts with the defendant
corporation's former employees. The court denied the motion, concluding
that the corporation's demonstrated interest in protecting privileged
information required the government to provide the corporation's counsel
with notice and opportunity to attend the government's interviews of former
corporate employees.'
Both Barfuss and Florida Cities Water Co. must be considered by
Florida lawyers contemplating ex parte contacts with former employees of
an opposing party. It may be noted, however, that these cases rely upon the
debatable decision handed down by the Middle District in Rentclub v.
Transamerica Rental Finance Corp."6 In Rentclub, a law firm that hired
the former chief financial officer of a division of the opposing corporation
as a paid "trial consultant" was disqualified from further participation in the
case based upon the "consultant's" possession of privileged information
about the corporate opponent and upon the appearance of impropriety. The
court defined organizational party for purposes of the communication rule
as including: "1) managerial employees, 2) any other persons whose acts or
omissions in connection with the matter at issue may be imputed to the
corporation for liability, and 3) persons whose statements constitute
admissions by the corporation.""..7  Cases following Rentclub may be
building upon a shaky premise, however, because it is quite clear from a
close reading of both the trial court and appellate court opinions that the
112. Id. at 488-89.
113. Id. at 489 n.5.
114. No. 93-281-CIV-FTM-21, 1995 WL 340980 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 1995).
115. Id. at *3.
116. 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992), af.f'd, 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 657.
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decisions were greatly influenced by the fact that the former employee
received a substantial sum as payment for his work as a "consultant."
' 8
Contact with unrepresented opposing parties was the subject of Florida
Ethics Opinion 94-4."9 The Professional Ethics Committee concluded
"that [o]pposing counsel may communicate with an individual who is
litigating pro se concerning that litigation even though [a lawyer] is
representing the individual in a related matter. Opposing counsel, however,
may not communicate with the individual about the subject matter of the
[lawyer]'s representation without the [lawyer]'s consent."'' 20
Much of a lawyer's time is spent dealing with other lawyers, and
several 1995 Professional Ethics Committee opinions addressed ethical
issues arising in these relationships. Florida Ethics Opinion 94-7121
provided the answer to the long-open question of whether lawyers who are
"of counsel''22 to one another are considered to be in the same firm, or
different firms, for purposes of the fee division rules (RPC 4-1.5(g) and
RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(D)). 123 This question became especially pressing after the
118. The penultimate paragraph of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion states:
The district court found that the payment to Canales made it appear that Trenam,
Simmons had both induced Canales to disclose confidential matters relating to
Transamerica, in violation of Rules 4-1.6, 4-4.2 & 4-8.4(d) of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, as well as paid him for his factual testimony rather
than his work as a "trial consultant," in violation of Rules 4-8.4(c) & 4-8.4(d).
Rentclub, 811 F. Supp. at 654. We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that there was the appearance of impropriety in the
payment to Canales. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's order.
Rentclub, 43 F.3d at 1440 (emphasis by italics added; emphasis by capitals in original).
119. FLA. B. NEws, Apr. 30, 1995, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The term "of counsel" may be used to describe a lawyer who maintains a close,
continuing relationship with another lawyer or law firm in a capacity other than that of a
partner or an associate. Fla. Ethics Op. 94-7, 75-41, 71-49. The relationship must be more
than a mere referral arrangement. Fla. Ethics Op. 72-29.
123. Subdivision (g) of RPC 4-1.5, "Fees for Legal Services," provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer;
or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation
and agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
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Supreme Court of Florida capped the amount of referral fee which a
referring lawyer could receive in a personal injury matter without prior
circuit court approval. 24 The committee decided that a lawyer "who is 'of
counsel' to a law firm is considered to be a member of that firm for
purposes of the fee-division rules only if that lawyer practices through that
firm exclusively."'"
Regarding another fee division issue, in Barwick Dillian & Lambert,
P.A. v. Ewing'26 the court held that the fee division provisions of the
ethics code did not apply in a situation in which an associate lawyer and the
employer law firm had agreed, during the associate's employment with the
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and
the basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(g). Subdivision (f)(4)(D) of RPC 4-1.5 provides:
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee within
subdivision (f)(4) [governing contingent fee personal injury matters] shall be on
the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the legal services on
behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the legal services
on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any fee in excess
of 25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in which 2 or more
lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active participation in the providing
of legal services. In such circumstances counsel shall apply for circuit court
authorization of the fee division in excess of 25%, based upon a sworn petition
signed by all counsel that shall disclose in detail those services to be performed.
The application for authorization of such a contract may be filed as a separate
proceeding before suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint.
Proceedings thereon may occur before service of process on any party and this
aspect of the file may be sealed. Authorization of such contract shall not bar
subsequent inquiry as to whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly
excessive. An application under this subdivision shall contain a certificate
showing service on the client and The Florida Bar. Counsel may proceed with
representation of the client pending court approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be applicable after
deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained especially for appellate
purposes.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(f)(4)(D).
124. This limitation, which restricts the share of the "secondary lawyer" to 25% of the
total fee, was adopted for all contracts entered into on or after January 1, 1988. Florida Bar
re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 519 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 1987). The
limitation is currently set forth in subdivision (f)(4)(D) of RPC 4-1.5, "Fees for Legal
Services." See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(f)(4)(D).
125. Fla. Ethics Op. 94-7 (emphasis added).
126. 646 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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firm, that the associate would receive a certain percentage of the fees from
cases brought to the firm by the associate.127 However, the case in ques-
tion was not concluded (and thus the fee was not received) by the firm until
after the associate's employment with the firm ended. Accordingly, the
court stated that, "[w]here, as here, [the associate's] sole claim is for
services rendered at the [employer] firm, we do not believe that a new, post-
departure set of agreements needed to be entered in order for [the associate]
to assert her claim."'
128
The rationale of Barwick was followed in Florida Ethics Opinion 94-
1.129 In this opinion, the Professional Ethics Committee decided that an
agreement between a law firm and an associate lawyer employed by the firm
"concerning division of the fee from a case brought to the firm by the
[associate was] not subject to the rules governing fee divisions between
[lawyers] in different firms when the [associate] leaves the firm before the
case is concluded."'
130
In contrast to the agreement at issue in Opinion 94-1, the fee division
provisions in the associate-law firm employment agreement under scrutiny
in hotly-contested 13' Florida Ethics Opinion 93-4132 were to be triggered
only if the associate left the firm and thereafter continued to work on
matters for "the Employer's clients." In addition to a requirement that the
departing associate pay the former firm "the greater of fifty percent (50%)
of any fee received from said client or the Firm's quantum meruit," the
agreement barred the associate from "seeking, directly or indirectly, any of
the Employer's clients" and from "inducing, either directly or indirectly, any
employee to quit or abandon the Employer."'133 The Committee concluded
that, when read as a whole, the employment agreement violated RPC 4-
5.6(a),134 which prohibits a lawyer from offering or making a partnership
or employment agreement that restricts a lawyer's right to practice after
127. Id. at 779.
128. Id.
129. FLA. B. NEws, July 15, 1994, at 2.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Mark D. Killian, BoardApproves Employment-Agreement Ethics Opinion,
FLA. B. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1995, at 3.
132. Id. at 21.
133. Id.
134. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-5.6, "Restrictions on Right to Practice," provides that a
lawyer shall not participate in offering or making "(a) a partnership or employment
agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship,
except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement[.]" R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-
5.6(a).
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termination of the relationship. The Committee opined that the offending
provisions created a substantial "financial disincentive" that would operate
to "preclude the departing [associate] from accepting representation of [firm]
clients," and would impermissibly restrict the right of association among
lawyers.1 35
RPC 4-5.6 is not the only ethical standard governing the relationship
between a law firm and its lawyer employees. A lawyer is obligated to deal
honestly with the firm that employs him or her. In Florida Bar v. Cox,'36
a lawyer was suspended for thirty days for engaging in unauthorized outside
employment against firm policy, willfully deceiving the firm about the
"moonlighting," and diverting some fees paid in these matters from the firm
to himself.137
A lawyer's relationship with his or her nonlawyer employees could be
affected by an amendment to RPC 4-5.4,138 concerning division of legal
fees with nonlawyers. This revision clarifies the circumstances under which
135. Fla. Ethics Op. 93-4.
136. 655 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1995). Specifically, the lawyer was found guilty of violating
RPC 4-1.7(b) ("Conflict of Interest; General Rule"), RPC 4-4.1 ('Truthfulness in Statements
to Others"), and RPC 4-8.4(c) ("Misconduct"). Id. at 1122 n.1.
137. Id. at 1123.
138. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-5.4, "Professional Independence of a Lawyer,"
provide:
(a) Sharing Fees with Nonlawyers. A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal
fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate
may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after
the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to I or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of
the total compensation that fairly represents the services rendered by the
deceased lawyer;
(3) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disap-
peared lawyer may, in accordance with the provisions of rule 4-1.17, pay to the
estate or other legally authorized representative of that lawyer the agreed upon
purchase price; and
(4) bonuses may be paid to nonlawyer employees based on their extraordi-
nary efforts on a particular case or over a specified time period, provided that the
payment is not based on the generation of clients or business and is not
calculated as a percentage of legal fees received by the lawyer or law firm.
(b) Qualified Pension Plans. A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer
employees in a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or retirement plan, even though
the lawyer's or law firm's contribution to the plan is based in whole or in part
on a profit-sharing arrangement.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-5.4(a)-(b).
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a lawyer may pay a bonus to these employees. A bonus may be based on
the nonlawyer's "extraordinary efforts on a particular case or over a
specified time period, provided that the payment is not based on the
generation of clients or business and is not calculated as a percentage of
legal fees received by the lawyer or law firm."' 39 The supreme court thus
reaffirmed the principle that nonlawyers may not ethically be paid for
bringing in cases."4
Whether dealing with another lawyer over fees or other matters, a
lawyer may come to believe that a fellow lawyer has engaged in unethical
behavior. Regardless of the validity of this belief, however, the Professional
Ethics Committee stated in Florida Ethics Opinion 94-5 '41 that it ordinarily
is unethical to threaten to file a disciplinary complaint against another
lawyer. The committee reasoned that a lawyer is obligated under RPC 4-
8.3142 to report serious misconduct on the part of other lawyers and,
accordingly, that to threaten not to file a report when otherwise required by
this rule would itself be unethical. Furthermore, even in situations in which
reporting is not required by RPC 4-8.3, the committee believed that
threatening to file a grievance complaint in order to obtain an advantage
from the other lawyer could be extortionate (thereby violating RPC 4-
139. Id. 4-5.4(a)(4).
140. See also RPC 4-7.2(q), "Advertising," which provides:
Payment for Recommendations; Lawyer Referral Services Fees. A lawyer shall
not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services,
except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written or
recorded communication permitted by these rules, may pay the usual charges of
a lawyer referral service or other legal service organization, and may purchase
a law practice in accordance with rule 4-1.17.
Id. 4-7.2(q).
141. FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 30, 1995, at 2.
142. RPC 4-8.3, "Reporting Professional Misconduct," provides in pertinent part:
(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer having knowledge that
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate professional
authority.
(c) Confidences Preserved. This rule does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by rule 4-1.6.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.3.
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8.4(b))143 or would constitute "conduct ... prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice" (in violation of RPC 4-8.4(d)).144
It follows that falsely accusing another lawyer of misconduct -is
unethical. In Florida Bar v. Adams,145 the supreme court so held and
suspended the lawyer for ninety days. 146 Finally, in two instances involv-
ing child support obligations the supreme court addressed the matter of a
lawyer's relationship with his or her children, and presumably with society
(in the event the failure to pay support implicates the state's public
assistance machinery). First, in Florida Bar v. Taylor,47 the court
declined to discipline a lawyer who had been held in contempt of a New
Hampshire court for failing to pay substantial child support arrearages 48
The supreme court took great care to distinguish between criminal contempt
and civil contempt, stating that under its then-existing rules it could
discipline lawyers for the former but, absent fraudulent or dishonest conduct,
had no authority to impose discipline for the latter. 49 Then, just a few
weeks after the Taylor decision, the court on its own motion promulgated
new RPC 4-8.4(h), making it unethical for a lawyer to "willfully refuse, as
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, to timely pay a child
support obligation.' ' 50
143. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-8.4, "Misconduct," provides that a lawyer shall not
"(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness,
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects[.]" Id. 4-8.4(b).
144. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-8.4, "Misconduct," provides that a lawyer shall not:
(d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous
indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,
witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not
limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin,
disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status,
employment, or physical characteristic.
Id. 4-8.4(d).
145. 641 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1994).
146. Id. at 399.
147. 648 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1995).
148. Id, at 709.
149. Id. at 711.
150. The Comment to new RPC 4-8.4(h) expresses the court's view of the purpose
behind the rule and its intended application:
Subdivision (h) of this rule was added to make consistent the treatment of
attorneys who fail to pay child support with the treatment of other professionals
who fail to pay child support, in accordance with the provisions of section
61.13015, Florida Statutes (1993). That section provides for the suspension or
denial of a professional license due to delinquent child support payments after
1995] 249
252
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
V. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DISCIPLINARY
CONTEXT
Looking at the bigger picture, it is apparent that the position in society
held by lawyers-trusted fiduciaries who are not only officers of the court,
but who in the minds of many personify our system of justice'l-justifies
the imposition of ethical obligations commensurate with this position. In
1995, the Supreme Court of Florida, the ultimate authority over the
admission to and practice of law in our state,15 imposed disciplinary
sanctions on a number of lawyers for a variety of offenses. This section of
the article briefly reviews some significant disciplinary cases not previously
discussed in parts II, III, or IV.
Initially, Florida lawyers should realize that, even in the absence of a
substantive rules violation, they are obligated to respond in writing to
accusations that are being investigated by the Florida Bar. Two rules, RPC
4-8.1151 and RPC 4-8.4(g), 54 impose this duty. In Florida Bar v. Grigs-
all other available remedies for the collection of child support have been
exhausted. Likewise, subdivision (h) of this rule should not be used as the
primary means for collecting child support, but should be used only after all
other available remedies for the collection of child support have been exhausted.
Before a grievance may be filed or a grievance procedure initiated under this
subdivision, the court that entered the child support order must first make a
finding of willful refusal to pay. The child support obligation at issue under this
rule includes both domestic (Florida) and out-of-state (URESA) child support
obligations, as well as arrearages.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(h) cmt.
151. See generally Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
152. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
153. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-8.1, "Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters," provides:
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar
admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the
person to have arisen in the matter or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that
this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule
4-1.6.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.1(b).
154. Subdivision (g) of RPC 4-8.4, "Misconduct," provides that a lawyer shall not
"(g) fail to respond, in writing, to any inquiry by a disciplinary agency when such agency
is conducting an investigation into the lawyer's conduct." Id. 4-8.4(g). The pertinent portion
of the Comment to RPC 4-8.4 explains:
A lawyer's obligation to respond to an inquiry by a disciplinary agency is stated
in subdivision (g) and rules 3-4.8 and 3-7.6(g)(2). While response is mandatory,
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by,155 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded and placed on three years'
probation for failing to respond to the Bar's investigative inquiries. 156 In
mitigation, it was noted that the lawyer had been suffering from clinical
depression.57 Such a mitigating factor apparently was not present in
Florida Bar v. Grosso,"5 8 because in that case a similar violation resulted
in a ten-day suspension. 9
Similarly, a lawyer who willfully evades the Bar's attempts at service
faces disciplinary problems. In Florida Bar v. Hawkins,'6° a lawyer whom
the court allowed to resign in lieu of disciplinary action was later investigat-
ed for violating the terms of the resignation order. The lawyer avoided
service of an order to show cause, but nevertheless was disbarred for five
years for violating the resignation order as well as avoiding service.
61
In the view of the supreme court, perhaps the two most serious offenses
are lying to a court and misappropriation of client funds. Both were present
in Florida Bar v. de la Puente.'62 In de la Puente, a lawyer who repeat-
edly used client trust funds for his own purposes, forged signatures on
checks in order to gain access to the funds, misrepresented information to
a court in a probate proceeding, fabricated evidence in the disciplinary
proceeding, and instructed a witness to lie, was disbarred for a minimum of
ten years. The court noted that, "[s]everal of these actions, when considered
alone, create a presumption that disbarment is the appropriate penal-
ty."
1 63
Another disciplinary case involving trust accounting violations is
Florida Bar v. Condon.'" In Condon, garden variety theft of client funds
resulted in a three-year suspension to be followed by a probationary
the lawyer may deny the charges or assert any available privilege or immunity
or interpose any disability that prevents disclosure of certain matter. A response
containing a proper invocation thereof is sufficient under the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar. This obligation is necessary to ensure the proper and efficient
operation of the disciplinary system.
Id. 4-8.4(g) cmt.
155. 641 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1994).
156. Id. at 1343.
157. Id. at 1342.
158. 647 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1994).
159. Id. at 841.
160. 643 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994).
161. Id. at 1075.
162. 658 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1995).
163. Id. at 69.
164. 647 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1994).
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period. 65 In Florida Bar v. Cramer,'" a lawyer violated trust account-
ing rules when he used his trust account in an apparent attempt to hide his
own funds from the Internal Revenue Service. 67 Although no client funds
were misappropriated, the court found that this attempt to mislead the IRS
amounted to conduct involving "dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation,"
and imposed a ninety-day suspension. 68 In Florida Bar v. Mitchell,169
commingling and other trust accounting violations netted a lawyer a ninety-
day suspension, followed by a one-year probation. 7° There appeared to
be no loss of any client funds, but among other violations, the supreme court
found the lawyer guilty of failing to remit interest earned on his trust
account to the Florida Bar Foundation as required under the Interest on
Trust Accounts ("IOTA") program rules.' 7' Also of interest in this case
was the court's rejection of the lawyer's minority status as a mitigating
factor.'72 Finally, trust accounting violations coupled with the charging
of an excessive fee in a probate matter led to a ninety-day suspension in
Florida Bar v. Forrester.173 No theft occurred, but the lawyer moved
funds from her trust account to her operating account before they were
earned. In this case the court "expressly note[d] that we consider the
maintenance of contemporary and accurate trust account records to be
essential to public confidence that members of The Florida Bar are
maintaining these accounts pursuant to their fiduciary and ethical obliga-
tions."'17
4
As in other years, 1995 saw no shortage of disciplinary actions as a
result of lawyers' involvement in criminal activity. In Florida Bar v.
Smith,175 the court suspended a former Congressman for three years as a
result of felony convictions arising from income tax under-reporting and
violation of federal election laws. 176 The presence of a number of mitigat-
ing factors helped the lawyer avoid disbarment,'" the usual penalty for
165. Id. at 824.
166. 643 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1994).
167. Id. at 1070.
168. Id. at 1070-71.
169. 645 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1994).
170. Id. at 416.
171. Id. at 415; see R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 5-1.1(e).
172. Id. at 416.
173. 656 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (Fla. 1995).
174. Id.
175. 650 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1995).
176. Id. at 982.
177. Id. at 981.
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such conduct. Disbarment did result from a lawyer's out-of-state criminal
convictions for grand larceny and conspiracy in Florida Bar v. Wilson.
178
A lawyer's involvement in criminal activity, even if he or she is not
convicted of a crime, can still result in discipline. For example, the court
disbarred a former circuit court judge caught in the Dade County "Operation
Courtbroom" investigation, for his participation in bribery and misconduct
while on the bench, in Florida Bar v. Davis.'79 Discipline was imposed
despite the fact that the lawyer had been acquitted of federal criminal
charges. It may be noted that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof
used in disciplinary proceedings is lower, and thus easier to meet, than the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applied in criminal cases. 180 In
Florida Bar v. Wheeler,'8' the supreme court disbarred a lawyer involved
in the "Operation Courtbroom" probe for his misconduct, even though he
avoided prosecution by testifying against fellow conspirators in exchange for
immunity. 2  In Florida Bar v. Marable," a lawyer expressed interest
in obtaining the fruits of what a law enforcement informant led him to
believe was a burglary." 4 In reality, the informant fabricated the story.
The court rejected the referee's finding that the lawyer had committed the
crime of solicitation of a burglary, but suspended the lawyer for sixty days
for his "unethical behavior in involving himself and his client with the
products of what he believed to be criminal activity."'
' 5
Neglect of client matters continued to be a cause for disciplinary action.
In Florida Bar v. Daniel,"16 a lawyer earned a suspension of ninety-one
days, and thereafter until rehabilitation was proved, for repeatedly neglecting
client matters. 7 In Florida Bar v. Robinson,88 however, mitigating
factors helped a lawyer receive a reprimand rather than suspension' 9
178. 643 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1994).
179. 657 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1995).
180. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Rayman, 238 So. 2d 594, 596-97 (Fla. 1970).
181. 653 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1995).
182. Id. at 392.
183. 645 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1994).
184. Id. at440
185. Id. at 443.
186. 641 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1994).
187. Id. at 1332. RPC 3-5.1(e), 'Types of Discipline," provides that: "A suspension
of 90 days or less shall not require proof of rehabilitation or passage of the Florida bar
examination. A suspension of more than 90 days shall require proof of rehabilitation and
may require passage of all or part of the Florida bar examination." R. REGULATING FLA.
BAR 3-5.1(e).
188. 654 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1995).
189. Id. at 555-56.
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Interestingly, the referee had recommended that the lawyer be ordered to
notify his clients of the reprimand. The supreme court declined to impose
this requirement."
A case of note in the area of fees is Florida Bar v. Garland.'9 In
Garland, the lawyer was charged with collecting an excessive fee in a
probate case, along with other misconduct such as trust accounting
violations and falsification of records. He paid himself almost $33,000 in
fees, while expert testimony in the case indicated that a reasonable fee
would have been between $15,000 and $18,000. Sometime after this
occurred, legislative amendments to the probate code concerning calculation
of reasonable fees to the personal representative and attorney of an estate
became effective. Surprisingly, the supreme court found the lawyer not
guilty of the excessive fee charge because "if the fee charged in this case
were charged today it likely would be considered reasonable under the new
statutory provisions.""19  Thus, it appears that, if a lawyer has the good
fortune to do something that is improper under one rule and that rule is later
changed, the lawyer may escape discipline. This seems like an incongruous
result in view of the fact that lawyers are expected to conform their conduct
to the rules and laws in existence when the conduct occurs.
Knowingly providing a false affidavit to a bank to help a relative
secure a loan resulted in a sixty-day suspension for the lawyer in Florida
Bar v. Johnson. 93 The court stated that it "will not condone attorneys
making affidavits for submission to a lender or to any other person or entity
which are in fact not true and correct as to the statements therein."'' 94
In the past year, the court has also reaffirmed its willingness to impose
what may be termed "reciprocal discipline" upon Florida lawyers who are
disciplined by other jurisdictions in which they are admitted to practice law.
In Florida Bar v. Friedman,95 a member of the Florida Bar was suspend-
ed from practice in another state. 96 Based on the suspension order from
the other state, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended the lawyer from
practice in Florida.' 97 The lawyer argued that Florida should not accept
190. Id. at 556.
191. 651 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1995).
192. Id. at 1184. Though not guilty of the excessive fee charge, the lawyer was found
guilty of other misconduct and suspended for two years. Id.
193. 648 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1994).
194. Id. at 682.
195. 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1707 (1995).
196. Id. at 189.
197. Id. at 190.
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the other state's suspension order because the other state's finding of guilt
was premised on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, rather than the
"clear and convincing" test used in Florida. The supreme court rejected this
argument.'
98
A final noteworthy development in the disciplinary area was the
supreme court's adoption of a "Practice and Professionalism Enhancement
Program," commonly referred to as an "ethics school."199 This program
is intended to divert from the disciplinary system lawyers who have
committed minor transgressions and whose conduct, it is believed, could be
improved through education in basic ethics rules, law office management,
and interpersonal skills. No case in which the misconduct rises above the
level of minor misconduce' is eligible for diversion, and a lawyer who
has been the subject of a prior diversion within the past seven years is not
eligible.2 '
VI. CONCLUSION
Professional responsibility has become almost a "growth industry" in
recent years. Legal malpractice suits are becoming more common,
grievance complaints are being filed at record rates, and motions to
disqualify lawyers from trial representation have mushroomed. In fact, this
increased attention on the legal ethics field has led to the formation of a
national group for lawyers whose practices are concentrated in this area, the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers ("APRL"). Decisions
rendered during the past year by Florida courts and ethics committees
addressed a wide range of professional responsibility issues and must be
given careful consideration by the practicing lawyer. Failure to adhere to
the professional responsibility standards set forth in these decisions can have
serious consequences.
198. Id.
199. The new rule 3-5.3 was adopted in Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282, 289-90 (Fla. 1994).
200. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(b).
201. Id. 3-5.1(c).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period from July 1, 1994 through June 30,
1995 that the authors selected as being of special interest to the real estate
practitioner.
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Seton v. Swann.' The Supreme Court of Florida has eliminated any
question as to the requirements for obtaining title by adverse possession
under color of title. In 1982, the Setons acquired the lot next to the one
owned by the Swanns. A 1951 survey properly located the common
boundary, but surveys in 1959, 1972, 1976, and again in 1984 had placed
the boundary between the two lots in the wrong place. Relying on the 1984
survey, the Setons improved a strip of land which actually belonged to their
neighbors. In addition, the Swanns built a fence along the incorrect
boundary, although Mrs. Swann testified that she knew the fence was not at
the edge of her land when the fence was built. When a 1992 survey
revealed the correct boundary, the Swanns brought this ejectment action
against the Setons. The trial court, accepting the defense of adverse
possession under color of title, ruled for the Setons finding that they had
acquired title.2
1. 650 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1995).
2- Id. at 36.
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed3 and the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed the district court in an unanimous opinion written by
Justice Harding.4 Adverse possession under color of title was in this case,
and still is, controlled by section 95.16 of the Florida Statutes as amended
in 1987. In Seddon v. Harpster,6 the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted
an earlier version of this statute to allow an adverse possessor "under color
of title" to acquire title to land which was not described in a written
instrument if it was contiguous to the land described and protected by a
substantial enclosure. Before the 1987 amendment, the statute read: "If
only a portion of the land protected by the enclosure is included within the
description of the property in the written instrument, judgment, or decree,
only that portion is deemed possessed." The supreme court held that this
language clearly required all of the claimed land to be described in a
recorded instrument in order to acquire title to it under this statute.' Thus,
Seddon was the law in effect only between 1975 and 1987.
III. BouNDARims
DuBois v. Amestoy.10 The record in this ejectment action established
that: 1) the appellees decided, based on a government survey, the proper
boundary was a dike and ditch; 2) their neighbors' surveyor placed boundary
stakes beyond that point on land the appellees considered to be theirs; 3)
appellees pulled up the stakes and told their neighbors that they considered
the dike and ditch to be the proper boundaries; and 4) their claim was not
challenged by the neighbors. The appellees claimed that this established the
dike and ditch as the boundary by the doctrine of acquiescence. The well-
established element for locating a boundary by this doctrine is uncertainty
or dispute as to the boundary's correct location by neighboring landowners
3. Swann v. Seton, 629 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 650 So.
2d 35 (Fla. 1995).
4. Seton v. Swann, 650 So. 2d at 38. Chief Justice Grimes and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Kogan, Wells, and Anstead concurred.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 95.16(1), (2) (1991).
6. 403 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1991).
7. FLA. STAT. § 95.16(2)(b) (Supp. 1974), amended by FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1991).
8. Note, title can be acquired by adverse possession without color of title under section
95.18 of the Florida Statutes, but that was not discussed in this case.
9. The court expressly disapproved Turner v. Valentine, 570 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 576 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1991) and Bailey v. Hagler, 515 So. 2d
679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 587 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1991), which applied the
Seddon logic after the 1987 amendment to section 95.16.
10. 652 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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who acquiesce in a particular location for the prescriptive period. The
district court concluded that the appellees were not entitled to summary
judgment because "the record evidence permits different reasonable
inferences on the issues of mutual uncertainty, location of a boundary by the
parties, and acquiescence ... ."" The moving party must establish all the
elements and, having failed to do so, the district court reversed. 2
Evers v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.3 The
Division of Forestry filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking to
locate the boundary of property it was leasing for a state forest from the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund. A 1984 survey revealed that the
neighboring landowners were using and claiming ownership to part of the
land. The neighbors argued that there was an old agreement among their
predecessors in title that a certain fence line constituted the boundary, and
that subsequent owners, including the Division of Forestry, had acquiesced
to that boundary.
The Division of Forestry claimed that a 1938 eminent domain
proceeding by the federal government had vitiated the prior agreement and
any boundary by acquiescence. It also claimed that the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence was not available to establish a boundary to
public lands. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Division. 14 The First District Court of Appeal reversed, in an opinion
written by Judge Mickle, finding that there were genuine issues of material
fact still in dispute. 5 First, the record did not establish that the neighbors
or their predecessors were parties to the eminent domain proceeding.
Second, the neighbors claimed that their predecessors had established a
boundary by acquiescence against the predecessors of the Division. The
First District Court of Appeal characterized the correct, but still unresolved
issue as: "whether a governmental entity can later be bound as a successor
in interest and therefore take the property subject to a previously acquiesced
to boundary. 16
Shultz v. Johnson.1 Janice Shultz brought suit in circuit court seeking
to ascertain the boundary line of her property, alleging boundary by
acquiescence, boundary by agreement, and adverse possession. After the
11. Id. at 920.
12. Id. Judge Stevenson wrote the opinion. Judges Polen and Klein concurred.
13. 651 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
14. Id. at 803.
15. Id. at 804.
16. Id.
17. 654 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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trial court directed verdicts against Shultz in the acquiescence and agreement
claims and vacated a jury verdict in favor of Shultz on her adverse
possession claim, Shultz appealed."8
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the directed verdict entered
on the boundary by agreement claim because there was insufficient evidence
of any agreement.' 9 The court also affirmed the order vacating the jury
verdict in favor of Shultz on her adverse possession claim because there was
insufficient evidence to prove the essential element of the property being
enclosed by a substantial enclosure for the seven-year period under section
95.16 of the Florida Statutes.20
However, it reversed and remanded on the boundary by acquiescence
claim, and set out the elements of an acquiescence claim: 1) a dispute or
uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary, implying a cognizance
by both parties that the true boundary is in doubt; 2) location of a boundary
line by the parties; and 3) the continued occupancy of, and acquiescence to,
a line other than the true boundary line for a period of more than seven
years.21 The defendant claimed that there was no uncertainty as to the true
boundary. The court disagreed, finding the requisite element of uncertainty
as to the location of the true boundary.Y
IV. BROKERS
Gauthier v. Florida Real Estate Commission.' The Smiths advertised
their business for sale. When Gauthier, a broker, contacted them stating that
he had a potential buyer, the Smiths responded that they did not want to use
a broker or pay a brokerage commission. Subsequently, Gauthier and his
prospect joined in making a purchase offer which was accepted. When the
transaction broke down, the Smiths sued and won a $25,000 judgment
against the two co-buyers. Because the money judgment was not satisfied,
the Smiths filed a claim with the Real Estate Recovery Fund, the fund
created by the legislature to protect the public from the misconduct of real
estate brokers. After the Florida Real Estate Commission granted the claim
and suspended Gauthier's license, the broker appealed.
18. I at 568.
19. Id at 569.
20. d at 569-70.
21. Id at 568.
22. Shultz, 654 So. 2d at 569.
23. 654 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed in a soundly reasoned
opinion written by Judge Cobb, finding no basis on which to hold the fund
liable.24 The plaintiffs would be entitled to recover from the fund if they
had obtained a judgment holding that they had "suffered monetary damages
by reason of [certain enumerated] acts committed as a part of any real estate
brokerage transaction ."25 or a judgment for damages "wherein the cause
of action was based on a real estate brokerage transaction *.26
However, Gauthier, the broker, had not acted as a broker for these sellers.
They had refused to hire him and they never relied on him as a broker. The
sole reason the deal fell through was that the buyers did not perform their
portion of the contract; the co-buyers had breached the purchase agreement,
and the sellers had obtained a judgment for breach of the purchase contract.
That judgment did not satisfy the statutory condition precedent to recovery
from the Real Estate Recovery Fund.
Judge Thompson dissented, stating that the statute does not require an
agency relationship to exist with the broker as a prerequisite to recovery
from the fund. 7 In this case, the broker first became involved in the case
in the role of a broker even though he later became a co-buyer. The Real
Estate Commission predicated recovery on its finding that the sellers' harm
resulted from incompetent drafting of the contract which the sellers allowed
Gauthier to do because he was a licensed broker. Judge Thompson argued
that the appellate court should not substitute its findings of fact for those of
the Florida Real Estate Commission.2"
Rauch v. Chama Investments, N. V.29 Rauch, a real estate broker,
procured a commercial tenant under a thirty-year lease for the landlord,
Chama Investments. The brokerage agreement provided that the broker's
commission was to be three percent of the gross annual rental for the term
of the lease and any extensions of it.
Twenty years into the lease, the landlord and tenant modified the lease
without the participation of the broker and after that the landlord refused to
continue making commission payments. The trial court accepted the
landlord's argument that Rauch was not entitled to further commissions
because he had not taken part in the new lease. This was apparently based
24. Id. at 582.
25. FLA. STAT. § 475.482(1) (1991).
26. Id. § 475.483(1)(a).
27. Gauthier, 654 So. 2d at 583 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. 641 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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upon the cases3" which hold that a broker is not entitled to a commission
under an extension clause if the parties enter into a lease after the original
expires if it is substantially different from the original.31 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded in a per curiam opinion,32
finding this situation to be entirely different. Since this broker was seeking
his commission for the original term, he could not be deprived of it because
the landlord and tenant still enjoyed the benefits of the original lease,
although under somewhat modified terms. The court, however, volunteered
dicta that the broker's claim for annual commissions could be defeated by
the tenant's abandonment.
Legislation of note with regard to brokers is Chapter 95-274 which
amended section 721.20 to prohibit brokers from collecting advance fees for
listing timeshares.33
V. CONDOMINIUMS
Casa Del Mar Condominium Ass'n v. Richartz.3' The condominium
association brought an action for an injunction to prevent future acts of
physical violence against the association and its members perpetrated by Mr.
Richartz. Mr. Richartz, irate about ongoing work related to his unit, had
thrown the association president to the floor and uttered various threats. 5
The trial court erroneously dismissed the action, holding that the
association did not have standing because the dispute was between Richartz
and the association president in his individual capacity.36 Section 718.303
of the Florida Statutes specifically allows such actions to be brought by the
association or by the individual unit owner, and the statute authorizes the
use of injunctions to enforce condominium bylaws.37
Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. v. Seawatch at Marathon Condo. Ass'n,
Inc. 8  The Supreme Court of Florida answered the following certified
question in the affirmative:
30. Woodard Tire Co. v. Hartley Realty, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review denied, 605 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1992); Cushman & Wakefield of Fla., Inc. v.
Williams, 551 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Strano v. Reisinger Real Estate,
Inc., 534 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review dismissed, 542 So. 2d 1334 (Fla.
1989).
31. Rauch, 641 So. 2d at 502.
32. Judges Anstead, Hersey, and Senior Judge Mager concurred.
33. See Ch. 95-274 discussed infra part XVIII.
34. 641 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
35. Id. at 470.
36. Id,
37. Id. at 470-71.
38. 658 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1994).
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Does section 718.124, Florida Statutes[(1987)], grant a condominium
association an extended period of time in which it may assert a cause
of action for damage to common elements in condominium buildings,
beyond the time granted in section 718.203, Florida Statutes [(1987)],
after unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board
of administration?39
The Seawatch Condominium was built and occupied by 1983, and
control of the association passed from the developer to the unit owners on
August 10, 1985. The association filed a section 718.203 breach of implied
warranty suit on May 13, 1988, for damages due to the developer's use of
allegedly defective concrete and metal decking resulting in cracking and
seepage of rust-stained water onto cars parked below the building.40
The statute of limitations for implied warranty actions is four years.4 '
However, section 718.124 tolls the running of the limitation period until
control of the association passes from the developer to the unit owners.42
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court's dismissal,
based on the tolling provision, but nevertheless certified the above question
for clarification.43 The Supreme Court of Florida approved the District
Court of Appeal's decision, noting that the right to bring a warranty action
belongs to the unit owners, and that they can exercise their right collectively
through their association. 44
In his dissent, Justice Harding argued that expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, when applied to the tolling provision, indicated that it only applied
to actions in which the association was the real party in interest, and not in
actions accorded to the unit owners individually.45 Justice Harding found
nothing in the language of section 718.203 [breach of warranty section] to
support the majority's holding that such actions can be brought by condo-
minium associations on behalf of the unit owners. As such, he argued that
the unit owners had sat on their rights and were using the association to
revive their cause of action.
Under the facts of this case, where the defects involved the building's
internal structure and composition, it seems more appropriate to have the
association represent the common interests of the unit owners, making
Justice Harding's position unpersuasive.
39. Id. at 923.
40. Id.
41. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1987).
42. Id. § 718.124.
43. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 658 So. 2d at 923.
44. Id. at 924.
45. Id. at 926. (Harding, J., dissenting).
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Horizons Condominium Management Ass'n. v. Salvato.46  The
Salvatos owned a unit in the condominium. The declaration of condomini-
um had an incorrect legal description of the unit, erroneously including a
side yard as part of the unit. As a result of this error the 8alvato's unit was
assessed higher ad valorem property taxes and higher condominium
assessment fees, causing a pending sale of the unit to fall through when the
potential buyer found out about the higher charges on that unit.47
The Salvatos sued for damages for the lost sale, the higher taxes, and
for reformation of the legal description in the declaration of condominium.
The trial court held in their favor. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
affirmed the reformation, but reversed the damage award.48 It reasoned
that damages for the lost sale were not based on any legally acceptable
evidence of loss. 49 The overpaid taxes were a matter for the Salvatos to
litigate against the county tax assessor, not the association.50
Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Mead.51 The Supreme Court
of Florida answered the following certified question from the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in the affirmative:
WHETHER A CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION CAN ENFORCE A
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT IMPOSED TO PAY JUDGMENTS,
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN CONNECTION
WITH A LAWSUIT BROUGHT BY UNIT OWNERS AGAINST THE
ASSOCIATION IN WHICH THE ASSOCIATION'S PURCHASE OF
REAL PROPERTY WAS INVALIDATED AS AN UNAUTHORIZED
ACT AND SUBSEQUENTLY RESCINDED. 2
The case involved the association's attempt to purchase real property
apparently valued at over $630,000. The association imposed a $1500
special assessment to pay for the purchase, and 150 unit owners brought
suit, claiming that the attempted purchase was beyond the power of the
association's board of directors. The unit owners prevailed, and their
attorneys were awarded $194,079.37 in fees. The association had to refund
the special assessment, and sought to impose another special assessment of
46. 641 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So..2d 1195 (Fla.
1995).
47. li at 924.
48. Id.
49. Id
50. Id
51. 650 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1994).
52. Id. at 5-6.
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$500 to pay for the attorney's fees resulting from the litigation. The unit
owners again sued for a declaratory judgment that the $500 special
assessment was unauthorized, and for breach of fiduciary duty arising from
the selective disbursement of the refunds to only those unit owners who
sued.
The circuit court held that the $500 special assessment was an
authorized common expense, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the association could not be authorized to impose
assessments to pay for the consequences of acts which were themselves
unauthorized.53 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Fourth District
Court of Appeal's decision and remanded with orders to affirm the circuit
court's judgment.54 The court based its decision on a logical reading of
chapter 718, finding that judgments against an association make the common
elements subject to execution and levy, and an association is empowered to
impose special assessments to protect the common elements.5 Justice
Kogan argued in his partial dissent that the Condominium Act did not
sanction such a result, in which the unit owners were forced to pay the judg-
ment they obtained. 6
Residential Communities of America v. Escondido Community Ass'n.57
Escondido Community Association ("ECA"), recorded an amendment to the
declaration of condominium which prevented the sale of any condominium
unit to a person unless the occupant was fifty-five or older. The developer,
Residential Communities of America ("RCA"), sued because the amendment
was passed without the necessary approval of RCA. RCA also sought
damages and attorney's fees in the trial court, claiming that the amendment
amounted to a slander of title. The case ultimately reached the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, which ruled in favor of the developer RCA, holding that
ECA had acted in good faith, and therefore that RCA was required to prove
actual malice in order to prevail in its slander of title claim. 58 Since ECA
had made no false or malicious statement, RCA was unable to prove
damages.
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc., 650 So. 2d at 8 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
57. 645 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
58. Id. at 151.
Vol 20
268
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman / Valcarcel
Chief Judge Harris dissented, arguing that good faith and lack of malice
was irrelevant and that RCA should be awarded attorney's fees for having
to bring the suit in the first place. 9
Rosso v. Golden Surf Towers Condominium Ass'n. ° The condomini-
um association owned a dock. Rosso used the dock to moor his forty-seven
foot sailboat. The association informed Rosso that there was a monthly
charge of $2.00 per linear foot for the exclusive use of the dock space.
Rosso paid the fee initially, but stopped paying when the association
increased the fee to $3.00 per linear foot. The association then obtained a
preliminary injunction removing the sailboat from the dock, and it sued to
collect the unpaid fees. Rosso claimed that no fee for the use of common
elements was permitted under chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes, but the
Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed."
The association can charge a fee for the use of common elements if the
declaration of condominium provides for such practice and a majority of the
association votes to adopt the practice, unless the charges relate to one
owner having exclusive use of the property.62 The court held that a genu-
ine issue of material fact existed as to whether the association had met any
of the alternatives to support its action in charging the fee.
63
Additionally, if the fee were permitted, the association would have to,
under section 718.111(4), create rules and regulations regarding the terms
of the usage fees. The district court affirmed the injunction, reversed the
summary judgment in favor of the association, vacated the award of
attorney's fees, and remanded? 4
Greens of Town 'N Country Condominium Ass'n v. Greens of Tampa,
Inc.6' The condominium association appealed a dismissal with prejudice
of its complaint against the developer and the pre- and post-turnover
directors. The cause of action was negligence in design, construction,
inspection, repair, and maintenance of the condominium's roof and electrical
wiring. The Second District Court of Appeal affrmned the dismissal based
on the economic loss rule which requires the remedy to be in contract when
59. Ma at 151 (Harris, J., dissenting).
60. 651 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
61. d at 788.
62. Id
63. Id at 789.
64. Id
65. 653 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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a contract exists.66 However, it reversed the order making the dismissal
without prejudice, allowing the association to amend its complaint.67
With regard to legislation, Chapter 95-274 made important changes to
Chapter 718 as well as homeowner association provisions in Chapter 617.
Chapter 95-274 is discussed in Part XVIII.
VI. CONSTRUCTION
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp.68 The contract provided for the N. Sinha
Corporation to build additions and improvements to the owners' home. The
corporation commenced this action to foreclose on its mechanic's lien and
for breach of contract. The homeowners counterclaimed and filed
affirmative defenses based upon claims that the work was defective. The
homeowners also filed a third-party complaint against the corporation's
president, N. Sinha, as the corporation's qualifying agent. Chapter 489 of
the Florida Statutes requires that a business organization such as a corpora-
tion, acting as a contractor, have an individual licensed contractor act as the
"qualifying agent" for the corporation. 69 The homeowners claimed that the
statute's imposition of duties on the qualifying agent to supervise the
construction impliedly created a private cause of action for breach of that
duty.7° The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed the claim because N.
Sinha individually was not a party to the contract. The Supreme Court of
Florida, in an unanimous opinion written by Senior Justice McDonald,7
agreed. The court stated that "legislative intent, rather than the duty to
benefit a class of individuals, should be the primary factor considered by a
court in determining whether a cause of action exists when a statute does
not expressly provide for one., 72 It found no evidence in the language of
the statute or the legislative history suggesting the legislature intended to
create a private cause of action. The general rule is that a statute which
provides for the safety or welfare of the general public will not be construed
to create a private cause of action in the absence of express language.
Consequently, no cause of action existed against the qualifying agent for
breach of his supervisory duties.
66. Id. at 1137.
67. Id.
68. 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994).
69. FLA. STAT. § 489.119 (1991).
70. Murthy, 644 So. 2d at 985. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.105(4), 489.115 (1991).
71. Chief Justice Grimes and Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan, and Harding concurred.
72. Murthy, 644 So. 2d at 985.
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Hendry Corp. v. Metro-Dade County.73 This case involved a contract
to demolish the old Rickenbacker Causeway connecting Key Biscayne to the
mainland. The County withheld part of the payment under the contract
when the contractor failed to complete the work as scheduled. Hendry sued
the County, alleging the County was liable for costs .arising from unexpected
site conditions which it failed to disclose (such as subsurface debris and
pilings of wood instead of concrete, both making the job more difficult).
The trial court rejected Hendry's request to have the jury instructed that the
County had a duty to disclose all available information on the project and
to warrant that plans and specifications provided were full, complete, and
accurate.74 The district court held that was not an error.75 Judge Jorgen-
son's majority opinion stated, "our courts have recognized only that the
government has an affirmative duty to provide bidders with information that
will not mislead them.
76
Judge Baskin dissented based upon the terms of the contract. The
contract contained a differing site condition ("DSC") clause which provided:
The Contractor shall promptly, and before such conditions are
disturbed, notify the Engineer in writing of: (1) Subsurface or latent
physical conditions at the site differing materially from those indicated
in this Contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at the site, of an
unusual nature, differing materially from those ordinarily encountered
and generally recognized as in work of the character provided for in this
Contract. The Engineer will promptly investigate the conditions, and if
he finds that such conditions do materially differ and cause an increase
or decrease in the Contractor's cost of, or the time required for,
performance of any part of the work under this contract, whether or not
changed as a result of such conditions, an equitable adjustment will be
made and the contract modified accordingly.77
This type of clause is common in public works contracts. It "shifts the
normal contractual risk of additional costs incurred from an unexpected
condition from the bidder [i.e., the contractor] to the contracting public
73. 648 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.
1995). This replaces the original opinion at 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2301a which was withdrawn
after the granting of a motion for rehearing.
74. Id. at 141.
75. Id. at 142.
76. Id. at 141 (citations omitted).
77. Id.
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authority.""s The contractor need not allege or prove fraud or misrepre-
sentation on the part of the public authority. Judge Baskin concluded that
the requested jury instruction was accurate given the DSC clause in this
contract and thus the contractor should have been entitled to reversal.
Hummel v. Stenstrom-Strump Construction & Development Corp.79
Owners of land entered into a contract for the construction of a home on
their lot. The builder submitted the plans to the City of Sanford for
approval, and then built the home. After the City issued a certificate of
occupancy, the landowners moved in. A short time later, stormwater caused
significant physical damage to the home and the contents. The landowners
sued the builder under a variety of theories and also sued the City of
Sanford for negligence in approving the plans and inspecting the builder's
work, for breach of the City's warranties contained in the certificate of
occupancy, and for negligent operation and maintenance of its stormwater
drainage system. The City asserted sovereign immunity and argued that it
owed no duty to the plaintiffs.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal ° affirmed the trial court's dismiss-
al of the claims against the City for negligence in approving the plans and
inspecting the construction, as well as the claims for breach of warranties
based on the certificate of occupancy. 8' This case presented a novel
situation because this landowner was the one who had paid the inspection
fee to the City.82 Regardless of that distinction, the court followed the
policy set out by the Supreme Court of Florida in Trianon Park Condomini-
um Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,3 where it said, "[w]e find that the
enforcement of building codes and ordinances is for the purpose of
protecting the health and safety of the public, not the personal or property
interests of individual citizens... ,,84 The district court, however, reversed
the trial court's dismissal of the action based on failure to maintain and
operate its stormwater drainage system. Such actions may be brought
78. Hendry Corp., 648 So. 2d at 143 (Baskin, J., dissenting).
79. 648 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
80. Chief Judge Harris wrote the opinion in which Judges Goshorn and Diamantis
concurred.
81. 648 So. 2d at 1240.
82. Compare Victoria Village G Condominium Ass'n v. City of Coconut Creek, 488 So.
2d 900 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 497 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1986) with Friedberg
v. Town of Longboat Key, 504 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
83. 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
84. Hummel, 648 So. 2d at 1240 (quoting Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 922-23).
85. Id. at 1240-41.
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against municipalities if their drainage systems fail to operate as intended or
fail to meet the standards required by the building codes.86
Martin v. Jack Yanks Construction Co. 7 The homeowner appealed
the trial court's judgment in favor of Yanks Construction, holding that the
landowner had breached the construction contract the parties had entered
into, and denying Martin punitive damages in its action to remove a lien
fraudulently filed by Yanks.
Shortly after Hurricane Andrew, the landowner signed a repair
"proposal" to return the home to its pre-hurricane condition with the final
price for the work to be worked out between Yanks and Martin's insurer.
After the landowner prevented Yanks from commencing the work, Yanks
filed a claim of lien for the entire $107,208.60 insurance check issued by
Martin's insurer, arguing that it was entitled to file the lien based on the
underlying contract.
The Third District Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Judge Nesbitt,
agreed with the homeowner. It held the contract was void for indefiniteness
because of the "absence of a definite price or a means of determining a
price not left solely to the contractor's discretion ... ."88 The court also
concluded that the landowner was entitled to claim punitive damages under
Florida Statutes section 713.31. A contractor may have a lien "for any
money that is owed to him for labor, services, materials, or other items
required by, or furnished in accordance with the direct contract."89 Since
Yanks had not furnished anything, the lien was held to be fraudulent.
Nystrom v. Cabada.9° Nystrom built his own house even though he
was not a licensed contractor. After living there for about one year, he sold
it. The buyer experienced problems with walls cracking and doors sticking.
Engineers inspected the property and reported it to be hazardous. The buyer
sued, claiming breach of implied warranty, fraud, rescission of contract,
breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the county building code.
After winning on the merits, the court gave the buyer the option of
rescinding the purchase and getting back the purchase price or a damage
judgment for the full purchase price. Of course, she chose the latter because
that meant she could also keep the property and continue to live in the
house. The Second District Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Judge
86. Id. at 1240; see Slemp v. City of North Miami, 545 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1989).
87. 650 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
88. IeL at 121.
89. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.05 (1993)).
90. 652 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
1995]
273
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
Patterson, affirmed9 on the issue of liability, holding that the Nystroms
had a duty to disclose the defects and the fact that the house was built by
an unlicensed contractor. The court reversed on the issue of damages,
however, holding that Cabada should not have been given the option of
obtaining a money judgment for the full purchase price of the property and
keeping the property.92 Therefore, the case was remanded for a new trial
on the issue of damages.
Oriole Homes Corp. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. 93 The
developer and the utility were involved in a dispute over who should bear
the cost of road widening. Florida Statutes sections 125.42 and 337.403
allocate responsibility between a public body and a utility in a road
widening or extension case. Judge Glickstein's opinion relied upon the first
district's interpretation of an earlier statute9" to reach the conclusion that
the developer must bear the cost of road widening when the decision to
widen to road is made by a developer for private benefit.
VII. COVENANTS, DEEDS, AND RESTRICTIONS
Antioch University v. Dept. of Natural Resources.95 Antioch Universi-
ty sued to enforce the reverter clause contained in two deeds which
conveyed land in Broward County to the State of Florida with the proviso
that it "shall be used and devoted solely and exclusively for State Park
purposes .... 96 The land became known as Hugh Taylor Birch State
Park, named after the original grantor, who granted the reverter interest to
Antioch. The basis for Antioch's claim to enforce the reverter was that the
installation of storm water outfall pipes, use of structures as concession or
refreshment stands, the presence of a Department of Transportation trailer,
power lines and water mains, and the operation of a landfill or dump
violated the exclusive use provision in the deeds. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision holding that the above did not
violate the deed conditions and that Antioch was not entitled to enforce the
reverter clause.
97
91. Acting Chief Judge Danahy and Judge Fulmer concurred.
92. Nystrom, 652 So. 2d at 1268.
93. 641 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
94. Century Constr. Corp. v. Central Tel. Co., 370 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 338.19 (1977)).
95. 647 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 659 So. 2d 270 (Fla.
1995).
96. Id. at 915.
97. Id. at 915-16.
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Blue Reef Holding Corp., Inc. v. Coyne.9" Blue Reef appealed the
denial of a temporary injunction after the trial court determined that a
declaration of restrictions to real property gave a developer the right to
change the size and configuration of the recreation area in the development
without obtaining the consent of the owners. The developer of Jupiter Key
recorded covenants and restrictions describing the recreation area and stating
that the designated area could only be used for recreational purposes. The
declaration also stated that the covenants could be amended by the developer
without consent of the owners, but "no amendment to this declaration shall
be effective which would increase the liabilities of the then Owner or
prejudice the rights of a then Owner... to utilize or enjoy the benefits of
the then existing Common Property unless the Owner or Owners ...
consent to such amendment. . . ."" The developer reduced the size of the
recreational area without recording any amendment, and without obtaining
the consent of the appellant owner.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the
temporary injunction because the reduction meant that the land was not
going to be used only for recreational purposes, and it prejudiced the rights
of the owners to enjoy the "then existing Common Property" in violation of
the covenants."°° Consent from the owners was required.' 0'
Brower v. Hubbard." The Browers owned a single-family home in
a subdivision called Suburban Acres. The deed to their property contained
restrictive covenants prohibiting any building in excess of two stories in
height, and prohibiting noxious or offensive activity which may be a
nuisance to the neighborhood. Their eighty-seven foot tower antenna was
held to be a violation of these covenants, and they were ordered to remove
it and to refrain from further radio transmissions. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling that the antenna had to be
removed, but reversed on the prohibition against further transmission on
grounds that this part of the decision was overly broad."0 3
Dolphins Plus, Inc. v. Hobdy.'" Dolphins Plus is a volunteer
nonprofit organization dedicated to caring for and rehabilitating injured or
sick marine mammals in Key Largo. The organization owns land in Key
98. 645 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
99. IM at 1054.
100. Id. at 1055.
101. Id.
102. 643 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
103. Id. at 29.
104. 650 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
19951
275
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
Largo Ocean Shores addition subdivision, as does Hobdy and several others.
Hobdy and others sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Dolphins
Plus because the organization had fenced in the area depicted on a platted
subdivision as a "boat basin," and used it as a pen for the injured marine
mammals. Dolphins Plus had previously obtained a lease from the heirs of
the subdivision developer to use the "boat basin" as a pen, and had also
obtained permission from Monroe County and the Department of Environ-
mental Regulation. °5
Hobdy and the other property owners argued that the fence and
Dolphins Plus's use of the basin for purposes unrelated to the mooring of
boats violated the plat restrictions and unreasonably interfered with their use
and enjoyment of the basin. The Declaration of Restriction reads: "No
structure, building, dock, ramp, barge or any other thing or condition shall
be permitted to impede or obstruct navigation in the waterway; boat basins
excepted ...."106
The trial court ruled in favor of the objecting property owners, holding
that the restriction and the term "boat basin" clearly prohibited Dolphins
Plus's use of the basin as a pen.'07 Furthermore, the lease from the
developer's heirs did not release or terminate the plat restriction. The Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed, stating that, "a restriction imposed alike
upon all the lots of a block or tract of land cannot be released to one
purchaser or his grantee without the assent of the other purchasers, or their
grantees, for whose benefit it was imposed."'
0 8
Metropolitan Dade County v. Sunlink Corp."° Sunlink entered into
a contract to sell forty acres of vacant land in northern Dade County. The
land was encumbered by a restrictive covenant which prevented the land
from being sold to anyone other than an entity owned, controlled by, or
affiliated with AT&T. The covenant was created before AT&T was restruc-
tured, and Sunlink was a former AT&T affiliate. The covenant was to run
from December, 1974, for thirty years, and to be extended automatically for
successive ten-year periods unless an instrument recorded and signed by a
majority of the then owner(s) of the real property, and a majority of those
owners within 500 feet of the boundary of the property, agree to change the
105. Id. at 213-14.
106. Id. at 214.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 3173 (4th
ed. 1962)).
109. 642 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.
1995).
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covenants in whole or in part, providing the covenants have first been
released by the [Dade County] Commission. The prospective buyer did not
fit this restriction and the County argued that Sunlink could not sell the land
without obtaining the permission of the several thousand neighboring
property owners to release the restrictive covenant.11
Sunlink sued in circuit court, seeking termination of the covenant due
to changed circumstances, and argued in the alternative that the covenant
was an unlawful restraint against alienation. The circuit court granted
Sunlink summary judgment, holding that the covenant was an illegal
restraint against alienation, and the County appealed."' The initial
decision from the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court.
However, the County's motion for a rehearing en banc was granted and the
en banc court reversed, instructing Sunlink to seek the permission to release
the covenant from the neighboring property owners. The court held that the
restriction was not an unreasonable restraint against alienation because it
was subject to cancellation or modification and was not perpetual. 2 The
goal of the covenant, to preserve the character of the neighborhood for the
general welfare of the public, was reasonable.
Judge Baskin's dissent restated the law in Florida on the validity of
restraints against alienation: validity is determined by measuring the term
of duration of the restraint, the type of alienation precluded, and the size of
the class precluded from taking. Here, Judge Baskin argued that these
factors clearly indicated that the restraint should be void, and criticized the
majority's reliance on Metropolitan Dade County v. Fountainbleu Gas &
Wash, Inc."' That case dealt with an attempt to circumvent a zoning
restriction, which Judge Baskin explained is a different issue from an
unreasonable restraint against alienation."1
Judge Cope argued that the answer to this case was given in Davis v.
Geyer."5 The Supreme Court of Florida in Davis held that "[a] condition
to alien only to a particular person ... is void . . ." citing the Statute of
Quia Emptores in support of its decision.'16 Judge Cope went further,
however, stating that the remedy in such a case should be determined by an
110. Id.
111. Id. at 552.
112. Id. at 556.
113. Id. (Baskin, J., dissenting); see Metropolitan Dade County v. Fountainbleu Gas &
Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
114. Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 556.
115. Id. at 558; see Davis v. Geyer, 9 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1942).
116. Davis, 9 So. 2d at 730.
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evidentiary hearing, because the covenant may have been taken into
consideration when negotiating the sale of the property."
7
Legislation impacting the law of covenants consisted of Chapter 95-274
which provides in relevant part, that homeowner association covenants
survive after tax and foreclosure sales.118
VIII. EASEMENTS
Cook v. Proctor & Gamble Cellulose Co."' Proctor & Gamble
brought an action to establish a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress
over property owned by the appellants Cook and Rives. Proctor & Gamble
had no action in its own right because the property owners' predecessor in
title had given Proctor & Gamble's predecessors permission to construct and
use the roadway. In fact, the former owner used the road herself. The land
in question consisted of the southernmost 700 feet of a twenty-two mile road
which had been used for many years by Proctor & Gamble and its
predecessor for commercial purposes. In support of its action to establish
a public easement, Proctor & Gamble presented evidence of only four
people who testified that they had used the road for more than the required
twenty years.
The requirements in Florida to obtain a right of use by prescription are:
actual, continuous, adverse, and inconsistent uninterrupted use of the lands
of another for the prescribed twenty-year period. Therefore, Proctor &
Gamble sought to establish a "public" prescriptive easement. The trial court
held in favor of Proctor & Gamble and the property owners appealed."
The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that use by four people
was insufficient to establish substantial use by the public so as to lead to a
public prescriptive right.'' In order to establish a public prescriptive
easement, the land must be used by the public in general. " Additionally,
the First District Court of Appeal held that Proctor & Gamble's use was not
inconsistent with the owner's use of the land. "Doubts as to the creation of
a prescriptive right must be resolved in favor of the landowner .... Under
117. Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 558.
118. Chapter 95-274 is discussed later in this article. See infra part XVIII.
119. 648 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
120. Id. at 180-81.
121. Id. at 181.
122. Id.
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Florida law, any use in common with the owner is presumed to be
subordinate to the owner's title and with the owner's permission."''
Finally, the court held that Proctor & Gamble lacked standing to assert
the rights of the public.'24 It was plain to the court that Proctor &
Gamble's purpose in bringing the action was not to benefit the public, but
instead to benefit its own interests, because during the three years of
litigation, no other member of the public or representative body had come
forward to establish the easement. The court stated that in order to bring an
action to redress a public wrong, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he
suffered or is threatened with some special, particular, or peculiar injury
growing out of the public wrong."z Associate Judge Reynolds disagreed
on the standing issue in his partial dissent, arguing that the longer route
Proctor & Gamble must now take was a sufficient injury to provide
standing.' 6
Enzor v. Rasberry.27 Rasberry filed suit to extinguish Enzor's claim
to a common law way of necessity across Rasberry's land. The trial court
entered a final judgment quieting title to the disputed road, holding that
Enzor had reasonable and practicable alternative means of ingress and egress
to his property.' The First District Court of Appeal disagreed, reversed,
and remanded. 29
Section 704.01(1) of the Florida Statutes codifies the common law rule
of an implied grant of a way of necessity where:
a person... grants lands to which there is no accessible right-of-way
except over his land .... Such an implied grant or easement in lands
or estates exists where there is no other reasonable and practicable way
of egress, or ingress and same is reasonably necessary for the beneficial
use or enjoyment of the part granted or reserved. An implied grant
arises only where a unity of title exists from a common source other
than the original grant from the state or United States. 3
123. Id (citations omitted).
124. Cook, 648 So. 2d at 181.
125. Id. at 182.
126. Id (Reynolds, J., dissenting).
127. 648 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
128. ML at 789.
129. ld. at 795.
130. FLA. STAT. § 704.01(1) (1993).
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Once established, a way of necessity passes by each conveyance to
subsequent grantees. The proponent of an implied grant of a way of
necessity must establish three elements:
(1) both properties must at one time have been owned by the same
party, (2) the common source of title must have created the situation
causing the dominant tenement to become landlocked, and (3) at the
time the common source of title created the problem the servient
tenement must have had access to a public road.
31
Rasberry owned three parcels and sold two of them to a Mr. Adams,
causing the conveyed parcels to become landlocked at the time when the
third parcel, retained by Rasberry, had access to a public road. Enzor
owned one of the parcels formerly owned by Adams, and, therefore, also
obtained the way of necessity. He used this easement to reach another
landlocked parcel he owned and used as a hunting camp. Later, the State
of Florida, during construction of Interstate 10, condemned a portion of
Rasberry's property and created a service road leading from a public road
through part of Enzor's easement, but stopping short of Enzor's land. Enzor
still had to use the end part of the easement to reach his property. The
service road, however, did provide an alternate route for the initial part of
the journey. Enzor made use of this new road. However, the State later
transferred the road to Okaloosa County, which vacated it and quitclaimed
the road to Rasberry. At that time, Rasberry gave Enzor permission to use
what was formerly the service road to reach his parcels. Rasberry now
wanted to revoke such permission, arguing that Enzor had another implied
easement of necessity through the parcel kept by Adams when Adams sold
one parcel to Enzor. Adams, however, obtained an easement from Rasberry
when he purchased two parcels from Rasberry. Adams then sold one of
those parcels to Enzor. When Adams conveyed one parcel to Enzor, it was
not only accessible through the parcel retained by Adams, but it was also
accessible through the easement over Rasberry's parcel. Therefore, there
existed only one easement, the original one over Rasberry's land. Although
a road was subsequently created across the parcel that Adams had retained,
Enzor had no right to use it, and the road was not always usable.'32
The First District Court of Appeal held that the original easement was
still valid because the necessity which gave rise to it still existed.'33
131. Enzor, 648 So. 2d at 791 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 794.
133. Id. at 795.
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IX. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation."M The Supreme Court
of Florida considered the question, although it was not properly certified,
"[w]hether evidence of environmental contamination is relevant and
otherwise admissible in an eminent domain valuation trial" and answered in
the affirmative.135
In this case the subject property was a gas station with petroleum
contamination. In the valuation trial, the Department of Transportation
("DOT"), moved in limine to include evidence that the property was
contaminated, but the trial court ruled that the proffered evidence of
contamination due to the stigma that would attach to the property was not
relevant because the contamination was being remedied under the Early
Detection Incentive program, which would reimburse property owners for
the costs of eliminating the problem. The property was then valued as if not
contaminated.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, and the Supreme Court
of Florida, in an opinion by Justice Wells, affirmed in part, but reversed in
part. ' 6 Under the circumstances of the reclamation program, the property
should have been valued as if clear of contamination. However, evidence
that the existence of prior contamination would stigmatize the property,
affecting its market value, would be relevant and admissible in a valuation
trial if the proper predicate was laid. The court expressed concern over the
prejudicial nature of evidence of contamination. In order to be admissible,
the evidence of contamination must "have a basis in facts and data
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of real property valuation,
section 90.704, Florida Statutes (1993), and pass the test of section
90.705(2), Florida Statutes (1993). ''137 Evidence of sales of comparable,
contaminated property would provide an adequate factual basis. The
supreme court agreed with the trial court that evidence of the cost of
remediation should not be admitted where those costs were not to be born
by the landowner.
134. 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995).
135. Id. at 922.
136. Id. at 925.
137. Id.
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Justice Anstead expressed his concern that the majority opinion was
going too far, answering questions that had not been asked. 3 ' Quite
prudently, he would have simply answered the question in the affirmative
and awaited later cases to elaborate on issues of evidence and valuation.
Basic Energy Corp. v. Hamilton County.13 9  The City of Jasper
wanted to attract the prison industry for economic reasons, such as to
provide jobs for local citizens and add to the City's revenues. Consequent-
ly, it commenced this condemnation action to acquire land which it would
offer to donate to the state as a site for a state prison. The property owner
challenged the taking, contending that the City had no authority to exercise
eminent domain powers for this purpose. The landowner lost in the circuit
court, but prevailed in the First District Court of Appeal. This was not a
case which analyzed the limits of the eminent domain power, but rather
focused on the limits of power granted to this particular governmental entity.
The court noted that the City is granted power by the Florida Constitu-
tion'o to perform municipal functions, but concluded that securing the
construction or operation of a state prison did not fit within the scope of
municipal function. Furthermore, the statutory grant of authority to
construct and operate jails to municipalities14' did not include authority to
engage in prison construction or operation. A prison and a jail are not the
same thing. A jail is a short-term lockup, holding prisoners awaiting trial
or serving short sentences and operated by a city or county. A prison, on
the other hand, is for long-term incarceration and is operated by the state.
Department of Transportation v. Manoli.42  DOT appealed the
amount awarded to the appellee as business damages after DOT took a
portion of appellee's gas station as part of its highway widening project.
The business was incorporated, but the appellee was personally the lessee
of the gas station and worked there as an employee of the corporation.
Appellee's expert convinced the trial court that the wages the appellee
received should not be considered in calculating his business loss. His
damages were calculated by deducting from gross income the cost of goods
sold, wages, rent, and other operating expenses, but not the wages he
received as an employee. Judge Klein, writing for the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, concluded" that was incorrect. He noted that business
138. Id. at 926.
139. 652 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
140. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
141. FLA. STAT. § 180.06 (1993).
142. 645 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
143. Judges Hersey and Gunther concurred.
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damages are entirely based upon a statute,144 not the constitution. Busi-
ness damages are based on lost profits. To ignore the profits he had
received, even in the form of wages, would inflate his damages. The court
noted that the amount of lost profits is not the only way of computing
business damages, but that when lost profits is the method used, the
reasonable value of the self-employed owner's services must be deducted.
Downtown Square Assoc. v. Florida Department of Education.145 In
this condemnation action, the landowner sought fees for attorneys and
experts. At the time that the litigation began, Florida Statutes section
73.092 provided:
(1) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings,
the court shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the
client [condemnee] from the services rendered.
(2) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings,
the court shall give secondary consideration to: (a) The novelty,
difficulty, and importance of the questions involved. (b) The skill
employed by the attorney in conducting the cause. (c) The
amount of money involved. (d) The responsibility incurred and
fulfilled by the attorney. (e) The attorney's time and labor
reasonably required adequately to represent the client in relation
to the benefits resulting to the client.
(4) In determining the amount of attorney's fees to be paid by
the petitioner, the court shall be guided by the fees the defen-
dant would ordinarily be expected to pay if the petitioner
[condemnor] were not responsible for the payment of fees and
costs.
146
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Judge Polen, 47
decided that this list was exclusive, relying without elaboration on an earlier
supreme court decision. 141 Consequently, the trial court erred when it
considered factors outside the list, although the court did not specify what
144. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1991).
145. 648 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
146. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993), amended by Ch. 94-162, § 3, 1994 Fla. Laws 564,
566-67.
147. Chief Judge Dell and Judge Stone concurred.
148. Schick v. Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 599 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1992).
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those factors were. Because the trial court had been thoughtful enough to
specify what the reasonable fees would have been had it not considered
those additional factors, the Fourth District Court of Appeal simply reversed
and ordered fees to be awarded on that basis. 49
JFR Investment v. Delray Beach Community Redevelopment Agen-
cy- 5  After the City declared an area to be blighted and in need of
rehabilitation, it created a community redevelopment agency ("CRA"). The
CRA moved to take this land with plans to use it:
for off street parking and two historic homes will be relocated there.
One of these homes will serve as the CRA headquarters and the other
is expected to house the Palm Beach County Historic Preservation
Board. A walkway through the block will link the Old School Square
with municipal offices and other structures to the west.... The parking
facilities planned ...will serve as overflow parking for the tennis
center and the community center and also provide parking for offices
to be located in the relocated historic houses.'
The landowner challenged the taking, claiming that it was being done
for private rather than public use because the parking would be used for the
benefit of private development. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in this
per curiam decision, 152 properly distinguished this case from Baycol, Inc.
v. Downtown Development Authority of City of Fort Lauderdale.53 The
court observed that this project "will end up with a combination public use,
retail, office, and entertainment center that will need parking."'" The
record supported the conclusion that the parking provided on this land
would primarily benefit the public usage.'55 The private benefit was
incidental, and an incidental private use of taken land is permissible.
White v. Department of Transportation.5 6 The landowner was a real
estate broker. At the condemnation trial, he did not call an appraiser but
offered his own testimony regarding the value of the property. On cross-
examination, he was required to publish portions of an appraisal report,
revealing that he had hired an appraiser, received that appraiser's report, and
149. 648 So. 2d at 1266.
150. 652 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
151. Id. at 1262.
152. Judges Stone, Warner, and Farmer concurred.
153. 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
154. 652 So. 2d at 1263.
155. Id.
156. 645 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Vol 20
284
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman / Valcarcel
did not call that appraiser as an expert. According to the Fifth District, this
was reversible error because it might create the inference that he was
concealing or covering up evidence harmful to his case. A brief opinion by
Judge Griffin"57 pointed out the district court had, a decade earlier in Sun
Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando,158 established a rule allowing a
landowner to use the condemnor's expert only where such inference is
carefully avoided. The rule was here applied with equal force against the
condemnor.
B. Inverse Condemnation
Rubano v. Department of Transportation.5 9 The Supreme Court of
Florida, in an opinion written by Justice Anstead,' 6° answered the follow-
ing certified question in the negative:
DID THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ENGAGE IN A
COMPENSABLE TEMPORARY TAKING OF ACCESS WHEN IT
ELIMINATED PETITIONERS' DIRECT ACCESS TO A STATE
ROAD BY PLACING PETITIONERS' PROPERTY ON A SERVICE
ROAD, ELIMINATED A PROTECTED U-TURN AND REPLACED
IT WITH ANOTHER U-TURN WHICH ADDED ONE AND ONE-
HALF MILES OF TRAVEL TO REACH THE PROPERTIES, AND
SEVERED THE CONNECTIONS FROM INTERSTATE 95 TO
STATE ROAD 84?161
This case involved five separate inverse condemnation actions which
were consolidated. The properties were all located in Broward County west
of 1-95 between Southwest 26th and 23rd Terrace on the north side of S.R.
84. Before the construction, the properties were accessed by eastbound
traffic on S.R. 84 by making a u-turn. Traffic exiting the properties could
get back on the eastbound lanes of S.R. 84 by another u-turn. During
construction of a new bridge on S.R. 84 over 1-95, a u-turn was eliminated
so that eastbound traffic from S.R. 84 would have to go an additional mile
and a half to reach the property and the property could not be directly
157. Judges Cobb and Peterson concurred.
158. 407 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
159. 656 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1995).
160. Chief Justice Grimes and Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan, and Harding concurred.
Justice Wells also wrote a short special concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Grimes
concurred.
161. 656 So. 2d at 1265.
1995]
285
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
reached from S.R. 84. It was now reached only through a service road. In
addition, the construction eliminated an exit from 1-95 to S.R. 84, so 1-95
traffic could not reach the properties by that direct route. 1-95 traffic would
have to exit onto 1-595 and then exit onto S.R. 84 which runs parallel to it.
The supreme court held that this did not constitute a compensable
taking. It cited Department of Transportation v. Gefen 62 for the proposi-
tion that no one has vested rights to the maintenance of a public highway
in any particular place.163 Similarly, no owner has a vested right in the
continuation of traffic flow past his property. In this case, access was not
completely eliminated, not even temporarily. The petitioners just lost their
most convenient means of access.
Justice Wells agreed with the court's analysis and conclusions, but was
uncomfortable with the results.' 64 With Chief Justice Grimes' concur-
rence, he called on the legislature to provide relief to the victims of long
disruptions caused by road construction.
Weaver Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee.165 The lessee of a commercial
gas station and convenience store enjoyed two points of access from the
main street. As part of a road improvement scheme, the City took a strip
of land along the frontage. The City also constructed a traffic control island
on city-owned property. This island reduced the width of one access from
forty-four to twenty-seven feet. In response, the lessee sought statutory
business damages and won $94,000 in the trial court. The First District
Court of Appeal reversed, but certified the following question concerning a
1987 Florida statute:
DOES SECTION 73.071, FLORIDA STATUTES, PERMIT A CLAIM
FOR STATUTORY BUSINESS DAMAGES FOR AN ALLEGED
SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT OF ACCESS RESULTING FROM
GOVERNMENTAL CONSTRUCTION ON EXISTING RIGHT-OF-
WAY ABUTTING THE OWNER'S PROPERTY, WHERE NO LAND
IS TAKEN? 166
In an unanimous opinion written by Justice Overton,' 67 the Supreme
Court of Florida answered the certified question in the negative. A loss of
162. 636 So. 2d 1345-46 (Fla. 1994).
163. 656 So. 2d at 1267-68.
164. Id. at 1271.
165. 647 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1994).
166. City of Tallahassee v. Boyd, 616 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
167. Chief Justice Grimes, and Justices Shaw, Kogan, Harding, Wells, and Anstead
concurred.
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access can constitute a taking for which compensation is required even
though no land is actually lost. The taking occurs when a landowner has
suffered an unreasonable interference with the access to or from his property
to an existing street. However, the loss of access must be substantial. The
supreme court quoted from its earlier opinion in Palm Beach County v.
Tessler168 that, "the fact that a portion or even all of one's access to an
abutting road is destroyed does not constitute a taking unless, when
considered in light of the remaining access to the property, it can be said
that the property owner's right of access was substantially diminished."169
The facts in the case at bar did not support the conclusion that a taking had
occurred and, consequently, business damages could not be recovered.
The court went on to provide some interesting dicta. It reiterated that
the legislature had provided for business damages, available only when there
has been a partial taking of land. The statute did not provide for business
damages where there had been a partial taking of access, even though that
required compensation. Although this case arose in conjunction with the
condemnation of a strip of land, the basis for the business damages claim
was the creation of the traffic island limiting access. Consequently, even if
the loss of access had required compensation, the landowner would still not
have been entitled to statutory damages for injury to the business.
Department of Transportation v. Gefen."70 The landowner prevailed
in the trial court in an action for inverse condemnation, but lost on appeal.
She then filed a motion for appellate attorney's fees based upon Florida
Statutes, section 73.131(2). 7  The statute provides for a condemning
authority to pay appellate attorney's fees except in cases where the
landowner had appealed unsuccessfully, and that was not the situation in this
case. That statute had been interpreted to apply to inverse condemnation
cases, 172 so it would appear at first glance that the landowner would be
entitled to attorney's fees here. The supreme court disagreed. In unani-
168. 538 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 1989).
169. Weaver Oil Co., 647 So. 2d at 821-22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Palm Beach
County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 1989)).
170. 636 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1994).
171. Section 73.131(2) provides in relevant part: "(2) The petitioner shall pay all
reasonable costs of the proceedings in the appellate court, including a reasonable attorney's
fee to be assessed by that court, except upon an appeal taken by a defendant in which" the
judgment of the lower court shall be affirmed." FLA. STAT. § 73.131(2) (1993).
172. County of Volusia v. Pickens, 435 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 443 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1983); State Road Dep't v. Lewis, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 192 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1966).
1995]
287
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
mously denying the motion,'73 the court found, without elaboration, that
an unsuccessful litigant should not recover appellate attorney's fees even if
the appeal had been filed by the State. The court concluded that "a
landowner claiming inverse condemnation is only entitled to appellate
attorney's fees if the claim is ultimately successful."' 74
Department of Transportation v. Heckman 75 A landowner seeking
a building permit to construct an indoor gun range was required by the City
of Oakland Park to convey a seven-foot strip in exchange for waiver of
platting requirements. Later, the City conveyed the strip to the Department
of Transportation for widening the highway. When the Department of
Transportation later condemned additional portions of the owner's property
for a drainage easement, the owners sued for compensation for the taking
of the seven-foot strip, claiming inverse condemnation in that the City had
been acting as an agent for the Department of Transportation when it had
improperly required them to give up the land. The owners prevailed in the
trial court, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in an opinion written by
Judge Klein, 7 6 reversed, holding that there was no evidence of a direct
agency relationship.'77 The court distinguished this case from out of state
examples'78 in which the state agency was directly involved and thus
173. Chief Justice Grimes, Justices Overton, Shaw, Kogan and Harding, and Senior
Justice McDonald all concurred in the order. The author was not identified.
174. Gefen, 636 So. 2d at 1347.
175. 644 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1194
(Fla. 1995). The original opinion, which appears at 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1926 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 14, 1994), differed from the final opinion only in that the following was deleted
from the next to last paragraph of the original: "Nor are courts unwilling to compensate
property owners for egregious conduct by local governments. See, e.g., Town of Highland
Beach v. Resolution Trust Corp., 18 F.3d 1536 (1 1th Cir. 1994), in which a verdict in excess
of $30 million was affirmed against a town as a result of an unconstitutional regulatory
taking of property" and the elimination of a footnote which stated: "We are aware that the
property owners have a separate lawsuit pending against the city. Although the trial court
found that the city acted improperly in this case, the city is not a party here, and our mention
of that finding in this opinion is nothing more than a description of what the trial court
found. Our conclusion does not require us to consider the propriety of the city's conduct."
19 Fla. L. Weekly at D1927 n.1.
The appellate review of the suit against the City appears as Heckman v. City of
Oakland Park, 655 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), in which summary judgment
was reversed due to the existence of a factual issue.
176. Judge Gunther concurred.
177. Heckman, 644 So. 2d at 529.
178. Roth v. State Highway Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Gaughen
v. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., 554 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); Orion Corp.
v. State. 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
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liable for a taking and also because in none of those cases had the landown-
er conveyed the land to the agency.
179
Nor did the court find there was agency by estoppel. The necessary
elements of agency by estoppel are: "(1) that the principal manifested a
representation of the agent's authority or knowingly allowed the agent to
assume such authority; (2) that the third person in good faith relied upon
such representation; and (3) that relying upon such representation such third
person has changed his position to his detriment."' 0 Therefore, DOT was
not liable under agency theory for the City's prior demand for the seven-foot
strip of land. Since the landowner's entire case against DOT was founded
on agency theory, it could not prevail.
In Judge Stevenson's dissent, he noted that the opinion of the trial court
was "well reasoned '81 and found sufficient facts in the record to support
the trial court's conclusion of fact that an agency relationship existed.
1 2
Once that had been established, the Department of Transportation, as the
principal, would be responsible for the acts of its agent, the City.
Department of Transportation v. Zyderveld.183 The Department of
Transportation had filed a map of reservation pursuant to Florida Statutes,
sections 337.241(2) and 337.241(3) for the planned realignment of a state
road, but in 1990 the Supreme Court of Florida held that such reservations
without compensation were unconstitutional1 4 so the Department had
withdrawn the map. In 1991, Zyderveld sued for inverse condemnation,
arguing that he had suffered a temporary taking due to the filing of a map
of reservation. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landowner
on the issue of liability. The landowner had suffered a temporary taking,
and proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict
of $375,000 for the temporary taking and $70,000 for severance damages.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed after finding three errors. 5
First, the trial court had allowed the landowner's experts to testify
about the appropriate compensation for a temporary taking of the entire
property, but the Department of Transportation was prohibited from
introducing evidence rebutting the claim that the entire parcel had been
179. Heckman, 644 So. 2d at 530.
180. Id. at 529 (quoting Carolina Georgia-Carpet & Textiles, Inc. v. Pelloni, 370 So. 2d
450, 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
181. ld. at 531.
182. Id.
183. 647 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
184. See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
185. Zyderveld, 647 So. 2d at 309-10.
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taken. Second, the trial court had relied upon an earlier precedent I8 6 to the
effect that the filing of the map constituted a per se taking. The Fifth
District had already receded, in an opinion approved by the Supreme Court
of Florida,187 from that holding and had adopted the rule that even where
such a map of reservation had been filed the inverse condemnation claimant
had the burden of showing that he had been deprived of all or substantial
economic use of his property. Consequently, the landowner here was not
entitled to summary judgment on the liability issue. Finally, the court had
allowed the landowner's expert to testify on the issue of severance damages
after testifying that the whole parcel had been taken. This was an error
because severance damages are applicable only in the case of a partial
taking.
Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. Harrell.8' also
dealt with the filing of a map of reservation pursuant to Florida Statutes,
section 337.241. In condemnation proceedings, landowners of two parcels
claimed additional damages based upon an earlier temporary taking of their
property by the filing of a map of reservation. That claim was supported
with affidavits stating that the recording of the map of reservation prevented
them from developing additional dwelling units on the property, refinancing
or selling the property although they had no plans to do any of those things
and had continued to live on the property. The Authority appealed a
judgment awarding damages and the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed.' 89 Noting that the Supreme Court of Florida had held that the
recording of a map of reservation pursuant to section 337.241 of the Florida
Statutes did not amount to a per se taking of property,"9 the court held
these assertions were insufficient to meet the burden of proving loss of all
economically beneficial or productive use.
Sarasota County v. Ex.' 91 Mr. and Mrs. Ex had sought permits to
build a condominium on their land. After being informed that the permits
could be obtained only if a ten-foot strip of land was deeded to the county,
they deeded the land to the county. This occurred in 1983. Mr. and Mrs.
186. Orlando/Orange County Expressway Auth. v. W & F Agrigrowth-Fernfield, Ltd.,
582 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 591 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1991).
187. Department of Transp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993), approved, 640 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1994); see also Tampa-Hillsborough County
Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
188. 645 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
189. Id. at 1027.
190. See Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth., 640 So. 2d at 54.
191. 645 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
1995).
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Ex lost the land through judicial sale in 1987. In 1991, they brought this
action against the County for compensation for the ten-foot strip on the
theory that the conveyance had been involuntary, meaning that they had
been coerced, and therefore amounted to inverse condemnation. Since eight
years had passed between the conveyance and the filing of the action, the
County raised the defenses of estoppel and the statute of limitations.
The Second District, in an opinion by Judge Altenbemd, " consid-
ered the proposition that, in the absence of a specific statutory period for
inverse condemnation, the adverse possession statute of limitations is
generally applied. The court however, concluded that it would not make
sense in this situation because, unlike most inverse condemnation situations
where the government is effectively adversely possessing the property, the
landowners here validly deeded the property to the government. Since the
government became the owner at that date, it could not be an adverse
possessor. That reasoning was based upon the court's finding that the
record would not support a claim that the deed was either void or voidable.
However, the lack of reasoning for that conclusion, including that duress
would be inapplicable, is troublesome. The district court did not decide
which statute of limitations did apply. It reasoned that the longest possible
statute of limitations period which might apply was seven years, 93 and
that period had expired before Mr. and Mrs. Ex had filed this action.
City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc.194 This case
also involved a statute of limitations defense although the parties there
agreed that the four-year statute should apply.195 The City appealed a
non-final order in an action finding the City liable for inverse condemnation
of the restaurant's property. The Yardarm Restaurant is located on a parcel
of land overlooking the Hillsborough Inlet with a view of the lighthouse.
In 1972, the owners decided to expand their business by building a 165-unit
hotel and marina on the lot. The City opposed the plan, and passed an
ordinance imposing a ten-story height restriction on new buildings in
Pompano Beach. Litigation challenging the restriction ensued over the next
five years, resulting in the issuance of a building permit in 1977. By then,
the restaurant was unable to finance the costs of construction on its own.
The restaurant struggled to find financing, yet continued construction. In
192. Acting Judge Campbell and Judge Fulmer concurred.
193. 645 So. 2d at 10 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.14 (1991)).
194. 641 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1197
(Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2583 (1995).
195. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(f) (1985); see also id. § 95.11(3)(p).
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1985, the mortgagee foreclosed, and the restaurant filed a bankruptcy
petition. When the stay was later lifted, the property was sold to the City.
This action was brought by the restaurant in 1987, alleging inverse
condemnation due to the City's extended obstruction of the restaurant's
attempts to build a hotel and marina. After prevailing in the trial court, the
City lost on appeal. The exhaustive and well-reasoned opinion by Associate
Judge Griffin196 concluded that this did not amount to a taking because the
activity complained of, the City's improper use of land use regulations, had
been struck down by the court based upon a due process challenge.
97
Moreover, the inverse condemnation claim would be barred by the statute
of limitations since the City's last action had taken place more than four
years prior to the institution of this suit. The court rejected the restaurant's
argument that the taking did not occur as long as the landowner continued
to contest the City's invalid regulations.
Tinnennan v. Palm Beach County.'98 The landowner petitioned the
County to rezone his property to general commercial with a special
exception to permit his planned commercial development of the property as
an office/warehouse. The county's planning and zoning board recommended
the approval, subject to certain conditions, and then the Board of County
Commissioners approved the petition but provided that: "No building
permits ... shall be issued until construction has begun for West Atlantic
Avenue from Military Trial to Jog/Carter Road as a 6 lane section plus the
appropriate paved tapers ... ."199 Because of this indefinite delay in
being able to begin his project, the landowner sued for inverse condemna-
tion.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted, in a per curiam opin-
ion,2"" that some uses did not require a building permit, so this moratori-
um on building permits had not deprived this landowner of all use of his
land. At most, there was only a temporary taking, but the extent of that
taking would still be subject to speculation. The County's decision,
although technically final after the County Commission vote, was still
subject to alteration, variance, or modification and the landowner had made
no effort to persuade the board to alter its decision nor any alternative
196. Associate Judges Cobb and Peterson concurred.
197. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So. 2d at 1388. These might amount to temporary
takings and a basis for a successful claim under title 42, § 1983, of the United States Code,
but the court was careful not to issue any advisory opinions on those possibilities.
198. 641 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
199. Id. at 524.
200. Judge Gunther, Judge Stevenson, and Associate Judge Mickle concurred.
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proposals which might have convinced the County to lift the moratorium.
"Ripeness requires a firm delineation of permitted uses so that the extent of
the taking can be analyzed."2 1 Therefore, the inverse condemnation claim
was not ripe.
The Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act,202
which becomes effective on October 1, 1995, may turn out to be the most
important piece of legislation this session and possibly this decade. The
legislature has provided a remedy for situations which do not amount to a
taking under existing state or federal law, 3 but in which a landowner has
been "inordinately burdened" by the action of the State of Florida, one of
its agencies, or one of its political subdivisions. 4 An "inordinate burden"
is defined as a direct restriction or limit of an existing use or vested right so
that landowner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-
backed expectation in a way that is disproportionate in comparison to the
burden on others." 5 The Act provides the procedures to be followed by
a property owner in making a claim,2 6 allows settlements, and provides
for attorney's fees and costs.207
X. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Davey Compressor Co. v. City of Delray Beach."8 Davey Compres-
sor was sued by the City of Delray Beach for trespass, negligence, private
nuisance, and strict liability, after Davey Compressor's chemical dumping
at its worksite contaminated some of the City's wellfields. The jury
awarded the City $3,097,488 for past damages plus $5,600,000 for estimated
future response costs. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the past
damages award but reversed on the future damages.2" The issue before
the court was whether the award for future restoration costs should be
limited to a maximum equal to the value of the property.10
201. 641 So. 2d at 526.
202. Ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1311 (West).
203. Id. § 1(1), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1311.
204. Id. § 1(3)(c), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1312.
205. Id. § l(3)(e), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1312.
206. Id. § 1(4), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1312.
207. Ch. 95-181, § 1(6)(c)(3), Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1311, 1314 (West).
208. 613 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 626 So. 2d 204 (Fla.), and
decision approved, 639 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1994).
209. Id. at 63.
210. Id. at 61.
1995]
293
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
The court discussed the "restoration" rule, which states that damages
for the wrongful injury of property are measured either by the diminution
in value or the costs of repairing or restoring the property to its prior
condition, whichever is less.21 This rule does not allow restoration costs
to be the measure of damages when this amount exceeds the value of the
property. The rationale for the rule is to prevent overcompensation of
plaintiffs.212
The court ruled here that the negligible risk of overcompensation did
not justify limiting the City's damages to the value of its wellfields. 213
Therefore, defendants held liable for environmental torts involving
government property may have to pay full restoration costs, even if this
amount exceeds the value of the property. In a secondary issue of whether
the City was the proper party to bring the suit, the court ruled in favor of
the City. Although the state owns natural resources such as groundwater,
the City has standing because it has the duty to supply safe drinking water
to the residents.214
Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. v. Board of County
Commissioners.215 This case came to the Supreme Court of Florida on a
certified question from the United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh
Circuit.21 6 The question certified was:
UNDER EXISTING FLORIDA LAW, NOT LIMITED TO THE
STATE'S EPA-APPROVED UNDERGROUND INJECTION CON-
TROL PROGRAM, WHERE A HOLDER OF AN EXPLORATORY
WELL CONSTRUCTION AND TESTING PERMIT HAS MADE A
TIMELY APPLICATION FOR AN INJECTION WELL OPERATING
PERMIT, DOES THE CONSTRUCTION AND TESTING PERMIT
CONTINUE IN EFFECT PAST ITS EXPIRATION DATE UNTIL
THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION HAS ACTED ON THE PENDING APPLICATION?217
The Board of Commissioners of Brevard County had applied for an
exploratory well construction and testing permit for testing at the Indian
River. The County wanted to use the well for treated sewage disposal, with
211. Davey Compressor Co., 639 So. 2d at 596.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 642 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1994).
216. 10 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1994).
217. Id. at 1584-85; 642 So. 2d at 1081-82.
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a plan to inject the treated sewage underground. The County later filed a
timely application for an operating permit. While the application was
pending approval, the County was given verbal approval to begin using the
well for sewage disposal. The Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation
challenged such use in federal court, arguing the County was operating the
well without having been formally granted the operating permit. The
County argued that its timely application for the operating permit operated
to continue its now expired permit for construction and testing, and that this
permit allows for operation incident to testing.28
The Supreme Court of Florida held that such renewal of the construc-
tion and testing permit would only be valid for construction and testing, and
not for a new and different function, which is operation. The two types of
permits are different for a reason, and the applicable law, section 120.60(6)
of the Florida Statutes, as well as Florida Administrative Code, section
17-4.090(1), cannot be construed to extend the expiration date of a
construction and testing permit when an application for an operating permit
has been submitted.219
XI. EQUITY
Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enterprises.' Nachon filed an action in
county court to foreclose a construction lien. The landowner filed an action
in circuit court challenging the county court's jurisdiction. The circuit court
discharged the lien on the theory that by statute lien foreclosure actions must
be brought in circuit court.221 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed
and its opinion was affrmned by the Supreme Court of-Florida.22
It had long been established that a lien foreclosure is an action in
equity. Florida Statutes, section 34.01(4), provides that: "[j]udges of
county courts may hear all matters in equity involved in any case within the
jurisdictional amount of the county court, except as otherwise restricted by
the State Constitution or the laws of Florida."'  Under this section, it
appears that the lien foreclosure was properly commenced in county court
if the amount did not exceed the jurisdictional amount. However, Florida
218. Legal EnvtL Assistance Found., Inc., 642 So. 2d at 1082.
219. Id. at 1084.
220. 615 So. 2d 245 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla.
1993), and decision approved, 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
221. Id. at 862-63.
222. Id. at 247.
223. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(4) (1993).
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Statutes, section 26.012(2)(g), provides that circuit courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction "[i]n all actions involving the title and boundaries of
real property.' 'z The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that foreclo-
sure of a lien on real estate did involve the title and, therefore, fit within this
exclusive jurisdiction.225 So there appeared to be a conflict in the statutes
for which the constitution did not provide a solution.
The supreme court looked to the legislative history and invoked the
plain meaning approach to statutory construction, but it solved the dilemma
by holding that the 1990 amendment to section 34.01(4) impliedly amended
the inconsistent provisions of the earlier statute, section 26.012. The court
concluded that, "the legislature intended to provide concurrent equity
jurisdiction in circuit and county courts, except that equity cases filed in
county courts must fall within the county court's monetary jurisdiction, as
set by statute. 226 It went on to decide that satisfaction of the monetary
limits would be determined in a lien foreclosure by reference to the debt,
not the value of the property subject to the lien.
Justice Shaw, considering the unsigned majority opinion227 to be
"badly flawed in parts," 228 wrote an opinion concurring in the result, but
challenging the conclusion that a lien foreclosure involves the "title and
boundaries" of real property as required by section 26.012(2)(g). 229 The
conjunction "and" convinced him that both title and boundaries must be the
subject of the action to fit within this section, but this lien foreclosure
involved only title. Consequently, he would have preferred the supreme
court to conclude that the lien foreclosure was properly filed in the county
court because there was no conflicting statute giving exclusive original
jurisdiction over this case to the circuit court.
The supreme court had thus finally settled the confusion over the
foreclosure jurisdiction of the county court. Subsequent buyers and title
insurers, who were in grave danger because they had a county court
foreclosure in their chain of title, can breathe a sigh of relief. The next
case, Sea Breeze, Video, Inc. v. Federico,230 illustrates how this will be
224. Id. § 26.012(2)(g).
225. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 862.
226. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1) (Supp. 1990) (stating the necessary monetary
amounts).
227. Chief Justice Grimes, Senior Justice McDonald, and Justices Overton, Harding, and
Kogan concurred in the per curiam opinion. Justice Shaw concurred in the result only.
228. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 862.
229. Id.
230. 648 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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applied to an injunction action. Still unanswered, however, is how this
might translate into county court jurisdiction to hear quiet title actions.
Apparently the county court would have jurisdiction because such actions
would involve title or boundaries if the jurisdictional amount can be
determined. How that would be done remains uncertain. Furthermore, it is
worth noting that there is an Article V Task Force in existence which is
expected to issue a report in December of 1995, and may spur further
changes.
Sea Breeze, Video, Inc. v. Federico.23' Sea Breeze sued Pinellas
County in circuit court requesting a declaration that certain county
ordinances were invalid and an injunction against their enforcement. The
complaint alleged subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court based on
value of the business property exceeding $15,000. Sea Breeze sought
review by mandamus of the circuit court's sua sponte transfer of the action
to the county court. Although the petitioners conceded that county courts
now have equitable jurisdiction, they argued that the new concurrent
jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive relief. The respondents challenged
the basis for the amount in controversy.
The Second District Court of Appeal held that county courts can now
issue injunctions, under the reasoning of Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enterpris-
es, Inc. 232 in which the supreme court held that the county and circuit
courts have concurrent jurisdiction in equity over lien foreclosures. The
district court stated that:
[t]he circuit court's exclusive jurisdiction is invoked by a good
faith allegation that the amount in controversy is within the jurisdiction-
al amount. Where an action for declaratory and injunctive relief does
not reach the threshold jurisdictional amount of the circuit court, a
plaintiff may choose either court, each court having concurrent
jurisdiction. 33
Because the petitioners alleged the amount in controversy to be more than
$15,000, the action should not have been transferred.
The court did not specifically address the issue of whether the amount
in controversy in a declaratory and injunctive relief action is based on the
value of the property involved, as alleged by the petitioners. However, in
a footnote, the court did mention that federal diversity cases involving such
231. Id.
232. 641 So. 2d at 858.
233. Sea Breeze, Video, Inc., 648 So. 2d at 228 (citations omitted).
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relief have based amounts in controversy on the value of the right sought to
be protected, the value of the right to be free of the particular regulation, not
the entire value of the business.234
Koschler v. Dean.235 On March 1, 1966, a warranty deed dated
February 28, 1966 was recorded in the public records conveying the
property at issue to "William H. Dean and Mary Dean, his wife." William
and Mary were divorced at that time. On June 21, 1966, they remarried and
remained legally married until William's death in 1990, but they did not live
together. Only William lived on the property. Mary lived with another
man, acting and holding herself out to be his wife. After William died,
Mary and the man with whom she lived gave a mortgage to the Koschlers.
The person who conducted the title search concluded from the record that
title to the property vested in Mary as the surviving spouse of William.
Mary and her boyfriend executed an affidavit stating that no one else had
a legal or equitable interest in the property.
Meanwhile, unknown to the Koschlers, the personal representative of
her late husband had begun an adversary proceeding in the probate division
of the circuit court against Mary, challenging her interest in the property and
seeking a declaration that she was not entitled to participate in William's
estate as an heir. On the day before the closing of the mortgage transaction,
the personal representative filed a notice of lis pendens against the property
in the probate division of the circuit court. However, he did not record the
notice of lis pendens in the official county records after obtaining a judg-
ment divesting Mary of any interest in this property.
The personal representative sought, obtained, and brought this quiet title
judgment against the mortgagees. The trial court held that the Koschlers
were not "bona fide mortgagees for value" because if they had searched in
the public records for the name of Mary's boyfriend, they would have found
an affidavit falsely claiming that Mary was married to her boyfriend. The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that this was not in the
chain title to this property and did not have any bearing on the title.236
The Koschlers were entitled to rely on the chain of title found in the official
records unless they had actual knowledge of an adverse unrecorded right.
The court stated that the fault lies with the personal representative for failing
to record the notice of lis pendens in the public records at the time he began
the litigation.237 Merely filing the documents in the probate division of
234. Id. at 228 n.4.
235. 642 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
236. Id. at 1121.
237. Id.
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the court does not constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers of
real property, so they take without constructive notice.
XII. FORECLOSURE
A.J. Stanton, Jr., P.A. v. Ivey.238 Stanton filed a mortgage foreclosure
action against Ivey based on a $10,000 note and mortgage executed by Ivey
in settlement of an attorney's fee dispute. Ivey had defaulted on the
mortgage payments but asserted the defense of unclean hands, contending
that he was not aware that Stanton had represented other clients with
interests conflicting with his, thereby breaching his fiduciary duty.239
The trial court submitted the equitable issue of unclean hands to the
jury. The Fifth District Court of Appeal saw this as a potential error,
although judges can sometimes use advisory juries for guidance in equitable
matters. However, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's judgment in favor of Ivey based on other grounds. The evidence to
support a finding of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Stanton was
sufficient to avoid enforcement of the mortgage. The mortgage and note
arose from a fee dispute regarding Stanton's representation of Ivey in a
divorce, and Stanton was unaware at the time he represented Ivey that those
other clients in question had conflicting interests from prior dealings with
Ivey.24
0
A Mortgage Co. v. Bowman.24 This case involved the foreclosure
of a VA mortgage. The foreclosure sale was set for July 8, 1993, but could
not be held on that date because the bidding instructions could not be
obtained from the VA in time. Section 3701 of the United States Code, and
those that follow thereafter, require that bidding instructions be obtained
from the VA before a foreclosure sale can occur. Otherwise, the VA can
refuse to guarantee the loan. Because of the delay in issuing the instruc-
tions, the lender moved to reschedule the sale. The request was denied
without explanation. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that such
refusal was an abuse of discretion, and reversed and remanded.242
Amos Fowler & Amylene, Inc. v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n.243 Amylene, Inc. and its president, Mr. Fowler, appealed a final
238. 645 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
239. Id. at 1051.
240. Id.
241. 642 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
242. Id. at 124.
243. 643 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of First Federal. The appellants
executed a note and mortgage to the lender in 1977, for $275,000 at ten
percent interest. The purpose of the loan was to refinance a mortgage held
on a sixty-five unit motel complex. The lender later approved Fowler's plan
to convert the motel into a condominium, and Fowler began to sell the units
subject to the mortgage. In 1985, the appellants stopped paying the
mortgage, and the lender accelerated the loan and foreclosed. In July of
1985, the court appointed a receiver at the request of the lender.2"
In 1992, after a one-day trial, the trial court entered final judgment of
foreclosure in favor of the lender, in the amount of $606,449.51, well in
excess of the original loan amount. This amount included $233,345.97 in
unpaid principal, $243,556,84 in interest from December of 1984 until the
date of the judgment on a per diem basis, $17,140.14 in late charges,
$62,406.56 as costs, and $50,000 as attorney fees.245
The mortgage had a paragraph providing for interest to accrue on
expenses the lender incurs to protect its interest when the borrower fails to
perform the covenants and agreements contained in the mortgage. On
appeal, the court held that this provision in the mortgage justified the
disputed interest charges. 46 However, the appellate court reversed and
remanded on the award of interest because the per diem was based on 360
and not 365 days per year, and it was not clear whether it was based on
simple or compound interest. 47 Additionally, the court reversed the award
of late charges because it should not have included charges for each month
after acceleration.248 The lender is only entitled to late charges accrued
up until acceleration of the note. Similarly, the court reversed the $50,000
attorney fee award because it lacked competent, substantial evidence of both
the services performed and the reasonable value of such services.249
Apparently there was no transcript of the hearing on attorney fees.
Batchin v. Barnett Bank of Southwest Florida.zS  Mr. Batchin was
the deceased mortgagor's heir. Barnett began foreclosure of the deceased's
mortgage and attempted to serve the decedent, apparently unaware that he
had died. Mr. Batchin advised the process server that his father, the
mortgagor, was deceased. The return of service stated this. The bank
244. Id. at 32.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 32-33.
247. Id. at 33.
248. Amos Fowler & Amylene, Inc., 643 So. 2d at 33.
249. Id.
250. 647 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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subsequently served Mr. Batchin with a notice of deposition, at which he
testified that he was the sole beneficiary under the decedent's will, and that
the will had not yet been probated.
Despite this and other communications between Mr. Batchin and the
bank through its attorneys, the bank's attorneys later attempted service by
publication, and changed the name of the defendant in the foreclosure from
the decedent to the decedent and all parties claiming interests by, through,
under or against the decedent. Notice was published, and when no one
responded, the court appointed a guardian ad litem, who filed an answer on
behalf of the decedent. Final summary judgment was entered, and the
property was sold to an individual.
Mr. Batchin then sought to enjoin the issuance of a certificate of title
to the property, seeking a declaration that he was the owner of the equity of
redemption, either as the heir under the will or under intestate succession.
The court initially granted a temporary injunction but later vacated it.25'
On appeal, the court held that service by publication was improper here
because there had not been a diligent search for interested parties, especially
since the same law firm had deposed the one interested party.252 Because
there had been no valid service of process, the foreclosure judgment was
entered without authority. The court mentioned but left unresolved whether
the judgment would be void or voidable.25 3 The court said such a deter-
mination would be relevant when determining the rights of the purchaser at
foreclosure sale.2" However, the court noted that the purchaser in this
case was not a bona fide purchaser because she had actual notice of Mr.
Batchin's claim to the property one day before the certificate of title was to
issue.255 The bank would have to reforeclose and personally serve Mr.
Batchin, or if unable to do so, file a more complete affidavit of diligent
search. 6
BSL Investors, II v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n.257 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal reversed a partial summary judgment entered in
favor of the lender, holding the individual general partners of BSL Investors
jointly and severally liable in the amount of $847,155.74.258 Downey
251. Id. at 213.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Batchin, 647 So. 2d at 213.
256. Id.
257. 649 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
258. Id. at 332.
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Savings brought an action to foreclose the appellants' property, the Colony
Plaza Hotel. The lender moved for summary judgment, and a hearing was
set for October 7, 1993. On that date, in open court, the lender filed an
"Emergency Motion for Turnover of Property to Receiver," claiming that
BSL and its general partners had been siphoning the hotel "rents" during the
eighteen months since the foreclosure action was commenced. The trial
court entered summary judgment against BSL Investors and granted
Downey's Motion for Turnover of Property in the amount of $847,155.74.
Next, the court entered the disputed partial summary judgment holding the
general partners jointly and severally liable for that amount, and authorized
259a writ of execution.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellants that the
partial summary judgment should not have been granted because the lender
never moved for such action and the procedure followed by the lender in
obtaining the judgment was "so thoroughly defective as to constitute a
denial of due process.""r
County Collection Services, Inc. v. Allen. 61  County Collection
Services brought a lien foreclosure action. However, the circuit court,
having first granted summary judgment for the Collection Service, ultimately
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the amount
in controversy to be within the county court's jurisdictional amount.262
The subject lien arose from the property owner Allen's violation of the
Palm Beach Zoning Code, resulting in a fine of $75 per day. The claim of
lien was recorded on March 12, 1990 after the fines totaled $9900. On
March 12, 1990, the jurisdictional amount in controversy limit for the
county courts was $5000.263 The relevant section of the Florida Statutes,
section 34.01(1)(c), was amended in 1990 to provide for the increased
amount in controversy currently in place for the county courts. The
amended statute provides that the county court has subject matter jurisdic-
tion "[a]s to causes of action accruing ... [o]n or after July 1, 1990 ... at
law in which the matter in controversy does not exceed the sum of $10,000,
exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney's fees, except those within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit courts."2" The statute provides for a
further increase of subject matter jurisdiction for causes of action accruing
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 650 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
262. Id. at 650.
263. Id.
264. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1)(c)3 (1993).
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on or after July 1, 1992, where the amount in controversy does not exceed
$15,000, the current jurisdictional limit of the county courts.265
Because the jurisdictional limit was $5000 at the time that the claim of
lien was filed, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the $9900
action was clearly not within the county court's jurisdiction, and should not
have been dismissed by the circuit court.2  The Fourth District Court of
Appeal noted further that Florida Statutes, section 162.09(3), provides for
continued accrual of the fine until judgment is rendered, so that the current
amount of the lien would be well within the circuit court's jurisdiction.267
The court made no mention of the provision in section 34.01(1)(b) of
the Florida Statutes which states that the county courts have original
jurisdiction "[o]f all violations of municipal and county ordinances.... ,268
This provision seems to support the circuit court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. This was, after all, an action based on the
violation of the Palm Beach County Zoning Code.
Although the action arose from violations of county ordinances, it was
a foreclosure action. Foreclosure actions are in equity, and equitable
jurisdiction was, at the time that the cause of action accrued, exclusively
within the circuit courts. This seems to support the Fourth District Court of
Appeal's holding that the action belonged in the circuit court, but the Fourth
District Court of Appeal made no mention of this. It seems as though the
court intentionally avoided any mention of equitable jurisdiction in its
269
opinion.
It was as recent as September 9, 1994 that the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the county and circuit courts had concurrent jurisdiction in
equity, in a decision which involved the jurisdictional statutes as amended
effective October 1, 1990, after the cause of action had accrued in this
case 7  Therefore, the recent holding that the two courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, if applied retroactively, would have affected the disposition of
this action.
Dvorak v. First Family Bank. 1 First Family Bank foreclosed the
Dvorak's mortgage, but two hours before the commencement of the
foreclosure sale, the Dvorak's filed a Chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy.
265. Id.
266. County Collection Servs., 650 So. 2d at 650.
267. Id.
268. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(1)0,).
269. Id.
270. Alexdex, 641 So. 2d at 858.
271. 639 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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The bankruptcy was later converted to Chapter 7. Two years later, the
bankruptcy trustee conveyed the mortgaged property to the Bank for $6000,
the amount of equity that the Dvoraks had in the property. The bank then
filed a motion in state court to amend its prior foreclosure judgment,
requesting a new sale date and adding more attorney's fees and interest to
the judgment amount.
The issue was one of first impression: whether a bank which purchases
the mortgaged property from the debtor as part of the debtor's bankruptcy
liquidation can subsequently continue its former foreclosure action and add
the attorney's fees incurred due to the bankruptcy.272
The Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled en banc that attorney's fees for
work before the bankruptcy court must be sought in the bankruptcy action
against the appropriate fund being held in that court, as stated in title 11,
section 506(b), of the United States Code. Failure to collect the fees
through the bankruptcy action when the creditor's claim is oversecured, such
as when there is money available for payment of fees, results in waiver of
the fees. Because the claim was oversecured, the bank's failure to collect
the fees through the bankruptcy action was held to constitute a waiver of the
fees.273 The court, in a footnote, however, commented that in certain
circumstances, a state court has the power to award attorney's fees for a
274bankruptcy action.
As footnote four mentions, it is also apparent that the bank, by
purchasing the property from the trustee, discharged the Dvoraks. 75 The
court stated that merger did not occur because of an anti-merger clause in
the deed from the trustee. However, the purchase operated as a deed in lieu
of foreclosure. Thus, the bank now owned the property subject to its own
mortgage. It could foreclose itself to eliminate junior lienors, but it could
not seek a deficiency against the original mortgagors.276
First Union National Bank of Florida v. Goodwin Beach Partner-
ship.277 First Union appealed a denial of a deficiency judgment because
the trial court determined that the fair market value of the property exceeded
the judgment at the time of the foreclosure sale. The final judgment amount
was $4,986,487. First Union purchased the property at the foreclosure sale
for the nominal sum of $1000 and moved for entry of a deficiency
272. Id. at 1077.
273. Id. at 1079.
274. Id. at 1079 n.8.
275. Id. at 1077.
276. Dvorak, 639 So. 2d at 1077.
277. 644 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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judgment. While still in the deficiency proceedings, First Union sold the
property for $2.5 million. First Union used this sale amount, in addition to
the tax assessed value of $3,106,500 and an appraisal using the income
approach giving a value of $2.18 million, in support of its deficiency
argument.2
78
Goodwin presented its own experts who arrived at values in the $5
million range using the comparable sales approach. The trial court declined
to award a deficiency judgment, and specifically rejected any consideration
of $124,953 in unpaid real estate taxes due as of the date of foreclosure sale,
on res judicata grounds. The judge ruled that the unpaid taxes should have
been included in the final judgment of foreclosure.279
The Fifth District Court of Appeal found this to be error.28  Res
judicata applies when there are two actions. Here, the deficiency was
sought by motion within the same foreclosure action. "Section 702.06,
Florida Statutes, authorizes entry of a deficiency decree, should a deficiency
exist, in all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages.""2  Therefore, the
delinquent taxes should have been considered in arriving at the fair market
value for determining the deficiency.
82
According to the lengthy dissent by Judge Sharp, this decision is in
conflict with Home v. Smith2 3 and Consales, N.V. v. Sunshine State
Mortgage Co.2  Judge Sharp argued that even though claiming the
unpaid taxes as part of the deficiency decree might not be barred by res
judicata because the deficiency was sought within the same action, it should
be barred because it was sought after the mortgagee became the owner of
the property at the foreclosure sale. This proposition seems to be supported
by the doctrine of merger and the Statute of Quia Emptores. First Union
could have amended its foreclosure judgment to include the delinquent
taxes, but failed to do so.285
Ginsberg v. Lennar Florida Holdings, Inc.2 6 Appellant Ginsberg is
the owner and operator of a property management firm. He is also the
general partner of two limited partnerships which own apartment complexes
278. Id. at 1361.
279. Id. at 1362.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. First Union Nat'l Bank, 644 So. 2d at 1362.
283. 368 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
284. 639 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
285. First Union Nat'l Bank, 644 So. 2d at 1367.
286. 645 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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located in Broward County, Florida. The apartment complexes were
managed by the appellant's property management firm. In 1988 both of the
partnerships gave mortgages on the apartment complexes to Amerifirst. In
1991, the Resolution Trust Company ("RTC") acquired the mortgages as
part of the liquidation of Amerifirst.
The appellees purchased the appellant's mortgages from the RTC after
the RTC had already commenced foreclosure proceedings against the
appellant, who had defaulted. Lennar subsequently obtained a foreclosure
judgment and scheduled a foreclosure sale for January of 1993. The sale
was stayed after the two limited partnerships sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In March of 1993, Lennar filed a five-count complaint against
Ginsberg. The counts consisted of conversion, waste, civil theft, violation
of Florida's RICO statute, and violation of section 772.103(4) of the Florida
Statutes, a conspiracy count. The counts related to Ginsberg and his
management company's wrongful diversion of rents to Ginsberg's personal
use. The loan documents gave Lennar a right to the rents from the
apartment buildings. Ginsberg used delay tactics in responding to the
complaint, and Lennar finally obtained a default judgment in August of
1993, after four tries. In January of 1994, Ginsberg moved to vacate the
default judgment, arguing excusable neglect. The motion was denied and
Ginsberg appealed.8 7
The Third District Court of Appeal rejected the excusable neglect
argument, but vacated the default judgment on other grounds. 8  The
court held that the complaint failed to set forth a viable cause of action and
could not support a judgment even by default.289 The reason for this was
that the relationship between the parties was explicitly expressed in the loan
documents, making the claims purely contractual in nature: "breach of
contractual terms may not form the basis for a claim in tort. Where
damages sought in tort are the same as those for breach of contract a
plaintiff may not circumvent the contractual relationship by bringing an
action in tort."29  The court cited cases supporting the principle that
purely economic losses are not recoverable in tort. This negated any claim
for conversion, civil theft, and RICO. Lennar could not sue for waste
because "[w]here the cause of action arises out of an injury to property, that
action is personal to the owner of the property and a party who subsequently
287. Id. at 493.
288. Id. at 502.
289. Id. at 494.
290 Id.
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takes title to the property, without receiving an assignment of that cause of
action, may not pursue that cause of action. '29' The assignment of
mortgage was silent regarding any waste cause of action held by the RTC.
Furthermore, waste is a valid cause of action only when the property is
rendered less valuable than the outstanding debt. There was no evidence of
such impairment of security.2 2
Additionally, the court held that section 697.07, the assignment of rents
provision, applies retroactively to the date of default.293 The court,
however, disagreed with Lennar's claim that under 697.07(3) the parties
have the power to contract away their right to a written demand for the
rents.294 According to the court, a written demand for the rents is still a
prerequisite. Furthermore, section 697.07 creates a lien for the rents after
the written demand is made; the lien must be foreclosed before any right to
possession of the rents arises. Therefore, Lennar had no right to the rents
immediately upon default. The only action Lennar had the immediate right
to bring was to pursue its remedies under the loan documents. Because
Lennar had no possessory right to the rents, Ginsberg, the rightful possessor,
could not steal them. Therefore, the theft, RICO, and conspiracy counts
failed.295
Levine v. FDIC.296 The Levines appealed a circuit court judgment
holding that the FDIC, under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), could repudiate the deed in lieu of
foreclosure agreement entered into by the Levines and their now insolvent
and liquidated lender, First American Bank & Trust. The deed in lieu
agreement covering three properties was very beneficial to the Levines. It
allowed them to set the minimum prices for the lender's sale of the
properties and provided that the Levines would potentially receive $500,000
from the sales proceeds of the three properties. The agreement also allowed
the Levines to live rent free in one of the properties until sold. In May of
1988, First American sold two of the lots but refused to pay the Levines
their share of the proceeds as agreed to in the deed in lieu agreement. The
Levines sued.2
97
291. Ginsberg, 645 So. 2d at 496.
292. Id. at 500.
293. Id. at 497.
294. Id. at 498.
295. Id. at 501-02.
296. 651 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
297. Id. at 135.
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First American was declared insolvent on December 15, 1989 and the
FDIC was appointed receiver. The FDIC then notified the Levines that it
was repudiating the 1987 agreement pursuant to section 1821(e) of FIRREA.
The circuit court held that the repudiation provision, which became effective
on August 9, 1989, nearly a year and a half after the deed in lieu agreement
was executed, applied retroactively. This was the issue upon which the
Levines based their appeal.298
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute
did not apply retroactively. 299 The court noted the tension between the
two possible approaches, one being the presumption against retroactivity,
and the other being the maxim that courts must apply the law in effect when
a decision is rendered.3" The decision was based on the Supreme Court
of the United States' recent clarification of the conflict in Landgraf v. USI
Filn Products.30 1 In Landgraf, the Court provided an analytical frame-
work for determining whether a federal statute can be applied retroactively.
First, the statute's legislative history is analyzed to determine whether
Congress has stated the proper scope of application. If not, the statute must
be analyzed to determine whether it will have "genuinely retroactive effect,"
such as impairing rights possessed when the party acted, increasing liability
for past acts, or imposing new duties with regard to completed transactions.
If so, a presumption against retroactivity applies.
In this case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal applied the above
analysis, finding no congressional statement of the statute's proper scope,
and then finding that the statute did have truly retroactive effect because it
impaired the Levine's contract rights. Therefore, the court held that the
presumption against retroactive effect applied.3"
Morgan v. Kelly.30 3 Morgan appealed a post-foreclosure deficiency
judgment, claiming the trial court erred in entering a judgment for less than
the amount due. Morgan was the foreclosing mortgagee, and obtained a
foreclosure judgment of $387,087.28. He purchased the property at sale for
$100,000. The court determined fair market value to be $215,000. The trial
court determined the deficiency by subtracting the sales price from the fair
market value, arriving at the judgment amount of $115,000. The Third
298. Id.
299. Id. at 138.
300. Id. at 136.
301. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
302. Levine, 651 So. 2d at 137.
303. 642 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court applied an
incorrect formula for arriving at the deficiency judgment.30
The correct formula for determining a deficiency judgment is the total
debt, as secured by the final judgment of foreclosure (here, $387,087.28)
minus the fair market value of the property as determined by the court.3 5
Although the court has discretion in determining deficiency judgments, a
departure from the above formula must be supported by a statement of legal
or equitable justification. Otherwise, it is an abuse of discretion."°
Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n v. Brooks.31 This case involved
the foreclosure of a condominium association's lien for unpaid association
dues. The lien amount was under $15,000 and the action was originally
brought in the circuit court. The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed,
holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that the
county court had exclusive jurisdiction in equity to hear the foreclosure."
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Third District Court of Appeal's
decision based on the recent holding in Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon3°9 that
the county and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction in equity.
XIII. HISTORIC PRESERVATION
Metropolitan Dade County v. P.J. Birds, Inc.3" Metro-Dade peti-
tioned for a writ of certiorari to quash the circuit court's order which
overturned the designation of part of Parrot Jungle in Miami as a historic
site. The County, by local ordinance in 1990, declared a twelve-acre portion
of Parrot Jungle a historic site because the property had achieved exception-
al significance for over fifty years. The ordinance provides that generally
properties must achieve significance during a period of over fifty years in
order to be considered historic sites. This is known as the over fifty rule.
Parrot Jungle qualified through the above described rule as well as through
the exceptional significance exception which allowed a property to be
considered if it has not been significant for over fifty years, but its
significance has been exceptional. The County used this dual rationale
304. Id. at 1117-18.
305. Id. at 1117.
306. Id. at 1118.
307. 649 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1995), on remand, 656 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
308. Brooks v. Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 625 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
309. 641 So. 2d 858 (1994).
310. 654 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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because it was uncertain as to which justification was necessary because the
property had been in existence for over fifty years but significant structures
had been built within the last fifty years. 1
The owner of Parrot Jungle contested the County's determination,
arguing that the standard of "exceptional importance" was undefined and
that his procedural due process rights were violated.312 The court dis-
agreed, overlooking the fact that the County had based its designation on
both alternatives (the over fifty rule and the under fifty exception) so that
a lack of clarity in the "exceptional importance" standard would not be
dispositive." 3 Furthermore, the standard was not vague because there
were prior administrative law cases setting out recognized professional
criteria for interpreting "exceptional importance." Besides, it is a determina-
tion which must be made on a case-by-case basis.3"4 Judge Barkdull
dissented, arguing that the court should have denied review.315
XIV. HOMESTEAD
King v. Ellison.316 The Supreme Court of Florida answered the
following certified question in the negative:
WHETHER SECTION 732.401(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1991),
WHICH VESTS A REMAINDER INTEREST IN HOMESTEAD
PROPERTY IN LINEAL DESCENDANTS, IS UNCONSTITUTION-
AL WHEN APPLIED TO DEFEAT A TESTATOR'S INTENT TO
DEVISE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY EQUALLY TO ADULT
STEPCHILDREN AS WELL AS ADULT LINEAL DESCEN-
DANTS? 317
In so doing, the court found no conflict between section 732.401(1) and
article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution.318
Florence and Hubert Calhoun, a married couple each with children
from prior marriages, purchased property in Indian River County. They
both drew up their own wills, in which they bequeathed their entire estates
311. Id. at 173-74.
312. Id. at 172.
313. Id. at 175.
314. Id. at 178.
315. P.J. Birds, 654 So. 2d at 181 (Barkdull, J., dissenting).
316. 648 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1994).
317. Id. at 667.
318. Id. at 668.
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to each other. The wills each contained a provision that the one who lived
longest would pass his property to the children and stepchildren. When
Florence died, Hubert married Rosemarie, establishing homestead in the
Indian River property. Hubert died two years later, leaving Rosemary as the
surviving spouse. Because there was a surviving spouse and a homestead,
and because article X, section 4(c), of the constitution does not allow
homestead to be devised when the owner is survived by a spouse, the devise
in the will was invalid. Section 732.401(1) governs the requirement that the
surviving spouse receive a life estate in the homestead with a vested
remainder going to the decedent's lineal descendants. In response to the
stepchildren's claim that the statute constitutes an improper and unconstitu-
tional restraint on alienation, the court responded that the statute does not
restrict the right to devise homestead property, but merely states how
homestead property will descend if it is not devised as permitted by the
Florida Statutes or the constitution.319  The constitutional provision
restricts the right to devise homestead.3 20
Miami Country Day School v. Bakst.32" ' The school obtained a money
judgment against the Baksts for failure to pay tuition, and sought to enforce
the judgment against the Baksts' residence, a houseboat. The trial court
held that the houseboat qualified as homestead pursuant to article X, section
4, of the Florida Constitution, and section 222.05 of the Florida Stat-
utes.2 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.3" The court
restated that the homestead provision is to be broadly construed as a matter
of public policy. Thus, a "dwelling house," as used (but not defined) in
section 222.05, is now extended past the inclusion of mobile homes to
houseboats.324
XV. INSURANCE
Preferred Mutual Insurance Co. v. Martinez." Preferred issued a
homeowner's policy to the Martinezes who subsequently filed a claim after
Hurricane Andrew. The parties disagreed on the amount of the claim, and
the Martinezes sued, arguing that Preferred failed to offer them the full
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. 641 So. 2d467 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
1995).
322. Id. at 468.
323. Id. at 470.
324. Id. at 469.
325. 643 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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replacement value of their home. The policy stated that in the event of such
a dispute, either party could demand an appraisal. The insurance company
made such demand, but the trial court denied it, holding that the insurance
company had waived this right by not demanding appraisal earlier in the
negotiations. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for
entry of an order compelling appraisal.326 The court held that such
appraisal provisions, like arbitration clauses, are deemed to be conditions
precedent to recovery under the insurance policies.327
XVI. LAND USE PLANNING
Equity Resources, Inc. v. County of Leon.328 Leon County adopted
an ordinance to insure that property owners' vested rights would not be lost
by operation of the County's adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Land Use
Plan. Equity resources owned forty-seven acres: ten acres had already been
developed; on thirty acres, permits for development had been issued and
construction of multifamily housing had begun when the permits were
revoked due to down-zoning; 329 and the remaining land was zoned
commercial. Equity Resources and Richard Pelham, Equity's president and
one of its co-owners, applied for a determination that their development
rights had vested; however, the application was denied. Equity Resources
then petitioned the circuit court for certiorari which was also denied. The
First District Court granted certiorari and, in an extensive and well-reasoned
opinion written by Chief Judge Zehmer,330 the decision of the trial court
was quashed.
The focus of the opinion was on "whether the trial court observed the
essential requirements of the law in ruling on the petition. '331 The
ordinance, recognized equitable estoppel as a basis for granting a vested
rights determination. Equitable estoppel based upon the actions of a zoning
authority has the following elements: 1) a property owner's good faith
reliance, 2) on some act or omission of the government, and 3) a substantial
change in position or the incurring of excessive obligations and expenses so
326. Id. at 1103.
327. Id.
328. 643 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1194
(Fla. 1995).
329. Note that the down-zoning occured prior to the adoption of the plan. This has led
to litigation in federal court. See Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Lake County, 796 F. Supp.
1477 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
330. Judge Miner and Senior Judge Smith concurred.
331. Equity Resources, Inc., 643 So. 2d at 1117.
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that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he
acquired.332 The trial court erred by confusing these elements with the
requirements of standing. The trial court had concluded that Equity
Resources lacked standing because Pelham, not Equity Resources, was the
one who had relied upon the government's position. Further, Pelham lacked
standing because Equity Resources was now the owner. Pelham, as an
indirect owner of the property, did have standing. Equity Resources, as a
vehicle created and controlled by Pelham to invoke estoppel based upon
Pelham's acts of reliance which a stranger successor would not.
The trial court had also ruled against the petitioners because "'there is
no evidence they incurred expenses exclusively for the undeveloped portion
of the property, because the expenditures were not made in reliance on any
promise by the County and because the [Petitioners] waited far too long to
complete the project.' ' '333 The district court found that there was "no basis
in law for this ruling."3' There is no requirement that the claimant have
incurred expenses exclusively for one particular piece of land; there is no
requirement that the County have made any promise; and there is no
requirement that development have been commenced within any particular
time or a reasonable time.335 The case was remanded to the trial court
with directions to order the County to give further consideration to the
original application in a manner consistent with the opinion.
City of Jacksonville v. Wynn. 3 6 Wynn and other property owners in
a Jacksonville residential subdivision sued seeking a declaration that the
City's comprehensive zoning plan was invalid as applied to their property.
They also sought an injunction to prevent the City from imposing on their
property any use classifications more restrictive than "neighborhood
commercial," and claimed inverse condemnation.
The reason behind the property owners' opposition to the City's plan
was that their six residential lots, five improved with single-family homes
and one vacant lot, were zoned as "residential low density" in the City's
plan. The property owners claimed that their lots had gradually become less
conducive to residential use and that the best use for the property was now
neighborhood commercial. The City refused to change its plan and the
property owners argued that the zoning of their properties under the plan did
332. Id. (quoting Franklin County v. Leisure Properties, Ltd., 430 So. 2d 475, 479 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), review denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983)).
333. Id. at 1119.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. 650 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare, and was thus an invalid exercise of police power. The circuit court
held that the plan failed to meet the requirements of chapter 163 of the
Florida Statutes. It entered judgment in the property owners' favor with
regard to all their claims except inverse condemnation, finding that the
injunctive relief would prevent a taking from occurring. The First District
Court of Appeal, in an opinion written by Judge Kahn,337 reversed on two
grounds.
First, the court determined that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the action. 33 Part II of chapter 163 of the Florida
Statutes provides that an administrative hearing before the Division of
Administrative Hearings is the sole method available for the determination
of whether a local government's plan is in compliance with chapter 163.
The Division of Administrative Hearings has exclusive original jurisdiction
over such challenges. 3 ' Even before such hearing is requested, the
Department of Community Affairs must make an initial determination as to
whether the plan is in compliance. This means that the circuit courts have
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Division of Administrative
Hearings regarding the disputed plan, but cannot hear claims such as those
made in the instant case which bypassed the administrative remedy. 4
The court explained that the rationale behind depriving circuit courts of
subject matter jurisdiction to determine the validity of comprehensive plans
is to prevent piecemeal changes to comprehensive plans from resulting, in
effect, in spot zoning.342 The legislature has decided that the administra-
tive agency is better equipped to analyze the impact that individual changes
might have on the overall plan.
The second basis for reversal was lack of ripeness. The landowners
here did not know what uses the government might permit on their
properties and they never submitted a development plan for the government
to accept or reject. They never received a final determination of the
permissible uses. It does not appear that a claim was made that such an
attempt would be futile, and there does not seem to have been any basis for
such a claim. Therefore, their taking claim was not ripe.
337. Judges Ervin and Wolf concurred.
338. Id. at 185.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Wynn, 650 So. 2d at 185.
342. Id.
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Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal.343 Blumenthal wanted to
have his twenty-acre parcel to RU-4L (Residential Limited Apartment House
with a maximum of twenty-three units per acre) rezoned so he could build
a 360-unit apartment complex. The planned development would have
eighteen units per acre. Nevertheless, a neighboring federation of homeown-
er associations objected, claiming that a trend had begun in the area to limit
density to thirteen units per acre. The County Commission denied the
rezoning application, agreeing that there was an emerging trend to limit
density in the area and that the current application was inconsistent with that
trend. Blumenthal successfully petitioned the circuit court for a writ of
certiorari. The circuit court held that, the Commission lacked substantial
competent evidence because the neighbor's testimony was conclusory and
lacked adequate support. The County then sought review by a petition for
a writ of certiorari to the district court.
The Third District Court of Appeal denied the writ. The court
noted3" that the standard of review is narrow in such cases and the district
court should determine two things: whether procedural due process was
afforded, and whether the circuit court applied the correct law. Procedural
due process was not raised as an issue and the district court ruled that the
circuit court had applied the correct law. It refused to reconsider the
question of whether the commissioner presented substantial competent
evidence because to do so would be to exceed the proper scope of review.
Judge Cope wrote a lengthy dissent to the effect that the circuit court
had applied incorrect law which may be characterized as follows. First, the
circuit court reviewed the remarks of an individual commissioner. The
circuit court should have determined whether the Commission's resolution
was based upon substantial competent evidence rather than on whether the
comments of an individual commissioner were based upon such evidence.
Second, based upon the facts in this record, the Commission had a choice
of alternatives. The fact that the circuit court would not have made the
same choice should not have been the question because there was sufficient
evidence in the record to support the choice that the Commission made.
Third, the circuit court's denigrating characterization of the testimony was
unwarranted. The court noted that, "[t]he citizen testimony in this case was
fact-based, and perfectly proper. In reality, there was no dispute as to the
material facts of the case in any event."345  Fourth, the majority has
applied the scope of review for administrative decisions, rather than the
343. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1445 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 1995).
344. Judges Hubbart and Goderich concurred in the per curiam opinion.
345. Blumenthal, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D1449.
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review which a district court may exercise over a circuit court decision. The
district court may determine whether the law has been correctly applied to
the facts in the record. Fifth, the majority has made a factual error about
the record.346
City of Punta Gorda v. Burnt Store Hotel.347 The City appealed an
order determining that a capacity increase fee was actually an illegal tax.
The issue arose from a utility contract between the City and Burnt Store,
which had purchased an existing hotel already connected to the City's water
and sewer system. As a new utility customer, Burnt Store was required to
sign an agreement to pay for increases in average consumption. Due to
increased consumption, Burnt Store was charged $154,000. The City argued
that the costs of increased consumption should be charged to the party
responsible for the increased consumption. Burnt Store argued that because
the newly acquired property had not been changed structurally and had
existed in the same capacity under prior ownership, there was no new
increase for which the City had not previously accounted.
The district court affirmed3 48 the lower court's ruling that this was an
illegal tax. It stated that impact fees are justified when there is a nexus
between new construction and a population increase which leads to
increased consumption. This affects the infrastructure and requires an
additional capital expenditure.349  A change in the ownership of an
existing business does not provide the required nexus even though the
continuation of the business results in increased usage. In dicta, the court
reaffirmed the proposition that structural changes alone are insufficient to
justify an impact fee when there is no showing of additional usage.350
Sarasota County v. Webber.35' Webber sought a variance so he could
build a home within the protected Gulf Beach Setback Line. The Board of
County Commissioners initially approved the variance by a 3-2 vote.
346. The majority stated that a citizen had testified about a trend and that the
Commission had based its decision on the existence of that trend even though the citizen was
not an expert qualified to testify about such trends. However, the only time the word "trend"
appears in the record is in the remarks of a County Commissioner at the conclusion of the
hearing. The resolution made no mention of any such trend as being the basis for the
Commission's decision.
347. 639 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
348. Judge Blue wrote the opinion. Acting Chief Judge Schoonover and Judge
Threadgill concurred. Id.
349. Id. at 680.
350. See City of Tarpon Springs v. Tarpon Springs Arcade Ltd., 585 So. 2d 324 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 593 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1991).
351. 658 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Vol 20
316
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman / Valcarcel
However, after a recess, one commissioner claimed a mental lapse and
moved to reopen the matter. The Board voted again and, this time, denied
the variance. Webber, claiming a violation of Florida's Government in the
Sunshine Law and a denial of procedural due process, sought certiorari
review in the circuit court which reversed the board. The Board and the
County brought this petition for a writ of certiorari in the district court
which held that the circuit court had erred by failing to determine whether
the Board's denial of the variance was supported by substantial, competent
evidence. Furthermore, the circuit court had applied the incorrect law in
assigning error to the Board's reconsidering a matter after having voted.
The Board properly followed the requirements of parliamentary proce-
dure352 and satisfied the requirements of procedural due process. The
district court found no evidence in the record of any violation of the
Government in Sunshine Law.
3299 N. Federal Highway, Inc. v. Broward County.353 This case was
primarily a First Amendment case dealing with the free speech issue of
regulating nude dancing, but one novel issue relating to real property law
was unsuccessfully raised. The bar argued that the Broward County Adult
Entertainment Code, because it affected land use within the meaning of
section 125.66 of the Florida Statutes, was subject to the zoning and land
use ordinance requirements of notice and public hearings.3" The Fourth
District .Court of Appeal held355 that the legislature intended to impose
those requirements only when an ordinance's effect on land use might be
substantial, meaning that it must be more than merely an incidental effect
on the use of land.356  Ordinances which require minimum distances
between residential areas and liquor establishments, or set moratoria on
building, or prohibit the keeping of horses, do affect the use of land. On the
other hand, ordinances which change building codes are not considered to
affect land use because their effect is incidental.357
In this case, the county ordinance sets a minimum distance between the
audience and nude performers. The court held that this is a regulation of
352. The motion to reconsider was made by a member of the original majority and only
a short time had passed between the votes. The applicant's attorney was still present in the
hearing room when the announcement was made. Apparently, there was no further
discussion or testimony. I
353. 646 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
354. Id. at 222.
355. Judges Glickstein and Warner concurred in the per curiam opinion. Judge Gunther
concurred specially without opinion.
356. Id. at 224.
357. Id.
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conduct, not land use, although it may necessitate some structural changes
in the interior of the buildings. Regulation of land use was not the primary
goal of the ordinance. Any such effect was incidental and not sufficient to
trigger the notice and hearing requirements. 58
The bar filed a motion for rehearing which the district court denied, but
the court359 certified the following question as being of great public
importance:
IS AN ORDINANCE THAT REQUIRES MODIFICATIONS TO
ONLY THE INTERIOR STRUCTURE OF A BUILDING AN
ORDINANCE THAT "AFFECTS THE USE OF LAND" WITHIN THE
MEANING OF SECTION 125.66, FLORIDA STATUTES? 6
Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act.361 This
act, which becomes effective October 1, 1995, provides, "(3) Any owner
who believes that a development order ... or an enforcement action of a
governmental entity, is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the use of his real
property, may apply within 30 days after receipt of the order or notice of the
governmental action for relief under this section.3 62 The relief cited
consists of a hearing before a special master3 63 or, for a landowner who
has been denied an application for an amendment to a comprehensive plan,
mediation or other alternative dispute resolution.
The Florida Legislature also amended section 177.142 of the Florida
Statutes,365 authorizing local governments to change the name of any
subdivision, street, plat or other name appearing on an official plat or map,
and even on any unofficial map or plat maintained by the clerk of the circuit
court, if it finds that the name constitutes an ethnic or racial slur.
XVII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Naples.366 Flanigan's
subleased its bar and sold the bar's furnishing and liquor license to the
358. 3299 N. Federal Highway, Inc., 646 So. 2d at 224.
359. Judges Glickstein, Gunther and Warner concurred in this per curiam opinion.
360. 3299 N. Federal Highway, Inc., 646 So. 2d at 228.
361. Ch. 95-181, § 2, Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1311, 1315 (West).
362. Id. at 1316.
363. Id. § 2 (5)-(29).
364. Id. § 4 (amending FLA. STAT. § 163.3181).
365. Ch. 95-176, § 2, Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1305, 1305 (West).
366. 639 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1994).
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subtenant. Under the sublease, Flanigan's had a security interest in the
liquor license. The subtenant later granted a security interest in the liquor
license to Barnett Bank. Barnett Bank recorded, but Flanigan's did not.
Therefore, Flanigan's apparently could not claim priority based upon the
security interest. Flanigan's advanced a different theory. It claimed to have
a statutory landlord's lien,367 which was prior to Barnett's security interest
and, therefore, the subtenant's sale of the license gave rise to a statutory
action for damages for disposing of personal property that was under a
lien. 68
The Supreme Court of Florida, in an opinion written by Justice Shaw,
rejected this claim. The court had recently held a liquor license was not
personal property to which a landlord's lien could attach. 69 Although the
liquor license was represented by a certificate which the licensee was
required to locate on the property, the certificate was not the license.
Lacking a lien on the property, the damage theory was fatally defective.
American Linens, Inc. v. Venmall International Group.370  The
landlord brought an action for breach of the lease. The trial court found that
the tenant owed $5325 in back rent and taxes, but that it was otherwise
entitled to a return of its $12,834 security deposit. The tenant appealed,
inter alia, the denial of prejudgment interest on the security deposit. The
Third District Court of Appeal reversed on this point,371 holding that inter-
est should have been awarded from the date that the tenant demanded the
return of its security deposit because the claim for $7509 was a liquidated
contractual claim which became due upon demand.
367. Id. at 618.
Landlord's lien for rent. Every person to whom rent may be due, his heirs,
executors, administrators or assigns, shall have a lien for such rent upon the
property found upon or off the premises leased or rented, and in the possession
of any person, as follows:
Upon all other property of the lessee or his sublessee or assigns, usually kept on
the premises. This lien shall be superior to any lien acquired subsequent to the
bringing of the property on the premises leased.
FLA. STAT. § 83.08 (1977).
368. Id. § 818.01.
369. Flanigan's, 617 So. 2d at 618 (citing Walling Enters., Inc. v. Mathias, 636 So. 2d
1294 (Fla. 1994)).
370. 645 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
371. Id. at 1060. Judges Hubbart, Baskin, and Green concurred in the per curiam
opinion.
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Anderson v. Fiocchi.72 The tenant cut his hands trying to open a
glass shower door in a leased mobile home. The shower door, which would
not open with ordinary pressure and was made of plain glass instead of
safety glass, as required by the building code. The door had been installed
before the current landlords purchased the property. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the landlords, holding that they were not liable
because they had no duty to determine what type of glass was in the door.
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed. Judge Blue's opinion
3 73
agreed with the trial court to a limited extent. If the sole basis for the claim
was based upon the glass used in the shower door, the plaintiff would lose.
However, the plaintiff testified in his deposition that he had complained
about the sticking door to the landlords' agent. The Supreme Court of
Florida has stated, "[a]fter the tenant takes possession, the landlord has a
continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous defective
conditions upon notice of their existence by the tenant, unless waived by the
tenant."374 There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
door was opening and closing properly, and whether the landlord was on
notice of its defective condition. Therefore, the motion for summary
judgment should not have been granted.
Lynch Austin Realty, Inc. v. Engler.3" The tenants apparently operat-
ed a consignment business. After defaulting on the lease, owing $45,000 in
unpaid rent, they removed $55,000 in inventory, fixtures, and equipment
regularly kept on the premises. The landlord brought an action for tortious
interference with a commercial landlord's lien, distress for unpaid rent, and
violation of the landlord's lien rights. The landlord also appealed a final
judgment in favor of the corporate tenant's guarantors.
The tenants claimed that more than half of the removed items had not
been paid for and were therefore subject to claims of their suppliers. The
trial court held that the suppliers' claims were superior to the landlord's, and
also absolved two of the four guarantors of liability. The Second District
Court of Appeal reversed on the issue of the suppliers' superior claims.
Under section 83.08(2) of the Florida Statutes, the landlord had a lien for
unpaid rent "upon all other property of the lessee or his sublessees or
assigns, usually kept on the premises. '376 The lien would attach either at
372. 640 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
373. Associate Judge Campbell and Judge Schoonover concurred.
374. Anderson, 646 So. 2d 276 (quoting Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1330
(Fla. 1981)).
375. 647 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
376. FLA. STAT. § 83.08(2) (1991).
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the time of the commencement of tenancy or when a chattel was brought on
the premises, whichever was later, and would be superior to a subsequently
created chattel lien. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code,3" the
landlord's lien would not have to be recorded to have priority over a
subsequently acquired security interest or lien. However, under the Uniform
Commercial Code,37 8 the suppliers must give some form of public notice
that they retained an interest in the goods. Since there was no evidence that
the suppliers had perfected their claim by giving notice, the landlord's lien
had priority.
Premici v. United Growth Properties, L.P.379 The shopping center
tenant stopped paying rent after a sewage system malfunctioned and
damaged the leased premises. The tenant sued the landlord for damages.
The landlord counterclaimed for eviction and back rent plus interest and
moved to bifurcate the actions in order to expedite its summary action for
possession. The trial court granted the landlord's motion.
The tenant asserted several defenses, including constructive eviction.
The landlord then filed a "Motion for Determination of Rent Due and
Payment of Rent Into Registry of Court," pursuant to the new procedure
established by section 83.232 of the Florida Statutes. The court ordered the
tenant to pay $28,886.35 to the registry of the court. When the tenant did
not comply, the landlord moved for and won a default judgment on its
possession claim on the theory that the tenant's failure to pay the rent due
into the registry of the court constituted a waiver of all defenses. The
landlord then moved for entry of final judgment on the money damages
claim alleging that the default judgment for possession constituted an
admission by the tenant of all the landlord's allegations. The trial court
agreed and entered final judgment for damages.
The tenant appealed and the Fifth District Court of Appeal rever-
sed.380 The court held, in the opinion written by Judge Griffin,38' that
the failure to make court-ordered rent payments into the court registry
waived all defenses only in the action for possession. The legislative history
revealed that the statute was intended to prevent commercial tenants from
having the benefits of continued possession during litigation without paying
rent. The court then utilized the purpose approach to overcome the
inadequate draftings found in this statute and concluded that the evil feared
377. Id. § 679.104(2).
378. Id. § 672.326(3).
379. 648 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
380. Id. at 1244.
381. Judges Cobb and Sharpe concurred.
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would be eliminated by applying this section only to the action for
possession.382 That interpretation would be consistent with the interpreta-
tion of the similar residential statute.
383
Thor Bear, Inc. v. Crocker Mizner Park, Inc. 384 The tenant leased
space in a shopping complex for the purpose of operating a retail movie
video store. He paid $75,000 as a security deposit and spent about
$160,000 on improvements. The store failed a little more than a month after
it was occupied due to lack of business. The tenant blamed the problem on
inadequate parking and access. He had raised these issues with the lessor
during the lease negotiations and before occupying the building. However,
the lessor had repeatedly reassured him that his needs would be accommo-
dated. The existence of a parking problem was well established, having,
inter alia, been the subject of newspaper coverage.
The tenant sued, claiming about $400,000 in losses and alleging
constructive eviction and fraudulent misrepresentation. The jury returned a
verdict for the tenant. However, the verdict was rejected by the trial court
which granted a belated directed verdict in favor of the lessors. The tenants
appealed.
The district court, in a per curiam opinion,3"5 recognized that the
verdict should not have been set aside if a reasonable jury could have
reached that verdict. The court then set out the elements for fraudulent
misrepresentation:
(1) a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) the
representor's knowledge at the time the misrepresentation is made that
such statement is false; (3) such misrepresentation was intended to
induce another to act in reliance thereon; (4) action in justifiable
reliance on the representation; and (5) resulting damage or injury to the
party so acting.31
6
The court then concluded that a reasonable jury could have concluded from
the evidence in the record that these elements were satisfied.387
The general rule of law is that the false statement of fact must concern
a past or existing fact to be actionable. But that rule is subject to an
382. Premici, 648 So. 2d at 1243.
383. See K.D. Lewis Enters. Corp. v. Smith, 445 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
384. 648 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
385. Judges Hersey, Glickstein and Klein concurred.
386. Thor Bear, 648 So. 2d at 172 (citations omitted).
387. Id.
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exception: a promise of future action made with no intention of performing
or with a positive intention not to perform is also actionable. In effect, the
fact which is the subject of the fraud is the promisor's intention. There was
testimony that the lessor's vice president told the tenant that additional
parking would be added when the leasing trailer was removed. However,
the vice president's successor told the tenant such additional parking was
never planned. A reasonable jury could infer from that evidence that the
landlord had made a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact.
In addition, the lessor's vice president made statements that the needs of the
tenant could be accommodated. Such an assertion made by one with
superior knowledge or who appeared to have superior knowledge could
constitute a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact rather
than merely an opinion. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could have decided
that the tenant's reliance on the vice president's assertions was reasonable
under the circumstances. Consequently, a directed verdict should not have
been granted.
Walgreen Co. v. Habitat Development Corp."' This case involved
a long-term commercial lease of the Walgreen building, a landmark in
downtown Miami. The landlord sought a declaration on the meaning of the
lease's surrender clause which required that the property be returned "in a
'safe condition and reasonably in good order and repair.""'3 9 The parties
and the trial court agreed that the phrase was clear and unambiguous and,
therefore, should have been given its plain meaning. However, then the trial
court construed that language to require the tenant to return the property "in
tenantable and rentable condition so that the premises are returned in reason-
ably like-new or nearly-new condition, safe and fit for immediate occupancy
and rental."3" The Third District Court of Appeal reversed,39' holding
that the trial court had gone far beyond what the words expressed since
"reasonably good repair" did not imply like-new or nearly-new condi-
tion.39
Furthermore, the trial court held that to be in a safe condition, the
property would have to be in compliance with the building code at the time
of the surrender.393 The district court held that the order would have to
be amended to provide, in essence, that the building not be in violation of
388. 655 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
389. Id. at 165 (quoting article 27 of the lease agreement).
390. Id.
391. Judges Hubbart, Levy and Goderich concurred in the per curiam opinion.
392. Id. at 165.
393. Id.
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the code, considering any exemptions or grandfathering-in which would be
applicable to the building.394
TCY, Ltd., Inc. v. Johnson.395 This circuit court decision merits
attention. The defendant rented a boat slip at the plaintiff's marina.
Alleging breach of the lease,396 the plaintiff filed a residential eviction
action in state court under chapter 83 of the Florida Statutes. Among the
defenses was a challenge, which Circuit Court Judge Linda Singer Stein
rejected, to the court's jurisdiction based upon the theory that such an
eviction fell within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court.
For a contract to fall within admiralty jurisdiction, it must "relate to the ship
as an instrument of commerce." '3 97 In this case, the defendant's boat was
moored to the dock, remained stationary, and was used exclusively as
defendant's residence. Thus, it had been withdrawn from commerce and an
action for possession of the slip where it was moored did not fall within
admiralty jurisdiction.
XVII. LEGISLATION
The Homebuyer's Protection Act398 broadens the protections provided
against unscrupulous contractors. The act provides that contractors must
now at all times, not merely in hurricane situations, apply for permits within
thirty days of receiving more than ten percent of the total contract price for
any construction work on residential properties. Additionally, for construc-
tion of completed homes, the deposit money must be placed in an escrow
account. All withdrawals from the escrow account require the signatures of
both the buyer and the contractor. The contractor must begin work within
ninety days from the issuance of permits unless the person ordering the
work agrees in writing to extend the period. A contractor who receives
payment in excess of the work already completed cannot fail to perform any
further work for any ninety-day period. The Act provides a procedure for
giving thirty-days notice to contractors when work has halted for sixty days.
Section 489.1265 of the Florida Statutes was amended to prohibit
contractors from allowing non-licensed persons to use the contractors'
394. Walgreen Co., 655 So. 2d at 165-66.
395. 3 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 72 (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995).
396. Plaintiff alleged breach of the lease by failing to comply with the marina's rules
and regulations and § 83.52 of the Florida Statutes.
397. TCY, Ltd., Inc., 3 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 73 (quoting Pillsbury Flour Mills Co.
v. Interlake S.S. Co., 40 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1930)).
398. Ch. 95-240, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1688 (West).
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registration numbers. Such violations now constitute a first degree misde-
meanor. Repeated violations constitute third degree felonies. Contractors
must notify homeowners in conspicuous writing, at the time that the home-
owner makes initial payment to the contractor, that there is a recovery fund
for claims against contractors. The specific form to be used will be
prescribed by the Department of Legal Affairs and provided by the
Construction Industry Licensing Board by November 1, 1995.
One of the most important changes involves the homeowner's right to
obtain a list of all subcontractors and materials suppliers which the
contractor will use. This should prevent the general contractor from using
unlicensed subcontractors. A contractor's failure to supply such a list within
ten days after receipt of a proper request from the homeowner precludes the
contractor from asserting liens to the extent that the owner is prejudiced.
Furthermore, filing a fraudulent lien is now punishable as a third-degree
felony, as does intentionally or knowingly making false statements regarding
the payment of subcontractors and suppliers such that a person may rely on
the statements and draw payments.
The Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act,39 9
which becomes effective as of October 1, 1995, is the most important act
relating to real property enacted so far in this legislative session. The act
provides remedies for real property owners whose property "has been
inordinately burdened by governmental action," which is defined in the act
as "an action [that] . . .has directly restricted or limited the use of real
property such that the property owner is permanently unable to attain the
reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real
property .... 40 The definition continues, emphasizing that the burden
must be permanent and disproportionate in comparison to the burden on
other properties. The act provides the procedures to be followed by
property owners in filing claims, allows settlements, and requires court
actions if a settlement agreement contravenes the application of state law.
Of course, it provides for attorney's fees and costs. It also provides a
mediation and dispute resolution mechanism for settling disputes regarding
amendments to comprehensive plans. The property owner must, not less
than 180 days prior to filing an action, present a written claim to the
governmental entity. During this 180-day period, the governmental entity
shall make a written offer of settlement, and must notify all contiguous
399. Ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1311 (West).
400. Id. § 1(3)(e), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1312.
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landowners of the pending claim. If the settlement offer is rejected by the
property owner, then suit can be filed in circuit court.
The, Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act,
401
which becomes effective October 1, 1995, provides:
(3) Any owner who believes that a development order . . . or an
enforcement action of a governmental entity[] is unreasonable or
unfairly burdens the use of his real property, may apply within 30 days
after receipt of the order or notice of governmental action for relief
under this section.4°2
Relief consists of a hearing before a special master403 or, for a landowner
who has been denied an application for an amendment to a comprehensive
plan, mediation or other alternative dispute resolution.'
The Florida Legislature also amended section 177.142 of the Florida
Statutes4 5 to authorize local governments to change the name of any
subdivision, street, plat or other name appearing on an official plat or map,
or even on any unofficial map or plat maintained by the clerk of the circuit
court if it finds that the name constitutes an ethnic or racial slur.
Chapter 95-274 made comprehensive changes to chapter 721 of the
Florida Statutes which deals with time-shares.' The law also made
amendments to chapter 718 which deals with condominiums and expanded
the statutory regulation of homeowners' associations under chapter 617
which deals with corporations that are not for profit.
Among the more important changes dealing with time-shares was the
creation of new statute, section 721.065, which requires use of time-share
resale purchase agreements containing prescribed disclosures about
assessments for common expenses, penalties for non-payment, and a ten-day
cancellation provision.4 7 Also of note is a new section 721.071, dealing
with trade secret protection for developers' confidential materials filed in
conjunction with a public offering of a time-share plan.408 Section 721.15
401. Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1315.
402. Id.
403. Id. § 2(5)-(29), 1995 Fla Sess. Law Serv. at 1316-1320.
404. Ch. 95-181, § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1315 (West) (amending FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3181).
405. Ch. 95-176, § 2, 1995 Fa. Sess. Law Serv. 1305, 1305 (West).
406. Ch. 95-274, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1936 (West).
407. Id. § 4, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1944.
408. Id. § 6, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1954 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
721.071).
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was amended to prohibit managing entities from commingling of operating
funds with reserve funds, or commingling of common expense funds of one
time-share plan with common expense funds of other time-share plans,
although such funds can be deposited into a common account for a period
not to exceed thirty days.
Chapter 95-274 included an amendment to section 721.20 prohibiting
real estate brokers and salespersons from collecting advance fees for listing
of time-shares.4 ' It amends section 721.26 to increase the regulatory
powers of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile
Homes, and increases the disclosure requirements for multi-state time-
shares.4" Changes to chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes include amend-
ment of section 718.111(15) to prohibit condominium associations from
commingling of reserve and operating funds.41 2 Section 718.117 was
amended to enumerate the powers and duties of condominium directors after
commencement of termination proceedings.413
With regard to homeowners' associations, sections 617.301 through
617.312 were substantially amended, rewording the definitions and the
powers/duties sections, and specifying who may sue and be sued under
homeowners' association law.4 14 New statutory sections were created to
provide for arbitration and mediation of disputes between associations and
members and to provide for survival of association covenants after tax and
foreclosure sales.415 Additionally, section 689.26 was amended to include
a mandatory disclosure statement which must be provided to prospective
purchasers of real property subject to a homeowners' association member-
ship requirement.4 16 The disclosure must be supplied by developers of
new homes as well as sellers in the resale market.417
409. Id. § 13, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1962 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
721.15(8)).
410. Id. § 14, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1963.
411. Ch. 95-274, § 15, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1963.
412. Id. § 35, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1983.
413. Id. § 47, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1993.
414. Id. §§ 52-62, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1997-2005.
415. Id. §§ 61-62, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2005.
416. Ch. 95-274, § 63, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2005-06.
417. Id.
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XIX. LIENS AND MECHANIC'S LIENS
Casa Linda Tile & Marble Installers, Inc. v. Highlands Place 1981,
Ltd. 18 The tile installer sued to enforce a mechanic's lien after it ceased
work due to nonpayment. The Highlands management counterclaimed for
defective work and for punitive damages due to Casa Linda's filing of a lis
pendens after the lien had been transferred to bond. Highlands alleged as
a defense to payment the condition precedent that the defects in the work,
as noted on a punchlist, be corrected. 19
The court ruled that "[w]hen a contractor has substantially performed
and otherwise complied with the mechanic's lien statute, it is entitled to an
award on its mechanic's lien claim for the contract price less all damages
caused by failure to render full performance."'42 Here, although the tile
installer failed to obtain the required architect's certificate of completion, the
court found substantial performance.42' As for the punitive damages for
filing a lis pendens after the lien was transferred to bond, the court ruled
that, absent a finding of actual malice, punitives are not justified, either by
statute or under a slander of title claim.422
Heidle v. S & S Drywall and Tile, Inc.4'2 Ms. Heidle appealed from
a denial of her recovery of attorney's fees from S & S Drywall, after a
$10,840 lien foreclosure action filed by S & S was dismissed for lack of
prosecution. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Ms.
Heidle was entitled to the attorney's fees under section 713.29, which allows
the prevailing party to recover such fees.424 There is no need to win on
a counterclaim to be considered a prevailing party. Ms. Heidle prevailed
because the action against her was dismissed.425
Hoepner & Assoc., Inc. v. Stewart Gilman Co. 426 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the Orange County Circuit Court's dismissal of
Hoepner's action to foreclose a construction lien. Hoepner, a professional
engineering company, recorded its original claim of lien on August 27,
1991, and then recorded an amended claim of lien on September 24, 1991.
Hoepner filed suit to foreclose the lien on September 24, 1992, exactly one
418. 642 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
419. Id. at 767.
420. Id. at 768.
421. Id.
422. Casa Linda, 642 So. 2d at 768.
423. 639 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
424. Id. at 1106.
425. Id.
426. 648 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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year from the record date of its amended claim, but over one year from the
original claim date.427 The action was thus time barred under section
713.22(1) of the Florida Statutes, which provides that no lien shall continue
for a longer period than one year after the claim of lien has been recorded
unless within that time an action to enforce the lien is commenced in a court
of competent jurisdiction. Recording an amended claim of lien does not toll
the one-year time period.42
The court cited Jack Stilson & Co. v. Caloosa Bayview Corp.429 in
support of its holding that, "although the lien statutes authorize a correction
or a change by way of an amendment to an original claim of lien, such
amendment does not toll the statutory time to institute suit. '430  The
rationale behind this interpretation is that the original and the amended claim
represent only one claim, which begins when first recorded.
Paulk v. Peyton.431 Appellant Paulk entered into a combination
written and oral contract with Peyton to perform certain improvements on
Peyton's real property. A dispute arose and Paulk instituted this action
seeking damages for breach of contract and foreclosure of a mechanic's lien.
Specifically, Paulk alleged that he furnished Peyton with a contractor's
affidavit stating that all lienors had been paid and that all conditions
precedent to the filing of the action had been satisfied. Peyton answered the
averment by stating that she was "without knowledge., 432 Later, Peyton
was granted summary judgment on the foreclosure claim because she was
not furnished with an original contractor's affidavit, but instead was given
a copy, which did not comply with the mechanic's lien statute, section
713.06(3)(d). 433
The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Peyton waived
her defense of nonperformance of this condition precedent by not pleading
it specifically and with particularity in her answer!'
Shipwatch Development Corp. v. Salmon.435 In a construction dispute
between Salmon, the contractor, and Shipwatch, the owner, the trial court
imposed a lien against Shipwatch's property in the amount of $16,024.07.
427. Id. at 854-55.
428. Id. at 855.
429. 278 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1973).
430. Hoepner, 648 So. 2d at 855 (citing Jack Stilson & Co. v. Caloosa Bayview Corp.,
278 So. 2d 282, 283-84 (Fla. 1973)).
431. 648 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
432. Id. at 773.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 774.
435. 646 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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The lien amount included amounts for Salmon's attorney's fees, as well as
prejudgment interest. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the
attorney's fees award because the trial court erred in not adjusting the
lodestar fee based on the extent of success achieved by counsel for
Salmon.436 The original amount alleged by Salmon to be due was over
$40,000.00, which indicates that the level of success was low. 437
The court also modified the award of prejudgment interest because it
erroneously included interest that accrued prior to the date the contractor's
affidavit was served. The trial court had granted prejudgment interest from
the date of filing the claim of lien, when the correct starting point is when
the contractor's affidavit is served.438
Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design, Inc. 4 39 The Supreme Court
of Florida answered the following certified question in the negative because
a binding contract is necessary in order to file a mechanic's lien:
DOES A SUBCONTRACTOR BEGIN TO FURNISH SERVICES,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIMELY PROVIDING A NOTICE TO
OWNER IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 713.06(2)(a), FLORI-
DA STATUTES (1991), WHEN, WITHOUT ANY BINDING
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO DO SO, HE OR SHE BEGINS
TO SELECT MATERIALS AT SOME LOCATION OFF THE JOB
SITE, FOR FUTURE INSTALLATION ON THE JOB SITE?4
The court also held that the forty-five-day period for giving notice to
the owner of a possible lien claim under section 713.06 of the Florida
Statutes, starts when a subcontractor begins to furnish services or materials
at the job site.44
Gazebo Landscaping was the landscaping subcontractor of a general
contractor who was building a home on the Stunkel's property. Gazebo had
been orally contacted by the general contractor, and on November 7, 1990
took the Stunkels to select trees for the landscaping. The planting work at
the Stunkel property did not begin until December 5, 1990. The Stunkels
went bankrupt and Gazebo posted its notice of claim of lien on January 18,
1991. The issue was whether the forty-five-day period for posting a claim
436. Id. at 839.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S220 (May 11, 1995).
440. Id. at S221.
441. Id.
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of lien under section 713.06(2)(a) began to run on November 7 or December
5 of 1990. Fortunately for Gazebo, the court held that it began to run from
the later date, so that Gazebo was within the deadline. 2
Sturge v. LCS Development Corp. 3 The Sturges sought certiorari
review of an order denying their motion to discharge a mechanic's lien.
The lien arose from hurricane repairs done by LCS on the Sturges' property.
LCS recorded a claim of lien after the Sturges refused to pay due to the
quality of work and time delays. Subsequent to the filing of claim of lien,
the Sturges sued for breach of contract and included a count to discharge the
lien pursuant to section 713.21(4) of the Florida Statutes. The clerk issued
a summons to show cause within twenty days why the lien should not be
discharged. On the twentieth day, LCS filed a motion to extend the
deadline to respond. After the twenty days had passed, the Sturges moved
to discharge the lien and the motion was denied.4"
The Third District Court of Appeal quashed the order and remanded
with instructions to discharge the lien." 5 The court restated that mechan-
ic's lien laws are to be strictly construed. 4' Extensions of time to respond
pursuant to section 713.21(4) should only be granted for good cause, and
such good cause must be shown within the twenty day period. The lien was
discharged due to LCS's failure to comply with this requirement.
447
Note that section 713.21(4) states that the circuit court of the county
where the property is located is the court empowered to discharge liens.
With the recent holding that county and circuit courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with regard to equitable actions, such as foreclosure of liens,
within the county court jurisdictional amount of $15,000, this statute should
probably be amended to state that the county courts can also discharge liens.
Although the lien in this case did not involve equity because it had not
reached the foreclosure stage, other mechanic's lien cases which reach
foreclosure could still involve claims for discharge. If these cases are being
heard in county court, the county court should be able to decide the related
discharge claims.
442. Id.
443. 643 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
444. Id. at 54.
445. Id. at 55.
446. Id. at 54.
447. Id. at 55.
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XX. Lis PENDENS
Acapulco Construction, Inc. v. Redavo Estates, Inc." The plaintiff,
Acapulco Construction, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review
of an order discharging their notice of lis pendens. The Third District Court
of Appeal treated the petition as an appeal from a non-final order dissolving
an injunction under rule 9.130(a)(3)(B) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure and reversed the trial court's order discharging the lis pen-
dens." 9 The plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive trust on the subject
property, which was a viable claim entitling them to file a notice of lis
pendens. In an action such as imposing a constructive trust which
challenges the legal or equitable ownership of the property, a lis pendens is
necessary to protect both the parties and subsequent purchasers or encum-
brancers. It was not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove their claim in order
to file a lis pendens; they only had to show a fair nexus between the
apparent legal or equitable ownership of the subject property and the dispute
involved in the lawsuit.450
Medical Facilities Development, Inc. v. Little Arch Creek Properties,
Inc. 451 This case addresses the question of under what circumstances must
a bond be posted by the proponent of a lis pendens when the lis pendens is
not based upon a duly recorded instrument or construction lien. The Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's imposition of a bond.
452
The lis pendens was filed after Medical Facilities sued for specific
performance of an agreement in which it was to purchase a building from
Little Arch. Little Arch had entered into another contract to sell the
property to someone else for $6.5 million. Medical Facilities filed a lis
pendens preventing Little Arch from closing on the $6.5 million deal. Little
Arch moved to require Medical Facilities to post a bond to protect Little
Arch in the event that the lis pendens was later held to have been improper-
ly filed. The trial court ordered Medical Facilities to post a $1 million
bond.453
The court referred to section 48.23 of the Florida Statutes, which
governs lis pendens. There are two types: those involving actions upon a
duly recorded instrument of construction lien, which do not require a bond;
448. 645 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
449. Id. at 183.
450. Id.
451. 656 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
452. Id. at 1303.
453. Id. at 1301-02.
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and those which are not founded on a duly recorded instrument or
construction lien, in which a bond might be required. This is controlled in
the same manner as the method by which the court grants and dissolves
injunctions. However, there are different approaches by the districts. Some
courts grant the bond if the owner of the property can show that it will
suffer irreparable harm if the lis pendens is unjustified. Others leave it to
the court's discretion. The third approach makes the posting of a bond
mandatory when the lis pendens is not founded upon a duly recorded
instrument. The Third District Court of Appeal follows the mandatory bond
approach. 4 4
The appellants referred to Chiusolo v. Kennedy,4'5 in which the
Supreme Court of Florida stated, "[w]e agree... that the statutory reference
to injunctions exists merely to permit property holders to ask in an
appropriate case that the plaintiff post a bond where needed to protect the
former from irreparable harm. 45 6  The Third District Court of Appeal
stated that this was dicta and non-binding.4 7 The lis pendens bond was
analogized to a temporary injunction bond, which can be obtained as of
right.4 8 Judge Green dissented, arguing that lis pendens bonds should not
be required unless the owner of the property would suffer irreparable harm.
Further, the court stated that monetary harm alone, which is the harm that
would have been caused by the lis pendens preventing the $6.5 million sale
of the building, is not irreparable because there was an adequate remedy at
law.
459
XXI. MARKETABLE RECORD TrILE AcT
Martin v. Town of Palm Beach.41 The 1948 deed to the County of
Palm Beach provided that the land be used for no other purpose than as a
public park, public beach, and recreational area. The County conveyed the
land to the Town of Palm Beach in 1957 by a deed which did not mention
the restriction, but did state that the conveyance was "subject to easements,
covenants, limitations, reservations and restrictions of record. 46 1 In 1964,
a shack on the property was converted into a fire station, which was
454. Id. at 1303.
455. 614 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1993).
456. Id. at 492-93.
457. Medical Facilities Dev., Inc., 656 So. 2d at 1303.
458. Id. at 1304.
459. Id. at 1307.
460. 643 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
461. Id. at 113.
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expanded in 1979. When the Town decided to replace the building with a
new fire station, a County resident brought this action for an injunction.462
The district court decided4 63 that the 1957 deed was the root of title
for the purposes of the Marketable Record Title Act ("MRTA"). 464 The
court followed the statutory mandate to liberally construe the statute to
effectuate the legislative purpose 465 of simplifying and facilitating land title
transactions. 4' Accordingly, the general reference to "limitations, reserva-
tions and restrictions of record" was insufficient to preserve the restriction
which appeared in a document on the record prior to the root because it did
not refer to the book and page where the specific restriction could be found
or refer to the name of the recorded plat which imposed the restriction.467
A most interesting point is hidden in a footnote.4 6' The plaintiff had
tried to convince the court to create an exception to MRTA for charitable
donations. However, the district court wisely refused. 469 The reasons
given were that: 1) to do so would constitute "impermissible judicial
legislation""47 and 2) it was a subject which should be "best addressed to
the legislature. ' 471 However, the best reason for the refusal would have
been the above-stated statutory rule of construction. Any exception to
MRTA would have the effect of complicating and obstructing land
transactions. Furthermore, the one asked for here would be particularly bad.
Title searchers would be burdened with determining whether pre-root title
transactions contained any limitation, reservation or restriction and, if so,
whether the conveyance or devise had been a charitable donation. That
information might not be discernible from the public records, so the inquiry
might be difficult, slow and costly.
462. The court declined to rule on the issue of the plaintiff's standing to bring this
action because it was raised for the first time on oral argument. Id.
463. Associate Judge Diamantis wrote the opinion. Associate Judges Harris and Griffin
concurred.
464. Martin, 643 So. 2d at 114 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01-.10 (1993)).
465. FLA. STAT. § 712.10 (1993).
466. Id. § 712.02.
467. See Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v. Caruana, 623 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993).
468. Martin, 643 So. 2d at 115 n.7.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
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XXII. MOBILE HOMES
Doral Mobile Home Villas, Inc. v. Doral Home Owners, Inc.472 The
appellant, Doral Mobile Home Villas, Inc., owns and operates a mobile
home park with more than 500 lots in Pinellas County. In 1991 and 1992,
it served notices on its tenants that it intended to raise its rental rates. The
mobile home owners opposed the increases and invoked the dispute
resolution provisions of the Florida Mobile Home Act.473 When a negoti-
ated settlement could not be reached, the homeowners' association sued.
Some homeowners withheld payment of the increased portion of their rent,
and the homeowners' association sought permission to pay the disputed rent
into the court's registry. The trial court allowed such payment and the park
owner appealed. The parkowner argued that payment into the court registry
was permissible only as a defense in actions brought by mobile home park
owners against individual homeowners, and could not be used by the
representative association. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed,
relying upon the plain language of the statute. The court noted that the
statute did not provide for payment of disputed rent in an action by a mobile
homeowners' association, like it does in an action by the park owner for
rent. The court opined, "[w]hether this was an oversight by the legislature
or an affirmative decision to limit defenses in section 723.063 to tenants at
risk of eviction is unclear. The statute, however, is not ambiguous in its
failure to mention the association." 474  Therefore, Judge Altenbernd's
opinion475 held that payment of the disputed rent into the court registry
was not available to the homeowners' association.
Florida Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Department of Revenue.476
The Association filed a petition with the Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings challenging the proposed rules' dealing with the ad valorem
taxation of mobile homes, arguing that the Florida Constitution prohibited
the ad valorem taxation of mobile homes.47 8 The petition was rejected and
the First District Court of Appeal affirmed in a per curiam opinion.479
472. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D75 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1994).
473. FLA. STAT. §§ 723.001-.0861 (1993).
474. 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D76.
475. Acting Chief Judge Campbell and Judge Quince concurred.
476. 642 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
477. Proposed Rule 12D-6.001(3) and 12D-6.002(1)(d)1-2, FLORIDA ADMIN. CODE
(published in 18 FLA. ADMIN. WEEKLY 389 (Jan. 24, 1992)).
478. Florida Manufactured Hous. Ass'n, 642 So. 2d at 627 (quoting FLA. CONST. art.
VII, § l(b)).
479. Associate Judge Jorgenson and Judges Barfield and Benton concurred.
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The court noted that the constitution provides that the term "mobile home"
will be "as defined by law,"48 and in 1991 the legislature had redefined
that term so as to exclude, for purposes of this section of the constitution,
mobile homes permanently affixed to land owned by the mobile home own-
er.48' The court could see no constitutional flaw in the legislative action,
so the proposed rules were valid.48 Judge Benton concurred, noting that
since the litigation began, the relevant administrative rules were amended to
deal with the association's prime concern, that inventory of dealers and
manufacturers might be subject to the tax if permanently affixed to realty as
often occurred with models or samples.483
XXII. MORTGAGES
Anderson v. North Florida Production Credit Ass'n.4 '84 A foreclosure
action was brought on a mortgage of a prior owner, which had been
improperly indexed by the clerk of court. The current mortgagor and
mortgagee were unaware of the improperly indexed mortgage and claimed
that they had priority because of the recording error. The trial court
disagreed and granted the foreclosure judgment to the prior mortgagee. The
First District Court of Appeal affirmed.485 The rule for mortgage priority
is provided in section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes, which states that "[t]he
sequence of ... official numbers shall determine the priority of recorda-
tion," referring to the official number of recordation given by the clerk of
courts when an instrument is recorded.486 Although indexing is a statutory
duty imposed on the clerk of courts, the priority of mortgages is not based
on proper indexing. Rather, it is based on ranking of official register
number.487
480. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(b).
481. FLA. STAT. § 193.075 (1991).
482. Florida Manufactured Hous. Ass'n, 642 So. 2d at 627.
483. FLA. STAT. § 193.075 (as modified by 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-132 and 1994 Fla.
Laws ch. 94-353).
484. 642 So. 2d 88 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 651 So. 2d 1192 (Fla.
1995).
485. Id. at 91.
486. FLA. STAT. § 695.11 (1993).
487. Id.
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BancFlorida v. Hayward.488 The bank appealed an order granting
priority to purchasers of single family homes over the lender because the
lender had actual notice of the buyers' purchase and sale agreements with
the developer prior to the bank's loan to developer. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed.4 9
The developer owned the land which was to be developed. Each buyer
entered into a purchase and sale contract with the developer who was to
build a home on the lot. The developer would, with each transaction, go to
the lender and obtain a separate construction loan for each lot. Each loan
and mortgage was executed and recorded after the purchase and sale
contracts were executed. The equitable liens held by the purchasers, of
which the bank had actual notice, were superior to the mortgages of the
bank.49
°
Bank One, Dayton v. Sunshine Meadows Condominium Ass'n.49 1
Sunshine Meadows is a condominium equestrian center which was
developed in phases. The developer completed and sold the units in phase
I and then executed a note and mortgage on 1.43 acres to begin developing
phase II. The developer subsequently amended the original declaration of
condominium to make phase II part of the common elements of the
condominium. The bank consented to the amendment. When the developer
defaulted, the bank sought to foreclose the entire condominium, arguing that
its mortgage encumbered property which was part of the common elements,
and that those common elements were an appurtenance to each unit of the
condominium. 4' The trial court agreed with the lender, but the district
court of appeal reversed, holding that the lender's consent to the amended
declaration of condominium subjected the mortgage to the provisions of
condominium law.493  Section 718.121(1) prohibits liens against the
condominium property as a whole unless there is unanimous consent of all
unit owners. Additionally, section 718.107 prevents the separation of an
individual condominium unit interest from the undivided interest in the
appurtenant common elements. The mortgage covered the property which
488. 20 Fa. L. Weekly D761 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1995). The court subsequent-
ly withdrew this opinion on rehearing and replaced it with a new one after the end of this
article's survey period. See BancFlorida v. Hayward, 20 Fa. L. Weekly D2041 (3d Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 6, 1995).
489. Hayward, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D761.
490. Id.
491. 641 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1994).
492. Id. at 1334.
493. Id.
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was to become the common elements and not the units. Therefore, the
lender could not foreclose on the units because it had no mortgage on them.
In addition, the lender could not foreclose on the specific mortgaged
property because it was now part of the condominium common elements,
which cannot be divided from the unit interests. The supreme court, in
weighing the equities, agreed that the bank caused its own harm by
consenting to the amended declaration and that it would be inequitable to
subject the unsuspecting unit owners to the lender's mortgage.494
Bay Financial Savings Bank v. Hook.495 The bank obtained a final
default judgment against Hook and other guarantors of a mortgage which the
bank had foreclosed. Hook moved the lower court to set aside, amend, or
reduce the default judgment, arguing that the bank's receipt of monies from
collateral sources reduced its deficiency claim. The court denied the motion
and Hook filed a complaint in another county asking the court to void the
default or reduce the amount awarded and to strike the final judgment from
the public records in the county where the foreclosure had been decided.
Hook was precluded by res judicata. The bank then sought an award of
attorney's fees in accordance with sections 57.105 and 57.115 of the Florida
Statutes. The trial court denied the bank's motion, and the bank ap-
pealed.496
The Second District Court of Appeal held that Hook was barred by res
judicata from bringing the same litigation in a different county.
Although Hook voluntarily dismissed his complaint after the bank asserted
res judicata, the Second District Court of Appeal held that "the filing of a
lawsuit that is nonjusticiable on its face offers an appropriate setting for the
fulfillment of section 57.105's purpose to deter misuse of the judicial
system. '498 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with directions
to enter an order awarding the bank a reasonable fee.499
Circle Mortgage Corp. v. Kline.5" The Klines applied to Circle
Mortgage to secure an adjustable rate purchase money mortgage to buy a
condominium unit. The interest rate was to change every twelve months,
with the first rate change to occur eleven months after the due date of the
first mortgage payment. The closing occurred in December of 1991. At the
494. Id. at 1336.
495. 648 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
496. Id. at 306.
497. Id. at 307.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. 645 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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closing, one document contained a scrivener's error, providing that the first
interest rate change would occur in December of 1993, instead of January
of 1993, as contemplated in the previous disclosures. The Kines signed a
compliance agreement in which they promised to cooperate in the correction
of any clerical or other errors later discovered regarding the closing
documents. Circle Mortgage subsequently sold the loan to Beneficial
Mortgage Corporation, which discovered the error. Beneficial refused to
accept the loan and Circle Mortgage sought to correct the error, but the
Klines refused to cooperate. Circle Mortgage then filed a three-count
complaint to foreclose the mortgage, reform the note, and recover damages
and attorney's fees arising from breach of the compliance agreement. °
The trial court held in favor of Circle Mortgage on the reformation
count, but denied the foreclosure and breach of contract claims. Circle
Mortgage appealed the denial of damages, and the Klines cross-appealed the
decision granting reformation."°
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision granting
reformation because there was a definite prior agreement between the
parties.0 3 "The rationale for reformation is that a court sitting in equity
does not alter the parties' agreement, but allows the defective instrument to
be corrected to reflect the true terms of the agreement the parties actually
reached."" ° The trial court's decision passed the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also affirmed the denial of
damages because Circle Mortgage could not prove actual losses when it was
still collecting the monthly payments . 5' The argument of lost sale value
of the loan was unsupported by documentation. Furthermore, after the
reformation, the loan would place the parties in the position they would
have occupied if the error had not been made, except for the litigation
expenses.5 6 On the claim for attorney's fees, the District Court of Appeal
noted that the trial court had retained jurisdiction to make the award, and
therefore, the issue was not yet appealable."°
501. Id. at 77.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 78 (citing Providence Square Ass'n v. Biancardi, 507 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (Fla.
1987)).
505. Circle Mortgage Corp., 645 So. 2d at 79.
506. Id.
507. Id.
1995]
339
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
FDIC v. Verex Assurance, Inc.508 The Supreme Court of Florida
answered the following certified question in the affirmative for the United
States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit: "Did Fla.Stat. § 627.409
apply to applications for and contracts of mortgage guaranty insurance prior
to the enactment of Fla.Stat. § 635.091 on October 1, 1983?""0
The FDIC brought suit against Verex, the insurer, to collect on two
policies covering two loans made by Sunrise Savings and Loan. FDIC was
the successor in interest of the liquidated S & L. Verex claimed that it was
entitled to rescind the two policies because of material misrepresentations
contained in the applications. The misrepresentations involved overstating
the amounts given as down payment. Section 627.409 provides that when
a borrower misrepresents a material fact in a loan application, which
misrepresentation forms part of the insurance application, the risk of loss
from the loan is placed on the bank and not the mortgage insurer. The
district court agreed and entered summary judgment for Verex. The FDIC
appealed, arguing that the above statute did not apply to mortgage insurance
policies issued before October 1, 1983, such as the two policies in
question.10
The court noted that although chapter 635 of the Florida Statutes, the
mortgage guaranty insurance chapter, does not contain a provision similar
to section 627.409, that section has been applied to mortgage insurance
policies in the past.51' On October 1, 1983, however, chapter 635 was
specifically amended through section 635.091, titled "Provisions of Florida
insurance Code applicable to mortgage guaranty insurance." This new
section did not mention section 627.409, so that it would not apply to
mortgage insurance policies after October 1, 1983. The question certified
asked whether section 635.091 was also meant to make section 627.409
inapplicable to mortgage insurance policies issued prior to October 1,
1983.51 The Supreme Court of Florida held that section 627.409 did
apply to pre-October 1, 1983 policies. 13
The court concluded that the legislature did not intend that mortgage
guaranty insurance should be governed only by the provisions of chapter
635, but also by the general insurance provisions of chapter 627.409.' 4
508. 645 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1994).
509. Id. at 428.
510. Id. at 429.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 430.
513. Verex, 645 So. 2d at 432.
514. Id.
Vol 20
340
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman / Valcarcel
Mortgage insurance is a form of casualty or surety insurance, as defined in
section 635.011, and these are two types of insurance governed by section
627. Therefore, until section 635.091 became effective, mortgage insurers
were protected from material misrepresentations.
First National Bank of Southwest Florida v. Cardinal Roofing & Siding
of Florida, Inc.5 16 The bank sought to rescind a satisfaction of mortgage
it had filed by mistake. The mortgage secured a loan to the construction
company under which Cardinal Roofing was a subcontractor. When
Cardinal was not paid, it filed a claim of lien and foreclosed. Cardinal
purchased the subject property at a clerk's sale free and clear of the bank's
mortgage. When the bank sought rescission of its satisfaction of mortgage
and reinstatement of its mortgage, the trial court dismissed for failing to
state a valid cause of action. 17
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that rescission
of a mortgage satisfaction and reinstatement of the mortgage is a valid cause
of action in Florida.18
James v. Nationsbank Trust Co.5 19 The appellants purchased homes
from General Development Corporation ("GDC"), and financed the
purchases with GDC's mortgage subsidiary. Nationsbank subsequently
purchased the loans from the originating mortgagee. Shortly thereafter,
GDC was indicted for criminal fraud; the appellants stopped paying their
mortgages, and Nationsbank foreclosed. The trial court granted a summary
judgment to Nationsbank. The appellants alleged that Nationsbank was not
a holder in due course, and thus was not free of the personal defense of
fraud in the inducement, the borrowers claiming they were fraudulently
induced to execute the notes and mortgages. 520
The appellants argued that Nationsbank, in purchasing the loans,
became part of GDC's conspiracy to defraud, because the proceeds from the
loan purchases allowed GDC to continue its sales scheme. The Fifth
District Court of Appeal rejected this argument.52  However, the court
reversed and remanded on the claim by the borrowers that Nationsbank was
aware of GDC's fraud scheme when it purchased the loans.5' Such
515. Id. at 430
516. 639 So. 2d 1101 (Fla 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
517. Id. at 1101-02.
518. Id. at 1102.
519. 639 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
520. Id. at 1032.
521. Id. at 1033.
522. Id. at 1034.
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knowledge would preclude holder in due course status for Nationsbank. The
borrowers had alleged that they were induced to buy their homes for more
than they were actually worth, due to fraudulent appraisals which misrepre-
sented their value. Nationsbank was allegedly aware of the invalidity of the
appraisals. The issue of knowledge should have precluded entry of
summary judgment for Nationsbank.
Koschler v. Dean. 523 The Koschlers appealed a final judgment
quieting title in favor of Dean, the personal representative of the estate of
William H. Dean, and determining that the Koschlers' mortgage was invalid.
On March 1, 1966, a warranty deed dated February 28, 1966 was recorded
in the public records of Pinellas County, conveying the property at issue to
"William H. Dean and Mary Dean, his wife. 524 William and Mary were
divorced at that time. However, they did remarry later on June 21, 1966.
The two remained legally married until William's death on May 28, 1990,
but they did not live together. Only William lived at the property at issue.
Mary lived with another man and "held herself out to be his wife .... "'
After William died, Mary and the man she was living with, but not married
to, gave a mortgage to the Koschlers on William's residence. The person
who conducted the title search concluded from the record that title to the
property vested in Mary as the surviving spouse of William. Mary and her
boyfriend executed an affidavit stating that no one else had a legal or
equitable interest in the property.526
Meanwhile, unknown to the Koschlers, Robert Dean, as personal
representative, began an adversary proceeding in the probate division of the
circuit court against Mary, challenging her interest in the property and
seeking a declaration that she was not entitled to participate in William's
estate as an heir. On the day before the closing date of the above mentioned
mortgage transaction, Robert Dean filed a notice of lis pendens against the
property in the probate division of the circuit court. However, he did not
record the lis pendens in the official county records until 1991 after
obtaining a judgment divesting Mary of any interest in William's estate.
Hence, he filed the quiet title action against the Koschler mortgage. 527
The trial court held that the Koschlers were not "bona fide mortgagees
for value" because, if they had searched the name of Mary's boyfriend, they
523. 642 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see also supra text accompanying
notes 235-37.
524. Id. at 1120.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
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would have found a false affidavit alleging that Mary was married to her
boyfriend.5" The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
this was neither in the chain of the property's title nor of any bearing on its
title.529 The court stated that the Koschlers were entitled to rely on the
chain of title found in the official records, absent actual knowledge of an
adverse unrecorded right.530 The court stated that fault lies with Robert
Dean for not recording the notice of lis pendens in the public records at the
time he filed it in the probate division of the court. 531 "Documents filed
in the probate division of the court do not constitute constructive notice to
purchasers for value of real property."532
Metroplex Investments, Inc. v. Precision Equity Investments, Inc.
533
This appeal by Metroplex, the purchaser at a judicial sale, was based on
Florida Statute, section 45.03 1(1) as it existed at the time of litigation, prior
to the statutory changes in 1993. Section 45.031(1) provided that the
owners of property in foreclosure, or their successor in interest, could
redeem the property up to the time of the judicial sale. This was consistent-
ly interpreted to mean that redemption could occur at any time prior to the
issuance of a certificate of title, which could be subsequent to the date of
sale. The current version of section 45.031(1), section 45.0315, provides a
more limited redemption period: redemption must now occur, if at all, prior
to the issuance of the certificate of sale.5M
The trial court held that Precision, the mortgagor, had complied with
the redemption statute, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed.535
The judicial sale was held on July 20, 1993 and the property was redeemed
on July 28, 1993. The certificate of title was not issued until August 2,
1993. These facts demonstrated clear compliance with the redemption
statute. Metroplex argued that the purchaser at sale should not have to
search for information concerning redemption, and that the clerk of court
should have been put on notice of any attempted redemption. The Fifth
District Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the statute existing at the
time of redemption placed no duty on the clerk of court to provide
528. Koschler, 642 So. 2d at 1120-21.
529. Id. at 1121.
530. Id
531. Id.
532. 653 So. 2d at 1121 (citing Pierson v. Bill, 189 So. 679 (Fla. 1939)).
533. 647 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
534. Id. at 305.
535. Id.
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information concerning redemption. 36 Furthermore, Metroplex had actual
knowledge that the property would be redeemed because the appellees had
notified Metroplex 37
Chief Judge Harris dissented because the redemption was not completed
until after the certificate of title was issued to Metroplex. Specifically, the
mortgagor paid the total amount due to the mortgagee, but the record did
not reflect when or if a satisfaction of mortgage had been recorded.
Additionally, the deed to the redeemer was not recorded until four days after
the certificate of title had been issued to Metroplex. To further complicate
the situation, Metroplex had already conveyed the property to Mark Orman
when the deed to Precision was recorded. However, Metroplex repurchased
the property from Mr. Orman in order to bring this action. 38
While this case seems to implicate the recording act, it is never cited
in the decision. One interesting question is whether, based on the recording
act, Metroplex would still lose because it had actual notice that the
redemption would occur. Metroplex was a purchaser at a judicial sale and
was charged with notice that a right of redemption existed. As Chief Judge
Harris argued, these problems could be avoided by requiring redemption to
occur by depositing the total amount due with the clerk, rather than
extrajudicially with the mortgagee.
Rissman v. Kilboune.539 In 1980, Rissman contracted to purchase
real property in Alachua County. The property was encumbered by three
mortgages. Rissman gave an "all inclusive" note and mortgage to the
seller.54 After executing the purchase agreement, Rissman obtained
estoppel letters stating the balances due from each of the three mortgagees.
Two years later, Rissman sued the seller for breach of the purchase
warranties concerning the sewer system. As part of the judgment, he again
obtained estoppel letters from the three mortgagees. 41
In 1990, pursuant to a request for a payoff statement from one of the
mortgagees, the mortgagee responded by stating that there had been an error
in its prior estoppel letters and that an additional $67,000 was owed.542
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Metroplex, 647 So. 2d at 306 n.1.
539. 643 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
540. An "all-inclusive" note is like a wrap-around, except that here the seller/mortgagee
received only its excess portion of the loan payments; the buyer/mortgagor paid the three
preexisting mortgages directly, as if assuming them.
541. Rissman, 643 So. 2d at 1138.
542. Id.
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Rissman responded with three letters from his attorneys stating that the
mortgagee was estopped from asserting a different amount due and offering
to pay the balance under the estoppel letters. After receiving no response,
Rissman filed suit for a declaratory judgment on the balance. The trial
judge ruled in favor of the mortgagee without explanation. Rissman
appealed, claiming error in not finding estoppel and in holding that his
letters were not valid tenders of the amount due. 43 The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling that the three attorneys' letters were not
tenders because no actual tender of funds had been made.5" However, the
court reversed on the claim of estoppel, holding that Rissman relied on the
mortgagee's statements in the prior estoppel letters to his detriment. 45
The detrimental reliance consisted of Rissman's closing on the original
purchase, thereby relying on the amount stated as the balance of the mort-
gage.546
RSR Investments, Inc. v. Barnett Bank.547 Barnett obtained a foreclo-
sure judgment in the amount of $86,109.59. 48 Due to a clerical error by
Barnett's attorney, no one appeared on Barnett's behalf to bid at the
foreclosure sale. Further, a provision in the judgment required Barnett to
advance the costs of the sale, which it had not done. 49 The clerk of court
allowed RSR, along with another investor, to pay the sale costs. The sale
was held and RSR purchased the property with an unopposed bid of $5000.
Barnett's counsel then filed a motion to set aside the sale, arguing excusable
neglect in the clerical error and the gross inadequacy of the sale price.5
The trial court found the $5000 sale price "sublimely inadequate" and that
it raised a "presumption of bad faith on the part of the buyer. '551 The
property was apparently worth over $100,000. The Second District Court
of Appeal affirmed, holding that the unopposed bid price coming from an
investor experienced in real estate supported the trial court's finding that the
purchasers were not bona fide purchasers, and it was not inequitable to set
aside the sale.552
543. Id. at 1137.
544. Id. at 1140.
545. Id. at 1139.
546. Rissman, 643 So. 2d at 1139-40.
547. 647 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
548. Id. at 874.
549. Id.
550. Id. at 875.
551. Id.
552. RSR Investments, Inc., 647 So. 2d at 875.
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Judge Quince dissented, arguing that Barnett had caused its own harm
and that the trial court erred in the manner by which it took judicial notice
of the value of the property. Specifically, the trial court did not afford the
opposing side an opportunity to offer its own evidence on the matter." 3
As such, the trial court was not in a position to conclude that the sale price
was inadequate. Consequently, Judge Quince did not believe that the facts
justified setting aside the sale."
United National Bank v. Tellam.555 This decision is very relevant to
commercial banks and has the effect of invalidating many existing dragnet
clauses. The issue on appeal was whether a mortgagee can enforce a
dragnet clause in a promissory note against a preexisting obligation, the
basic purpose of dragnet clauses." 6 The court held that dragnet clauses
are to be strictly construed against the drafter and that debts incurred prior
to the security agreement are not covered within a dragnet clause, unless
those debts are specifically identified in the security agreement itself. 57
The requirement for specification seems reasonable because the lender will
know all prior debts. In addition, the requirement imparts record notice to
other lienors of the extent of coverage of the mortgage.5 '
The majority failed to note that in this case, the dragnet clause was
located in the note, not the mortgage. Furthermore, the note which
contained the dragnet clause was paid in full. The bank sought to use a
dragnet clause contained in a paid off note to make a mortgage, which
secured the paid off note, cover a separate note, now in default. The court
probably could have decided the case on these facts alone, and not set forth
a new restriction on dragnet clauses.
XXIV. OPTIONS
Summit Boulevard Animal Clinic v. Lemon Tree Plaza.59 The tenant
clinic sued the lessee for breach of the option and right of first refusal in a
commercial lease.56° The alleged breach was the lessor's failure to give
the clinic the chance to exercise its right to purchase the plaza at a fixed
price as provided in the commercial lease. The clinic lost at the trial court
553. Id. at 876 (Quince, J., dissenting).
554. Id.
555. 644 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
556. Id. at 97-98.
557. Id. at 98.
558. Id. at 99.
559. 641 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
560. Id. at 438.
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on a directed verdict because it failed to submit sufficient proof that it was
capable of completing the purchase at the specified price . 61 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed in an opinion written by Judge Steven-
son.
562
The court recognized that there were no Florida cases directly on point
and followed "the overwhelming weight of authority, t563 as illustrated by
the Massachusetts case of Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co. 564 The
optionee would only be harmed by the optionor's breach if he was deprived
of a right that he was planning to, and able to exercise. The optionee is the
one in possession of the evidence concerning his ability to perform, so the
burden of producing that evidence should fall on him.565  Where the
optionee's evidence could not establish it had the ability to perform, the trial
court properly granted a directed verdict.
566
XXV. PREMISES LiABILrrY
National Property Investors, II, Ltd. v. Attardo 67 The victim of an
abduction and sexual assault sued the owners of the apartment complex
where she lived. She claimed the owners were liable due to inadequate
lighting and security in the parking lot where the crimes occurred. The
owners filed a third-party action against the Southland Corporation, owners
of a nearby 7-Eleven store, alleging that Ms. Attardo had been threatened
and assaulted in the 7-Eleven parking lot. The trial court dismissed the
third-party complaint and Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed in a brief
opinion written by Chief Judge Harris. 568 The court reasoned that'the
third-party complaint was susceptible to two different interpretations.5 69
One was that there had been two separate assaults, one on the 7-Eleven lot
and one on the apartment lot.570 However, Ms. Attardo had not sued the
owner of the 7-Eleven for an assault on its lot; therefore, the apartment
owners did not have standing to do so.
561. Id.
562. Judge Gunther and Associate Judge Barr concurred. Id. at 439.
.563. Id. at 438.
564. 479 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1985).
565. Summit Boulevard, 641 So. 2d at 438-39 (citing Kanavos, 479 N.E.2d at 172).
566. Id. at 439.
567. 639 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
568. Judges Peterson and Diamantis concurred.
569. Id. at 692.
570. ld
1995]
347
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
Apparently, the second theory was that only one assault had oc-
curred.571 It began when the perpetrator was attracted to Ms. Attardo on
the 7-Eleven lot and came to fruition on the apartment lot. However, the
court found that the allegations did not suggest that any abduction or assault
took place on the 7-Eleven property. This led the court to conclude that
"[a]pparently the security at 7-Eleven ... was sufficient to protect its patron
so long as she remained there. 572 Consequently, there was no basis on
which the owner of the 7-Eleven could be held liable. The district court
suggested that owners of the 7-Eleven might be liable if the abduction
actually began on their lot. The court allowed them the chance to amend
the third-party complaint accordingly if they could do so "IN GOOD
FAITH.25
73
Paul v. Sea Watch of Panama City Beach, Inc. 4 A bar patron sued
for damages after she fell from a tall bar stool while tipping one of the male
nude dancers performing in the bar's review. She alleged that the bar was
negligent in allowing an unsafe and dangerous condition to exist at the club.
Specifically, there was a drastic drop-off of the floor area near the stage
where the live entertainers were performing which constituted unsafe seating
conditions. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant bar, but the First District Court of Appeal reversed. 5
The court stated: "[i]n Florida, a landowner owes two duties to an
invitee: (1) to warn the invitee of concealed dangers which are or should
be known to the owner but which the invitee cannot discover through the
exercise of due care, and (2) to keep its property in reasonably safe condi-
tion. 576 The district court agreed that the bar had no duty to warn patrons
of the difference in elevation of the floors because that was patent.
However, a genuine issue existed as to whether the bar was reasonably safe
because the bar may have allowed a dangerous condition to exist through
its policy of "condoning its patrons' consumption of unlimited alcohol and
permitting contact between the entertainers and the patrons who were seated
on high stools immediately next to an elevated dance floor. 5 77 Further-
more, liability based upon this theory, rather than on a theory that the dancer
acted negligently in his manner of accepting the tip, would have made the
571. Id.
572. Attardo, 639 So. 2d at 692.
573. Id.
574. 643 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
575. Id. at 666.
576. Id. at 667 (citations omitted).
577. Id.
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bar's claim that the dancers were independent contractors rather than
employees irrelevant. 78
XXVI. SALES
Bodon Industries, Inc. V. Brown.579  Bodon was an out-of-state
corporation seeking to acquire a concrete plant in Florida. A Texas operator
of a concrete plant learned of Bodon's interest and offered to assist Bodon
without receiving a commission. He hoped to be hired to work at whatever
facility Bodon acquired. He enlisted the help of his sister-in-law, a Florida
real estate broker.
The sister-in-law contacted the seller who executed an agreement to pay
a $50,000 commission, to be split equally between the sister-in-law's firm
and the seller's broker. Unfortunately, the negotiations fell through.
However, without the knowledge of the broker, the negotiations resumed
eight months later between the principals. Upon learning of the sale, the
brokers brought suit against the seller for the $50,000 commission or, in the
alternative, a commission based on quantum meruit.5 8 0 The jury verdict
was based upon the latter in the amount of $100,000, to be shared equally
by the seller's broker and buyer's sister-in-law.58
The seller brought this action against the buyer for indemnification
based upon a provision in the contract of sale that, "buyer agrees to save
harmless the seller from any claim by any party asserted for a real estate
commission, finder's fee or other compensation resulting from any action
taken by buyer., 582  The seller prevailed in the trial court, but lost on
appeal. Judge Peterson, writing for the Fifth District Court of Appeal,
applied traditional rules of broker-client relationships. 83 The court found
that the brokers were working for the seller, not the buyer.84 There was
no contract between the buyer and his sister-in-law.58s Rather, she was
entitled to a share of the commission as the selling broker due to an
independent agreement she had with the listing broker.586 In the absence
578. Id. at 667-68.
579. 645 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
580. Id. at 35.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Judges Sharp and Goshorn concurred. Id. at 36.
584. Bodon Indus., Inc., 645 So. 2d at 35.
585. Id.
586. Id. at 35-36.
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of a selling broker, the seller would have had to pay the full commission to
the listing broker. 87
The court held that an indemnity clause "must be construed strictly in
favor of the indemnitor when such provision is not given by one in the
insurance business but is given as an incident to a contract, the main
purpose of which is not indemnification. 588 This indemnity provision was
intended to protect the seller from being surprised by a claim for a broker's
commission, a particularly unpleasant surprise if it came after the seller had
already paid out the full commission. But since this claim should not have
been a surprise to this seller, the seller was not entitled to indemnification.
Munshower v. Martin.589 The seller agreed to sell a $257,000 house
to the buyer who, under an oral lease, was allowed to move in before the
closing. A short time after the parties signed the purchase and sale agree-
ment, Hurricane Andrew struck and damaged the roof of the house. The
seller's insurance company issued a $17,000 check for repairs. A dispute
ensued over who had a legal right to the funds. The buyer considered the
seller's claim to the funds to be a breach of the purchase and sale agreement
and refused to close. The seller then declared the buyer in default. The
buyer sued for specific performance, a declaratory judgment that he was
entitled to the insurance funds, quantum meruit for the cost of materials and
services paid by the buyer to repair the house prior to closing, and breach
of the oral lease.590
The trial court relied on a provision in the purchase/sale contract,
stating that if after a roof inspection, repairs were necessary and the amount
was in excess of two percent of the purchase price, the seller had the option
of paying the excess or cancelling the contract if the buyer refused to pay
for the excess. 59' Because of this option, the seller was not compelled to
specifically perform. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed.5"
Judge Nesbitt's opinion focused upon a different contract provision and it
expressly placed the risk of loss prior to closing on the seller.593 The
court held that this risk of loss provision, and not the roof inspection
provision, was the controlling clause in the case of casualty loss. The
doctrine of equitable conversion, which would have shifted the risk of loss
587. Id. at 35.
588. Id. at 36.
589. 641 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
590. Id. at 910.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 910-11.
593. Id. at 910.
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to the buyer, was not applied because the parties had expressly agreed to a
different risk allocation.594 Therefore, the seller would be responsible for
the repairs, would have to indemnify the buyer for the buyer's out of pocket
repair costs, and would have to specifically perform.5 95 Consequently, the
seller was entitled to the insurance funds. 96
Ivanov v. Sobel.597 The Ivanovs sought the assistance of a broker to
purchase a home. After negotiations, they entered a contract to purchase a
home for $300,000, placing a $30,000 deposit in the broker's trust account.
To facilitate the closing, the salesperson suggested that the Ivanovs form a
Florida corporation, place the money to close in the corporate account, and
authorize the salesperson to issue checks from that account. The salesperson
then absconded with the money causing the Ivanovs to default on the
purchase contract. After the default, the realtor disbursed the deposit to the
sellers. The Ivanovs sued the sellers, the broker, and the salesperson.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the sellers and
the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 98 The court concluded that
the sellers were innocent and could not be held responsible for the
intentional wrongful act of the real estate salesperson.599 The salesper-
son's wrongful act could not have been anticipated and it certainly did not
further the seller's interests since it caused them the loss of the sale.6W
The buyers had in fact-defaulted and the sellers were, therefore, entitled to
rely upon the liquidated damages clause."1
It is unfortunate, however, that the court did not elaborate on the
agency relationship which the seller had with the broker and its salesperson.
Traditionally, the selling broker would be considered to be the sub-agent of
the seller unless a different arrangement had been agreed upon. It was not
suggested that the Ivanovs had contracted for the broker to be its agent, for
example, to act as the buyer's broker. Nor was there any suggestion that a
dual agency relationship existed. Consequently, it appeared that the money
was probably misappropriated from the sellers' agent. The court referred to
the rule, "where one of two innocent persons must suffer from the wrongful
594. Munshower, 641 So. 2d at 911.
595. Ia
596. Id at 910-11.
597. 654 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
598. Chief Judge Schwartz and Judges Nesbitt and Cope concurred in the per curiam
opinion.
599. Id. at 992.
600. Id.
601. Id
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act of a third, the person who made the wrongful act possible must bear the
loss."'  Would the application of that rule put the burden on the agent's
principal who, in this case, just might be the seller? It is a thought which
bears investigating.
Wasser v. Sasoni.63  The contract to buy a sixty-seven-year-old
apartment building expressly provided that the sale was "as is" and
contained standard inspection and integration clauses. After the closing, the
buyer had the building inspected and discovered that it had structural
problems. He sued for fraud and the trial court granted summary judgment
to the seller.' The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 5
The court held, in an opinion written by Judge Gersten, that caveat
emptor is still the law in commercial real estate transactions. 616 Here, the
sophisticated buyer had agreed to a contract with an "as is" provision and
an integration clause. There were no allegations that this agreement was
procured by fraud. Moreover, it has long been established that "a misrepre-
sentation is not actionable where its truth might have been discovered by the
exercise of ordinary diligence."'  He had the opportunity to inspect prior
to closing, but chose not to exercise that right. The seller's statement that
it was "a very good building" and that it required only a "normal type of
maintenance" 6 8 constituted only the seller's opinion or, at most, puffing
under the circumstances.
XXVII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Hummel v. Stenstrom-Strump Construction & Development Corp. W
9
The Hummels, owners of land in Sanford, Florida, contracted with the
defendant builder to construct a home on the Hummels' lot. The builder
submitted the plans to the City of Sanford for approval and then built the
home. The City issued a certificate of occupancy once the home was
completed and the Hummels moved in. Shortly thereafter, stormwater
602. Ivanov, 654 So. 2d at 992 (citing Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Seawright, 134
So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961), cert. denied, 143 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1962)).
603. 652 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
604. Id. at 412.
605. Id. at 413.
606. Id. at 412.
607. Id.
608. Wasser, 652 So. 2d at 412.
609. 648 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). This case was also discussed
previously in Part VI with regard to the issues relating to construction. See supra text
accompanying notes 79-86.
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flooded the house and caused physical damage to the home and its contents.
The Hummels sued the builder for fraud, negligent misrepresentation with
regard to the elevation and drainage capability of the property, as well as
breach of contract.610  The Hummels also sued the City of Sanford for
negligence in approving the plans and inspecting the builder's work, for
breach of the City's warranties contained in the certificate of occupancy, and
for negligent operation and maintenance of its stormwater drainage sys-
tem.61 The City asserted sovereign immunity and argued that it did not
owe a duty to the plaintiffs.61 2 The Fifth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of the Hummel's claims against the City
for negligence in approving the plans and inspecting the construction, as
well as the claims for breach of warranties based on the certificate of
occupancy.6 11 The court, quoting Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah,614 stated:
We find no indication that chapter 553 [Building Construction Stan-
dards] was intended as a means to guarantee the quality of buildings for
individual property owners or developers. We find that the enforcement
of building codes and ordinances is for the purpose of protecting the
health and safety of the public, not the personal or property interests of
individual citizens ....
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal
of the plaintiffs action based on its failure to maintain and operate its
stormwater drainage system. The Hummels were permitted to amend their
defective complaint to state a cause of action under the precedent of Slemp
v. City of North Miami,61 6 which held that such actions may be brought
against municipalities if their drainage systems fail to operate as intended,
or do not meet the standards required by the building codes.
617
610. Id. at 1240.
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. Id. at 1240-41.
614. 468 So. 2d 912, 922-23 (Fla. 1985).
615. Hummel, 648 So. 2d at 1240 (quoting Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n., 468 So.
2d 912, 922-23 (Fla. 1985)).
616. 545 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1989).
617. Hummel, 648 So. 2d at 1240-41.
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XXVIII. TAX DEED SALES
DeMario v. Franklin Mortgage & Investment Co., Inc.618 Demario
and the other appellants were lienholders of an unsatisfied mortgage on a
property sold in a tax deed sale. They appealed a partial summary judgment
awarding $125,000 in surplus funds from the sale to Franklin Mortgage, the
last title holder of record.619 The Fourth District Court of Appeal re-
versed, holding that the appellants had a superior claim to the surplus
funds.62
The facts are fairly interesting. DeMario sold the subject parcel of land
on Worth Avenue in Palm Beach to a Franklin DeMarco in 1986 for
$3,150,000. DeMarco paid $900,000 down and DeMario took back a four
year, $4,250,000 note secured by a purchase money first mortgage. In 1990,
DeMarco defaulted and DeMario foreclosed. In 1991, the parties entered
into a settlement and escrow agreement under which DeMarco was given six
months to perform his obligations under the note and mortgage.6 21
DeMarco was required to quitclaim the property to an escrow agent, who
would convey the property to DeMario if DeMarco failed to perform.
However, DeMarco was given further extensions. Somehow, DeMarco was
still able to quitclaim the property from himself to the appellee, an insolvent
real estate company in which DeMarco was the sole shareholder. The
investment company paid no consideration for the property. Furthermore,
this rendered the escrowed deed ineffective because it fell outside the
property's chain of title.
After the last day of the extension passed without payment, DeMario
proceeded with foreclosure. The court granted summary judgment for
DeMario, but delayed entry of judgment based on DeMarco's assertion that
he had a buyer for the property. Franklin Investment, the quitclaim grantee,
then for filed bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Columbia, resulting in an automatic stay of the foreclosure
proceeding. The bankruptcy court later dismissed Franklin Investment's
petition, finding it constituted a substantial abuse of process and that it was
filed in bad faith as a delay tactic.
However, before the foreclosure could be completed, because neither
party paid $355,002.39 in property taxes that had accrued, the property was
sold at a tax sale. The buyer at the tax sale purchased the property for a
618. 648 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
619. Id. at 211.
620. Id.
621. Id.
352 Vol 20
354
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Brown / Grohman / Valcarcel
bargain price of $350,010, leaving a $125,000 surplus. The clerk of court
issued a notarized written notice to all persons having an interest in the
property according to the abstract of title. The notice required that anyone
claiming the surplus funds must submit a notarized written claim within
ninety days. DeMario's wife submitted an unnotarized claim which was
rejected. DeMarco submitted a timely notarized claim. DeMario's attorney
then filed a notarized claim one day after the ninety-day deadline had
expired. The trial court refused to recognize DeMario's late claim.6'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal referred to Florida Statutes,
chapter 197, sections 197.582(2), 197.473, 197.502(4) and 197.522(1)(a),
and rule 12D-13.065 of the Florida Administrative Code, and held that the
applicable statute of limitations for claims to surplus funds in a tax deed sale
is two years.' z The court held that the notarized statement of claim
required by rule 12D-13.065(4) does not impose a ninety-day claims bar for
persons otherwise entitled to distribution of surplus tax sale proceeds.624
In such instances, if a "particular lien appears to be entitled to priority and
the lienholder has not come forward and made a claim to the excess funds,
payment cannot be made to other junior lienholders.., and the clerk should
initiate an interpleader action .... 625
In this case, an interpleader action was not required because the
appellants had filed their claim, albeit on the ninety-first day.626 Addition-
ally, the ninety-day time period refers only to the amount of time the clerk
must hold the proceeds before turning them over to the board of county
commissioners. The board of county commissioners can keep the funds
only after two years have passed. Therefore, the DeMarios were entitled to
the surplus.627
XXIX. TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY
City of Punta Gorda v. Burnt.Store Hotel, Inc.62s The City of Punta
Gorda appealed an order determining that a capacity increase fee was
actually an illegal tax. The issue arose from a utility contract between the
City and the hotel, which had purchased an existing hotel property that was
622. l at 212.
623. DeMario, 648 So. 2d at 212.
624. Id. at 213.
625. Id.
626. Id. at 213-14.
627. Id. at 214.
628. 639 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). This case was discussed previously
in Part XVI with regard to land use planning. See supra text accompanying notes 347-50.
1995]
355
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
connected to the City's water and sewer system. As a new utility customer,
the hotel was required to sign an agreement to pay for increases in average
consumption, also known as an impact fee.629 Due to increased consump-
tion, the hotel was charged $154,000. The City argued that the costs of
increased consumption should be charged to the party responsible for the
increased consumption. The hotel argued that because the newly acquired
property had not been changed structurally and existed in the same capacity
as it had under previous ownership, the City had already accounted for all
new increases.630
The court affirmed the lower court's order ruling that the impact fee
was an illegal tax.63' The court stated that impact fees are justified when
there is a nexus between new construction and a population increase
(increased consumption) that will affect the infrastructure and require
additional capital expenditure.632 The court noted, "[c]hange of ownership
of an existing business does not provide the required nexus even though the
continuation of the business results in increased usage. 633 Additionally,
in dicta, the court reaffirmed the proposition in City of Tarpon Springs v.
Tarpon Springs Arcade, Ltd.,634 that structural changes alone are also
insufficient to justify an impact fee when there is no showing of additional
usage. The present case would add "and vice versa" to the above proposi-
tion.
Davis v. St. Joe Paper Co. 635 Richard Davis, property appraiser of
Bay County, along with Larry Fuchs, Executive Director of the Department
of Revenue, appealed the lower court's decision reversing the property
appraiser's denial of an agricultural use classification for property owned by
the St. Joe Paper Company.636 Section 193.461 (3)(b) of the Florida Stat-
utes, states that lands must be used primarily for "bona fide agricultural
purposes" in order to be classified as agricultural. The court noted that,
"bona fide agricultural purposes" means good faith commercial agricultural
use of the land. Section 193.461 sets forth factors to be considered in
making the determination. The First District Court of Appeal held that the
property owner failed to show that the property appraiser did not consider
629. Id. at 679-80.
630. Id. at 680.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Punta Gorda, 639 So. 2d at 680.
634. 585 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
635. 652 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
636. Id. at 908.
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the statutory factors or no reasonable hypothesis supported the appraiser's
determination that the subject property was not primarily used for bona fide
agricultural purposes.637 Consequently, the court reversed and remand-
ed. 638
Florida Department of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Authority639 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the Canaveral Port Authority,
created in 1953 by special act of the legislature for the purpose of operating
the port in Brevard County, was not exempt from ad valorem taxation on
portions of property leased to nongovernmental lessees who were not
performing a governmental-exempt function.'
The court stated that political subdivisions, such as counties, are
immune from taxation. 6" However, a business-type organization lacking
the usual incidents and powers of a governmental subdivision will not be
immune, and may not even be exempt, from taxation.6" The distinguish-
ing quality is that political subdivisions are a branch of the general adminis-
tration of the policy of the state, as in the case of school boards, state
agencies, and departments.64 The court held that the Canaveral Port
Authority did not fit this description, and therefore, was not immune from
taxation.644 The court recognized that the Port does have an exemption,
but it only applied to property used for government purposes."
Florida Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue. 6" The Florida Manufactured Housing Association ("FMHA"),
filed a petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings to challenge
proposed Florida Administrative Code rules 12D-6.001 and 12D-6.002,
which deal with the taxation of mobile homes, on grounds that section
193.075 of the Florida Statutes violates the constitutional prohibition against
ad valorem taxation of mobile homes. The petition was denied and FMHA
appealed.647
637. Id. at 909.
638. Id.
639. 642 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
640. Id. at 1103.
641. Id. at 1099.
642. Id. at 1100-01.
643. Id. at 1101.
644. Canaveral Port Auth., 642 So. 2d at 1101-02.
645. Id. at 1103.
646. 642 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
647. Id. at 626-27.
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The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting the argument that
section 193.075 of the Florida Statutes is unconstitutional."8 The court
noted that "[a]rticle VII, section (b) of the Florida Constitution provides that
'mobile homes, as defined by law, . . shall not be subject to ad valorem
taxes."' ' 9 Section 193.075, as amended in 1991, takes mobile homes
which are permanently affixed to land owned by the mobile home owner out
of the definition of mobile homes. Therefore, by changing the definition of
mobile homes, they are now subject to ad valorem taxation.6"
Judge Benton concurred to point out that since the litigation began, the
relevant administrative rules were amended to deal with what FMHA was
most concerned about, ad valorem taxation of mobile homes inventoried by
dealers and manufacturers on grounds that they were permanently affixed to
realty.651 Dealers often have models or samples on display which are
anchored down. The court noted that, "[a] mobile home that is taxed as real
property shall be issued an 'RP' series sticker as provided in [section]
320.0815. "652
Green v. Greider.653  Section 125.0104 of the Florida Statutes
authorizes any county to levy a tourist development tax on leases of certain
living accommodations for a term of six Months or less. The Clerk of the
Lee County Circuit Court imposed such a tax on the appellee's rental
condominium units. The appellee responded to this tax by making the
leases last for six months and one day. The Clerk sued and the trial court
held that the tax could not be imposed on the appellee's units because of the
manipulated lease terms. The Clerk appealed, arguing that the six-month-
and-one-day terms were in effect shorter because the lessees paid the same
amount and did not occupy the units for the full term. The Second District
Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court's decision denying
the imposition of the tax.6 4
Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre.655  The Sebring Airport
Authority is a legislatively created public body. From 1970 to 1991, it
promoted and operated the "12 Hours of Sebring" on its property. In 1991,
the Authority leased the raceway to "Sebring International Raceway," a
648. Id. at 627.
649. Id. (emphasis omitted).
650. Id.
651. Florida Manufactured Hous. Ass'n, Inc., 642 So. 2d at 627 (Benton, J., concurring).
652. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 193.075(1) (1993)).
653. 645 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
654. Id.
655. 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994).
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for-profit corporation. The Highlands County Property Appraiser assessed
and levied ad valorem real property taxes on the leased property. The
Raceway corporation sought an exemption under section 196.199(2)(a) of
the Florida Statutes, arguing that the property was being used to further a
public purpose, as it had been from 1970 through 1991. In the litigation
that ensued, both the trial court and the district court of appeal denied the
6-56exemption.
The supreme court first set out the general principle that all property
is subject to taxation unless expressly exempt and such exemptions are
strictly construed against the party claiming them.657  Then the court
analyzed section 196.199(2)(a). The court held that the exemptions
contemplated under that subsection of the statute relate to
''governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to
"governmental-proprietary" functions.5 The former deals with use of
governmental property by non-governmental entities to perform functions
which would otherwise be within the traditional administrative duties of the
government. The latter deals with use of governmental property by
non-governmental entities to carry on functions which are for the profit of
the non-governmental entity and would not fall within the valid functions
of the government. Although the distinction is not clearcut, the court stated
that no exemption is granted to nongovernmental lessees of governmental
property when the lessee uses the property for governmental-proprietary
purposes.659 Therefore, because the raceway corporation, as a for-profit
lessee, was leasing the property for governmental-proprietary purposes, it
was not entitled to an exemption from property taxes.6 60
Government-owned property is subject to tax if leased to a private party for
that party's own profit aims.6 6 1
Wilkinson v. Kirby.662 The Lee County Property Appraiser, Kenneth
Wilkinson, and the Lee County Tax Collector appealed judgments granting
an agricultural classification under section 193.461 of the Florida Statutes
to Larry Kirby, the trustee of a land trust in Cape Coral. The land was
originally intended to be developed into a planned unit development, but
was later used as a tree farm when the prospects for development weakened.
656. Id. at 1073.
657. Id.
658. Id.
659. Id. at 1074.
660. Sebring Airport Auth., 642 So. 2d at 1074.
661. Id. at 1073.
662. 654 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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In 1991, the trust applied for an agricultural classification, which the
Property Appraiser denied.663 The County Value Adjustment Board
denied an appeal and Kirby filed suit.664 The trial court found that in
1991, eighteen acres had been used for bona fide agricultural purposes, and
in 1992 that number rose to twenty-four acres.665 The Property Appraiser
argued that under section 193.461, which sets out the factors for determining
bona fide agricultural purpose and includes a catch all, the zoning classifica-
tion was relevant. Here, the property had been zoned for most of the time
as planned unit, also known as PU, and was currently rezoned as residential
development, also known as RD. The court stated that this was not
important because the land was not zoned agricultural even when the trust
purchased it.666  The Property Appraiser also pointed to the lack of
profitability as a factor. The land trust which owned the farm transferred
trees to related corporations without generating income. The court stated
that the tree farm still had a profit motive and was not a sham.667 There-
fore, the court affirmed the agricultural classification of the land.668
XXX. USURY
Jersey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper.669 Jersey Palm-Gross, a real estate
developer, made a loan to the defendant real estate partnership. The loan
amount was $200,000, and the interest rate was fifteen percent for eighteen
months, amounting to $45,000 in interest charges. The developer/lender
also demanded a fifteen percent equity interest in the partnership. The court
valued the partnership at $600,000.670 The borrowers agreed to grant the
equity interest, not being in a position to bargain or seek other financing.
Therefore, the total charge for the loan was fifteen percent of $600,000,
which equals $90,000, plus $45,000, which equals $135,000. The $200,000
loan cost $135,000, which is equivalent to a forty-five percent per annum
interest rate over the eighteen month term of the loan. The loan seems to
have been a mix between equity sharing and a participating mortgage. The
663. Id. at 196.
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. Wilkinson, 654 So. 2d at 196.
667. Id. at 197.
668. Id.
669. 639 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
670. Id. at 667.
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lender did not want to be a joint venturer, but did want a portion of the
equity in addition to its interest charge.
The borrowers defaulted, the developer/lender sued, and the borrowers
made a usury defense, arguing the debt was unenforceable because they
were being charged what amounted to forty-five percent per annum in
interest. The trial court held in favor of the borrowers, finding usury, and
the lender appealed.67
The court discussed usury law as stated in chapter 687 of the Florida
Statutes. The cause of action has four elements:
1. A loan, either express or implied.
2. An understanding that the money must be repaid.
3. In consideration of the loan, a greater rate of interest than is allowed
by law is paid or agreed to be paid by the borrower.
4. Intent to charge a usurious rate, sometimes referred to as corrupt
intent.6 72
The intent is determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances,
including looking beyond just the loan documents.
Civil usury involves loans of $500,000 or less, and an interest rate
greater than eighteen percent, but less than twenty-five percent. Whereas
criminal usury involves any loan amount with a rate of interest greater than
twenty-five percent, but less than forty-five percent. Penalties for civil
usury include forfeiture of all interest charged. If the usury rises to the level
of criminal usury, the penalties include the forfeiture of the right to collect
the debt.673
In this case the first three elements were conceded by the lender. The
lender argued a lack of usurious intent and pointed to a "usury savings
clause" in the note. The clause disclaimed intent and would automatically
amend the transaction to remove any charges deemed by a court to be
usurious. The court held that the lender had knowledge of the amount
charged for the loan, which established the intent element. 674 Therefore,
"usurious intent" means purpose or knowledge in the way of consciousness,
and not necessarily ill will or corrupt motive.675 The intent is not negated
as a matter of law by the insertion of a disclaimer of usurious intent in the
671. Id. at 666.
672. Id. (citations omitted).
673. Id. at 667.
674. Jersey Palm-Gross, 639 So. 2d at 668.
675. Id.
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note, at least in the case of transactions which are usurious at the outset.
The only way a lender can be certain to defeat a claim of usury is through
section 687.04(2), which requires the lender to take affirmative action to
notify and refund the overcharge before the borrower raises the claim of
usury in litigation.676 Of course, this section applies to civil, not criminal
usury.677 Here, because the amount charged exceeded the usury limit from
the outset, and exceeded the limit by so much, the court found the savings
clause of little weight and affirmed the trial court's judgment for the
borrowers.678
The dissent, which even quotes Polonius in Hamlet, disagreed and
questioned the valuation of the fifteen percent equity interest in the
partnership, which was the charge which made the transaction usurious.67 9
The partnership was arguably fully leveraged, and therefore, there was really
no equity. Thus, the fifteen percent interest was not worth anything at the
outset. The argument makes sense because it is generally agreed that
money, which is not absolutely payable, is not interest for usury purposes.
However, the elements of the cause of action as listed by the court do not
emphasize this concept. The fifteen percent partnership interest was not
absolutely payable. Rather, it was contingent on the presence of real equity,
and there was no such showing.
XXXI. WATER AND WATER COURSES
Macnamara v. Kissimmee River Valley Sportsman's Ass'n.680
Macnamara, a riparian owner, fenced-off a spoil island. Section 253.12(1)
of the Florida Statutes and article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution
provide that spoil islands and navigable waters are public lands held by the
state in trust for public use and enjoyment. The island in question was
formed in the 1960s from the "spoil" produced from dredging a canal as
part of the Southern Florida Flood Control Project.
The Sportsmans' Association, which used the island for recreation, sued
as relator for the State of Florida. The title holder of the spoil island, the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund, intervened on their side. The court held
676. Id. at 670.
677. Id.
678. Id. at 671.
679. Jersey Palm-Gross, 639 So. 2d at 672 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
680. 648 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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that the association had standing as a representative of the people in a quo
warranto proceeding.
61
The issue was whether the island was within the water boundary of
Macnamara's lots. Macnamara's lots are government lots. The water
boundary of government lots is the "ordinary high water boundary,"
meaning, the true line of ordinary high water, and not the meander line
plotted by the public lands surveyors.682
The boundary usually results in the land boundary extending less into the
water than when meander lines are used. Using the high water boundary the
area fenced off was beyond the land boundary and into the "federal
navigation servitude.' 683
Private riparian owners can exclude the public from portions of lakes
that have been the subject of sovereignty sales. However, Ma'cnamara did
not buy the lake bottoms from the State, and thus could not exclude the
public. Therefore, the court ordered Macnamara to remove the fence.614
Macnamara made an estoppel argument that he was granted a permit
from the Army Corps of Engineers, and obtained verbal approval from the
Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Environmental
Regulation, and the Water Management District.685 Macnamara also
claimed that he paid ad valorem taxes on the fenced land. The court held
that estoppel did not apply because Macnamara had not relied on any
positive act from an authorized official. Furthermore, taxes had not been
assessed on the area in question because the assessors relied on meander line
boundaries.686
XXXII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of cases and legislation presents selected
materials of significance to real estate professionals. One thing is clear:
there is no shortage of litigation in the real estate area, although there seems
to be no consistent pattern to the case law and legislative development.
681. Id. at 163.
682. Meander lines are a series of straight lines intended to approximate the shoreline.
Boundaries figured using meander lines will be different from the "ordinary high water
boundary," which is figured by a straight line marked at the furthest point actually exposed
at the high water mark.
683. Id. at 162.
684. Id. at 165.
685. Id. at 162-63.
686. MacNamara, 648 So. 2d at 163.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last year has been an explosive one in the tort arena. In lawyer
advertising, "Went For It" went for it, but the Supreme Court of the United
States did not. Defendants "discovered" more discovery from non-parties,
and an expert's expertise was expertly blocked when plaintiffs were barred
from seeking to obtain certain financial discovery from defendants' experts.
With regard to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, we learned that just
because you say it doesn't mean they get it. We were also educated on the
"fees"ability of obtaining attorney's fees, whether or not you had a
reservation. On bringing certain claims after they have previously been
adjudicated, the "res" is history.
The "Fabre monster" reared its ugly head, but two state supreme court
justices nearly stabbed it to death. The court took another bite out of dog
owners and warned physicians once again about the "duty to warn." We
learned that you don't always win with the "economic loss rule," and that
you still need to make an "impact" to succeed in certain tort cases. Another
court gave life to wrongful death cases involving a fetus. We were
informed that the "misuse" absolute defense is absolutely dead in products
liability cases. The Florida Department of Corrections learned that they
won't get away with an escapee getting away. With regard to the seatbelt
defense, we buckled down on buckling up, as Bulldog remained the big dog
in town. ",You got without having," as our supreme court eliminated the
need for permanent injury to recover in tort. We were told that absolute
immunity absolutely immunized a party in certain situations. Finding
voluntary dismissal different from an adjudication on the merits, we were
informed that just because you're done doesn't mean you're finished.
Although lawyers are talented people, they were unable in contribution cases
to make ten equal one hundred. Our supreme court stated that it is no
longer fairly debatable that it is fairly debatable, and we saw insurance
companies come out from hiding (behind defendants). We learned that you
should not "prejudge" the "interest"ing prejudgment development, and courts
expressed the vitality of implied covenants. We close with the punitive
warning that you may be damaged if you damage others.
II. PERSONAL INJURY SOLICITATION: "WENT FOR IT" CAN'T Go
FOR IT
Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and 4-7.8(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar
prohibit personal injury lawyers from engaging in targeted direct-mail
1995]
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solicitation to victims or their relatives until at least thirty days following an
accident or disaster.! The rules also prevent a lawyer from accepting a
referral of a client that has been solicited in such a manner.2 The Supreme
Court of the United States in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.3 upheld this
restriction, finding that lawyer solicitation was commercial speech entitled
only to limited First Amendment protection.
4
The Court found that the restriction satisfied all three prongs of the
intermediate scrutiny test.5 More particularly, the Court reasoned that 1)
the Bar had a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of
personal injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited
contact by lawyers;6 2) the harms targeted by the prohibition were real,
1. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2"374 (1995). The rules at issue in
Florida Bar prohibited lawyers from soliciting victims, or relatives of victims, by means of
targeted direct-mail advertising for 30 days following a disaster or accepting a referral for
a client that had been solicited in such a manner. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.4, 4-7.8.
2. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
3. Id. In March of 1992, G. Stewart McHenry, an attorney, and his lawyer referral
service, Went For It, Inc., claimed that the restriction of their direct-mail campaign was a
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in their action for declaratory and
injunctive relief. Id. Before trial, another Florida lawyer, John Blakely, was substituted in
McHenry's place. Id. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed based upon Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977),
and its progeny. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374-75. The Court, however, noted that it was
"'disturbed that Bates and its progeny require[d] the decision' that it reached." Id. at 2375
(quoting Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (1 1th Cir. 1994)).
4. Id. In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a two-year study regarding the effects of
lawyer advertising on public opinion and determined that changes to the rules governing
lawyer solicitation were required. Id. at 2374. In 1990, the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the Bar's proposed amendments. Id. (citing The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990)).
5. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376-81. The three-prong test is taken from Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. In Central Hudson, the Court stated that if
commercial speech is not misleading and does not concern unlawful activity, then it may be
freely regulated if: 1) the government asserts a substantial interest in support of regulating
the commercial speech; 2) the government demonstrates that the restriction directly and
materially advances that interest; and 3) the regulation is narrowly drawn. Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 564-65.
6. The Court had "little trouble" finding a substantial interest for the Bar's regulation,
citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975), among others. Florida Bar,
115 S. Ct. at 2376.
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demonstrable, and sufficient to justify restriction of such speech;7 and 3) the
ban's scope was reasonably well-tailored to meet the stated objectives.8
The dissent9 asserted that the majority misapplied Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n ° and that the three-prong test of Central Hudson was not
met." It found the first prong was not satisfied because the Shapero
case-which approved a similar form of advertising-was indistinguishable
from the case at bar.' The dissent asserted the second prong of Central
Hudson was not met either, in that the restriction on speech did not support
the state's asserted interest in a direct and material way. 3 Finally,
according to the four justices, the third prong was not met because "the
relationship between the Bar's interests and the means chosen to serve them
[was] not a reasonable fit.' ' 4
IL. DISCOVERY
A. "What's Up Doc?"
Reiterating the general discovery rule of nondisclosure of the names of
a private physician's patients who are not parties to the action, the First
7. The Court distinguished Edenfeld v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993), finding that
contrary to the 106-page study proffered in Florida Bar, the State Board of Accountancy in
Edenfeld had presented no studies in support of its regulation. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at
2377. In fact, the Court found "the only evidence in the record tended to 'contradic[t] rather
than strengthe[n] the Board's submissions."' Id. (quoting Edenfeld, 113 S. Ct. at 1801).
Therefore, the Court invalidated the regulation banning in-person solicitation by C.P.A's.
Id.
8. Id. at 2380. The 30-day waiting period was not overly restrictive and numerous
alternatives exist to direct-mail solicitation in order for injured parties to become aware of
legal representation. Id. However, the Court admitted it may have had greater difficulty in
upholding the Florida Bar rules had the restriction not been limited to a brief period, and if
other ways to learn about the availability of legal representation had not existed. Florida
Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
9. The dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsberg. Id. at 2381.
10. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
11. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2382-86.
12. Id. at 2382-83. The dissent's principal disagreement in this regard was based on the
finding in Shapero that direct-mail advertising was not "overreaching and undue influence."
Id. at 2382.
13. Id. at 2383-84.
14. Il at 2384. The dissent described the Florida Bar's rule as a "flat ban" which
prohibited more speech than necessary to achieve the state's purported interest. Florida Bar,
115 S. Ct. at 2384.
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District Court of Appeal in Staman v. Lipman 5 held that non-party patients
have a privacy interest in not having their names revealed in a medical
malpractice action." The court reasoned that the names of the non-party
patients of the private physician are not relevant to 1) whether the defendant
physician obtained informed consent from the plaintiff or 2) whether he
deviated from the community standard of care while treating the plaintiff. 7
In refusing to allow discovery of the doctor's sign-in logs in Staman, the
court distinguished Big Son Health Care Systems, Inc. v. Prescott,8 on the
basis that the discovery of hospital records (i.e., emergency room sign-in
records) in that case were subject to limited disclosure by statute.'
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Amente v. Newman,
20
held Florida Statutes section 455.241(2) inapplicable to requests for
complete medical records, as long as those medical records are properly
redacted so as to protect the patient's identity.2" The court found no
violation of the patients' rights of privacy where all identifying information
15. 641 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Staman concerned sign-in logs from
a physician's private office, where disclosure of the patients' names would not only violate
those non-party patients' privacy interests but allegedly would cause irreparable injury to the
physician's professional reputation. Id. at 455.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 582 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding hospital sign-in logs
containing limited information are discoverable because patients listed on them have no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the logs since any other patient who signs
in could view the names of patients who signed previously).
19. Staman, 641 So. 2d at 454-55 (citing Prescott, 582 So. 2d at 758). Chief Judge
Zehmer dissented, asserting that there was no privacy interest in allowing disclosure of the
names appearing on the "sign-in" log, as they were "open and available for inspection by all
persons who signed in at the doctor's office on a given day." Id. at 455 (Zehmer, J.,
dissenting).
20. 653 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1995).
21. Id. at 1032
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was eliminated,' but conceded that there may be circumstances where the
privacy of one's medical records would be constitutionally protected.23
22. ld. at 1033. The court approved Amisub, Inc. v. Kemper, 543 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989), and Ventimiglia ex reL Ventimiglia v. Moffit, 502 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986), but expressly disapproved the following cases: Leikensohn v.
Cornwell, 434 So. 2d 1030, 1030-31 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding medical
malpractice defendant could not be compelled to answer interrogatory which requested non-
party patient's initials, date of surgery, and name of hospital where surgery was performed);
North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding hospital was not required to answer interrogatory
concerning hospitalization records of patients not involved in the suit because this would
"impermissibly compromise their right to the confidentiality of their medical records");
Teperson v. Donato, 371 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding order
requiring production of non-parties' medical records was error because the question of
medical malpractice is whether the doctor used a standard of care commensurate with that
used in the community, and this question can be answered by methods other than invading
the medical records of strangers); and Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Peralta, 358 So. 2d 232, 233
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (holding order requiring production of medical records and
photographs of non-parties was in error because "to permit a party to inject into the public
record medical information of a stranger to the suit, under the guise that it has a bearing on
the competency of the doctor, would be unconscionable"), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 889 (Fla.
1978).
23. Amente, 653 So. 2d at 1033. The impact of this decision is evident in Bassette v.
Health Management Resources Corp., 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1938 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug.
23, 1995). In this case, the plaintiff alleged she suffered physical and psychological injuries
from the purchase and consumption of a powdered diet food product. Thereafter, the
respondent, Health Management, sought and was granted non-party discovery of the medical
records of Dr. Bassette, the father of the plaintiff, on the basis of its assertion that such
discovery would be useful in confirming whether there is a history of depression or other
mental illnesses in plaintiff's family. Id. at D1938. The Second District Court of Appeal
held that "T]ust because one family member files a lawsuit that places her medical condition
at issue does not mean that the medical history of her entire, or even immediate family,
becomes relevant for discovery purposes." Id. For another case addressing the issue of the
disclosure of a non-party's medical records, see In re Fink, 876 F.2d 84, 85 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
(applying Florida law in granting writ of mandamus to prohibit the discovery of medical
records of non-parties, also stating that "[t]he Florida courts have consistently refused to
permit discovery of the medical records of non-parties to an action"); accord Dierick v.
Cottage Hosp. Corp., 393 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that although
medical records relating to the patient's siblings might have been relevant to the defendant's
theory of a genetically transmitted defect, the records were privileged and not subject to
discovery).
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B. A Prescription for Compulsion
A plaintiff can be compelled to sign, execute, and deliver medical
authorization forms to the defendant so as to allow the defendant to directly
obtain the plaintiffs out-of-state medical records. In Rojas v. Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc.,24 the plaintiffs, residents of Massachusetts, sustained injuries
in an auto accident that occurred in Florida. The plaintiffs filed suit
seeking damages for their injuries and for aggravation of other previously
existing medical conditions.26 When the defendant was unsuccessful in
obtaining discovery of the plaintiffs' Massachusetts medical records, they
petitioned the court to compel such discovery.27 The court's ruling
required the plaintiff to execute a blank medical authorization form, without
requiring the defendants to institute a separate action in Massachusetts. 2s
The court apparently treated the Massachusetts medical providers like
Florida residents, reasoning that this discovery method provided the most
practical and least burdensome method for obtaining the records, in that
neither party should be placed in a different position or be prejudiced just
because a medical facility is located out-of-state.29 The court also noted
that the out-of-state medical records requested by the defendants were "non-
24. 641 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1994).
25. Id. at 856.
26. Id. During discovery, the defendants attempted to obtain the plaintiffs' medical
records using subpoenas filed pursuant to rule 1.351 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. However, the medical facilities in Massachusetts, where the plaintiffs were treated,
refused to supply the records. Id.
27. Rojas, 641 So. 2d at 856.
28. Id. at 857.
29. Id. The court stated that "[i]t makes no sense to impose a more costly and time-
consuming discovery process on the seeking party solely because the medical providers are
located out-of-state. The rules . . .do not prohibit judges from using their discretion to
fashion an appropriate remedy to obtain out-of-state records." Id.
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privileged, potentially relevant, and discoverable documents., 30  In so
holding the court harmonized Rojas with Johnston v. Donnelly31 and
Reinhardt v. Northside Motors Inc.
32
C. An Expert's Expertise Expertly Protected
Finding oppressive and burdensome the discovery relating to indepen-
dent medical examinations performed by an expert, the Third District Court
of Appeal in Syken v. Elkins33 prohibited discovery of information relating
to 1) the defendant expert's income amount received from testifying, as well
as 2) the total number of independent medical examination performed in this
regard.34 During discovery in Syken, the plaintiff's counsel requested that
the defendant's expert witness produce documentation of the income the
expert earned from independent medical examinations since January 1,
1990."5 The court found that "[t]he production of the information ordered
...causes annoyance and embarrassment, while providing little useful
information ' '36 and, therefore, discovery could be limited.37 Although
recognizing conflict with prior decisions and other district courts, the court
30. Id. The supreme court added that it made no sense to burden the seeking party with
a discovery process which requires more time and money just because the medical providers
are out-of-state residents. Rojas, 641 So. 2d at 857; accord Kennedo v. U.S., No. CV-94-
2552, 1995 WL 428660, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 1995) (holding it was inappropriate for
plaintiffs attorney to interview treating psychiatrist employed by medical negligence
defendant without defendant's consent).
31. 581 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding execution of a blanket
medical authorization release will not allow for disclosure of medical records).
32. 479 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (denying request for execution of a
medical release where the requesting party had made no known attempts to get the medical
records by any other means). One wonders whether a party may use this case in other ways
for the purpose of bypassing the requirements of another state's regulations.
33. 644 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
34. Id, at 544-45.
35. Id at 541. Apparently, the plaintiffs counsel sought these documents in an effort
to demonstrate the bias of defendant's expert witness.
36. Id at 545.
37. I1d Discovery of relevant, non-privileged information may be limited or prohibited
in order to prevent annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.280(c), 1.410(b), 1.410(d)(1); see also South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v.
Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); cf Crandall v. Michaud, 603
So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (limiting the holding to its facts, the court
said an independent medical examining doctor was not required to reveal the reports of
medical examinations of patients other than plaintiff, as such disclosure was unduly
burdensome in comparison with the benefit to the plaintiff).
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established new guidelines" regarding discovery of an opposing medical
expert for impeachment purposes.39
38. Syken, 644 So. 2d at 546. Under the new guidelines, discovery of an opposing
medical expert (for impeachment) is limited by the following criteria:
1. The medical expert may be deposed either orally or by written
deposition.
2. The expert may be asked as to the pending case, what he or she has
been hired to do and what the compensation is to be.
3. The expert may be asked what expert work he or she generally does.
Is the work performed for the plaintiffs, defendants, or some percentage of each?
4. The expert may be asked to give an approximation of the portion of
their professional time or work devoted to service as an expert. This can be a
fair estimate of some reasonable and truthful component of that work, such as
hours expended, or percentage of income earned from that source, or the
approximate number of IME's that he or she performs in one year. The expert
need not answer how much money he or she earns as an expert or how much
the expert's total annual income is.
5. The expert may be required to identify specifically each case in
which he or she has actually testified, whether by deposition or at trial, going
back a reasonable period of time, which is normally three years. A longer
period of time may be inquired into under some circumstances.
6. The production of expert's business records, files, and 1099's may
be ordered produced only upon the most unusual or compelling circumstance.
7. The patient's privacy must be observed.
8. An expert may not be compelled to compile or produce nonexistent
documents.
Id.
39. Id. at 544-45. The court noted support for its conclusion. Id. at 544; see LeJeune
v. Aikin, 624 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Schwartz, C.J., concurring
specially); Trend South, Inc. v. Antomarchy, 623 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.)
(Jorgenson, J., dissenting) (finding that the trial court's order compelling expert witness to
provide information on tax returns and other sources of income was an unreasonable "fishing
expedition"), review denied, 630 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1993); see also Ex parte Morris, 530 So.
2d 785, 787 (Ala. 1988); Allen v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 198 Cal. Rptr.
737, 741 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that lower court abused its discretion when it required
medical expert to produce documents that may have been obtained through less intrusive
means); Jones v. Bordman, 759 P.2d 953, 964 (Kan. 1988) (stating that if sole purpose of
discovery request is to obtain evidence which could impeach witness' veracity, then
information is not discoverable, especially when party could have acquired evidence through
less obtrusive means); Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 365, 368 (Ohio 1994)
(holding evidence of common insurance interests among defendant and expert witness is
sufficiently probative of expert's bias to outweigh any prejudice evidence might cause);
Mohn v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 515 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986);
Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434, 435 (Tex. 1970) (reasoning that non-party witness'
records are not discoverable prior to trial if sought for purposes of impeaching witness).
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D. Just Because I Said It Doesn't Mean You Get It
A party's right to invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not
necessarily terminate because others are aware that the party was receiving
treatment.' In Yarborough v. Lewis,4 1 the Second District Court of
Appeal found the defendant's right to invoke the psychotherapist-patient
privilege was protected, notwithstanding that plaintiff admitted during a
deposition that his family, physician, associates, office staff, and some
friends were aware of his hospitalization.42 The court distinguished H.J.M.,
M.D., P.A. v. B.R.C. & R.H.C.,43 a case that found a waiver can occur
through disclosure, finding it not to be controlling where a party consistently
and frequently asserted the privilege prior to complying with any court
order."
E. You Can't Party on a Non-party
The Department of Insurance is not considered a "defendant" for
purposes of service under rule 1.070 of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
40. Yarborough v. Lewis, 652 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). But see Nelson
v. Womble, 657 So. 2d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that there is no
privilege for discovery of psychological records where mental and emotional condition is at
issue); Castillo-Plaza, M.D. v. Green, 655 So. 2d 197, 200 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(explaining statutory privilege of doctor-patient confidentiality does not apply in a medical
negligence action where a health care provider is or reasonably expects to be named as a
defendant). The Castillo-Plaza court reasoned that even if the statutory privilege under §
455.241(2) applied, the trial court could not preclude ex parte conversations between defense
counsel and the plaintiff's non-party treating physician on unprivileged subjects by restricting
counsel to formal discovery. Castillo-Plaza, 655 So. 2d at 202.
41. 652 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
42. Id at 835. In Yarborough, the defendant was being sued for medical malpractice
arising out of a surgery. The plaintiff never alleged that the defendant's negligence or failure
to obtain the patient's informed consent was the result of the defendant's impairment due to
drugs or alcohol. Nevertheless, the plaintiff attempted to obtain any information relating to
defendant's drug and alcohol abuse through interrogatories and production requests. During
the defendant's deposition, he admitted having been treated at a medical facility for alcohol
use for one month in 1991. Id. at 834.
43. 603 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 834 (Fla.
1992).
44. Yarborough, 652 So. 2d at 835. In H.J.M., the defendant admitted to participating
in a substance abuse program while being deposed. H.J.M., 603 So. 2d at 1332. The First
District Court of Appeal concluded the defendant had "effectively waived the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege" because he provided part of the information ordered disclosed by the
court before he raised any objection to such an order. Id. at 1334.
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dure. In Turner v. Gallagher,45 the court defined "defendant" as "a party
named in a lawsuit against whom some type of relief or recovery is sought
or who claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff."46 Since the Department
of Insurance in Turner was not named as a "defendant," it did not have to
be served with process within 120 days of the filing of the initial com-
plaint.47 The court also found that chapter 768 does not require the
Department of Insurance to be made a "party" to an action, presumably
because relief in such cases is not sought or obtained from the Depart-
ment.48
IV. OFFER OF JUDGMENT & AT'rORNEY'S FEES
Originally, there were two statutory sections and one rule governing a
party's right to obtain an award of attorney's fees from a rejection of an
offer to settle: 1) section 768.79;49 2) section 45.061;5" and 3) rule 1.4-
42.51
The defendant who files an "offer of judgment" under section 45.061
which is not accepted within thirty days52 may recover attorney's fees if
the judgment is of no liability 3 or at least 25% less than the offer.14 The
45. 640 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
46. Id. at 121. The defendant, Sheriff Walter J. Gallagher, moved to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint, alleging they had failed to serve the Department of Insurance within
120 days after filing of the complaint, as required by § 768.28(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes.
Id.
47. Id. at 121-22. The Fifth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the First
District Court of Appeal, which decided Austin v. Gaylord, 603 So. 2d 66 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
48. Turner, 640 So. 2d at 121-22. The court concluded that merely serving someone
with process does not make them a defendant, and even a strict application of the 120-day
rule could not make it applicable to an entity that is not a "defendant." Id. at 123.
49. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1993), entitled "Offer of Judgment and Demand for
Judgment."
50. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1993), entitled "Offers of Settlement."
51. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442. Rule 1442 was repealed in 1992, and parties are now
directed to "comply with the procedure set forth in section 768.69 of the Florida Statutes
(1991)." Id.; see also Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992) (adopting § 768.79 of
the Florida Statutes as the rule).
52. Cf Puleo v. Knealing, 654 So. 2d 148, 149-50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(applying the enlargement of time set forth for court-ordered mediation in § 44.102 of the
Florida Statutes, but certifying the question in light of Timmons of whether § 44.102
represented an unconstitutional intrusion into the rule-making authority of the supreme court).
53. Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 1. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Malmberg, 639 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1994), the Malmbergs sued the defendant, State Farm, to
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amount awarded is set off against the plaintiff's award. 5 If the fees and
costs exceed the amount awarded to the plaintiff, the court will enter a
judgment for the defendant less the amount of plaintiff's award. 6
Correspondingly, the plaintiff may receive attorney's fees if its "demand for
judgment" under section 768.79 is not accepted within thirty days and it
recovers at least 25% more than the demand.57 A court may deny such an
award if the offer was made in bad faith.
The two statutes differ in their application. A party may avail itself of
section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes and secure an award of attorney's
fees. 8 An award of attorney's fees under section 768.79 does not depend
on the "reasonableness" of the rejection." Once the requirements of
section 768.79 have been met, the offering party can be denied attorney's
fees only if the offer made was a "bad faith" offer.6 The nature, validity,
and enforceability of an offer are factors to consider when deciding whether
the offer was made in good faith.61
Contrary to section 768.79, section 45.061 allows a party to collect
attorney's fees after the court has made an express finding on the record that
the rejection of the offer was unreasonable. 6 - A defense verdict, under
recover damages under their uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 615. After the Malmbergs
rejected State Farm's offer to settle, the case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict
for State Farm. Id. at 616. Although the court agreed with the district court's finding that
the statutory presumption of. unreasonable rejection is not conclusive, it found no support
either in § 45.061 of the Florida Statutes or Timmons for the proposition that the
presumption should not apply to defendants' verdicts. Malmberg, 639 So. 2d at 616. The
court in Malmberg noted that § 768.79 grants defendants attorney's fees only on policies
issued or renewed after October 1, 1990, thus finding it inapplicable to the Malmberg's 1987
accident. Id. But see Pickett v. Tequesta Dev. Co., 639 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding pre-amendment version of § 768.79, which applied to these
plaintiffs, denied a defendant an award of fees where the judgment was of no liability).
54. Malmberg, 639 So. 2d at 616.
55. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1993).
56. Id.
57. Id,
58. Accord Baker Protective Servs. v. F.P. Inc., 659 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
59. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1993). The prerequisites of § 768.79 are a finding of no
liability and a judgment obtained by the plaintiff that is at least 25% less than the defendant's
offer of judgment. Id.
60. A court may not deny attorney's fees on the basis of the reasonableness of the
rejection. Government Employee's Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 641 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
61. Id.
62. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1993).
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section 45.061, creates a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff must have
unreasonably rejected the defendant's previous offer of judgment.63 The
presumption of an unreasonable rejection present in Florida Statutes section
45.06164 applies even when there is a verdict for the plaintiff. The court's
holding in Malmberg 5 makes clear that the unreasonable rejection
presumption applies to defendants' verdicts as well as judgments for
plaintiffs.66
A. The "Res" Is History
A defendant who prevails on a motion for summary judgment based on
the doctrine of res judicata is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Florida
Statutes. In Olson v. Potter,67 the Second District Court of Appeal
determined that the plaintiffs failed to plead any justiciable issue of law or
fact because they attempted to litigate issues which had previously been
determined by summary judgment.68  The court thus awarded attorney's
fees pursuant to section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes.69
63. Henson v. Haslam, 644 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The court
remanded for express findings that the plaintiffs rejection was "reasonable," thus rebutting
the presumption that the rejection is unreasonable when there is a verdict for the defendant.
Id.; see also Malmberg, 639 So. 2d at 616 (holding that the presumption of an unreasonable
rejection, present in § 45.061, applies even when there is a verdict for the defendant).
64. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1993). Subsection (2) provides, in pertinent part:
An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a defendant
if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent greater than the offer rejected, and
an offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a plaintiff if
the judgment entered is at least 25 percent less than the offer rejected.
Id.
65. Malmberg, 639 So. 2d at 616; see also Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 1.
66. Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes which allows prevailing defendants to receive
attorney's fees, applies only to policies issued after § 768.79 was amended on October 1,
1990. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1993).
67. 650 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
68. l at 637.
69. Id. Section 57.105 allows the prevailing party to collect attorney's fees when no
justiciable issue of either law or fact is raised by either the complaint or defense of the losing
party. Id.; cf. Skubal v. Cooley, 650 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that prevailing party entitled to fees under § 772.11 where plaintiff's claim lacked substantial
factual or legal support). As a result, it is not necessary to find a "complete absence" of
legal or factual support as provided in § 57.105. Id.
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B. Sometimes It's "Fees "able to Get a Table
Even without a Reservation
In Amlan v. Detroit Diesel Corp.70 and Wyatt v. State,7 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reiterated the rule that, where you can meet the
"independent and collateral" test, you may proceed to recover on certain
motions, even if a notice of appeal has been filed.72 Determining that
motions to assess fees and costs as a sanction for discovery violations is a
collateral and independent claim, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reiterated that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to entertain a post-
trial motion once a notice of appeal is filed.73 There may even be times
where you can secure fees upon a motion made after judgment.74
C. Operation Lodestar
Agreeing with the Third75 and Fourth76 District Courts of Appeal, the
Supreme Court of Florida, in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley,
70. 651 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
71. 652 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
72. Wyatt, 652 So. 2d at 454; Amlan, 651 So. 2d at 706. This usually occurs in motions
directed to recovery of attorney's fees. The court in Amlan, however, found the trial court
correct in declining to consider the motion because the appeal dealt with the same discovery
sanctions. Amlan, 651 So. 2d at 706.
73. Wyatt, 652 So. 2d at 454; see also Roberts v. Askew, 260 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1972).
In Roberts, the court held that "costs may be adjudicated after final judgment, after the
expiration of the appeal period, during the pendency of an appeal, and even after the appeal
has been concluded." Roberts, 260 So. 2d at 494. "However, the motion to tax costs should
be made within a reasonable time after the appeal has been concluded." Id.; see also
Finkelstein v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 1986) (finding that
post-judgment motion for attorney's fees raises "collateral and independent claim" which a
trial court has continuing jurisdiction to entertain within reasonable time, notwithstanding that
litigation of main claim may have been concluded with finality).
74. Tampa Letter Carriers, Inc. v. Mack, 649 So. 2d 890, 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (finding defendant's right to attorney's fees may not be "thwart[ed]" by plaintiffs
voluntary dismissal of its case); see also Ganz v. HZJ, Inc., 605 So. 2d 871, 872-73 (Fla.
1992) (holding that rule announced in Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1991),
that requires requests for contractual attorney fees, does not apply to § 57.105 of the Florida
Statutes). The court in Tampa Letter Carriers extended the supreme court's holding by
"conclud[ing] that the Ganz analysis applies to fee requests under section 768.79." Tampa
Letter Carriers, 649 So. 2d at 891.
75. Stabinski, Funt & DeOliveira, P.A. v. Law Offices of Frank H. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d
159 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 500 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1986).
76. Faro v. Romani, 629 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), quashed on other
grounds, 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
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P.A. v. Polet, 77 held that the lodestar method for determining reasonable
attorney's fees does not apply to a fee dispute between a discharged attorney
and a former client, where the fee will be paid for by the client.78 The
supreme court in Searcy found the lodestar approach is "ill-suited for the
task of assessing attorney's fees due as damages for breach of an agreement
for the payment of fees because it does not allow for consideration of the
'totality of the circumstances surrounding the professional relationship.'
79
D. Section 57.105 May Be "Teething"
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, putting some bite in section 57.105
of the Florida Statutes, entered an order sua sponte directing the trial court
to assess costs and fees pursuant to section 57.105. In doing so, the court
in Brahmbhatt v. Allstate Indemnity Co.0 reiterated the standard for
determining a frivolous appeal:
A frivolous appeal is not merely one that is likely to be unsuccessful.
It is one that is so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face
of the record that there is little, if any, prospect whatsoever that it can
ever succeed. It must be one so clearly untenable, or the insufficiency
of which is so manifest on a bare inspection of the record and assign-
ments of error, that its character may be determined without argument
or research.81
E. You Gotta Know What You Have to Know What You Can Do
An order determining liability for attorney's fees is not an appealable
non-final order unless it determines the amount of the fee. As the court
noted in Winkelman v. Toll,82 "[r]ule 9.130 (a)(3)(C)(iv), [of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure] authorizes the appeal from non-final orders which
determine 'the' issue of liability, not 'an' issue of liability."83 Accordingly,
77. 652 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1995).
78. Id. at 368-69.
79. Id. (citing Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982)).
80. 652 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
81. Id. at 1225 (citations omitted); cf. Olson v. Potter, 650 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (stating "trial court should have awarded [§ 57.105] attorney's fees to the
appellees/cross-appellants since they prevailed on the motion for summary judgment on the
doctrine of res judicata").
82. 632 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
83. Id. at 131.
Vol. 20
379
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Mager
the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently dismissed the appeal of an
order of entitlement to attorney's fees.84
In Winkelman, the appellant challenged a post-judgment order which
had determined the appellee's entitlement to (but not the amount of)
attorney's fees." The appellate court found that it lacked jurisdiction to
review an order as to the "entitlement" to attorney's fees when the amount
had yet to be determined.86 Indeed, even in cases where an appellant is
completely justified in challenging "entitlement," jurisdiction will still not
lie from that order (in the absence of a judicial determination of the
amount). 87
84. Reliable Reprographics Blueprint & Supply, Inc. v. Florida Mango Office Park, Inc.,
645 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
85. Winkelman, 632 So. 2d at 131. The court considered an order for entitlement to
attorney's fees similar to a partial summary judgment, which was governed by rule
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), stating that the rule authorizes the appeal of non-final orders which
determine "the" issue of liability, not "an" issue of liability. Id. at 131.
86. Id. The court explained that:
Allowing appeals from such an order as this one would mean that any time a
court enters an order determining a party is entitled to attorney's fees, costs, or
some other type of relief which could be construed as "affirmative relief," it
could generate two appeals, one from the order of entitlement, and a second
from the order determining the amount, even before a final judgment, which
could then produce a third appeal. Another reason why orders merely
determining entitlement to attorney's fees should not be appealable is because
consideration of entitlement and amount are frequently overlapping consider-
ations which cannot be separated.
Id. at 132; see also Hunt v. Hunt, 648 So. 2d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Trans
Atl. Distrib., L.P. v. Whiland & Co., S.A., 646 So. 2d 752, 752 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (appealing an order which determined entitlement to attorney's fees but not amount
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); First Oak Brook Corp. Syndicate, Inc. v. Swiss
Beach Holdings, Inc., 644 So. 2d 1030, 1030 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gonzalez Eng'g,
Inc., v. Miami Pump & Supply Co., 641 So. 2d 474, 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding court was without jurisdiction to review post-final judgment order which determined
appellant was entitled to attorney's fees but § 57.105 of the Florida Statutes did not fix
amount.); Cooper v. Cooper, 641 So. 2d 198, 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
87. See Noggle v. Turner Cattle Co., 656 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
see also Hernando County v. Leisure Hills, Inc., 648 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (stating that until damage amount is assessed, no appeal may lie for judgment of
liability); McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So. 2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Trans
Atil. Distrib., LP., 646 So. 2d at 752; Gonzalez Eng'g, Inc., 641 So. 2d at 474; Adlow, Inc.
v. Mauda, Inc., 632 So. 2d 714,714 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Knight v. Mastrianni, 626
So. 2d 338, 338 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) ('"We decline review of the order granting
attorney's fees since it does not fix the amount of the fee awarded. Thus, the issue of
attorney's fees is not ripe for appellate review."); Hobbs v. Hobbs, 518 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla.
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V. IMPACT OF THE FABRE DECISION
A. All's "Wells" That Ends Well
When interpreting the infamous footnote three in Fabre v. Marin,88
our supreme court has determined that a non-settling defendant is not
entitled to a setoff from non-economic damages based on the amount paid
by the settling defendant.8 9 The court reasoned that the set-off statutes
were applicable to economic damages, and for purposes of calculating the
non-settling defendant's obligation, the settlement proceeds were to be
apportioned between economic and non-economic damages in the same
proportion as the jury's award.9" Arguing that the set-off statutes are only
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988); cf Reliable Reprographics, 645 So. 2d at 1042 (distinguishing
Winkelman on ground that order may be appealable where trial court denies motion for
attorney's fees, since issue of attorney fees is completely resolved).
88. Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. 1993). There are a number of recently
decided cases which apply or interpret Fabre. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc. v.
Nash, 654 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Ashraf v. Smith, 647 So. 2d 892,
893 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding hospital should have been included on verdict
form), review denied, 658 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1995); City of Homestead v. Martins, 645 So. 2d
187, 187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding trial court erred in entering judgment
against hospital for amount exceeding percentage of liability apportioned to it by jury);
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Viera, 644 So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that despite fact that county was not party to suit at trial, court should have
instructed jury to apportion liability of county which owned building in which accident
occurred even though county had settled with victim's estate); Owens-Illinois v. Baione, 642
So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (stating apportionment of fault is precluded where
evidence is insufficient for jury to make accurate assessment of fault of other entities who
manufactured asbestos products), review denied, 649 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1994); BellSouth
Human Resources Admin., Inc. v. Colatarci, 641 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (finding it was error to fall to include non-party tortfeasors on verdict form); East West
Karate Ass'n, Inc. v. Riquelme, 638 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
trial court erred in not submitting name of karate student who administered kick which
caused plaintiff's injury together with name of karate association on jury verdict form;
despite fact that student was not party to suit, association was only required to pay non-
economic damages in amount proportionate to percentage of fault); Graham v. Brown, No.
93-1110-CIV-T-17A, 1994 WL 456631, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 1994) (holding fault can
be apportioned to third party even where defendant has caused removal of third party from
action).
89. Wells v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 659 So. 2d 249 (Fla.
1995).
90. Id. at 252-53; cf. Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (Ct. App. 1994)
(reasoning that to apply set-off provisions in situations of several liability would discourage
rather than encourage settlement). The Hoch court stated if the settlement was "low," the
plaintiff would receive less that the non-economic damages awarded by the jury. Hoch, 29
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applicable where there is common liability, as in the case of economic
damages, Wells asserted that the payment by one tortfeasor should only
extinguish that tort feasor's liability and have no effect on another
tortfeasor's liability.91 Thus, Wells contended, where liability is deter-
mined by the jury as a percentage of fault, section 768.81(3) would apply
and there would be no set-off.92 Using the language in section 46.015, the
court reasoned93 that a defendant sued under section 768.81 may not be
jointly liable with other defendants for non-economic damages.94 In light
of this determination, the court needed only to categorize the damages to
ascertain the non-settling defendants' obligation." As the court noted, "the
settlement proceeds should be divided between economic and non-economic
damages in the same proportion as the jury's award. 96
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. If the settlement was "high," the non-settling defendant would reap the
benefit, paying less than their fault-share of the non-economic damages. This would be
inequitable and provide "little incentive for the injured person to settle with one or fewer and
all of the tort feasors." Id.; see also McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1467-70
(1994); Neil v. Kavena, 859 P.2d 203, 206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (no set-off of settlement
amounts where liability of defendants is several rather than joint and several); Thomas v.
Solberg, 442 N.W. 2d 73 (Iowa 1989); Wilson v. Gault, 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 668 P.2d 308 (N.M. 1983). But see Curtis v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 831 P.2d
541 (Idaho 1992), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Laughten v. City of Pocatello, 886
P.2d 330 (Idaho 1994).
91. Wells, 659 So. 2d at 251.
92. Id.
93. The court distinguished Dionese v. City of West Palm Beach, 500 So. 2d 1347 (Fla.
1987), on the basis that the apportionment in question was among different causes of action
and not between economic and non-economic damages. Wells, 659 So. 2d at 254.
94. Wells, 659 So. 2d at 253. The court reasoned the § 46.015 does not apply to non-
economic damages. Id. The court also held that § 768.041 does not apply to non-economic
damages. Id.
95. Id, The court also reasoned that a jury verdict as the basis for allocation would
buffer possible collusion between settling parties as to the allocation of economic and non-
economic damages. lt
96. Wells, 659 So. 2d at 254. The concurrence is well taken. Justice Wells, joined by
Justice Kogan, suggested that there are potential due process problems in having a jury
apportion the liability of settling parties who are no longer parties to the judicial proceedings.
Id. (Wells, J., concurring). These settling parties present no evidence, cross-examine no
witnesses, and make no arguments. Id. It may be time to reexamine Fabre and Allied-
Signal in light of the ponderable, substantive, and procedural problems which have become
evident since these decisions were released. Id. It is also significant to note that similar
statutes have been held unconstitutional. See Newville v. Department of Family Servs., 883
P.2d 793, 803 (Mont. 1994) (holding allocation of percentages of liability to non-parties
violated substantive due process as to plaintiff).
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B. An Unsettling Experience
A nonsettling defendant is not entitled to a credit against what it owes
the plaintiff when another defendant settles for less than what that defendant
would have owed. In Dewitt Excavating, Inc. v. Walters,97 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal held that it was a violation of section 768.81 to
require the defendant to pay the first $25,000 and 25% of the remainder of
the plaintiffs noneconomic damages. 98  The court also reiterated the
statutory dictate that the doctrine of joint and several liability has no
application where damages exceed $25,000. 9'
VI. DuTY
A. Service with a Smile
A retail establishment is not subject to liability under section 768.125
of the Florida Statutes when it sells alcohol in closed containers to an adult
to be consumed off of the premises of the establishment. 1' ° In Persen v.
Southland Corp., 0 the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned that since the
legislature used the words "knowingly serves," they must have intended that
the habitual drunkard exception apply only to bars, taverns, or restau-
rants.1°2 The court's construction of section 768.125 also appears consis-
97. 642 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
98. Id. Section 768.81(5) of the Florida Statutes provides that "[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of this section, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies to all actions in
which the total amount of damages does not exceed $25,000." FLA. STAT. § 768.81(5)
(1993).
99. Dewitt, 642 So. 2d at 834; cf PAM Transp. v. Freightliner Corp., 57 F.3d 746, 747
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding Arizona statute which almost completely destroyed joint and several
liability eliminated right of contribution where settling defendant's liability is "several only").
100. See FLA. STAT. § 768. 125 (1993). Section 768.125 entitled "[1]iability for injury
or damage resulting from intoxication," provides:
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful
drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or
resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a person who willfully
and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of
lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the
use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage
caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person.
Id.
101. 656 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1995).
102. Id. at 455. The court interpreted the legislative intent of the statutory language
"knowingly serves" as referring to a habitual drunkard, rather than the statutory language
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tent with the legislature's decision that there is a distinction between liability
under 1) the habitual drunkard exception and 2) the criminal statute. 3
Through this holding, the Supreme Court of Florida appears to have
extended much greater protection to retail establishments that sell alcoholic
beverages to be consumed off of the premises.
B. Don't Punish the Parents Unless They Did Something Too
Rejecting that Winn-Dixie v. Robinson"° imposed an alternative
avenue of direct liability for punitive damages in the absence of fault, the
court in Schropp v. Crown Eurocars, Inc. 5 stated that there are only two
methods of imposing liability for punitive damages against a (parent)
corporation: 1) The traditional Mercury Motors"° additional fault require-
ment; and 2) direct liability (i.e. without the need to show additional fault)
where the plaintiff can show the actions in question were committed by an
"owner" or "managing agent" of the corporation. 7
C. Taking Another Bite out of Dog Owners
Dog owners beware: The "independent contractor exception" to the
"dangerous instrumentality doctrine" is not available to a dog owner as a
"sells or furnishes," which refers to minors. Id
103. Id. The criminal statute would extend liability to "[any person who shall sell, give
away, dispose of, exchange, or barter" any alcoholic beverage to a habitual drunkard. FLA.
STAT. § 562.50 (1993).
104. 472 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1985). Here, an assistant store manager expressly approved
of the torts which had been committed against the plaintiff. Id. at 723. The acts of the store
manager provided the jury with evidence of misconduct sufficient for direct liability under
the managing-agent rule. Id.
105. 654 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1995). Plaintiff, Schropp, purchased a new Mercedes-Benz
from the defendant, Crown Eurocars, Inc. Shortly thereafter, Schropp complained about spots
on the finish of the car. After several unsuccessful attempts by Schropp to have the defect
corrected, he finally left the car with the defendant for several days at the request of the sales
manager. Again, Schropp was not satisfied with the defendant's attempts to remove the
spots. This suit followed when the defendant refused to exchange Schropp's car for a new
one. Id at 1158-59.
106. Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1981). Under the
vicarious liability theory, a corporation can be held liable for punitive damages if the plaintiff
establishes that the conduct of the employee was willful and wanton and establishes some
additional fault on the part of the corporate employer. Id. at 549.
107. Bankers Multiple Life Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1985).
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defense to an action brought pursuant to section 767.04108 of the Florida
Statutes.
In Wipperfurth v. Huie,'° the defendant was boarding his canine with
the plaintiff's employer."' The plaintiff was bitten by the dog while it
was being boarded and he sued the defendant. The defendant alleged the
kennel was liable while the kennel was watching the dog."' Relying on
Belcher Yacht, Inc. v. Stickney,"2 the supreme court contrarily defined the
term "owner" in section 767.04 as applying only to the dog's actual
owner."3 Thus, the court held that defendant remained liable while his
dog was in the kennel." 4 The court's holding thus extends the duty of
dog owners to kennel employees where they board their dogs."5
108. Section 767.04 of the Florida Statutes provides:
The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a
public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the
owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of
the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness.
However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate
cause of the biting incident reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the
percentage that the bitten person's negligence contributed to the biting incident.
A person is lawfully upon private property of such owner within the meaning of
this act when he is on such property in the performance of any duty imposed
upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the
United States, or when he is on such property upon invitation, expressed or
implied, of the owner. However, the owner is not liable, except as to a person
under the age of 6, or unless the damages are proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of the owner, if at the time of any such injury the owner had
displayed in a prominent place on his premises a sign easily readable including
the words "Bad Dog." The remedy provided by this section is in addition to and
cumulative with any other remedy provided by statute or common law.
FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1993).
109. 654 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1995).
110. Id. at 116. The independent contractor exception to the doctrine is inapplicable
because the dangerous instrumentality doctrine itself is inapplicable to an action brought
pursuant to § 767.04 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 117; see also Donner v. Arkwright-
Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 21, 26 (Fla. 1978) (holding that jury should not have
been instructed on assumption of risk, but only on defenses expressed in § 768.04).
111. Wipperfurth, 654 So. 2d at 116-17.
112. 450 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1984).
113. Wipperfurth, 654 So. 2d at 117.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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D. Physicians Are Warned about the Duty to Warn
Doctor's take heed: Physicians may be held liable to third persons who
are not their patients for failing to warn them of known dangers. In Pate
v. Threlkel,"6 the plaintiff alleged that a doctor had a duty to warn the
plaintiff's mother of the risks to her children of a genetically transmitted
disease.
In Pate, the doctor's failure to warn prevented early detection of the
plaintiff's (child's) cancer, significantly reducing her chances of successfully
treating the disease." 7 In rejecting privity as necessary to establish liability
between a patient's child and a health care provider,"' the court reasoned
that the prevailing standard of care may create a duty to certain identified
third parties where the physician knows of the existence of those third
parties.119 The court noted that this duty to warn could be satisfied by
warning the patient, whom it is presumed will inform the third parties. 20
The court through this holding joined the large number of jurisdictions that
protect innocent third parties from harm by imposing a greater duty upon a
doctor to persons other than his patients. 1 '
116. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S356 (July 20, 1995). The author claims a hollow victory in
this court's rejection as to the application of Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991), as his argument was exactly what the supreme court adopted in Pate.
117. Id.
118. Id. at S358.
119. Id. "[IMack of privity does not necessarily foreclose liability if a duty of care is
otherwise established." Id. at S357 (quoting Baskerville-Donovan Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pensacola
Exec. House Condominium Ass'n, 581 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Fla. 1991)).
120. Pate, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at S358.
121. See, e.g., White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (deciding
that psychotherapist in certain circumstances bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect foreseeable victim from danger); Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th
Cir. 1983) (holding liability exists against psychotherapisis for failure to warn where victim
was foreseeable and identifiable); Reiser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (applying similar duty to warn to decision of paroling dangerous sex-offender),
modifled on other grounds, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); Hicks v. United States,
511 F.2d 407, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating attack on wife by patient was foreseeable
because it was closely related to reason he was receiving treatment); Brady v. Hopper, 570
F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1982) (stating that "specific threats to specific victims" states
workable, reasonable, and fair boundary upon sphere of therapist's liability for acts of
patients), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp.
185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (recognizing psychiatrist had duty to initiate whatever precautions
were reasonably necessary to protect potential victims from violence when staff knew or
should have known of patient's dangerous propensities); Williams v. United States, 450 F.
Supp. 1040, 1046 (D.S.D. 1978) (recognizing liability of government for shooting death of
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three persons one day after mental patient was released from V.A. Hospital); Smith v. United
States, 437 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding psychotherapist liable for failure
to predict dangerousness of patient), rev'd on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1978);
Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745, 747-48 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (explaining failure of
physicians to admit homicidal patient can be negligent); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409, 418-20 (D.N.D. 1967) (stating psychiatrist is liable for
failure to predict dangerous propensities of patient); Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775
P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (psychiatrist in some circumstances owes duty to
protect possible victim); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal.
1976) (stating when therapist determines or should determine that patient poses serious risk
of violence to another, therapist must use reasonable care to protect that person which may
require duty to warn); Mero v. Sadoff, 37 Cal. Rptr. 769, 776 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating
physician may be liable for examination even where there is no physician-patient
relationship); Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 520 (Ct. App.
1995) (stating where defendant doctor negligently failed to tell 12-year-old girl, his surgical
patient, or her family that she received AIDS-tainted blood and three years later, young
woman innocently infected her boyfriend by their sexual relations, defendant's duty to warn
extended to boyfriend notwithstanding that at time of AIDS-tainted transfusion boyfriend was
unknown and unidentified third person); Myers v. Quesenberry, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (Ct.
App. 1983) (holding doctor's liability to extend to unknown but foreseeable third party when
doctor failed to warn patient of risk of driving in her condition); Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d
1198, 1212 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (explaining psychiatrist owes duty of care to make sure
that patient does not pose a danger to third parties); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072
(Del. 1988) (upholding judgment against psychiatrist based on his failure to take reasonable
steps to protect potential victim from violence resulting from release of committed patient
who killed victim in auto accident while in psychotic state); Nova Univ. v. Wagner, 491 So.
2d 1116, 1118 (Fla. 1986) (deciding that child care institution that accepted emotionally
disturbed children it knew or should have known had propensity to commit acts that might
harm others owes duty to exercise reasonable care in its operation to avoid harm to general
public); Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Lopez, 443 So. 2d 947, 948 (Fla. 1983) (holding seller of
insurance has duty to investigate where it has actual knowledge of beneficiary's murderous
intentions to its insured); Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (stating exception to general rule that there is no duty to control conduct of another
or to give warning to those placed in danger by that conduct arises where there is special
relationship between defendant and person whose actions need to be controlled or person
whose injury is foreseeable from failure to control conduct); Tucker v. Lavernia, 451 So. 2d
972, 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining whether harm inflicted by particular
patient was actionable was question of fact precluding summary judgment); Hofmann v.
Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (explaining physician has duty
to warn if patient poses threat to third parties); Bradley v. Wessner, 287 S.E.2d 716, 721 (Ga.
Ct. App.) (holding lack of privity between physician and ultimate victim not sufficient to
eliminate duty to warn), aff'd, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982); Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d
1339, 1344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (deciding cause of action arises against psychiatrist for failure
to warn); In re Votteler, 327 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa 1982) (holding duty to warn exists
where foreseeable victim does not know of danger); Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576,
580 (Iowa 1973) (stating complaint that alleges physician knew of patient's danger but failed
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to warn not dismissable for failure to state cause of action); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co.
v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 604 (Kan. 1991) (finding no cause of
action for failure to report); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86, 94 (Kan. 1983) (recognizing
cause of action against psychiatrist for negligence for failure to protect ultimate victims of
patient, his mother and younger brother); Evans v. Morehead Clinic, 749 S.W.2d 696, 699
(Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding therapist owes duty of ordinary care to protect reasonably
foreseeable victim of danger from assault by patient); Joy v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 529
A.2d 1364, 1366 (Me. 1987) (recognizing it is jury question whether physician should have
warned under particular set of circumstances); Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 454 A.2d
414, 418 (Md. 1983) (following Restatement, stating duty applies if special relationship
exists); Bardoni v. Kim, 390 N.W.2d 218, 226-27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining whether
psychiatrist should have known patient was dangerous specifically to his brother was fact
issue, precluding summary judgment); Welke v. Kuzilla, 375 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding doctor's injection given night before accident raised cause of action for
third party victim); Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851, 854-55 (Mo.
1993) (deciding where defendant clinic negligently failed to administer RhoGam to Rh-
negative expectant mother, causing her to develop antibodies that attacked blood cells of her
subsequently conceived Rh-positive child, clinic was liable for such preconception negligence
to then unconceived and later born child); Fosgate v. Corona, 330 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1974)
(holding doctor liable to relatives of tubercular patient for negligently having failed to
diagnose the disease that led to infection of relatives); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500,
508 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (deciding substantial fact issue as to whether
psychiatrist owed duty to warn victim precluded summary judgment); Wilschinsky v. Medina,
775 P.2d 713, 717 (N.M. 1989) (holding physician owed duty to public after administering
drugs to patient with known side effects that might impair patient's judgment); Homere v.
State, 361 N.Y.S.2d 820, 824-25 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1974) (holding hospital liable in negligence
for releasing patient who assaulted plaintiff), aff'd, 370 N.Y.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975);
Pangbum v. Saad, 326 S.E.2d 365, 367 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding complaint against
psychiatrist stated claim for relief in negligence for patient who stabbed plaintiffs sister
shortly after release); Leverett v. State, 399 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978)
(explaining motions to dismiss are inappropriate in negligence claims involving physicians'
duty to take precautionary measures); Wharton Trans. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521,
526-27 (Tenn. 1980) (holding physician liable for failure to take precautionary steps if his
conduct falls below recognized standard of accepted professional practice in medical
profession and specialty thereof, if any, that is prevailing in community in which he
practiced); Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that under
proper facts, physician can owe duty to use reasonable care to protect public); Peck v.
Counseling Serv., 499 A.2d 422, 427 (Vt. 1985) (recognizing psychiatrist had duty to warn
third party that patient was likely to cause property damage); Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230,
237 (Wash. 1983) (holding psychiatrist who diagnosed patient as "gravely disabled" had duty
to take reasonable precautions to protect persons who might be endangered by the patient's
dangerous propensities); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965)
(holding where plaintiffs truck driver had accident injuring several people, and plaintiff-
employer thereafter settled with victims and sought indemnity from doctor alleging doctor
negligently failed to diagnose driver's disabilities and warn driver, it was expectable that if
doctor negligently certified unfit person as qualified to drive commercial vehicle, any injury
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VII. ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE: YOU CAN'T ALWAYS WIN WITH
THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE
During the last year, the courts in Florida decided several cases'2
involving the application of the "economic loss rule."'' 2  The economic
to third person from highway accident was well within range of apprehension), modified, 401
P.2d 350 (Wash. 1965); Schuster v. Altenburg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Wis. 1988)
(recognizing complaint stated cause of action for relief based on psychiatrist's failure to take
reasonable measures to protect from patient).
122. See, e.g., Florida Bldg. Inspection Serv., Inc. v. Arnold Corp., 20 Fla. L. Weekly
D1703, D1703 (3d Dist. Ct. App. July 26, 1995) (deciding to decline any further erosion of
the economic loss doctrine); Greens of Town & Country Condominium Ass'n v. Greens of
Tampa, Inc., 653 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding economic loss
rule bars negligence claims where no additional personal injury or damages to any other
property occurs); see also Palau Int'l Traders, Inc., v. Narcam Aircraft, Inc., 653 So. 2d 412,
416 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining economic loss doctrine precluded subsequent
airplane purchaser from recovering from airplane inspector for economic losses arising out
of negligence in failing to locate flaw in airplane, despite absence of privity of contract and
no personal injury or property damage to property other than airplane); C.A. Oaks Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Ajax Paving Indus. Inc., 652 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating dismissal of counter claim based on negligent performance of contract work was
proper where economic loss rule bars tort recovery as between parties for purely economic
losses); City of Tampa v. Thornton-Tomasetti, P.C., 646 So. 2d 279, 281-82 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing economic loss doctrine precluded City's recovery in negligence
claim from engineering consulting firm for City's economic losses flowing from construction
of public building); see also Hoseline, Inc. v. USA Diversified Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d 1198,
1199-2000 (1 th Cir. 1994) (holding economic loss doctrine barred manufacturer's recovery
of damages against supplier for common law fraud and theft, where claims arose from breach
of contractual duty, and manufacturer did not allege any physical or property damage;
economic loss doctrine bars claims between parties who lack contractual privity; economic
loss doctrine bars tort recovery for contract claims which involve no injury to person or
property).
123. This rule prohibits plaintiffs from raising tort claims without evidence of personal
injury or property damage for the sole purpose of recovering economic damages arising from
a breach of contract. See Jones v. Childers, 18 F.3d 899, 904 (11th Cir. 1994). The two
most commonly referred cases are Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charlie Toppino
& Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993) and AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987). In Casa Clara, homeowners sued a concrete supplier under a
negligence theory for having provided defective concrete which caused damage to buildings
it was used in. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245. Because no damage to other property
occurred and nothing more than economic losses were involved, the plaintiff had no tort
claim against the concrete supplier. Id. at 1247-48. In AFM Corp., the court held that AFM,
which contracted with Southern Bell to have its name advertised in the yellow pages, could
not maintain a tort claim solely for economic losses. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180-81. The
court concluded that without a showing of some conduct resulting in personal injury or
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loss rule bars recovery even where there was "no alternative remedy"
outside of the tort claims." The court in SFC Valve Corp. v. Wright
Machine Corp. reasoned that to recognize a "'no alternative remedy' excep-
tion" to the rule would "cut[ ] against the purpose[s] of the economic loss
rule."' The court's holding strengthened the economic loss rule and
demonstrated the court's preference for encouraging parties to negotiate for
warranty protection or to take other steps, such as purchasing insurance, in
order to protect their economic interests.126
The economic loss rule will not defeat the claims of a "foreseeable
plaintiff" even if there is no contract between the parties. In Southland
Construction, Inc. v. Richeson Corp.,27 a general contractor, sued the
defendant, an engineer, for negligence in failing to meet professional
engineering standards in designing a wall." Although there was no
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, the court permitted the tort
action, finding that "Richeson, as an individual professional, owed Southland
a duty to perform his professional duties in a professional, competent
manner."
129
The economic loss rule also does not apply to tort claims where a
finished product causes damage to property other than itself.3 ' The
property damage, there could be no independent tort claim. Id at 181-82.
124. SFC Valve Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 710, 715 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
In SFC Valve, the defendant, Wright, sold valve stems to Southern Corporation pursuant to
a contract between the parties. Id. at 712. The certifications provided by Wright to
Southern, which were required by the contract, were falsified. When Southern filed for
bankruptcy, the plaintiff, SFC Valve, purchased Southern's assets, including the contract with
Wright. After SFC discovered the falsified certifications, it reopened Southern's bankruptcy
case in order to determine any causes of action Southern may have had against Wright for
the falsified certifications. The bankruptcy court auctioned off these causes of action as
assets, which Wright acquired by being the highest bidder. Id. at 712-13.
125. Id. at 715. The purpose of the economic loss rule is to encourage parties to protect
their economic losses by purchasing insurance or negotiating for warranty protection. Id.
126. In addition, the court relied on Hoseline, Inc. v. U.S.A. Diversified Prods., Inc., 40
F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 1994), finding no distinguishing facts in SFC Valve to warrant a
different result. SFC Valve, 883 F. Supp. at 716.
127. 642 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
128. Id. at 8-9. Economic losses consist of disappointed economic expectations and
include damages for inadequate value, cost of repair and replacement of a defective product,
or consequential loss of profits. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246.
129. Southland, 642 So. 2d at 8; accord A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397
(Fla. 1973). The holding of this case, which is limited to its facts, stated that a general
contractor has a cause of action for the alleged negligent supervisory performance by an
architect. A.R. Moyer, Inc., 285 So. 2d at 402.
130. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246.
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Second District Court of Appeal, in E.L Du Pont de Numours & Co. v.
Finks Farms, Inc.,31 permitted an action in tort because the defendant's
fungicide caused damage to other property, the plaintiff's tomato crop.
132
In finding liability, the court distinguished this case from Casa Clara.1
33
In addition, the court found that the product used here was not "ineffective,"
but rather "defective" because it damaged other property.1' Equally
significant, the Third District Court of Appeal has also recently ruled that
the economic loss rule does not bar claims for fraud in the inducement. 35
VIII. NEGLIGENCE
A. You Still Need to Make an Impact for Success
Two recent cases 136 illustrate the supreme court's reluctance to join
the majority of jurisdictions that have abolished the "impact rule."'137 In
R.J. v. Humana of Florida Inc.,' 38 the plaintiff sought recovery for
psychological injuries caused by a negligent diagnosis that the plaintiff was
HIV positive. 39 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim and upheld the
131. 656 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
132. Id. at 172. "The economic loss rule prohibits tort recovery when a product
damages itself, causing economic loss, but does not cause personal injury or damage to any
property other than itself." Id. at 172 (citing Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246).
133. Id. at 173. In E.L DuPont, the fungicide as a finished product damaged plaintiff's
"other property," namely his tomato crop. Id. at 172-73.
134. E.L DuPont, 656 So. 2d at 173. The defendant's fungicide, purchased independent-
ly by the plaintiff, damaged the plaintiffs plants. Id. at 173. This holding was not
precluded by the facts of King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1030 (1989), because the plaintiff did not purchase his plants with the fungicide
already sprayed on them. E.I. Dupont, 656 So. 2d at 173. Contra Monsanto Agric. Prods.
Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
135. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2086,
D2086 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1995).
136. R.J. v. Humana of Fla. Inc., 652 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1995); Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade
County Public Health Trust, 651 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1995); cf City of Hollywood v. Karl, 643
So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). But see K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn.
1995).
137. Under the impact rule, before a plaintiff can recover damages for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the
plaintiff sustained in an impact. Gonzalez, 651 So. 2d at 676; see Reynolds v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied,
623 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1993).
138. 652 So. 2d at 360.
139. Id. at 362.
Vol. 20
391
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Mager
validity of the impact rule."4 In Gonzalez, the plaintiff sued the defen-
dants for psychological injuries resulting from inaccurate statements that the
plaintiff's child, who had died months earlier, had actually never been
buried and remained in the refrigerator at the hospital morgue.14 The
Supreme Court of Florida found the claim uncognizable without willful or
wanton misconduct or physical injury.142 The court also refused to adopt
section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.!43
140. Cf. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 553 (stating actual exposure to HIV must be alleged in
order to establish claim for emotional distress resulting from fear of contracting AIDS).
141. Gonzalez, 651 So. 2d at 674.
142. Id. at 675.
143. Id. at 676. By holding this way, the court reaffirmed Donahoo v. Bess, 200 So.
541 (Fla. 1941), which held that absent physical injury, Florida law will not permit a suit for
emotional distress caused by the negligent handling of a dead body, and refused to adopt §
868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under § 868 "one who intentionally, recklessly
or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates, or operates upon the body of a dead person or
prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family
of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 868 (1977).
The Impact Rule continues to be liberalized. See Zell v. Meek, 20 Fla. L. Weekly
S515 (Fla. Oct. 5, 1995) (holding plaintiff who witnessed her father's death when his
apartment was bombed stated claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress although
plaintiff did not begin experiencing physical impairment until nine months after bombing).
It is time to abolish the impact rule in favor of a fair and equitable traditional pleading
and proof system that requires the plaintiff seeking damages for mental and emotional harm
to similarly plead and produce fact witnesses, expert testimony, or other relevant evidence
for jury consideration. Accord Angrand v. Key, 657 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1995) (stating under
certain circumstances, grief experts may testify).
The impact doctrine was first enunciated in England in 1888 in the case of Victorian
Railway Commission v. Coultas 13 App. Cas. 222; see also Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d
466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Significantly, it was quickly rejected in England but not
until after having been accepted into our system of jurisprudence. See Dulieu v. White &
Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
While the impact rule remained a thorn in the side of those parties who rightfully
suffered from psychic injury (unfortunately or fortunately) unaccompanied by physical
impact, recent decisions of our and other courts began to recognize the harsh inequity of the
rule. In 1985, for example, the Supreme Court of Florida in Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d
17 (Fla. 1985), was faced with a claim by the estate of a mother who sought damages for
psychic injury when she had a heart attack after seeing her daughter at the scene of the
accident just after she was killed by a car driven by the defendant. Id. at 18. The court
decided that now it was time to recognize:
that the price of death or significant discernible physical injury, when caused by
psychological trauma resulting from a negligent injury imposed upon a close
family member within the sensory perception of the physically injured person,
is too great a harm to require direct physical contact before a cause of action
1995]
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exists.
Id. at 18-19. Although not going as far as other jurisdictions which permitted recovery for
psychic trauma alone, without either physical injury or a "zone of danger" fright, see, e.g.,
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980), this court conceded that
psychic injury should be cognizable in certain situations. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18-19.
The litmus test of "impact" (or the arbitrary "zone of danger" exception) as a
prerequisite to recovery for psychic trauma simply does not comport with reality and the
present day medical advancements. The apparent arbitrary diminution in the "severity" or
"value" of those claiming psychic injury (by not permitting such claims) is neither warranted
nor justified. Society has come to recognize and accept the reality and often indelible
severity of mental or emotional distress (psychic injury) and thus, now is the time for a
positive change in the law, which will respond to our medical advancement and inure to the
benefits of society as a whole.
Indeed, as well-regarded former Chief Judge Gerald Mager of the Fourth District
similarly noted:
The beauty of our judicial system is its flexibility in the pursuit of justice -- its
adherence to precedent yet its ability to reevaluate the continued vibrancy of
such precedent. It is certainly more forthright to review and reject an unsound
principle than to resort to judicial exceptions in order to obviate the harshness
of such principle.
Jones v. Hoffman, 272 So. 2d 529, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
It is a great and honorable function of the supreme court to modify the law with
society's advancement and change. Quoting an earlier decision of the supreme court, Judge
Mager also reminds us in Jones that "[t]he law is not static. It must keep pace with changes
in our society, for the doctrine of stare decisis is not an iron mold which can never be
changed." Id. (quoting Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1971)).
Medical technology has advanced remarkably in detection and treatment of mental or
emotional distress. Pharmaceutical companies are now making billions of dollars on tricyclic
antidepressants, Mono-oxidase inhibitors, beta blockers, etc., all designed and (apparently
effective in) detection and treatment of the admittedly debilitating condition associated with
emotional and mental distress ("psychic injury").
Emotional or mental distress, whether accompanied by physical trauma, is real.
Ironically, the emotional or mental "trauma" can be far more devastating and indelible than
a physical injury from which an individual often recovers. We as a loving society cannot
dispute that scars of the heart often run deeper and are more "permanent" than those of the
skin. What we feel; our emotional state, often can weigh heavier than our body. We should
not send a message that this harm to this truly innocent person only becomes real if there is
some accompanying "impact." We, as a society, recognize the reality and severity of
psychological injury and the need for treatment (and redress). Therefore, persons who claim
justifiable psychological injury ought to have the right to present evidence to a jury.
Judge Mager's explanation in the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Jones
quite aptly responds to the three counter-arguments raised in support of the impact rule that
were mentioned or discussed in our supreme court's previous decisions such as Gilliam and
Champion: 1) the difficulty of proving causation between the damages and the alleged fright
or traumatic event; 2) the fear of fraudulent or exaggerated claims; and 3) the possibility of
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B. A Step in the Right Direction for the Unborn Fetus
While reluctantly admitting that the present law in Florida prohibits an
action for the wrongful death of an unborn child,'" the First District Court
of Appeal in Young v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, Inc.,45 urged the
supreme court to join the majority of jurisdictions in recognizing such an
146action. It remains to be seen if the supreme court will follow the
district court's suggestion 47 that Florida law should change and conform
with the majority of states which recognize a cause of action for the death
of an unborn, but viable child.
148
opening the flood gates to litigation. Jones, 272 So. 2d at 530-33.
In light of the above, and the recognition that mental suffering is already an actionable
damage in certain cases, the impact rule should be abolished. See Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Brown, 66 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1953) (holding mental suffering constitutes
recoverable damages in cases of negligent defamation); Carson v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla.
1944) (regarding an invasion of privacy); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569,
570, 652H, cmt. b (1977).
144. Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d
303 (Fla. 1977). Both cases stand for the proposition that actions for wrongful death when
the child is "envetre sa nere" (in the womb of the mother) do not exist in Florida.
145. 653 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The plaintiff, who had been
pregnant with twins brought suit against the defendant "alleging negligent prenatal care and
the resulting wrongful death of her unborn daughter." Id. at 500. A doctor, who was in
training, tried to determine the maturity of the babies' lungs by withdrawing amniotic fluid,
but instead withdrew blood. A test was not performed to determine if the fetus was still
bleeding. As a result, one of the twins whose lungs were punctured was stillborn. A doctor
entered a sworn statement that the stillborn child was viable. Id. at 499-500.
146. Id. at 500.
147. Although one shudders to think it possible, if there is' no change in the law
regarding wrongful death actions for unborn children, it would appear to become beneficial
for a defendant to actively or through inaction cause the demise of an unborn child in order
to escape personal liability.
148. Jones, 653 So. 2d at 503. The burden of proving viability, injury, and damages
rests upon the claimant. Thirty-four state courts have judicially created a cause of action
permitting the recovery for the death of a fetus which was viable but delivered stillborn. In
three other states, the legislatures have created a statutory cause of action. Five states have
not passed on the matter, and seven states, including Florida, still deny recovery. See
generally Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (holding parents can sue for
wrongful death of nonviable fetus); T.A. Borowski, Jr., Comment, No Liability for the
Wrongful Death of Unborn Children-The Florida Legislature Refuses to Protect the Unborn,
16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 835, 839 (1988); Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover
Damages for Death of Unborn Children, 84 A.L.R.3d 411, 422-25 (1978 & Supp. 1994).
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C. Can't Cross the Road with that Chicken
An administrative decision of a professional's misconduct is not
conclusive proof of negligence in a subsequent civil action. 49 In Stogniew
v. McQueen,50 the supreme court stated that the lack of mutuality' of
obligation barred a party from using an administrative decision as conclusive
proof of negligence.1 52
D. He Who Has Gas Better Have Class
In an exception to the general rule that one is not responsible for the
unexpected criminal behavior of a third person, the Second District Court
of Appeal in Butala v. Automated Petroleum & Energy Co. Inc.,"5 3 found
that a retailer has a higher standard of care to protect a customer from a
known ongoing attack."5 The court found in favor of the plaintiff when
a third party, known by the station employees to be in a "foul mood," while
at the station to purchase gasoline, set the plaintiff customer on fire.'55
The court found that the self-service station owner had a duty to take
reasonable steps to protect patrons from on-premises gasoline fires that
could result from the unsupervised use of its pumps. 1 56 This holding may
be a springboard to extend liability to other retailers who fail to take
149. Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1995).
150. 656 So. 2d at 917.
151. The court was unwilling to follow the lead of certain other states and of the federal
courts in abandoning the requirement of mutuality in the application of collateral estoppel.
Id. at 919-20.
152. Id. In this case, the plaintiff sought counseling from the defendant, a licensed
family therapist, and later filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Business &
Professional Regulation ("DPR") alleging that the defendant violated § 491.009(2)(s) of the
Florida Statutes by falling to meet the minimum standards of performance in his professional
relationship with the plaintiff. The DPR found for the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who also filed
a civil suit for negligence, then tried to assert collateral estoppel and requested the trial court
to follow the DPR ruling. Id. at 918-19; cf Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064,
1066 (Fla. 1995) (holding rule requiring that there be mutuality of parties in order for
doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply has been abrogated by statute in context of civil theft
claim).
153. 656 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
154. Id. at 175.
155. Id. at 174.
156. Id. at 175.
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reasonable steps to protect a customer from the dangerous use of instrumen-
talities by third persons on the premises.'
1 7
E. The "Misuse" Absolute Defense is Absolutely Dead
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Standard Havens Products, Inc. v.
Benitez,15 8 abolished the absolute defense of product misuse in product lia-
bility actions alleging negligence.! 9 The Supreme Court of Florida con-
cluded that "much like the earlier demise of the absolute defense of
contributory negligence, product misuse merges into the defense of
comparative negligence. Consequently, product misuse reduces a plaintiff's
recovery in proportion to his or her comparative fault."''
F. Department of Corrections May Get Away with Prisoners Getting Away
Applying Florida law,16 1 the Florida Department of Corrections has
only a general duty to protect. 62 The First District Court of Appeal in
Department of Corrections v. McGhee,163 noted that it felt bound by its
earlier decision of the issue in Department of Corrections v. Vann,164
157. Cf. Hall v. Billy Jacks, Inc., 458 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1984); Surat v. Nu-Med
Pembroke, Inc., 632 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Faverty v. McDonald's
Restaurants, Inc., 892 P.2d 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (stating employer liable for third party's
injuries caused by off-duty employee who had worked 17 hours and fell asleep at wheel
while driving home).
158. 648 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1994).
159. Id. at 1192.
160. Id. at 1197; see also West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336'So. 2d. 80 (Fla. 1976);
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
161. Department of Corrections v. McGhee, 653 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995). The court applied the "significant relationships" or "center of gravity" test from §
145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id at 1092; see also Stallworth v.
Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 515 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987); cf Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906, 917 (Fla. 1995) (stating department
is not liable for negligent placement of child unless done in bad faith or with malicious
purpose, or if placement occurs in manner that exhibits wanton and Willful disregard of
human rights, safety, or property).
162. See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Whaley, 574 So. 2d 100 (Fla.
1991).
163. 653 So. 2d 1091, 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming trial court's ruling
to apply Florida law where escaped prisoners fled from Florida to Mississippi and murdered
Robert McGhee).
164. 650 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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however it recertified the same question as in Vann.' 65 The court also
held that "[tjhe determination of whether a state agency may be held liable
for its conduct within the state of Florida is properly determined pursuant
to Florida law. 166
IX. INSURANCE
A. It's No Longer "Fairly Debatable" That It Is
"Fairly Debatable"
The Supreme Court of Florida recently found that the "fairly debatable"
standard is not applicable to the determination of bad faith.167 The court
also reasoned that the statute which provides as a penalty damages
recoverable from an uninsured motorist insurer in a bad faith action includes
the total amount of the claimant's damages, including the amount in excess
of the policy limits, and is therefore not to be applied retroactively. 68
165. McGhee, 653 So. 2d at 1093. The certified question was:
WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MAY BE HELD
LIABLE AS A RESULT OF THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF AN ESCAPED
PRISONER?
Id.
166. Id.
167. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 62 (Fla. 1995).
168. Id. at 61. The court itemized several other district courts that had rejected the
fairly debatable standard in both first party unfair insurance trade practices and third party
bad faith actions. Id. at 62. The case represents a significant step in giving insured's rights
to recover for the unfair practices of insurers. The author also notes that the recent decision
of Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Conquest, 658 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1995), which provides that
the "any person" language in § 624.155 means "any person," not any insured, should "open
the door" to a wide range of "bad faith" actions against insurers. It is also significant to note
that in Puntervold v. Fortune Insurance Co., No.89-01819, sua sponte dismissed on other
grounds, the author asserted the same "any person means any person" argument. See
Appellants Initial Brief at 6-17 (No. 89-01819). While the Fourth District Court of Appeal
appeared poised to issue an opinion similar to the result reached in Conquest, it was forced
to dismiss without issuing an opinion on the substantive claim, due to a procedural trial
defect. Indeed, while the section does contain the terms "insured" and "insurer," it also
refers to "third party claimants," and "beneficiaries," as well as to "any person or persons"
indicating that the legislature knew the difference between the terms, and used them
intentionally. See, e.g., Heredia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1978). Perhaps
even more significantly, § 624.155(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes itemizes other statutory
sections wherein the phrase "any person" must be read to include others than the first party
insured. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 626.9651(i)(2) (1987) ("any other person with any interest
in the proceeds payable under such contract or policy"); id. § 626.9541(I)(x) ("refusal to
insure ... because of race, color, creed, marital status, sex or national origin .. ."); id. §
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B. Permanently Happy
In Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Tompkins,169 the Supreme Court of
Florida recently ruled that future economic damages may be recovered when
such damages are established with reasonable certainty and without the need
to show permanent injury.17 Although permanent injury is not a prerequi-
site to the recovery of future economic damages, it is a significant factor in
establishing reasonable certainty of future damages."'
626.9551 (all releases "[u]nreasonably disapprove the insurance policy.. ."); id. § 626.9705
(provision that "[n]o life or disability insurer shall refuse to ... sell, or issue a life or
disability insurance policy...").
169. 651 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1995).
170. Id. at 90. The plaintiff, after being involved in an auto accident, settled with his
tortfeasor's insurance company for $25,000, the liability limits of his policy. To recover the
damages which exceeded the $25,000 limit, the plaintiff sued his own insurance carrier,
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, for underinsured motorist benefits. At trial, the court
denied the plaintiffs request for a jury instruction which would have allowed the jury to
award future economic damages even where the jury failed to find that the plaintiff suffered
permanent injuries. Id. The instructions given to the jury only permitted them to award
future economic damages if permanent injury was found. Id. Since the jury did not find that
the plaintiff suffered permanent injuries, they only awarded the plaintiff for past economic
damages. Id. at 90. The plaintiff appealed and the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed, finding that the lower court erred in requiring the jury to find permanent injury as
a prerequisite to awarding future economic damages. Tompkins, 651 So. 2d at 90. The case
arrived before the court based on a conflict between the Second District Court of Appeal's
decision and the Fourth District Court of Appeal's ruling in Josephson v. Bowers, 595 So.
2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that there must be "permanent injury
before a defendant may be held liable for future loss of income and other future damages in
a personal injury claim").
171. Tompkins, 651 So. 2d at 91. The impact of this decision was to clear up any
confusion among the districts about what needs to be established before future economic
damages can be awarded. This holding established the "reasonable certainty" test and thus
clearly rejected any showing of permanent injury as a prerequisite for recovering future
economic damages. Id at 90-91.
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C. You Can't Give Away What You Don't Have
Although certifying the question,'72 the First District Court of Appeal
held that an estate may recover under both the liability and uninsured
motorist coverage of a deceased driver's policy, even though the uninsured
motorist coverage excluded the car from coverage.'73 Dianna Warren died
from injuries sustained on May 5, 1990 while a passenger in an automobile
involved in a single-vehicle accident. 74 The car owned by Edward
Chancey was driven by his daughter, Celeste Chancey Bryant, who was also
killed. 7' As personal representative, Mr. Warren instituted a wrongful
death action and sought recovery for his wife's injuries on the theory that
the injuries resulted from the wife's negligent operation and/or negligent
maintenance of the automobile which was insured by Travelers under a
policy Mr. Chancey had purchased from Phoenix.176 The estate settled
with the appellees for the liability coverage policy limits of $50,000, but
reserved all claims for benefits under the uninsured motorist provisions of
the policy. 177 On behalf of the estate, Mr. Warren then filed the present
complaint for declaratory judgment seeking uninsured motorist benefits. 78
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees, finding that
the estate could not recover under both the liability and uninsured motorists
provisions of the same policy.'79 Because Reid v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co.1'c and its progeny' did not consider the validity of the
172. Warren v. Travelers Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review
granted, 658 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1995). The First District Court of Appeal certified the
following question:
MAY AN INJURED PERSON WHO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER BODILY
INJURY LIABILITY BENEFITS, BUT WHOSE DAMAGES EXCEED THE
POLICY LIMIT FOR LIABILITY COVERAGE, ALSO RECOVER UNDER
THE SAME POLICY FOR UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS, WHERE
THE POLICY EXCLUDES THE INSURED VEHICLE FROM ITS DEFINI-
TION OF "UNINSURED VEHICLE"?
Id. at 1084.
173. Id. Travelers argued that because of an exclusion in the policy, the automobile
involved in the accident was not "uninsured." Id. at 1083. As a result, the trial court refused
to allow the estate of Dianna Warren to recover under both the liability and uninsured
motorist provisions of the same policy. Id.
174. Warren, 650 So. 2d at 1082-83.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Warren, 650 So. 2d at 1083.
180. 352 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1977).
Vol. 20
399
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Mager
"your car" exclusion, the court in distinguishing the two cases, reasoned that
"[e]xclusions to [uninsured motorist] coverage are not enforceable if the
injured person is covered by the [bodily injury liability] provisions of the
policy."
182
D. Peek-a-boo, We Can See You!
An uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier who has been lawfully
sued and properly joined as a party in a lawsuit should be disclosed to the
jury in its actual status as a party defendant. In Krawzak v. Government
Employees Insurance Co. ("GEICO"),'83 GEICO was the real party in
interest, being both the liability insurer and underinsured motorist carri-
er.' In requiring disclosure, the court reasoned that "[i]f there had been
a settlement with the tortfeasor, there would be no question that GEICO
would have been the only party before the jury."'' 5  In stating that
"GEICO could not have been made invisible or disguised in the courtroom"
as merely "the tortfeasor's co-counsel," the court reasoned:
An uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier should not be able to hide
its true identity by being severed from the lawsuit while retaining its
influence over the conduct of the lawsuit as co-counsel for the
tortfeasor. In this case, this procedure seems inherently unfair to the
plaintiff, deceptive to the jury, contrary to the insurance contract entered
into between the plaintiff and its insurer, and contrary to statute." 6
181. See, e.g., Smith v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1992); Brixius v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 589 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1991).
182. Warren, 650 So. 2d at 1083; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 569 So. 2d
1337, 1339 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
253 So. 2d 229, 233-34 (Fla. 1971)); cf. World Wide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Welker, 640
So. 2d 46, 50 (Fla. 1994) (holding driver who was generally insured under mother's policy
as "resident relative" could not collect uninsured motorist benefits from mother's insurer
where driver had accepted financial responsibility for vehicle by obtaining his own liability
coverage, but had expressly rejected uninsured motorist coverage when he was operating his
vehicle).
183. 660 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
184. Id. at 307.
185. Id. at 309.
186. Id. The court rejected the analysis set forth in Colford v. Braun Cadillac, Inc., 620
So. 2d 780 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 626 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1993).
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E. If You Choose to Jump in the Water, Expect to Get Wet
If an insurer assumes the defense of an action where it could have
denied coverage and the insured can demonstrate that the assumption of the
defense resulted in prejudice to the insured, the insurer is estopped from
subsequently raising the defense of non-coverage. In Doe v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,'87 the supreme court reasoned that once an insurer begins
to fulfill its promissory obligation to defend an insured by hiring counsel,
conducting a pre-trial investigation, and controlling the insured's defense,
a fiduciary duty arises which requires the exercise of good faith. 88
X. OTHER INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS
A. Buckling Down on the Buckle Up Defense
The seat belt defense cannot be submitted to a jury, unless the plaintiff
presents "competent evidence"'89 that the failure to wear the seat belt
caused or substantially contributed to the injuries. The plaintiff in Zurline
v. Levesque,' 9° sued the driver of the car in which she was a passen-
ger. 91 Even though she was not wearing a seat belt, the court prohibited
the defendant from informing the jury of that fact because there was no
proof of causation.' 92
187. 653 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1995).
188. Id. at 373-74. See cases cited infra note 226 for other cases on the emergence and
application upon the implied covenant of good faith.
189. See Bums v. Smith, 476 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 565 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), dismissed, 570
So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1990).
190. 642 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1170. The court used the Pasarkanis test from Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Pasarkanis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984), which states that before a jury can consider the seat
belt defense, the defendant must plead and prove the following: 1) the plaintiff failed to use
"an available and fully operational seat belt;" 2) the nonuse was reasonable under the
circumstances; and 3) the plaintiffs failure to use the seat belt caused or contributed
substantially to his or her damages. Id. at 454. The court found that the defendant met the
first two elements (as interpreted in Bulldog Leasing Co. v. Curtis, 630 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 141 (1994)), but failed to meet the third requirement. Zurline, 642
So. 2d at 1170.
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B. Bulldog Remains the Big Dog on the Block
The standard set by the Supreme Court of Florida in Bulldog Leasing
Co. v. Curtis93 applies in all cases where the defendant asserts the seat
belt defense, and not only in cases where the plaintiff has possession or
control of the vehicle.'94 The Second District Court of Appeal in Osgood
Industries Inc. v. Schlau 95 applied the Bulldog test in its determination
that the trial court erred in granting its motion for directed verdict as to the
defendant's seat belt defense.19 6
C. It's Not What You Say, It's Where You Say It
Absolute immunity is afforded to any act which occurs during the
course of judicial proceedings, including the tortious interference with a
business relationship, so long as the act has some relation to the proceed-
ing." 7 Answering a question certified from the Eleventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court of Florida in Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayers
& Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.98 extended the well-
established rule of absolute immunity, which traditionally applied only to
acts of slander, libel, perjury,' 99 and other tort claims. °  In so holding,
193. 630 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 141 (1994).
194. Osgood Indus. Inc. v. Schlau, 654 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
see also Safety Kleen Corp. v. Ridley, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D842, D842 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
Apr. 6, 1995) (jury must be instructed that violation of § 316.614 constitutes evidence of
negligence).
195. 654 So. 2d at 959.
196. Id. at 961.
197. Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayers & Mitchell, P.A. v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1994). The certified question which brought this
case to the court was:
WHETHER CERTIFYING TO A TRIAL COURT AN INTENT TO CALL
OPPOSING COUNSEL AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
COUNSEL'S DISQUALIFICATION, AND LATER FAILING TO SUBPOENA
AND CALL COUNSEL AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL, IS AN ACTION THAT
IS ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FROM A CLAIM OF TORTIOUS INTERFER-
ENCE WITH A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BY VIRTUE OF FLORIDA'S
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE.
Id.
198. Id. at 606.
199. This absolute immunity has its roots in several cases. See Fridovich v. Fridovich,
598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) (quoting in part Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607) (holding defamatory
statements made in course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, "no matter how
false or malicious the statements may be, so long as the statements are relevant to the subject
of inquiry"); see also Cox v. Klein, 546 So. 2d 120, 122 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
19951
402
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Nova Law Review Vol. 20
the Supreme Court of Florida appears to have greatly extended the scope of
this immunity, again leaving the "[r]emedies for perjury, slander, and the
like committed during judicial proceedings ...to the discipline of the
courts, the bar association, and the state." ''
D. If You Sell It, Will They Come?
The mere hope of a plaintiff that some of its past customers may again
choose to buy from them cannot be a basis for a tortious interference claim.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in answering a certified question2 in
(holding immunity afforded to statemnents made during course of judicial proceeding extends
not only to parties in proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well); Wright v.
Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding torts of perjury, libel,
slander, defamation, and similar proceedings that are based on statements made in connection
with judicial proceeding are not actionable); Sussman v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (finding participants in judicial proceedings must be free from fear
of later civil liability as to anything said or written during litigation so as not to chill actions
of participants in immediate claim).
200. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608. In the bad faith action, it was revealed that an attorney
with the plaintiff firm was one of the people who had knowledge of the defendant's alleged
bad faith. Id. at 607. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to disqualify the
plaintiff firm in which the defendant certified that it would be calling an attorney from that
firm as a witness at trial. Id. The defendant never called or subpoenaed that attorney at trial,
and never notified the court that it would not be calling that attorney. Id. After the trial, the
plaintiff firm sued the defendant for tortious interference with a business relationship,
alleging that the defendant intentionally disqualified the attorney to prevent the plaintiff's
firm from representing their client. Id, The defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that
its actions were protected by the absolute immunity afforded to statements or actions taken
during a judicial proceeding. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607. The supreme court upheld the
dismissal. Id.; see also Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309, 310
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (holding tortious claim of extortion, which was based on alleged
fraud and delaying tactics of counsel in course of litigation, was improper because conduct
at issue was committed during course of judicial proceeding and was immune from civil
liability in any subsequent proceeding), review denied, 554 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1989); Sailboat
Key, Inc. v. Gardner, 378 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("injurious falsehood,
which is a tort that never has been greatly favored by the law, is subject to all the privileges
recognized both in cases of personal defamation and in those of other types of interference
with economic advantage") (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 114 (4th ed.
1971)).
201. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608 (quoting Wright, 446 So. 2d at 1164).
202. The certified question before the supreme court was:
Under Florida law, in a tortious interference with business relationships tort
action, may a plaintiff recover damages for the loss of goodwill based upon
future sales to past customers with whom the plaintiff has no understanding that
they will continue to do business with the plaintiff, or is the plaintiffs recovery
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Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 203 held that a plaintiff may
not recover damages for the tortious interference with a business relation-
ship, where the relationship is based on speculation regarding future sales
to past customers.204  The court distinguished Insurance Field Services,
Inc. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Services, Inc., 5 because the
ongoing relationship that the tortfeasor interfered with there was "far
different" than in Georgetown, where there was a retail furniture dealer with
89,000 past customers." 6 The court thus held that, while Georgetown
could recover damages reasonably flowing from its existing relationships,
it could not recover for tortious interference based on a speculative
contention that past customers would return to purchase furniture.2°
E. If You're Finished, You May Be Done
Voluntary dismissal of an active tortfeasor with prejudice entered by
the agreement of parties pursuant to a settlement agreement is not the
equivalent of an adjudication on the merits"8 that will serve as a bar to
of damages limited to harm done to existing business relationships pursuant to
which plaintiff has legal rights... ?
Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 813 (Fla. 1994).
203. 47 F.3d 1099 (11th Cir. 1995).
204. Id. at 1101.
205. 384 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (company had regularly been
performing underwriting inspections, premiums, audits, and loss control work for 16
insurance company clients).
206. Georgetown, 47 F.3d at 1100 n.1. The case from which this question arose centers
around a dissolution of a business relationship between a manufacturer and its former dealer.
See Georgetown Manor Inc. v. Ethan Allen Inc., 991 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993).
During the dissolution of their relationship, the manufacturer placed an ad in a newspaper
which was the basis of the tortious interference claim. The advertisement announced the split
between the parties and related that manufacturer had discontinued distributing to dealer,
because dealer was not current on its debts. The ad also stated that manufacturer was
opening new outlets and asked those customers who had unfilled orders with dealer to
contact the new outlets where their orders would be filled expeditiously. The dealer then
brought suit claiming that the ad interfered with its prospective relationship with former
customers who had shopped with them in the past and might shop with them again in the
future. Id. at 1535-36.
207. Georgetown, 47 F.3d at 1101. As a general rule, an action for the tortious
interference with a business relationship requires a business relationship evidenced by an
actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all probability would have been
completed if there had not been interference. Ia
208. JFK Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Price, 647 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. 1994). In JFK, the
plaintiff sued her doctor (active tortfeasor) for medical malpractice. The suit included a
claim against his employer, JFK Medical Center. The plaintiff agreed to dismiss her suit
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continued litigation against the passive tortfeasor.2 9 The Supreme Court
of Florida in JFK Medical Center, Inc. v. Price also held that the voluntary
dismissal of the active tortfeasor would not affect the passive tortfeasor's
right to indemnification, reasoning that "[i]t would be unconscionable to
require a passive tortfeasor to compensate an injured party, while at the
same time barring indemnification from the active party. 210
F. An Interest(ing) Prejudgment Development
A successful personal injury claimant is entitled to prejudgment interest
on the claim from the time of the jury verdict to the entry of the final
judgment.2 In Palm Beach County School Board v. Montgomery,212
some six months after entry of the verdict, the trial court decided post trial
motions and entered a final judgment.23 The school board contested the
award of interest from the date of the verdict that was entered by the trial
court rather than from the date of the final judgment.214 The court applied
the analysis as set forth in the seminal case of Argonaut Insurance Co. v.
May Plumbing Co. 21 5 in awarding prejudgment interest on a personal
injury claim from the date of the rendition of the jury verdict up to the time
(with prejudice) against the doctor, but "the claim against the Center would not be affected."
Id. at 833. The trial court granted JFK'S motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
the dismissal of the physician operated as an adjudication on the merits. Id. at 833-34. The
district court reversed and JFK asked the supreme court to quash the lower court's decision.
Id. at 834.
209. Id.
210. JFK Medical Ctr., 647 So. 2d at 834.
211. Palm Beach County Sch. Bd. v. Montgomery, 641 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
212. 641 So. 2d at 183.
213. Id. at 184.
214. Id.
215. 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985). In Argonaut, the court established the following
principles:
1) An unliquidated claim becomes liquidated and susceptible of bearing prejudgment
interest when a jury verdict has the affect of fixing the amount of damages;
2) Once a verdict has liquidated damages as of a certain date, computation of pre-
judgment interest is merely a ministerial mathematical computation to be performed by the
court; and
3) Prejudgment interest is calculated at the same rate as postjudgment interest. Palm
Beach County Sch. Bd., 641 So. 2d at 184 (referring to Argonaut, 470 So. 2d at 215); see
also Sullivan v. McMillan, 19 So. 340, 342-43 (Fla. 1896) (holding person injured should
receive interest from time verdict liquidates damage claim).
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of entry of the final judgment. The court distinguished Zorn v. Britton216
which held that prejudgment interest would not be recoverable for personal
injuries, on the basis that the case was limited to "unliquidated damages for
personal injuries.' 217
G. Even an Attorney's Magic Won't Make 10 Equal 100
Under Florida's Wrongful Death Act, 218 a defendant cannot be
required to pay 100% of the damages where one of the parents of the
deceased child has been held to bear the majority of the fault.219 Defen-
dants can seek contribution despite the operation of the statute.220 In
Hudson v. Moss,22 the Third District Court of Appeal reasoned that the
policy underlying parent/child tort immunity disappears entirely in the
unfortunate case where the child has died and the parent is suing for their
own damages as a survivor,2" and found that requiring a third party
216. 162 So. 879 (Fla. 1935).
217. Palm Beach County Sch. Bd., 641 So. 2d at 184 (quoting Zorn, 162 So. at 881).
218. FLA. STAT. § 768.20 (1993) ("A defense that would bar or reduce a survivor's
recovery if he were the plaintiff may be asserted against him, but shall not affect the
recovery of any other survivor").
219. Hudson v. Moss, 653 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). This issue
arose out of a wrongful death claim by the parents of a child drowning victim against the
owners of the swimming pool where the child drowned. Id. at 1072. The trial court held
the father to be 90% at fault for the child's drowning and held Larry and Sharon Hudson
each five percent at fault. Id. at 1072. The trial court allowed full recovery to the mother
by not reducing that amount by the percent of negligence attributed to the father. Id. The
trial court held that this result was clearly mandated based upon the interplay of the
Comparative Fault Act and the Wrongful Death Act of §§ 768.20, 768.71, and 768.81 of the
Florida Statutes. Id.
220. Hudson, 653 So. 2d at 1073. The appellate court found error in the trial court's
application of Joseph v. Quest, 414 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1982), which held that a
contribution claim for a child's damages against a negligent parent is allowed only to the
extent of the parent's liability insurance. Hudson, 653 So. 2d at 1073. Instead, the court
found that the reasoning of Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977), was applicable to this
case. Hudson, 653 So. 2d at 1073. The court did agree with the extension of the Joseph
case that was adopted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. School Board,
537 So. 2d 685, 685-86 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), which held that parent/child immunity
was not applicable to a contribution claim where the child was deceased and the parents were
suing for their own damages as survivors. Hudson, 653 So. 2d at 1073.
221. 653 So. 2d at 1071.
222. Id. (holding parent/child liability will deter parent from bringing action for damages
on behalf of injured child).
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tortfeasor to bear more than their proportionate share of liability unfairly
denied them their right to contribution.223
H. Doctors Medicate Hospital
In a case which could "open the door" to other similar avenues of
relief, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that doctors could sue
a hospital for damages that resulted from poor peer reviews.224
I. Expressing the Implied Covenant
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is gaining
recognition as a weapon against bad faith conduct by organizations which
are often in a superior bargaining position.225
223. Id.
224. Cooper v. Delaware Valley Medical Ctr., 654 A.2d 547, 551 (Pa. 1995).
225. This has been especially apparent in the franchise arena. With franchise litigation
on the rise, it is extremely important that both franchisors and franchisees (and their counsel)
be aware of the emerging theories based on the requirement of good faith and fair dealing
in contract performance.
One begins with the sentinel discussion as set out in Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756
F. Supp. 543, 548-49 (S.D. Fla. 1991):
It is axiomatic that a contract includes not only its written provisions, but also
the terms and matters which, though not actually expressed, are implied by law,
and these are as binding as the terms which are actually written or spoken.
Sharp v. Williams, 141 Fla. 1, 192 So. 476, 480 (1939). One such implied term
of a contract, recognized by Florida law, is the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. App.
1981) ("One established contract principle is that a party's good faith coopera-
tion is an implied condition precedent to performance of a contract"); Johnson
v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (seller of property has duty to disclose
material defects of which she is aware in accord with principles of fair dealing
and good faith).
Id. at 548-49; see also Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 798 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
As the court similarly stated in Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824
P.2d 841, 862 (Idaho 1992), in reiterating a particular jury instruction:
Every contract imposes on all partes to the contract an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance or enforcement. "Good faith" means honesty
in fact in the conduct or the transaction concerned. Each party owes a duty to
exercise good faith in its dealing and transactions with the other party. If a
party fails to deal honestly with the other party, it is liable for a breach of the
duty of good faith.
Id.; see also First Nationwide Bank v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1542
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (under Florida law, a party's good faith cooperation is an implied condition
precedent).
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This fundamental concept of good faith and fair dealing was also articulated by
renowned contract specialist Corbin:
If the purpose of contract law is to enforce the reasonable expectations of parties
induced by promises, then at some point it becomes necessary for courts to look
to the substance rather than the form of the agreement, and to hold that
substance controls over form. What courts are doing here, whether calling the
process "implication" of promises, or interpreting the requirements of "good
faith", as the current fashion may be, is but a recognition that the parties
occasionally have understandings or expectations that were so fundamental that
they did not need to negotiate about those expectations. When the court
"implies a promise" or holds that "good faith" requires a party not to violate
those expectations, it is recognizing that sometimes silence says more than [sic]
words, and it is understanding its duty to the spirit of the bargain is higher than
its duty to the technicalities of the language.
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & ARTHUR A. JACOBSON, CORBIN ON CONTRACrs § 570 (Supp.
1984).
Virtually every state agrees with this axiomatic principle. See, e.g., Dunkin' Donuts of
Am., Inc. v. Minerva, Inc., 956 F.2d 1566, 1569-70 (lth Cir. 1991) (holding under
Massachusetts law, "implied obligation of good faith exists by operation of law"); Louis
Glunz Beer, Inc. v. Martlet Importing Co., 864 F. Supp. 810, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract and fraud action); Jo-Ann's
Launder Ctr. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 854 F. Supp. 387 (D.V.I. 1994); Peoples
Heritage Say. Bank v. Recoll Management, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 159, 166 (D. Me. 1993)
(finding that "[e]very contract or duty . . . imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement"); Union Say. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
813 F. Supp. 481, 489 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (holding that under Minnesota law, every non-saies
contract contains implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Metro Communications
Co. v. Ameritech Mobil Communications, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1424, 1431 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(finding that "implied covenant attaches to every contract and 'imposes a limitation on the
exercise of discretion vested in one of the parties to a contract"'(quoting Dayan v.
McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984))), affd, 984 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.
1993); Zeno Buick-GMC, Inc. v. GMC Truck & Coach, 844 F. Supp 1340, 1348-50 (E.D.
Ark. 1992) (holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies under Michigan
common law), aff'd, 9 F.3d 115 (8th Cir. 1993); Colville Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. North Slope
Borough, 831 P.2d 341, 344 (Alaska 1992) ("In every contract . . . there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which will injure
the right of the other . . ." (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1292 (Alaska 1979)));
McAlister v. Citibank, 829 P.2d 1253, 1259 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Traumann v. Southland
Corp., 858 F. Supp. 979, 983 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing applies, and "[e]ven where one party retains, by virtue of the contract, a right
of approval or disapproval or a discretionary power over the rights of the other, such powers
must be exercised 'within the parameters of the duty of good faith' ... good faith requires
that each party act 'reasonably' in light of the 'justified expectations' of the other party."
(quoting Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987))); Ervin v. Amoco Oil Co., 885 P.2d 246, 250
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding every contract, regardless of type, contains an implied
1995]
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J. You Need a "Hickey" to Be Together
Two injuries arising out of two accidents may be joined together in a
suit as a matter of right where 1) the second accident contributed to the
injury from the first accident and 2) separate trials would create the risk of
inconsistent verdicts. In Hickey v. Pompano K of C,2 6 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal stated that if an injury sustained by a person while on one
property is later aggravated by an injury sustained on another person's
covenant of good faith); Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d
1359, 1362 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (adding that Colorado has recognized separate cause of
action for bad faith breach of an insurance contract); Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav.
Bank, 612 N.E.2d 650, 655 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Katz v. Oak Indust., Inc., 508 A.2d 873,
880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting that "[miodern contract law has generally recognized an implied
covenant to the effect that each party to a contract will act with good faith towards the
other"); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 862 (Idaho 1992);
Waller v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 620 A.2d 381, 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (implying
duty of good faith and fair dealing); Lemay Bank & Trust Co. v. Harper, 810 S.W.2d 690,
693 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 617 (Mont.
1990) ("[e]very contract, regardless of type, contains an implied covenant of good faith...
• [B]reach of an express contractual term is not a prerequisite to breach of the implied cove-
nant." (quoting Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 775 (Mont. 1990))); Morris v. Bank
of Am. Nev., 886 P.2d 454, 457 (Nev. 1994) ("Where one party to a contract 'deliberately
countervenes the intention and spirit of the contract, that party can incur liability for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."' (quoting in part Hilton Hotels Corp.
v. Butch Lewis Prod. Inc., 808 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Nev. 1991))); Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am.
v. Alcoa Bldg. Prod. Inc., 351 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1976) (applying implied covenant of good
faith); A.W. Fuir Co. v. Ataka & Co., Ltd., 422 N.Y.S.2d 419,422 (1979) (holding provision
giving "absolute and exclusive right to reject any order for any reason whatsoever" does not
give party right to arbitrarily refuse to perform); Richard Bruce & Co. v. J. Simpson & Co.,
243 N.Y.S.2d 503, 506 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (noting that "absolute discretion" means discretion
based on fair dealing and good faith-a reasonable discretion); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933) (finding every contract contains an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Dull v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 354 S.E.2d 752
(N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 358 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. 1987); Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez,
780 S.W.2d 477, 481-83 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding all contracts contain an implied
covenant of good faith); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502, 509
(Okla. 1993) (holding implied covenant of good faith imposed upon all contracting parties
by common law); Nelson v. Web Water Dev. Ass'n, Inc., 507 N.W.2d 691, 697-98 (S.D.
1993); Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 300-01 (Utah App. 1994)
(upholding an award based on breach of implied covenant of good faith); Betchard-Clayton,
Inc. v. King, 707 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that "there is an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on the parties to a contract"); Lonsdale v.
Chesterfield, 662 P.2d 385, 387 (Wash. 1983) (finding implied covenant of good faith applies
to assignee of contract).
226. 647 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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property, those two claims can be joined in a suit against both property
owners.227 The court reasoned that if the cases are tried separately, the
jury in the first trial could hold that the damages resulted from the second
accident, and a subsequent jury in the second suit could determine that the
injuries resulting from the second accident were the result of the damages
from the first accident.2' A low verdict in both trials could thus be
entered which would not require a new trial. It would be highly unlikely
that a plaintiff would be able to get post-trial or appellate relief in these
circumstances, and therefore the plaintiff would not have an adequate
remedy by appeal. 9
227. Id. at 271. The plaintiff's complaint alleged claims against two defendants
resulting from separate slip and fall accidents occurring three weeks apart. Plaintiff alleges
that the first fall on A's premises injured her knee and made her more susceptible to falling
on B's premises and that the second fall aggravated her initial knee injury. To require her
to conduct separate trials against both defendants could result in inconsistent verdicts for
"which there would be no adequate remedy by appeal." Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.; see Lawrence v. Hethcox, 283 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 1973) (holding joinder
required where plaintiff sued defendant for injuries sustained in auto accident and later
amended complaint to add second defendant involved in second accident about six weeks
later). The court so held because injuries from both accidents were overlapping and not
apportionable if the cases were tried separately and each defendant might be able to convince
the jury that the injuries were caused by the other defendant. Lawrence, 283 So. 2d at 44;
see also Pages v. Dominguez, 652 So. 2d 864, 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
consolidation of two brother's claims arising out of same accident was properly denied by
trial court because claims would require separate and distinct elements of damages and
testimony); Maharaj v. Grossman, 619 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Meyers v.
Shore Indus., Inc., 575 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); U-Haul Co. of N. Fla., Inc.
v. White, 503 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986). In Kraft v. Smith, 148 P.2d 23 (Cal.
0"44), the court held the negligence of both defendants contributed approximately to cause
an injury for which a plaintiff was entitled to recover. Extreme difficulty of proof as to
amount each defendant was responsible requiredjoinder to prevent difficulties of proof which
tended to obstruct rather than promote justice arising from separate actions and separate in
such a situation. Iii at 26. With regard to an injury caused or contributed to by two or more
people, see McDonald v. Florida Department of Transportation, 655 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Fla.
4th Dist Ct. App. 1995) (holding intervening act will absolutely absolve original tortfeasor
of liability only when it is independent of original negligence and not set in motion by
original negligent act-two separate acts can be proximate cause of same injury; if injury is
caused by concurring negligence of two or more parties, each of them is liable to same extent
as if injury had been caused by each alone); Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091, 1092
(Me. 1995) (where single negligent actor, by aggravating a plaintiff's preexisting injury
produces aggregate injury that is incapable of apportionment, that negligent actor is liable
for plaintiffs entire amount of damages). The single injury rule, which was previously
limited to situations in which tortfeasors caused a single injury that was incapable of
1995]
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K. You're Liable to Be Liable
An attorney can be held liable for legal malpractice even where the
plaintiff is neither a client nor in privity of contract with the attorney.230
In Rushing v. Bosse,231 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
special nature of an adoption proceeding permits a cause of action against
an attorney for professional negligence even in the absence of privity be-
tween the child and the attorney.232
apportionment, has been expanded.
230. Rushing v. Bosse, 652 So. 2d 869, 872-73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Accord
Baskerville-Donovan Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pensacola House Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 581 So. 2d
1301, 1303 (Fla. 1991) (holding "lack of privity does not necessarily foreclose liability if a
duty of care is otherwise established"); Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, P.A. v. Oberon Inv., N.V.,
512 So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1987) (finding limited exception to privity requirement where
plaintiff is intended third party beneficiary of attorney's actions); Greenberg v. Mahoney,
Adams & Criser, P.A., 614 So. 2d 604 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 624 So. 2d
267 (Fla. 1993); see also Meighan v. Shore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744, 754 (Ct. App. 1995)
(stating "in California, professional liability is not dependent upon privity of contract, but the
presence or absence of a client's intent that the plaintiff benefit from or rely upon the
attorney's services is particularly significant in the determination of duty. Intended reliance
may be express or implicit, obvious or subtle"); Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143, 145-46
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding rule of privity in legal malpractice actions is relaxed
when plaintiff is intended third party beneficiary of contract between attorney and client);
Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983) (holding beneficiary
of will may maintain legal malpractice action against attorney who negligently drafts or
supervises execution of will even though beneficiary is not in privity with attorney). Contra
Aglira v. Julien & Schlesinger, P.C., No. 55165, 1995 WL 567485, at "4 (N.Y. App. Div.
Sept. 21, 1995) (holding lack of privity between attorney and infant in medical malpractice
case prevents claim based on legal malpractice); C.K. Indus. Corp. v. C.M. Indus. Corp., 623
N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (App. Div. 1995) (holding legal malpractice plaintiff must establish
existence of attorney-client relationship because in absence of fraud, collusion, malicious acts,
or other special circumstances, attorney is not liable for harm caused by professional
malpractice to third parties).
231. 652 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The facts surrounding this decision
arose from the alleged misconduct of the attorneys who initiated and continued a private
adoption proceeding which resulted in the child being removed from her grandmother and
great-grandmother's care for ten months.
232. Id. at 872-73. Similarly, in Donahue v. Shughart, Thompson & Kilroy, P.C., 900
S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. 1995), the court held that the legal duty of attorneys to non-clients
must be determined by weighing the following six factors: 1) the existence of a specific
intent by the client that the purpose of the attorney's services was to benefit the plaintiffs;
2) the foreseeability of the harm to plaintiffs as a result of the attorney's negligence; 3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiffs will suffer injury from attorney misconduct; 4) the
closeness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury; 5) the policy of
preventing future harm; and 6) the burden on the profession of recognizing liability under
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L. Caveat Builder
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that builder-developers and
their selling brokers may be held liable for failing to disclose to unwary
home buyers offsite conditions which will affect the value and enjoyment
of their new homes, which in this case were built near a hazardous waste
dump.2 33
M. If It's Damaged, It May Be Worth More
Courts, by upholding significant punitive damage awards, are showing
how they have become tired of defendants' lack of responsibility.234
the circumstances. In Duffey Law Office, S.C. v. Tank Transp., Inc., 535 N.W.2d 91, 92
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995), the court held that an attorney who represents to a client that the
attorney has expertise greater than that of the average lawyer is to be held to the standard
of professional care that is consistent with the claimed expertise.
233. Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 431 (N.J. 1995). The author expects this case
to launch a series of actions against real estate organizations, their brokers and other similarly
situated persons.
234. See, e.g., Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 44 F.3d 1465, 1478
(10th Cir. 1995). In Continental, the court held that a punitive damages award of $30
million was not excessive, even in light of actual damage award being only $269,000. Id.
at 1479. "The jury apparently considered the wealth of the defendant ... in determining the
amount needed to punish and deter." Id. at 1478. Similarly, in Tiemey v. Community
Memorial General Hospital, 645 N.E.2d 284 (Ill. 1st Dist. App. Ct. 1994), the court held that
a $16 million award was not excessive in a medical malpractice case where the injuries were
substantial and the suffering was unique. Id. at 294. In Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd.,
888 P.2d 8 (Or. 1995), a punitive damages award of $5 million in a products liability action
was found to be within the range of what a rational jury would be entitled to award where
the defendant knew or should have known, before developing its product that it was likely
to cause death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 12. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal, in Department of Transportation & Development v. Schwegmann Westside
Expressway, Inc., 651 So. 2d 1359 (La. 4th Cir. Ct. App. 1995), found a severance damages
award of $4.85 million was proper where the defendant's appropriation of land for public
purposes resulted in a loss of visibility and access to plaintiff's property and subsequently
a loss of value of plaintiff's property. Id. at 1364-65. In Koplewicz v. Colony Ticket
Service, Inc., 620 N.Y.S.2d 384, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), an award of $680,000 plus
attorney's fees, interest, and costs did not materially deviate from a reasonable award for a
fractured clavicle. In Duck Head Apparel Co. v. Hoots, 659 So. 2d 897 (Ala. 1995), a
further reduction of punitive damages award which had been reduced from $19.5 to $15
million was not supported by a consideration of the defendant's financial position. Id. at
915. In Williams v. Rene, 886 F. Supp. 1214 (D.V.I. 1995), an award of $4.5 million was
not excessive where an expert testified that the victim's economic damages could reach
almost $6 million. IeL at 1242. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Wagner v. City of
Chicago, 651 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (III. 1995), upheld a $2.1 million award where the
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plaintiff's comparative negligence had already reduced the award and defendant had breached
its duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition. In Batiste v. New Hampshire
Insurance Co., 657 So. 2d 168 (La. Ct. App. 1995), an increase of the jury's damage award
to $250,000 was proper where the evidence showed that the victim suffered a 15% disability
of his body as a whole as a result of the accident. Id at 170. An award of $4.20 million
was held not to be excessive in Washington v. Barnes Hospital, 897 S.W.2d 611, 611 (Mo.
1995), where a child sustained severe and permanent brain damage as the result of negligent
care received immediately prior to and during delivery. Id. Similarly, in Luther v. Norfolk
& West Railway Co., 649 N.E.2d 1000, 1009 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), an award of over $1.57
million was not excessive for back injuries which aggravated a degenerative disc disease,
resulting in permanent injury and an inability to return to a past position as laborer, absent
any indication that the worker presented argument to inflame the passions or prejudices of
the jury. Id. at 1009. In Doe v. Doe, 657 So. 2d 628, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1995), the court
held an award of $750,000 was justified in light of a psychologist's sexual abuse of a patient
while the patient was in a severely depressed and suicidal state. Contra Chung v. New York
City Transit Auth., 624 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (App. Div. 1995) (holding award of $1.5 million
for past pain and suffering for plaintiff who, after falling from a subway platform lost both
legs, was excessive and a reduction to $600,000 was proper); Thibodeaux v. U.S.A.A.
Casualty Ins. Co., 647 So. 2d 351, 360-61 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding $90,000 award for
loss of future earning capacity not error despite expert witness' estimate of $440,000 to
$540,000).
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I. INTRODUCTION: 1998 AND PROTECTNG THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION
Nineteen ninety-eight is the year that could save the Florida Consti-
tution from being demeaned and trivialized. In 1998, the Florida Consti-
tutional Revision Commission will propose revisions of the Florida
Constitution to the people of Florida.1 A constitutional revision commis-
sion convenes in Florida each twentieth year after the tenth year following
the adoption of the 1968 Florida Constitution.2 The Commission will
consist of the Florida Attorney General,3 fifteen members appointed by the
Governor,4 nine members selected by the Speaker of the Florida House of
Representatives,5 nine members selected by the President of the Florida
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida. B.A.,
1970, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania; J.D., magna cue laude, 1982, Boston
College Law School; M.S., 1973, Boston University; M.P.A., 1974, Northeastern University,
Boston, Massachusetts. Professor Gordon is a member of the Florida and California Bars.
1. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c).
2. Id. § 2(a).
3. Id. § 2(a)(1).
4. Id. § 2(a)(2).
5. Id. § 2(a)(3).
414
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
Senate,6 and three members selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Florida with the advice of the justices of the supreme court. The
Revision Commission will examine the Florida Constitution, except for
matters relating directly to taxation and the state budget, by holding public
hearings.8
The Florida Constitutional Revision Commission should be appointed
and begin convening after the close of the 1997 legislative session.'
Preparations for the convening of the Revision Commission have begun."
Already, Floridians have proposed changes to the Florida Constitution"
and have begun discussions about issues that could result in constitutional
change.12 The Revision Commission, like its 1978 predecessor, could
review many aspects of Florida constitutional law and government.13
However, the most important work of the Commission should be preserving
the integrity of the Florida Constitution by preventing the constitution from
being downgraded to statutory law and a constitutional junkyard. The
Commission needs to spend a considerable amount of time and resources on
considering how the Florida Constitution is changed and amended. 4
Evidence of an emerging state constitutional junkyard was reflected in
the recent comments by a Florida Supreme Court justice concerning the
Florida Constitution, article XI, section 3, the initiative amending pro-
cess. 5 The supreme court justice complained that the supreme status of
Florida constitutional law became threatened by recent proposed amend-
ments to the constitution. Some of those proposed amendments seemed to
the supreme court justice to be more appropriate as statutes. The perma-
6. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)(3).
7. Id. § 2(a)(4).
8. Id. § 2(c). Beginning in 1990 and every tenth year after, a Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission meets to examine the Florida state budgetary process, revenue needs,
tax structure, and governmental productivity and efficiency. Id. § 6.
9. In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor Request of Nov. 19, 1976 (Constitution
Revision Comm'n), 343 So. 2d 17, 24 (Fla. 1977).
10. Stephen T. Maher, The Conference on the Florida Constitution, 68 FLA. B.J. 66
(1994).
11. Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Alfred A. Colby, Some Proposed Changes to the Florida
Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1519 (1994).
12. Stephen T. Maher, The Florida Cabinet. Is It Time for Remodeling, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 1123 (1994).
13. Stephen J. Uhfelder & Robert A. McNeely, The 1978 Constitution Revision
Commission: Florida's Blueprint for Change, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1489 (1994).
14. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-6.
15. See Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d
997, 999-1000 (Fla. 1993) (McDonald, J., concurring).
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nency and supremacy of the Florida Constitution remained jeopardized16
because the Florida Constitution lended itself too easily to amendment.17
What the justice neglected to say was that the Supreme Court of Florida was
being converted into a battleground for social"8 and economic 9 issues.
This battleground threatens the recent movement of the Supreme Court of
Florida toward making the Florida Constitution the primary protection for
individual rights in Florida.2" This has occurred by making Florida
constitutional adjudication susceptible to challenge in the federal courts,
which also happened recently in one other state.21
Preservation of the efficacy of the Florida Constitution requires reform
of the Florida constitutional amendment procedures, especially the initiative
procedures22 which allow the most democratic and politically unrestrained
amendments. The initiative procedures in Florida and elsewhere allow
interest groups to utilize state constitutions as socio-economic battle-
grounds.O This article proposes to curb the initiative procedures of the
Florida Constitution. Not only does the article consider subject matter
restrictions on initiative proposals,24 but the article also considers super-
majority and more deliberative techniques for curbing the social and
economic passions of Floridians in the context of their state constitution.25
This article urges that preference be given to more deliberative techniques
of constitutional change, such as legislative proposals of constitutional
16. aId at 1000.
17. MdJ at 1000 n.2.
18. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Restricts Laws Related to
Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).
19. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d
1336 (Fla. 1994).
20. See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 964 (Fla. 1992) (protecting an accused's
constitutional right to counsel); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 17 (Fla. 1990)
(recognizing constitutional right of privacy for incompetent persons); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d
1186, 1201 (Fla. 1989) (concluding that constitutional right to privacy encompasses minor's
right to terminate her pregnancy). See also Daniel Gordon, Good Intentions - Questionable
Results: Florida Tries the Primacy Model, 18 NOVA L. REv. 759 (1994) (discussing Florida
state constitution).
21. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
22. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
23. See William E. Adams Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges:
Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
583 (1994).
24. See Advisory Opinion - Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 1000 (McDonald,
T., concurring).
25. See infra notes 180-197 and accompanying text.
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amendments, 26 although some commentators have questioned the effective-
ness of those techniques. 27  Hopefully, the 1998 Florida Constitutional
Revision Commission will take action to preserve the supremacy and
efficacy of the Florida Constitution.
II. SYMPTOMS OF THE EMERGING JUNKYARD
Interest groups are slowly converting the Florida Constitution into aprivate law making mechanism. Groups including environmentalists,2 s
agricultural industrialists,2 9 and ethnic communities," have utilized the
initiative election process as a means either to support or oppose social
restrictions 31 and economic benefits.32 The years since 1988 demonstrate
how special interests have enhanced traditional legislative lobbying efforts
by appealing to the electorate's power to amend law through the state
constitutional initiative process. 33  In the nineteen years between the
adoption of the modem Florida Constitution in 19683' and 1987, seven
constitutional amendment initiatives appeared on the ballot.35 In the eight
26. Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 709, 718 (1994).
27. Joseph W. Little & Julius Medenblik, Restricting Legislative Amendments to the
Constitution, 60 FLA. B.J. 43 (1986).
28. The Save our Sealife Committee and the Conservation Committee supported a 1994
initiative limiting certain net fishing off the sea coast of Florida. Advisory Opinion - Marine
Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997.
29. The United States Sugar Corp. and Flo-Sun, Inc. opposed a 1994 initiative aimed
at raising funds to preserve and restore the Everglades. Advisory Opinion - Save Our
Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337.
30. The League of United Latin American Citizens and Haitian American Community
Association of Dade opposed a 1988 proposal to make English the official language of
Florida. In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. English - The Official Language of
Florida, 520 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1988).
31. See Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at
1020.
32. See Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1341.
33. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
34. See Twenty-Five Years and Counting: A Symposium on the Florida Constitution of
1968, 18 NOVA L. REV. 715 (1994).
35. Carroll v. Firestone, 497 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1986) (proposing state controlled lottery);
Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984) (suggesting civil liability limitations); Fine
v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984) (concerning taxation limitations); Floridians Against
Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Florida, 363 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1978) (relating to casino
gambling); Weber v. Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1976) (concerning ethics in govern-
ment); Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970) (suggesting a unicameral legislature).
In 1986, supporters of legalized gambling again proposed to legalize gambling. Jim Smith,
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years since 1988, fourteen constitutional amendment initiatives appeared on
the ballot.3
6
The most startling evidence of the interest group creation of a state
constitutional junkyard in Florida was the 1994 election year. Between the
adoption of the modem Florida Constitution in 1968 and the 1992 election,
ten constitutional initiative proposals37 fulfilled the technical requirements
for placement on the ballot. 8 In 1994 alone, ten initiative39 proposals
qualified for pre-election initiative judicial review.' Before 1994, the most
initiative proposals to qualify for ballot inclusion in one year was two.4
1
In 1970, 1976, and 1978, only one proposal made it on the ballot.
The types of initiative proposals facing the Florida voters have changed
a small, but significant, degree over the past twenty-five years. In 1970 and
1976, the first two initiative proposals under the 1968 constitution involved
changes concerning the operations of Florida government.42 After 1976,
So You Want to Amend the Florida Constitution? A Guide to Initiative Petitions, 18 NOVA
L. REV. 1509, 1511 (1994).
36. In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New
Taxes, Property Rights, and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1994) (suggesting four
proposals to limit taxes and property regulation); Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re
Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1994) (supporting casino gambling); Advisory Opinion
to the Att'y Gen. re Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 642 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1994) (limiting
early release of prisoners); Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re Funding for Criminal
Justice, 639 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1994) (proposing criminal justice trust fund); Advisory Opinion
- Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337 (raising funds to preserve and restore the
Everglades); Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at
1021 (restricting laws protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual preference);
Advisory Opinion - Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997 (proposing restrictions
on certain fishing nets); Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Limited Political Terms in
Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991) (providing term limits); In re Advisory
Opinion to the Att'y Gen. - Homestead Valuation Limitation, 581 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1991)
(proposing property tax limitations); In re Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen., Limitation
of Non-Economic Damages in Civil Actions, 520 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1988) (supporting civil
liability limitations); Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So.
2d at 12 (suggesting English as the official language).
37. Smith, supra note 35, at 1510-11.
38. See FLA. STAT. § 100.371 (1993).
39. See supra note 36 for a list of 1994 initiative proposals.
40. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(10).
41. Two proposals appeared on the ballot in 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1992. Smith, supra
note 35, at 1511.
42. The 1970 proposal involved the creation of a unicameral legislature, while the 1976
proposal raised the ethical standards for Florida government officials. See FLA. CONST. art.
HI, § 8.
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initiative proposals involved not only the functioning of government in
Florida but the need of private groups to sponsor their own economic and
social interests in government. Since 1968, three general types of proposals
have emerged through the initiative process. The first and most common
type of initiative sought to transform the structure, responsiveness, and
expense of government. Included in this type of initiative were proposals
to create a unicameral legislature,43 strengthen ethical standards for
government officials,' limit state and local taxes,45 limit the terms of
state and federal elected officials in Florida,46 keep state prisoners incarcer-
ated,47 restrict property regulations,48 and create a state-sponsored lot-
tery.49 A second type of initiative involved the creation or restriction of
economic opportunities. This type of initiative included proposals to create
a gambling industry in Florida,5° limit tort liability,5 limit fishing meth-
ods off the Florida coast,52 and force the Florida agricultural industry to
restore the Everglades.53 The final type of initiative involved proposals to
define group social status within Florida. Two such proposals have either
succeeded or been attempted. One required English to be the official
language of Florida,54 thereby relegating other languages to secondary
positions. The other attempted to forbid legal protection against discrimina-
43. Adams, 238 So. 2d at 825.
44. Weber, 338 So. 2d at 820.
45. Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property Rights,
and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 496; Advisory Opinion - Homestead Valuation Limitation,
581 So. 2d at 587; Fine, 448 So. 2d at 986.
46. Advisory Opinion - Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d
at 226.
47. Advisory Opinion re Stop Early Release of Prisoners, 642 So. 2d at 725; Advisory
Opinion re Funding for Criminal Justice, 639 So. 2d at 973.
48. Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property Rights,
and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 489.
49. Carroll, 497 So. 2d at 1205.
50. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72; Floridians Against Casino
Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 338. In addition to the two initiatives discussed, a third gambling
proposal appeared on the 1986 general election ballot. Smith, supra note 35, at 1511.
51. Advisory Opinion, Limitation of Non-Economic Damages in Civil Actions, 520 So.
2d at 286; Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1353.
52. Advisory Opinion - Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997-98.
53. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337-38.
54. Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 12.
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tion on the basis of sexual orientation,55 thereby relegating homosexuals to
second class political representation. 6
After 1976, initiatives for economic opportunities became periodic
proposals on the Florida political and legal landscape. One economics
opportunities constitutional amendment was proposed for placement on the
ballot in each general election of 1978,"7 1984,8 1986, 9 and 1988.60
However, not all made it on the ballot. In 1994, two economics opportuni-
ties proposals made it onto the ballot,61 while one failed in pre-election
judicial review. Social status proposals emerged in the late 1980s. In
1988, one appeared on the ballot;63 however, another failed to survive
judicial review in 1994.6' The greatest number of proposals involved the
structure, responsiveness, and expense of government. Over the years since
the adoption of the modem Florida Constitution in 1968, twelve such
proposals have either appeared on the ballot or been struck down by the
Florida courts prior to the election.
65
Indicative of the emerging junkyard in the Florida Constitution is what
has transpired since 1988. Prior to 1988, only three economics opportunities
initiative proposals surfaced in almost twenty years. Since 1988, not only
have four economics opportunities proposals surfaced in six years, but a
whole new category, the social status initiative proposal, has emerged. This
suggests that the initiative proposal process quickly is transforming from a
way for the people of Florida to influence the structure and operations of
55. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1019.
56. See generally Adams, supra note 23.
57. Floridians Against Casino Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 338.
58. Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1353.
59. The initiative in 1986 was another attempt to legalize gambling. Smith, supra note
35, at 1511.
60. Advisory Opinion, Limitation of Non-Economic Damages in Civil Actions, 520 So.
2d at 286.
61. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d. at 72; Advisory Opinion -Limited
Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997-98.
62. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1342.
63. Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 13.
64. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1021.
65. See Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property
Rights, and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 489; Advisory Opinion re Stop Early Release of
Prisoners, 642 So. 2d at 727; Advisory Opinion re Funding for Criminal Justice, 639 So. 2d
at 974; Advisory Opinion - Limited Political Terms in Certain Elected Offices, 592 So. 2d
at 229; Advisory Opinion - Homestead Valuation Limitation, 581 So. 2d at 588; Carroll, 497
So. 2d at 1205; Fine, 448 So. 2d at 986; Weber, 338 So. 2d at 822; Adams, 238 So. 2d at
832.
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their government to a means for promoting economic change and social
ordering.
Ill. AWAY FROM A MODERN CONSTITuTION AND TOWARD
SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYMBOLISM
The initiative process is converting the Florida Constitution into
something that the authors of the 1968 constitution, who worked to create
a modem state constitution,66 which serves as a flexible and adaptable
instrument that enables a state government to work with efficiency and
economy, did not intend.67 A modem state constitution possesses internal
discipline focusing on only what is necessary to support the people's
demands for services and regulatory protections. 8 A state constitution
should remain brief, limited to the basics.69 The subject matter included
in a state constitution should reflect the core of state government avoiding
what would reasonably be considered legislative matters,7" because
constitutionalizing legislative matter places that matter beyond amending by
normal law making processes.71 Including too many matters within a state
constitution can lead to legal fossilization which undermines flexibility in
serving the needs of the people through legislative and regulatory processes.
The 1968 Florida Constitution reflects flexible constitutional mod-
ernism which focuses on core matters. In the early 1960s, the demands of
reapportionment and equal representation in the political process 72 shifted
power in Florida from rural areas to emerging cities and suburbs. 73 This
new, more urban, political alignment created a movement to modernize and
streamline Florida government.74 The modem Florida Constitution flowed
from such a reform-minded context. The 1968 Florida Constitution shrunk
to almost half the size of the text of the amended 1885 Florida Constitu-
tion.75 Not only were racist provisions of the 1885 constitution eliminat-
66. See TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION, A REFERENCE
GUIDE 11-12 (1991).
67. See Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Forum for Our Time,
54 VA. L. REV. 928, 928-29 (1968).
68. Id. at 939-40.
69. Id. at 942.
70. Id. at 945.
71. Id. at 946.
72. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
73. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 66, at 12.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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ed76 in favor of clear and direct protection of human rights,77 but a
modernized Florida government was fashioned through a simple and flexible
constitution.78
The internal structure of the 1968 Florida Constitution reflects
simplicity devoted to structuring government to serve and regulate. The
document defines the basics. The constitution lays out the foundation of
governance such as state boundaries,79 branches of government,"0 seats of
government,"' and elections." The powers 3 and expectations 4 of the
legislature are defined, along with the powers of the executive branch 5 and
the jurisdiction of the judiciary. 6 Taxation 7 and the structure and
powers of local government 8 constitute the subjects for most of the
remaining content of the 1968 constitution. Most of the 1968 Florida
Constitution creates decision-makers 9 or decisional processes. 90 Very
few specific topics or subjects exist within the constitution. Those that do
exist, such as education, 91 natural resources, and scenic beauty,92 impact
most if not all people in Florida. A miscellaneous section93 includes only
fifteen sections dealing most often with generalized issues such as eminent
domain, 94 sovereign immunity," and an official census.96
76. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 24, art. XII, § 12 (1951).
77. See FLA. CONST. art. I, 88 2, 9.
78. See D'ALEMBERrE, supra note 66, at 11; James Bacchus, Legislative Efforts To
Amend The Florida Constitution: The Implications of Smathers v. Smith, 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 747, 748 (1977).
79. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
80. Id. § 3.
81. Id § 2.
82. Id, art. VI.
83. Id art. III, § 1.
84. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 4, 6.
85. Id, art. IV, § 1.
86. Id art. V, §§ 3-6.
87. Id art. VII.
88. Id art. VIII.
89. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
90. See, e.g., id art. V, § 3(b)(1).
91. Id. art. IX.
92. Id art. II, § 7.
93. Ild art. X.
94. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
95. Id § 13.
96. Id § 8.
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The initiative amendment provision in article XI must be read in the
context of the 1968 Florida Constitution that creates economic and efficient
government able to respond flexibly to the problems of Florida. The
initiative process remains the most restrictive method for changing the
Florida Constitution,97 reserving the right to revise or amend any portion
of the Florida Constitution to Floridians, but only when a revision or
amendment embraces one subject.9" The one subject rule has been read
narrowly by the Florida courts to prevent log rolling where voters were
forced to choose between something they favored and disfavored in one
proposal.99 The initiative procedure is an onerous one requiring the
signatures of hundreds of thousands of Florida voters." The initiative
process remains limited and tedious in order to preserve the streamlined
modernity of the 1968 Florida Constitution.
The initiative provision strikes a balance between populist democracy
and republican, deliberative, representative government in Florida. The
initiative allows the people of Florida to propose singular reforms in the
functions and structure of their state government. 101 The process remains
more restrictive than legislative proposals to amend the Florida Constitu-
tion."° Even a constitutional convention has seemingly unfettered power
to reconsider and rewrite the whole constitution. °'0 The initiative process
remains restrictive compared with legislative proposals and a constitutional
convention because the initiative process lacks the deliberative tools of the
legislature and a constitutional convention such as public hearings,
committee studies, and disciplined public debates." The Florida initiative
process reflects a rule of self-restraint adopted by the people of Florida to
protect against precipitous and spasmodic changes in Florida organic
law. 105
The 1968 Florida Constitution was intended to create efficient and
economic government limited by human rights protections. 1°6  The
initiative process allowed the people of Florida to make changes to the
97. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 66, at 148.
98. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
99. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988-89. See also Marks & Colby, supra note 11, at 1572-
81.
100. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
101. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988.
102. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
103. See id. § 4.
104. See Weber, 338 So. 2d at 824 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
105. See Adams, 238 So. 2d at 832 (Thornal, J., concurring).
106. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
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functions and structures of their government. Unfortunately, since 1988,
initiatives have been utilized to position populations of Florida both socially
and economically."0 7 Initiatives have become an alternative to the deliber-
ative processes of the legislature. Interest groups have added the initiative
process as a method for achieving public policy objectives in addition to
lobbying the legislature. For many of these groups, the Florida Constitution
has been transformed from a modern document of governance to a socio-
economic or ideological battle ground. Between 1968 and 1987, thirteen
organizations made appearances before the Supreme Court of Florida when
the court considered challenges to initiative proposals,108 while between
1988 and 1995, seventy such organizations made such appearances before
the Supreme Court of Florida."° To some extent, this increase reflects a
107. See supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Facing the Challenge: A Lawyer's Response to Anti-Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 665
(1994).
108. The organizations that made appearances between 1968-1987 were as follows:
Excellence Campaign: An Educational Lottery, Inc. ("E.X.C.E.L.") (1986), Florida Teaching
Profession - National Education Association (1986), People Against Legalized Lotteries
(1986), American Civil Liberties Foundation of Florida (1984), Florida Citizens for Tax
Relief and Limited Government Committee (1984), Florida Consumer Federation (1984),
Florida Education Association/United (1984), Floridians for Tax Relief (1984), Pacific Legal
Foundation (1984), Reason 84: The Committee for Citizens Rights (1984), Southeastern
Legal Foundation (1984), Floridians Against Casino Takeover (1978), The Tenants Associa-
tion of Florida (1978).
109. The organizations that made appearances between 1988-1995 were as follows:
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc. (1994), American Family
Political Committee (1994), American Planning Association, Florida Chapter (1994), Ameri-
can Tax Reduction Movement (1994), Associated Industries of Florida (1994), Bally Mfg.
Corp. (1994), Broward County Hispanic Bar Association (1994), Citizens for a Safe Florida
(1994), Common Cause (1994), Conservation Coalition (1994), Defenders of Property (1994),
Farm Credit of Northern Florida, ACA (1994), Farm Credit of Northwest Florida, ACA
(1994), Farm Credit of Southern Florida, ACA (1994), Farm Credit of Southwest Florida,
ACA (1994), FEA/United (1994), Florida Association of Community Relations Professions
(1994), Florida Audobon Society (1994), Florida Chamber of Commerce (1994), Florida
Farmers Fairness Committee (1994), Florida Foresty Association (1994), Florida Farm Bureau
Federation (1994), Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (1994), Florida League of Cities,
Inc. (1994), Florida Locally Approved Gaming, Inc. (FLAG) (1994), Florida Public Interest
Law Section (1994), The Florida Sugar Cane League, Inc. (1994), Florida Tax Reduction
Movement, Inc. (1994), Florida Wildlife Federation (1994), Flo-Sun, Inc. (1994), Friends of
Florida, Inc. (1994), FTP/NEA (1994), Howard Jarvis Tax Payer's Association (1994),
League of Women Voters (1994), Limited Casinos Inc. (1994), National Federation of
Independent Business (1994), National Tax Payer's Union (1994), No Casinos, Inc. (1994),
Proposition for County Choice Gaming, Inc. (1994), Save Our Everglades Committee (1994),
Save Our Sea Life Committee (1994), Sierra Club (1994), Southeastern Legal Foundation
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1986 Florida constitutional amendment that formalized the pre-election
judicial review process for initiatives."' However, the dramatic 500%
increase in participating organizations evidences something deeper.
Additionally, the types of organizations militating for and against constitu-
tional change have shifted in the nature of their interests.
Until 1988, the organizations involved in ballot questions tended to be
general lobbying organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Florida,' the Florida Education Association,' 12 the Na-
tional Educational Association, 13 the Florida Consumer Federation," 4
or organizations that focused on the narrow issues involved in the constitu-
tional amendment proposals such as Floridians Against Casino Take-
over,1  People Against Legalized Lotteries," 6 or Excellence Campaign:
An Education Lottery, Inc. ("E.X.C.E.L.")." 7 In the period prior to 1988,
some out of state organizations such as the Pacific Legal Foundation"
8
participated in the struggle for state constitutional change in Florida.
Since 1988, organizational participation evidences social and economic
struggles between broad based and substantial economic and social interests.
General lobbying organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union, 9 and organizations focusing narrowly on the constitutional
(1994), Sugar Cane Growers Co-op of Florida, Inc. (1994), Tax Cap Committee (1994),
United States Sugar Corp. (1994), Citizens for Limited Political Terms (1992), Let The
People Decide - Americans for Ballot Freedom (1992), National Conference of State Legisla-
tures (1992), Save Our Homes, Inc. (1992), Southern Legislative Conference of State Govern-
ments (1992), Tax Cap Foundation, Inc. (1992), Term Limits Legal Institute (1992),
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers (1988), American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc.
(1988), Aspira of Florida (1988), Bilingual Association of Florida (1988), Coalition of
Hispanic American Women (1988), Committee for Constitutional Honesty (1988), Cuban
American Democratic Association of Florida (1988), English First (1988), Florida Committee
for Liability Reform (1988), Florida English Campaign (1988), Greater Miami United (1988),
Haitian American Community Association of Dade (1988), League of United Latin American
Citizens (1988), Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (1988), National
Conference of Puerto Rican Women - Miami Chapter (1988), Puerto Rican Legal Defense
and Education Fund (1988), United States English Legislative Task Force, Inc. (1988).
110. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
111. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 985.
112. Id.
113. See Carroll, 497 So. 2d at 1205.
114. See Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1352.
115. See Floridians Against Casino Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 338.
116. See Carroll, 497 So. 2d at 1205.
117. Id.
118. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 985.
119. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1018.
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amendment question, such as Limited Casinos, Inc.," continue to partici-
pate. However, these organizations have been joined by others that
represent the social interests of millions of people throughout the United
States such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund"' and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund."
Corporate America, including Bally Manufacturing Corporation,"2 Flo-
Sun, Inc.,"2 United States Sugar Corporation,125 and the Florida Farm
Bureau, 6 jumped into the Florida state constitutional fray along with
those who sought to regulate business and property owners, especially in the
environmental realm, including the Sierra Club, 27 the Florida Wildlife
Federation," and the Florida Audobon Society.129
The numbers and types of interest organizations participating in
constitutional amendment litigation evidence the high social and economic
stakes perceived to be at risk in either the passage or defeat of the
amendment proposals. The money infused into the battles over those
proposals also evidences the enormity of the perceived impact of these
amendment proposals on social status and corporate bottom lines. In one
campaign alone, during the Fall of 1994, $16,531,063 was raised to con-
vince the people of Florida to vote in favor of the proposal. 30 In the
weeks before election day, $5,241,984 was contributed by sixty-nine
contributors, many of whom were from out of state.3 On November 1,
120. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72.
121. Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 12.
122. Id.
123. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72.
124. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337.
125. Id.
126. Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property
Rights, and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 488.
127. Id. at 489.
128. Id.
129. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1337.
130. Florida Dep't of State, Division of Elections, Campaign Treasurer's Report,
Proposition for Limited Casinos, Inc., Summary Sheet for 11-4-94 to 12-31-94, p.2 . See
generally Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bath Tub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and
Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733, 737 (1994); Gilbert Hahn III &
Stephen C. Morton, Initiative and Referendum - Do They Encourage or Impair Better State
Government, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 925, 941 (1977).
131. Florida Dep't of State, Division of Elections, Campaign Treasurer's Report,
Proposition Limited Casinos, Inc., Summary Sheet for 10-15-94 to 11-3-94, p.2.
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1994, a single out of state corporate supporter of the proposed amendment
gave $1,000,000.132
Consumer, corporate, and ethnic America engaged in battles over,
rather than refined, the modem and flexible Florida Constitution. Corpo-
rate, ethnic, and environmental interests sought either to create or limit
economic opportunities, or to limit social status. In one proposal, environ-
mentalists sought to require the Florida sugar cane industry to pay to clean
up pollution in the Everglades. All sugar cane grown in and near the
Everglades would be taxed one cent per pound, indexed for inflation for
twenty-five years, with the tax receipts placed into a trust fund. 3' A
second proposal sought to permit small and set numbers of gambling casinos
in a few, restricted areas of Florida.'34 Another proposal sought to prevent
the legislature, county commissions, and city commissions from enacting
laws that protect homosexuals from discrimination. 3 5 A final proposal
sought to establish English as the official language of Florida.'36
All four proposals share much in common. The proposals would have
only tangentially restructured or refined state government. Unlike other
proposals that primarily sought to change the workings of state and local
government, 137 these proposals focused on changing human behavior or
relationships. The proposal requiring the sugar industry to underwrite the
costs of restoring the Everglades sought to shift a large measure of wealth
away from one industry for a single public purpose. Such an arrangement
failed to benefit the broad governmental purposes intended to be served by
general taxation. 38 The casino gambling proposal failed to authorize the
Florida Legislature to allow gambling within Florida. Instead, the provision
created a constitutionally mandated monopoly for a relatively small number
of gambling establishments. The opening of additional casinos in the future
would require a subsequent amendment to the Florida Constitution.'
39
The anti-gay and English only proposals subjected sizable subpopulations
in Florida to legislative inflexibility and diminished legal status. No longer
could the legislature protect homosexuals from discrimination." Those
132. Id. at 1.
133. Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1338.
134. Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72-73.
135. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1019.
136. Advisory Opinion English - The Official Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 12.
137. See Advisory Opinion re Tax Limitation, Voter Approval of New Taxes, Property
Rights, and Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d at 490 (proposing constitutional limit to new taxes).
138. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
139. See id. art. XI.
140. See Adams, supra note 23.
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who spoke other languages would be relegated to a second class status by
their state and local governments as a result of English speakers being
favored constitutionally.
The proposals concerning English as an official language, restrictions
on protecting homosexuals from discrimination, creation of a gambling
casino monopoly, and taxation of the sugar industry pitted groups of
Floridians against each other, or encouraged one group to economically
exploit another. The Florida Constitution has become a weapon in the war
over public policy rather than a tool used to protect human rights and
enhance effective state government. A victory in such a war symbolizes one
economic or social force gaining an advantage over others. The initiative
process is converting the Florida Constitution from a tangible device
supporting law and human rights to a format for symbolic socio-economic
struggle. A constitution utilized in socio-economic struggles is transformed
into a symbolic value system of social and economic inclusion and
exclusion.'41 The Florida Constitution risks becoming a vehicle for
societal discourse 42 instead of a protection from closely defined govern-
mental and legal power.43 The initiative process threatens to convert the
Florida Constitution into an unintelligible babble reflecting clashing
localized and special interest values.'" The initiative process must be
reformed to protect the 1968 Florida Constitution as a modem instrument
empowering efficient and effective government that respects human
rights.1
45
141. See generally KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS
OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993); KENNETH L. KARST,
BELONGING IN AMERICA (1989).
142. See Neil H. Cogan, In Praise of Diverse Discourse, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 173
(1992); James A. Gardner, Discourses and Difference A Reply to Parness and Cogan, 5 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 193 (1992); Jeffrey A. Parness, Failed or Uneven Discourse of State
Constitutionalism? Governmental Structure and State Constitutions, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv.
155 (1992).
143. See Daniel R. Gordon, Super Constitutions Saving The Shunned: The State
Constitutions Masquerading As Weaklings, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 965, 970-79 (1994).
144. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARv. L. REV. 1147 (1993); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitu-
tionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992).
145. See supra notes 106-129 and accompanying text.
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IV. PREVENTING THE EMERGING JUNKYARD: LIMITING DIRECT
DEMOCRACY IN FLORIDA
The 1998 Constitutional Revision Commission" needs to consider
ways to inhibit the initiative process in Florida from converting the Florida
Constitution from a modem instrument of efficient government and
protection against governmental power to a socio-economic interest group
war zone. The single subject and signature requirements 47 for initiative
proposals have helped curb some socio-economic status defining propos-
als.148 Some proposals for shifting social status and economic power in
Florida were too complicated and omnibus to meet the single subject rule.
For instance, the proposal to restrict anti-discrimination protections for
homosexuals impacted municipal home rule powers, such as the basic rights
of all natural persons, the right to bargain collectively, and rights involving
ten enumerated classifications of people.'49 Voters could have been placed
in the position of being log-rolled because they would have to choose
between ideas they both supported and opposed in a single proposal. 50
Furthermore, the initiative proposal involved discrimination which the
Supreme Court of Florida found expansively encompassed civil rights and
the power of all government.' The initiative proposal failed to come
even close to meeting the single subject rule. However, some socio-
economic status defining proposals easily met the single subject rule and
other requirements.'52 The 1998 Revision Commission should consider
adding substantive restrictions on what can be proposed in an initiative
proposal.
The addition of four substantive restrictions along with the procedural
single subject rule and signature requirements should help to limit the use
of initiatives as tools in socio-economic struggles in Florida. The following
146. FLA. CONST. art. Xl, § 2.
147. Id. § 3. See also Cherie B. Albury, Comment, Amendment Nine and the Initiative
Process: A Costly Trip to Nowhere, 14 STETSON L. REv. 349 (1985).
148. See Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at
1020; Advisory Opinion - Save Our Everglades, 636 So. 2d at 1339-40.
149. Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at 1020.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 75; Advisory Opinion -
Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d at 997; Advisory Opinion English - The Official
Language of Florida, 520 So. 2d at 11; Advisory Opinion, Limitation of Non-Economic
Damages in Civil Actions, 520 So. 2d at 287.
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four limitations should be added to the Florida constitutional provision
regulating election of constitutional amendment or revision:
153
1) There shall be approval of 60% of electors voting in a general
election for any initiative proposals involving changes:
A. to article I;
B. to article X, section 4; or
C. that the Supreme Court of Florida in its pre-election review of
an initiative deems will diminish equality and equal protection before the
law.
2) No article I right may be directly diminished by an initiative
procedure. The Supreme Court of Florida shall possess the jurisdiction to
determine whether an initiative proposal diminishes an article I right.
3) No change to the Florida Constitution may be made by initiative
when that change involves a limited economic or social interest. The
Supreme Court of Florida shall possess the jurisdiction to determine whether
an initiative proposal involves a limited economic or social interest.
The following requirement should be added to the Florida constitutional
provision empowering the legislature to propose amendments or revisions
to the Florida Constitution:
4) Before an amendment or revision to change article I may appear on
a general election ballot, that proposal, change, or amendment, must be
approved by the Florida Legislature after two consecutive general elections.
These four proposed changes to article XI reflect a balance between
republicanism and popular democracy in Florida. The first proposal allows
the people of Florida to utilize the initiative proceedings to add human rights
protections to article I, to change the homestead protection,155 and to
enhance equal protection. However, the super-majority requirement
encourages the creation of a popular consensus, or at a minimum, strong
public support for the change. The super-majority also discourages such
initiatives by making ultimate electoral success that much more difficult.
The second proposal blocks popular democratic change through the initiative
process when a proposal directly diminishes an article I right. This would
still allow initiative proposals involving executive 56 and legislative
powers'57 that may indirectly diminish article I rights. This proposal also
allows the people of Florida to diminish their basic rights through the
153. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
154. Id. § 1.
155. Id. art. X, § 4.
156. Id. art. IV.
157. Id. art. HI.
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deliberative legislative'58  and constitutional convention159  amending
processes. The will of the people of Florida to diminish the rights of all or
some residents of Florida would be mediated through the established
processes of republican discourse. 6° The last two proposals both diminish
the lure of the initiative process for special interest lobbying groups 161 and
strengthen the deliberative and thoughtfulness of republicanism in Flori-
da.1
62
The pro-republican text of these four proposals exemplifies the tensions
between republicanism and direct democracy in Florida constitutional law
during the past twenty-five years. The Supreme Court of Florida has shown
restraint in blocking initiative proposals from being placed on the general
election ballot. This is because the court has recognized that ultimate
sovereignty resides in the people of Florida, which is a reflection of the
state's constitutional democracy. So long as the people of Florida abide by
the United States Constitution, they should be able to amend their constitu-
tion in ways they see fit.' 63 However, the Supreme Court of Florida
strongly tempered its sensitivity to popular democracy when the court
recognized that the people of Florida injected the single subject requirement
in the initiative process as a rule of self-restraint on populist decisions. The
rule of self-restraint protected the people of Florida against their own desire
to make precipitous and spasmodic changes in Florida organic law.' 1 The
Florida courts play an important role in guarding that self-restraint by
insuring the single subject and other initiative requirements are satisfied.' 65
The Supreme Court of Florida also recognized that the initiative procedure
should never be utilized to bring about revolutionary or far-reaching change.
Constitutional conventions exist for that purpose. 166 Restraint of populism
was necessary to preserve the Florida Constitution as a basic document that
controls governmental functions, including republican functions. 67 The
1968 Florida Constitution could not be converted into an amended jumble
158. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
159. Id. § 4.
160. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Law Making Is Not "Republican Government":
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 32-33 (1993).
161. See supra notes 107-132 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 170-175 and accompanying text.
163. See Floridians Against Casino Takeover, 363 So. 2d at 342 (Boyd, J., concurring
specially); Weber, 338 So. 2d at 821.
164. See Adams, 238 So. 2d at 832 (Thornal, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 831.
167. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989.
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as the 1885 Florida Constitution had been.168 Overall, the Supreme Court
of Florida found that the single subject and other initiative requirements
favored, and even protected, republicanism in Florida.169
The tension between popular democracy and republicanism in Florida
reflects a recent national legal scholarship discussion concerning the merits
of the two opposing viewpoints. 7 ' Initiatives, as a strong form of popular
democracy, serve to overcome entrenched factional interests. When
legislative bodies refuse to reform themselves, initiatives serve to supple-
ment representative government, correcting egregious legislative excess-
es. 7 ' Republican government was constituted in the United States to
foster popular democracy. 72 Direct vehicles of democracy such as
initiatives are integral parts of the American republican system. 173  The
pro-republican critics of direct popular democracy are not fueled by
concerns of legislative excesses and the need for the people to reform and
control their government. Instead, the republican critics of popular
democracy oppose the use of initiatives as a means to stigmatize minority
groups through law.7  More specifically, the modem champions of
republicanism fear the initiative as a means of blocking minorities from
lobbying in state legislatures and local commissions for equal and human
rights and from being protected equally by state law and the political
process. 75
Those who both favor and fear initiatives fail to focus on the same
issues. Those who favor initiatives fear unresponsive representative
168. See Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1358 (McDonald, J., concurring).
169. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
170. For an excellent overview of the modem debate and a bibliography, see William
E. Adams, Jr. Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative - The Technical Challenges, Pamphlet distributed
at the Annual Meeting of the Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues Section of the Association of
American Law Schools (Jan. 6, 1995).
171. See Dennis V. Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distress: The
Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State ConstitutionalAmendment by Initiative
Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 5, 39, 44-45, 48-49, 53 (1992).
172. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 757-58
(1994).
173. Id. at 761.
174. See Adams, supra note 23, at 831; Linde, supra note 160, at 37-38; James M.
Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43 (1983).
175. See Adams, supra note 23, at 602-3; Fischer, supra note 174, at 69; Linde, supra
note 26, at 709, 721-23; Linde, supra note 160, at 41-42.
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government,176 while those who criticize initiatives fear popular and biased
passions. 77  Florida constitutional philosophy shifts the democracy-
republican balance toward responsive government and against less delibera-
tive popular democracy. 78 Hence, Florida constitutional philosophy fails
directly to reflect the concerns of the modem critics and devotees of
initiative processes. Florida republican philosophy strengthens legislative
power,'7 9 but evidences little or no concern for majoritarian ballot box
oppression of socially or economically disadvantaged groups. However, the
Floridian preference for republicanism indirectly serves the minority
protective interests of those who fear initiatives. The power of the initiative
remains somewhat limited, while the Florida Legislature remains accessible
as the law maker even to minorities.
Proposals to require super-majorities for initiative proposals involving
human rights and to restrict initiative proposals that diminish human rights
fit well with traditional Florida constitutional philosophy. Traditionally,
Florida constitutional philosophy has favored republicanism over direct
democratic law making. The Florida Legislature would remain open to
those who petition for greater human rights protections, and the basic rights
already guaranteed in the 1968 Florida Constitution would remain protected.
Proposals to curb initiatives that threaten human rights, or require super-
majorities for constitutional change, are not unprecedented both in and out
of Florida.180 In fact, some states already include substantive restrictions
to initiatives or super-majority requirements within their constitutions.
California prohibits all referenda and initiatives that name any individual to
office or assign any power or duty to a private corporation.' Illinois
restricts the subject of constitutional initiatives to proposals that would
change the structure and procedure of the legislature. 82  Massachusetts
forbids initiative amendments relating to religion, religious matters, or
religious institutions.'83 Initiatives in Illinois require for passage either
176. See Arrow, supra note 171, at 44-46.
177. See Linde, supra note 26, at 721-25.
178. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988-89; Weber, 338 So. 2d at 823-24 (England, J.,
concurring and Roberts, J., dissenting); Adams, 238 So. 2d at 832.
179. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989.
180. See Little & Medenblik, supra note 27, at 45; Christopher A. Coury, Note, Direct
Democracy Though Initiative and Referendum: Checking the Balance, 8 NoTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 573, 590-92 (1994).
181. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 12.
182. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. See also Fischer, supra note 174, at 55 n.58.
183. MASS. CONST. art. 48, Part II, § 2. See also Alexander G. Gray, Jr., & Thomas
R. Kiley, The Initiative and Referendum in Massachusetts, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 27, 54-56
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approval by 60% of the people voting on the proposal or a majority of
people voting in the state wide election. 84 Even states that allow only
legislative proposals of constitutional amendments require super- majorities.
New Hampshire requires 66% approval of people voting1s5 while New
Mexico requires 75% for proposed amendments involving the elective
franchise or Hispanic education.
86
The super-majority and subject restriction proposals for the initiatives
will go a long way toward preventing the Florida Constitution from
becoming a socio-economic status defining junkyard. Two additional
proposals should help to preserve the integrity of the Florida Constitution.
First, no initiative will be permitted when the initiative involves a limited
economic or social interest.1 17  Such a restriction should stop special
interest groups from using the Florida Constitution as a means to attaining
very limited economic or social goals such as creating an economic
monopoly88 or restricting one type of behavior such as homosexuali-
ty." 9  Such a restriction also finds support in Florida constitutional
jurisprudence which has disfavored law that restricted social"9 and
economic'91 opportunities to the detriment of small classes or inter-
ests."l Second, the last proposal of the four discussed in this article 93
would require that any legislatively proposed changes to article I be
(1991).
184. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
185. N.H. CoNsT. art. 100. See also Albert L. Sturm, The Procedure of State
Constitutional Change, With Special Emphasis on the South and Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U. L
REV. 569, 574 (1977); Little & Medenblik, supra note 27, at 45.
186. N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1. See also Fischer, supra note 174, at 496 n.30.
187. See supra part IV.
188. See Advisory Opinion re Limited Casinos, 644 So. 2d at 72. The proposal would
have allowed the establishment of a limited number of gambling casinos, thereby
constitutionalizing the existence of those businesses and requiring further constitutional
amendments for the creation of competitor casinos.
189. See Advisory Opinion - Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d at
1019.
190. See Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993). See also Gordon, supra note 143,
at 974-77.
191. See Department of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d
1032 (Fla. 1986); Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962); Larson v. Lesser,
106 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1958).
192. See Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d at 1034; Liquor Store,
Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949). See also Daniel R.
Gordon, Ecomomic Liberty as the Basis of Social Liberty: Bowers Revisited in the Context
of State Constitutions, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1009, 1030-31 (1992).
193. See supra part IV.
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approved by the Florida Legislature after two consecutive general elec-
tions.194
Restricting legislative proposals involving human and basic rights
strengthens the deliberative quality of Florida republicanism and lawmak-
ing.195 This proposal has an analog in the Florida constitutional conven-
tion process'96 and parallels broad proposals made a decade ago restricting
legislatively proposed constitutional amendments.' 97  Two successive
general elections are required before a constitutional convention can be
convened.198 At the first election, the people of Florida decide whether
they desire to call a convention. Two years later, the people of Florida
choose their representatives to a constitutional convention. 99 Requiring
two elections over a two-year period allows popular passions to cool and
encourages less passionate and more thoughtful consideration of the
proposed revisions. A similar two-year cooling off period for legislatively
proposed amendments involving human and basic rights would encourage
a less passionate deliberation process for both the legislature and the people.
Nevada also requires two consecutive general elections to pass before any
proposed constitutional changes will be approved.2"°
V. CONCLUSION
The 1998 Florida Constitutional Revision Commission faces the
challenge of preventing the Florida Constitution from becoming a socio-
economic status defining junkyard. The Revision Commission must devise
the means for preserving the modernity, effectiveness, and flexibility of the
1968 Florida Constitution. Restricting the initiative proposal in Florida
even further than the current single subject and other requirements would
help to preserve the constitution, republicanism, and respect for pluralism
and diversity. The Revision Commissi6n should consider placing substan-
tive subject restrictions in the initiative process, requiring super- majorities
to approve proposals involving human and basic rights, restricting initiative
proposals that involve limited economic or social interests, and requiring
that legislatively proposed amendments involving article I be approved by
the legislature after two consecutive elections. The Revision Commission
194. Id.
195. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988.
196. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
197. See Little & Medenblik, supra note 27, at 44.
198. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4(b).
199. Id.
200. NEv. CONST. art. 19, § 2(4).
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should not fear the novelty of these proposals. Similar proposals have been
made before, and a number of states already include similar restrictions in
their constitutions. If the Revision Commission still fears such proposals as
too novel, the Commission should analyze the purpose of its existence. The
Revision Commission itself is a novel approach to amending a state
constitution."'
201. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 66, at 147.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to recent case law and commentary on labor and employ-
ment matters, the general concept recognized at common law that employees
can be "terminated-at-will" is still recognized today. Employees who are
not provided with written agreements setting forth a definite employment
term are characterized as employees "terminable-at-will," or "employees-at-
will."' Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer may terminate
the employee at any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.2
* Sole practitioner, Joseph Z. Fleming, P.A., Miami, Florida. B.A., 1962, University
of Florida; LL.B., 1965, University of Virginia School of Law; LL.M., 1966, New York
University Graduate School of Law; J.D., 1970, University of Virginia School of Law. Mr.
Fleming is a member of the Florida Bar, the American Bar Association, and the Dade County
Bar Association. He was listed in Martindale-Hubbell's Bar Register of Preeminent Lawyers
in 1993 as a specialist in labor and employment law and has lectured at numerous labor and
employment discrimination seminars.
1. See Dewachter v. Scott, 657 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
2. DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980). The court held that "where the term of employment is
discretionary with either party or indefinite, then either party for any reason may terminate
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The employee also has the opportunity to terminate employment at any
time.'
The employment-at-will concept was developed under common law.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of terminating employees-at-will was
rejected in many jurisdictions which felt that the prevailing trend allowed
the judiciary to take a second look at common law theories involved in
employment law.4  Courts in such jurisdictions applied more liberal
assessment of employee rights.5 Jurisdictions such as California favored
public policy considerations forbidding employees from being terminated-at-
will and imposed "just cause" requirements in termination cases. However,
even liberal jurisdictions, such as California, restricted their initial inclina-
tion to totally abandon the employment-at-will concept. Instead, these
jurisdictions modified their public interest concerns and "just cause"
concepts.6
Florida courts, on the other hand, have been somewhat reluctant to
reverse the common law, concluding that it is a process for the legislative
and not the judicial branch.7 However, there have been indications over the
past fifteen years that Florida might be moving in a direction perceived by
some as a more liberal humanitarian approach!
The experiences of other jurisdictions, the increasing statutory rights
afforded to employees in the work place, and reevaluation of public policy
considerations all suggest that the employment-at-will doctrine is advanta-
geous-not only for the jurisdiction but the employees in it. Recently, the
doctrine has been accepted further through the courts' recognition that the
it at any time and no action may be maintained for breach of the employment contract." Id.
at 136.
3. See Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994); Dewachter, 657 So.
2d at 962; Catania v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 266 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(noting that, in Florida, "if the period of employment is indefinite either party may terminate
it at any time"); DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136; Hope v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957), cert. denied, 102 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1958).
4. For an interesting overview of the evolution from common law to the more recent
decisions which have challenged the utilization of the employment-at-will concept, see
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 342 (1985) [hereinafter HOLLOWAY & LEECH].
5. See source cited supra note 4.
6. Cf. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (Ct. App. 1980)
(discussing the implied covenant to use a duty of just cause in termination cases).
7. See Arrow Air, 645 So. 2d at 424.
8. See id.; see also Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182,
185 (Fla. 1983) (Overton, J., concurring) (stating that he would "proceed a step further [than
the majority] and establish a common law tort for retaliatory discharge").
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employment-at-will doctrine is not only an appropriate continuation of the
common law, that should not be abandoned, but also benefits all of the
parties concerned.
This article presents an overview of the current status of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine in Florida. Part II provides an analysis of the recent
case law interpreting the doctrine. Part III presents commentary on the
employment-at-will concept and the discrepancies between the legislative
and judicial interpretations of the doctrine.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
DOCTRINE
A. Definition of Employment-At-Will
In a recent Florida case, Dewachter v. Scott,9 the court identified basic
concepts found in employment-at-will contracts. 10 In Dewachter, the
plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract alleging that her employer induced
her to leave full-time employment by orally promising her employment for
life or at least until she reached the age of sixty-five. The court held that
oral contracts for lifetime employment are terminable-at-will." The court
reasoned that absent an employment contract expressly providing for a
definite term of employment, the employment is indefinite and, therefore,
terminable-at-will by either party) 2
Under the common law employment-at-will doctrine, which has been
supplemented by the Florida Statutes, certain statutory rights enable the
employee to recover unpaid wages for work performed. Additionally, there
are statutory rights which permit employers to place restrictions on subse-
quent competition in consideration for an employment-at-will contract.1
3
9. 657 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
10. Md at 962-63.
11. I (citing Smith, 427 So. 2d at 182).
12. Id The court also held that even though the plaintiff:
couched her complaint as fraud in the inducement rather than breach of contract,
... her claim is still barred as it attempts to circumvent the bar to a breach of
contract action based on an oral contract terminable at will. Since the parties
clearly cannot be restored to the status quo that existed before the alleged
contract, as might be sought in an action based on fraud in the inducement, the
measure of damages Dewachter sought here would be the same as breach of
contract damages.
13. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1993).
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These statutes, which also apply to written contracts of employment, 4
clearly expand the benefits and the obligations that relate to employment-at-
will situations. For example, under the employment-at-will doctrine, the
employee is entitled to receive the appropriate pay for the work that has
been performed. The legislature has supplemented common law rights by
allowing employees to sue not only for wages, but for unpaid commissions
which have been earned and not yet paid. Should the employees prevail,
they can also seek statutory attorneys' fees.15
In 1994 and 1995, the state courts in Florida reconfirmed the validity
of the employment-at-will doctrine as the appropriate rule for judicial
interpretation of employee rights. Courts have held that where there are no
definite terms of employment, that employment is and should be regarded
as "at-will." For example, in Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 6 the Supreme
Court of Florida confirmed that employees are terminable "at-will" unless
there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary. 7 The court noted
that the legislature has the authority to change the employment-at-will
concept and can limit the ability of an employer to terminate its employ-
ees. 8 Arrow Air is significant because the supreme court rejected the
lower court's ruling which had enabled a terminated employee to retroac-
tively assert a Whistle-blowing claim19 before the statute had been
enacted.20
The Third District Court of Appeal noted that the termination-at-will
rule was harsh.21 In fashioning a judicial interpretation of whether a
statutory provision such as the Whistle-blower's Act should be interpreted
retroactively, the court found that public policy pervaded the situation.22
The court found that statutory provisions, whether they were enacted before
or after the events in question, suggest a more liberal attitude towards
employees.23 As a result, employees are able to overcome defenses raised
14. See generally Sanz v. R.T. Aerospace Corp., 650 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
15. FLA. STAT. § 448.104 (1993). The statute states that "[a] court may award
reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses to the prevailing party." Id.
16. 645 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1994).
17. Id. at 424.
18. Id.
19. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (1993).
20. Arrow Air, 645 So. 2d at 425.
21. Walsh v. Arrow Air, Inc., 629 So. 2d 144, 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd,
645 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1994).
22. Id. at 147.
23. Id.
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by employers that a statute is inapplicable because the event occurred before
the law was enacted.
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, rejected this reasoning, finding
the statutes to be prospective only. 4 Arrow Air is consistent with other
recent Florida cases which found that although the legislature has the ability
to change the law so as to preclude employment terminations without
meeting or satisfying statutory prerequisites, employees can be terminated
for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, unless there is a statutory
provision to the contrary. As the Third District Court of Appeal noted in
Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc.,25 "[t]he established rule in Florida is that
when the term of employment is discretionary or indefinite, either party may
terminate the employment at any time for any reason or no reason without
assuming any liability."26
B. Statutory Restrictions on Noncompete Agreements
Courts have refused to uphold claims by employees seeking a
continuation of an employment relationship which is terminable-at-will. In
addition, courts have refused to enforce oral employment agreements not to
be performed within the space of one year. However, an employer does
have the ability to enforce an agreement not to compete even in a termina-
ble-at-will situation as long as the restriction on such competition is
consistent with the statute of frauds. In other words, the enforcement does
not occur for a period of more than one year.
In Sanz v. R.T. Aerospace Corp.,7 the Third District Court of Appeal
held that an agreement not to compete entered into by an employee who
continued working under an oral agreement was not enforceable because of
the statute of frauds.28 The court refused to extend a written agreement
which barred the employee from competing for two years following
termination of employment to a subsequent oral agreement.2 9 The court
noted that:
Under the statute of frauds, any agreement that is not to be performed
within the space of one year from its making must be reduced to
24. Arrow Air, 645 So. 2d at 424-25 (citing Landgraf v. USI Films Prods., 114 S. Ct.
1483 (1994) (applying Title VII prospectively only)).
25. 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
26. Id. at 1328.
27. 650 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
28. Id. at 1060.
29. Il at 1059.
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writing in order to be enforceable. Further, Sanz's continued perfor-
mance after the expiration of the written agreement pursuant to any oral
agreement with R.T.A. cannot serve to remove the agreement from the
confines of the statute of frauds. The law is clear that the doctrine of
partial performance of an oral agreement has no applicability to
personal service contracts.30
In addition, the legislature has placed other restrictions on noncompete
agreements such as restraining employees from competing when their
employer sells the goodwill of the business.3' However, it is inconsistent
to maintain that an employer can terminate an employee in a wrongful
manner while, simultaneously, being allowed to enforce a noncompete
agreement. Thus, the courts have generally recognized that where there is
a noncompete clause preventing the employee from taking advantage of
confidential business information, the employer will be prohibited from
enforcing that otherwise enforceable covenant after wrongfully discharging
the employee.32
As William Holloway and Michael Leech note in Employment
Termination Rights and Remedies:33
The governing principle of contract law is that any material failure
of performance by one party that is not justified by the conduct of the
other discharges the latter's duty to perform under the contract.
Accordingly, if an employer wrongfully discharges the employee prior
to expiration of the contract, the employee is relieved from honoring a
covenant not to compete. Any other outcome would strip the employee
of his ability to earn a livelihood.34
30. Id. at 1060 (citations omitted).
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1993); Lovell Farms, Inc. v. Levy, 641 So. 2d
103, 105 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that even if a noncompete agreement were
enforceable, a court, before determining that it would grant an injunction to enforce such an
agreement, must engage in a balancing test). The court also noted that it must "weigh the
public interest, the potential effects on the employee, and the legitimate interests of the
employer, to determine the enforceability of the non-compete contract." Lovell Farms, 641
So. 2d at 105.
32. See HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 4, at 409.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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C. Federal Decisions
Federal courts that have interpreted Florida law in the past few years
have also recognized that employees cannot maintain that they have a public
policy right to challenge employment decisions terminating their employ-
ment at-will in the absence of a contract or specific statutory right.
Moreover, employees cannot raise oral contractual claims that they could
only be terminated for cause, or assert that they can contest their termination
based on contract claims, when they were employed at-will. For example,
the court in Golden v. Complete Holdings, Inc.,35 stated that "the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is the law in Florida.' 36  The court stated that:
"'[W]here the term of employment is discretionary with either party or
indefinite, then either party for any reason may terminate it at any time and
no action may be maintained for breach of employment contract."'37
Federal courts have also rejected the theory that an employee's
retaliatory termination could constitute a tort of retaliatory termination. In
Zombori v. Digital Equipment Corp.,38 the court noted:
Florida's at-will employment doctrine may be "cold-hearted,
draconian and out-dated," but it is the law of Florida. Notably,
Florida's legislature and courts have created exceptions to the at-will
doctrine allowing employees to assert wrongful discharge claims in
defined circumstances. By doing so, Florida's legislators and judges
have attempted to conform the doctrine to current public policy. Given
these officials are elected and appointed by the people of Florida, it is
their duty to define Florida law on this and other subjects.
While the Court regularly interprets Florida law to resolve claims
in diversity cases, it is not the Court's place to expand Florida's
common law by creating new causes of action. Federal courts are
entrusted to apply state law, not make it. As of today, Florida does not
35. 818 F. Supp. 1495 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (confirming that an employee can be terminated
as an employee-at-will for good reason, bad reason or no reason at all).
36. Id. at 1497.
37. Id. (quoting DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980)) (alteration in original). The court in
Golden also noted Florida cases such as Hartley, which confirmed that a plaintiff cannot sue
based on a type of contract theory. However, the court also noted allegations involving
attempts to humiliate the plaintiff into resigning and other misconduct which did not relate
to contractual allegations, but rather, to possible tort claims. Id. at 1496-99.
38. 878 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
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permit employees to sue employers for retaliatory discharge based on
a common law prima facie tort theory. 9
III. A REVIEW OF THE LITERARY COMMENTARY
An increase in conservative philosophy caused a rise in recent analysis
of the benefits of the employment-at-will doctrine by commentators. This
is due in part because conservative commentators seek to prevent judicially
made law from eroding the termination-at-will doctrine. Another reason for
the increased analysis may be the numerous legislative humanitarian rights
provisions allowing employees to sue their employers. As a result, the
factors that caused concern over the employers exploitation of employees
and the excessive control employers possessed over the employees have
changed. Undoubtedly, the enactment of statutes relating to labor and
employment law which give employees more rights to challenge their
employers' decisions (especially in the more progressive jurisdictions) has
also contributed to the rise in recent commentary. Thus, a review of the
basic texts on labor and employment law will illustrate the increase in such
laws as well as the decrease in the need to question the employment-at-will
doctrine.40
Peter Panken, a management labor lawyer, provided an illustration of
the availability of employee rights in a fairly liberal jurisdiction, such as
New York or California.4 ' Panken concluded that "[o]ne act by an
employee can give rise to 36 or more causes of action. 42 Panken also
noted that if an employer were to "[flire a 42-year-old minority woman shop
steward with a bad back and 4 years 11 months seniority, [the employer]
may face at least 36 different litigations .... ,,43 Some examples of these
include unemployment insurance claims, grievances, and arbitration of
grievances under the collective bargaining agreement. 44  Examples of
39. Id. at 209-10.
40. See generally SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (Patrick Hardin, et al., eds., 3d ed. 1992 & Raymond L.
Wheeler, et al., eds., Supp. 1994); BARBARA LINDEMAN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed. 1982 & David A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence
Ashe, Jr., eds., Supp. 1989).
41. Peter M. Panken et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90s, in 2 AIRLINE AND RAILROAD LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 553, 553-54 (ALI-ABA 1994).
42. Id. at 553.
43. Id.
44. id.
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discrimination charges under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC") include charges complaining of failure to hire, failure to
promote, or discharge due to age, sex, race, national origin, and religion.45
Despite the expanding statutory remedies, employees still raise alternate
theories for recovery when challenging an employer's decision to terminate.
This occurs where employees fail to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for
jurisdiction over a particular claim, where jurisdiction was satisfied pursuant
to pendant jurisdiction, or where various counts where filed to supplement
the statutory claims. Often, there are allegations that the employee was
improperly terminated because the employer did not have "just cause."
Thus, employees argue that the courts should ignore, modify or establish
exceptions to the common law rule that employees can be terminated at-will.
However, because of the numerous remedies available to employees,
it may be more difficult for courts to reach the conclusion that continuation
of the termination-at-will doctrine will result in management abuse. Even
in those jurisdictions recognizing the employment-at-will doctrine, there are
numerous vehicles which provide protection for employees, and enable
employees to challenge employment decisions that are inconsistent with laws
45. Id. The remaining causes of action include:
State (or city) administrative charges of discrimination on the basis of:
(9) Disability; (10) Gender; (11) National origin; (12) Race; and (13)
Age;
NLRB charges of:
(14) Discrimination for union activities (exercising § 7 rights to
form, join and assist labor organizations) even as the union is
charged with (15) Breach of its Duty of Fair Representation;
Federal lawsuits for discrimination on the basis of:
(16) Age (over 40); (17) Race; (18) Sex; (19) National origin; and
(20) Disability;
Federal lawsuits on the basis of:
(21) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (22) Complicity with union in
its violation of its Duty of Fair Representation; and (23) ERISA §
510 lawsuits (termination to avoid obtaining or payment of benefits);
State lawsuits for discrimination on the basis of:
(24) Race; (25) Gender; (26) National Origin; (27) Disability; and
(28) Age;
State lawsuits on the basis of:
(29) Wrongful termination for whistleblowing; (30) Discharge for a
reasons "against public policy"; (31) Libel; (32) Slander; and when
all else fails (33) Intentional; and (34) Negligent infliction of
emotional distress as well as (35) Prima Facie tort; and finally (36)
Retaliation for filing any of the above charges.
Panken, supra note 41, at 553.
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protecting employees. For example, these laws include causes of action for
discharge due to ethnicity, sex, age, disability, family status, Whistle-
blowing activities, and statutes which preclude retaliation because the
employee chooses to file suit.
46
However, these statutory provisions are so extensive that they counter-
balance the equities previously used by the courts to evaluate whether the
employment-at-will doctrine should be rejected due to the doctrine's
unfairness to employees. Courts also have to consider the viability of the
historical argument that management has all of the power and control in the
work place. Thus, numerous commentators recognize that by undermining
the management rights and prerogatives through statutory provisions, the
balance has shifted.47
In many instances, however, commentators are industry-oriented. As
a result, many have relocated to states with a favorable labor climate, such
as Florida. These right-to-work jurisdictions are less restrictive and tend to
influence commentators' evaluation of the employment-at-will doctrine.48
In addition, the increase in articulate spokespersons from the conservative
"Chicago School" of thought has resulted in a number of publications and
texts which document the advantages of the doctrine. One leading
proponent for this type of analysis is Richard Epstein, author of Simple
Rules for a Complex World,49 who comments extensively on the validity
46. Examples of statutes providing protection for employees who elect to file a cause
of action against their employer for statutory violations include: civil, workers' compensa-
tion, and Whistle-blowing statutes.
47. See PHILIP K. HOwARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE 46, 133-44 (1994).
48. See, e.g., David Tuller, Moviemakers Come to Mainstreet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1986, at 4. The article notes that California had $4 billion in estimated revenues from
motion pictures and featured television production, New York had $1.7 billion, and Florida
had $114 million in revenues and was third in national ranking. Id. The article further notes
that the "action" is not just in California and New York because the other 48 states are
wooing and winning film producers as well. In addition to state underwriting of expenses,
the article concludes that another advantage to operating in states other than New York and
California relates to lower labor costs because "[labor costs in right-to-work states like
Florida, North Carolina, and Texas can be as much as 25 percent lower than those in New
York." Id. Since employers in most cases are the ones that determine whether they are
going to operate in a state, this right-to-work provision creates an initial attraction. This
ultimately increases motion picture productions in these right-to-work states by assisting
employers. Even employees and unions may benefit by virtue of increased work, although
unions constantly press to eliminate the right to work provisions and do not agree with the
management approach that there are advantages for a state to exercise its right to work
option. Id.
49. RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
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of the "contract at will."5 Epstein notes that there are advantages for a
"contract at will." Such a contract is basically terminable-at-will, and as
such:
provides both sides with a secured obligation. The point sounds strange
given that one side can quit and the other side can fire, without any
explanation. For most people, the idea of security connotes a mortgage
or a lien on some form of property - the home mortgage is perhaps the
most familiar example. But it is appropriate to expand our horizons on
this point. The employer who decides to fire a worker has to pay a
price, that is, he will no longer be able to reap the benefits of the
worker's labor. Conversely, the worker who decides to quit will no
longer be able to command the wage. Each obligation is held hostage
to the other. Before quitting or firing, one has to make a hard decision
about whether the benefit forgone is worth the labor or the wages that
can now be retained. But once a decision to sever the arrangement is
made, the security on the other side is instantly realized, without the
formalities and delay of foreclosure proceedings. The worker instantly
recovers her labor, and the employer his cash. Knowing the efficiency
of the security arrangement, people will move with caution, given that
it is always costly to exercise the right to quit or to fire.5'
In addition, Epstein notes that the right to quit, or to fire, created by the
termination-at-will doctrine has "powerful and desirable incentive effects.
In particular, it serves as an effective check against the advantage-taking
open to either side in a continuous relationship."52 Epstein notes additional
advantages to the doctrine such as "moderating" influences which tend to
prevent either party from obtaining an advantage over the other, and the
"durability" of the doctrine due to its "fragile" legal nature.53  Because
either party can terminate the employment at any time, a fragile employment
relationship results. This relationship is thus strengthened, and hence
durable, because the parties are not required to enter into long-term
agreements which often cause additional demands and disputes over the
employment terms. Epstein argues further that "[t]he utility of the contract
at will is also strengthened by reputational forces. The employer with a
large work force is constrained in dealing with any particular employee.
Firing the first worker for reasons that other workers perceive as unfair will
50. Ud at 156-59.
51. d at 157-58.
52. Id at 158.
53. d
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have powerful ripple effects throughout the firm. 54 In concluding, Epstein
suggests that the "ease of its enforcement" is a final major advantage of the
termination-at-will doctrine." The author states that:
The legal position is this: I quit, or you fire me; judgment for the
defendant. The entire system takes about two words to explicate in the
standard case. "Anything goes" within the legal system precisely
because anything will not go in the business setting. Simplicity has its
dividends, for both sides can share in the administrative savings in the
form of higher profits and higher wages. Only the lawyers lose when
the contract at will is fully respected.56
IV. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION
It has been suggested that the statutory provisions are inconsistent
because they allow an employee who was terminated for exercising a
workers' compensation claim to be able to obtain reinstatement of that
employment, while not extending similar protection to all employees in
Florida.57 This statutory right permitting an employee to return to work
effectively eliminates the termination-at-will concept. However, statutory
provisions reflect important for public policy reasons. As a result, they do
not permit the same right to be asserted in other situations such as to
prevent a retaliatory firing of a employee at-will. The difference is due to
the legislative intent of a particular provision of the statute. Such legislative
intent has been articulated in the workers' compensation and Whistle-
blowing statutory provisions.
In these situations, the legislature reached conclusions resulting in
legislative provisions which changed the relationship between the parties in
the employment field by designating certain conduct as protected, and thus,
precluding termination because of it. The distinction between the statutory
provisions and the ability of courts to legislate policies through judicial
54. EPSTEIN, supra note 49, at 158.
55. Id. at 159.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Stephen G. DeNigris, The Public Policy Exception: The Need to Reform
Florida's At-Will Employment Doctrine After Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories
and Bellamy v. Holcomb, 16 NOVA L. REV. 1079 (1992) (arguing that conservative
jurisprudence notwithstanding, the termination-at-will doctrine should be abandoned or
reformed); Mark E. Walker, Comment, Workers' Compensation: Florida's Resistance to
Nonstatutory Limits to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 43 FLA. L. REV. 583 (1991).
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decisions is the difference which the courts have recognized, and utilized,
in their decisions not to strike down the termination-at-will concept.
As recent decisions have indicated, the increase in statutory provisions
also makes it very difficult for the judiciary to formulate public policy
arguments to undermine or eliminate the employment-at-will doctrine.
Difficulties exist not only because of the complexity of laws but because of
the inconsistencies in the statutory provisions. Additional inconsistencies
result where judges attempt to fashion a common law remedy which is
precluded under the statutory provisions. One example of this problem is
found where the inconsistencies in federal statutory provisions have caused
litigants to seek judicial resolution of the inconsistencies. For example, in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Attorney General of the United States,5" the
employer sought declaratory and injunctive relief to eliminate conflicting
legislative mandates and to "coordinate its equal opportunity laws., 59 The
opinion provided the employer's arguments:
[S]ocial attitudes, economic realities and earlier government policies -
specifically veterans preference schemes - combined to produce a
business environment in which most of the responsible and remunerative
posts were occupied by white males. Sears complains that these
previously established priorities in employment conflict with subse-
quently established priorities in employment.
In the second part of the complaint, Sears attempts to attribute the
alleged shortage of well-qualified female and minority applicants to the
government's failure to enforce equal opportunity laws in housing,
education and employment.60
Despite such allegations, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that the judiciary could not resolve inconsisten-
cies in federal legislation because of Article Im of the Constitution which
prohibits the resolution of matters that do not involve an actual case or
controversy. 61 The court ruled that 'a controversy in [the Article III]
sense involves considerably more than mere abstract philosophical disagree-
58. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 916 (D.D.C. 1979).
59. Id. at 916.
60. Id at 917.
61. Id (discussing U.S. CONsT. art. III).
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ment with the wisdom, propriety, or desirability of specific governmental
activities .... 62
In addition to the statutory inconsistency problem, there are also
problems with statutory provisions that preclude a judicially mandated "just
cause" standard. For example, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co.,63 an employee was discharged due to age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). The employer subsequently
discovered that the employee was guilty of misconduct that would have
supported the termination had the employer been aware of the conduct at the
time. The court held that although an employer may possess after acquired
evidence that would give him just cause to discharge the employee, the
employer is precluded from doing so because of an express statutory
provision to the contrary. 64 In other words, although courts might conclude
that the employee could have been terminated because of the employee's
improper conduct, the statutory policy, which favors relief for the employee,
may override and excuse the misconduct.65 As a result, just cause to
terminate an employee cannot be the sole standard applied in evaluating
whether the employment decision complained of by the employee was
proper.
A judicial body of law, which undermines the employment-at-will
doctrine and requires the establishment of the "just cause" standard for
termination, may not answer the question of whether the statutory prerequi-
sites have been complied with for the purpose of protecting statutory rights.
Federal statutory rights may preclude the need to evaluate a state common
law system which uses "just cause" because even establishing such a
standard would not resolve the question of whether a federal statute had
been violated.
In the same sense, Florida courts interpreting Florida statutes will also
have to evaluate the prerequisites for statutory protection. For example, an
employee who satisfied the requisites for suing under the Whistle-blowing
provisions" of the Florida Statutes might have acted in a manner that
would justify the employee's termination under a judicially created "just
cause" standard. However, if the employee establishes that the employee
was also terminated because of retaliation for Whistle-blowing activity,
62. Id. (quoting Gaillot v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 464 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972)) (alteration in original).
63. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1993).
64. Id. at 883-84.
65. Id.
66. FLA. STAT. §§ 448.101(5), .102 (Supp. 1994).
Vol. 20
450
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Fleming
which is protected under the statute, further judicial proceedings would be
required.
Thus, balancing the inconsistencies in the federal and state statutory
provisions and adding the fact that statutory provisions take precedence over
the common law issues may further reduce the reasons for the courts to
undermine the termination-at-will doctrine. On the other hand, it is equally
argued that courts can create a common law doctrine and should not be
dissuaded from doing so merely because, in certain cases, that doctrine may
be eliminated by statutory provisions. However, the courts would then be
faced with the proposition that the legislature has not yet eliminated the
termination-at-will doctrine in enacting various additional employment
rights. Thus, adding judicial modifications to the common law that conflict
with existing and expanding statutory provisions might be counterproductive.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears that conservative commentators now suggest additional
policy reasons for the continuation of the employment-at-will doctrine.
Moreover, the liberal commentaries, which are now decreasing, have also
conceded that more judges are now deferring to the legislature. Thus, the
question to be resolved in future years is whether a retreat from complex
employment rights created by statutory laws would cause a resurgence of
judicial opinions evaluating the employment-at-will doctrine. At this point,
however, the legislature has not decreased the rights and protections afforded
employees. Notwithstanding the conservative commentary and plentiful
rhetoric in both federal and state legislative bodies, there does not appear to
be a retreat from employment regulation in the work place by virtue of state
and federal laws. For this reason, the recent decisions which have sustained
the doctrine of employment-at-will in view of increasing statutory labor and
civil rights laws, appear to demonstrate a trend which will continue. Based
upon recent judicial rulings and trends, it appears that the employment-at-
will doctrine will be with us for some time to come.
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I. JIRODUCTION
In 1985, the Florida Legislature recognized that there was an ongoing
"insurance crisis." Accordingly, the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice
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the citizens of Florida have available competent and reasonably priced
medical services.' The legislation intended to ease the threat to the
continued availability of high quality care caused by escalating premium
costs for professional liability insurance.' The Act requires a medical
malpractice plaintiff to put a prospective defendant on notice that a suit
asserting professional negligence will be filed against the defendant. The
notice of intent is a condition precedent to the filing of a lawsuit.4 This
requirement, along with others in the statute, ostensibly promotes settlement
of medical malpractice claims and consequently reduces the overall societal
cost of health care.
This article is a detailed analysis of the presuit discovery provisions of
the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 and the
interpretation and application of the Act by Florida courts. This analysis
provides a procedural guidance for practitioners to anticipate how courts
may interpret the provisions of the statute in particular cases.
II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
A. The Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation
The Act applies to those causes of action filed after October 1, 1985'
and requires a claimant to send to prospective defendants a formal, written
"notice of intent to initiate litigation" advising them that a suit will be filed
against them.6 As an additional requirement, the notice of intent must be
accompanied by a verified, written opinion of a medical expert.7 The
notice of intent is a condition precedent to the institution of a claim.8 A
copy of the notice of intent must be furnished to the Department of Business
1. Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws
1183 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (1985)). In 1988, the Florida Legislature enacted
§ 766.201 through § 766.212. Ch. 88-1, §§ 48-59, 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 164-73. That same
year, the legislature strengthened § 766.106 of the Florida Statutes. See 1988 Fla. Laws ch.
88-173; 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-277. The changes were enacted with the stated intent of
providing a plan for the prompt resolution of medical malpractice claims.
2. Ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1183.
3. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (Supp. 1994).
4. Id.; Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1990); Pearlstein
v. Malunney, 500 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
5. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(13) (Supp. 1994).
6. Id. § 766.106(2).
7. Id. § 766.203(2) (1993).
8. Id. § 766.106(2) (Supp. 1994); see also Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 1994);
Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1991).
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and Professional Regulation and must include the full name and address of
the claimant and any prospective defendants who are health care providers
licensed under chapters 458, 459, 460, 461, or 466 of the Florida Statutes.9
The notice must also include the "date and a summary of the occurrence
giving rise to the claim[ ] and a description of the injury to the claimant."'
Once notice has been given, the claimant cannot file suit for ninety days.1
The purpose of this ninety-day period is to toll the statute of limitations as
to all properly notified defendants. 2 Ninety days after the defendant
receives the notice of intent letter, the plaintiff may file suit, and has either
sixty days or the remainder of the time left under the statute of limitations
to file suit, whichever is greater. 3
B. Presuit Investigation by the Parties
Once the prospective defendant receives the notice, the defendant's
insurer or self-insurer must review and evaluate the claim utilizing one of
the several methods set forth in the statute. 4 Both the claimant and the
prospective defendant are required to cooperate with the insurer during this
evaluation process.' Furthermore, the claimant may be required to appear
before a screening panel or medical review committee, or submit to a
physical examination. 6 If a party unreasonably fails to comply with this
section, the court is justified in dismissing the claims or defenses. 7
Sometime before the end of the ninety-day period, the insurer or self-
insurer must serve the claimant with a response either admitting liability,
rejecting the claim, or offering a settlement. 8 This response must then be
evaluated by the claimant's attorney who must utilize the procedures set
forth in the statute.'9 Should the recipient of a notice letter respond by
denying liability, the denial letter must be accompanied by a verified written
medical expert opinion.2"
9. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (Supp. 1994).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 766.106(3)(a).
12. Id § 766.106(4).
13. IM; Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1993); Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d
177, 182-84 (Fla. 1993).
14. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (Supp. 1994); Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 484.
15. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (Supp. 1994).
16. IM
17. Id.
18. Id § 766.106(3)(b).
19. Id § 766.106(3)(d).
20. FLA. STAT. § 766.203(3)(b) (1993).
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C. Presuit Investigation by the Court
1. Dismissal of the Claims and Defenses
The statute permits the court, upon a request by any party, "to
determine whether the opposing party's claim or denial rests on a reasonable
basis. 21 Section 766.206(2) clearly states that if:
the notice of intent to initiate litigation mailed by the claimant is not in
compliance with the ... requirements of [the statute], the court shall
dismiss the claim, and the person who mailed [the defective] notice of
intent, whether the claimant or the claimant's attorney, shall be
personally liable for all attorney's fees and costs incurred during the
investigation and evaluation of the claim.22
Similarly, if the court finds that the defendant's response rejecting the
claim fails to comply with the reasonable investigation requirements, the
court must strike the defendant's response.23 Thus, the person who mailed
the defective response, whether the defendant or the defendant's insurer or
attorney, will be held personally liable for all attorney's fees and costs.24
2. Disciplinary Action
In addition to dismissal of the claim or defense, noncompliance with
the statute could result in the matter being submitted to the Florida Bar for
disciplinary review. For example, section 766.206(4) provides that if the
court finds that an attorney for the claimant mailed a notice of intent without
a reasonable investigation, that the attorney filed a medical negligence claim
without first mailing the proper notice of intent, or that the defendant's
attorney mailed a response rejecting the claim without a reasonable investi-
gation, the court must submit its findings in the matter to the Florida Bar for
disciplinary review. Any attorney reported to the Florida Bar three or
more times within a five-year period must be reported to a circuit grievance
committee acting under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida. 6
21. Id. § 766.206(1).
22. Id. § 766.206(2) (emphasis added). These fees and costs include those incurred by
the defendant and the defendant's insurer. Id.
23. Id. § 766.206(3).
24. FLA. STAT. § 766.206(3) (1993).
25. Id. § 766.206(4).
26. Id.
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If the grievance committee finds probable cause to believe that an attorney
has violated the presuit investigation requirements, the committee must
forward a copy of its findings to the Supreme Court of Florida for
review 2
7
The expert who provided the corroborating medical opinion may also
be subjected to disciplinary action. The statute provides that if the court
finds that the corroborating written medical expert opinion attached to any
notice of intent, or to any response rejecting a claim was not based upon
reasonable investigation, the court must report the expert to the Division of
Medical Quality Assurance. 28 Section 766.206(5)(b) permits'the court to
refuse to consider the testimony of any expert who has been disqualified
three times pursuant to this section.29
III. FLOPIDA CASE LAW
A. Presuit Requirements
There are a number of Florida cases construing theabove-mentioned
requirements. Public Health Trust v. Knuckl0 is the first Florida case that
interpreted the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985.
In Knuck, Blanche Freundlich filed a medical malpractice suit against
various defendants, including Public Health Trust of Dade County and Dr.
Peritz Scheinberg. The suit was filed on February 10, 1986 as a conse-
quence of allegedly negligent medical care rendered on February 16, 1984.
Although Freundlich had provided notice to the hospital prior to filing suit,
she failed to give notice to the University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint because Freundlich failed
to serve the requisite notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice
litigation on the University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg during the
27. Id
28. lId § 766.206(5)(a).
29. FLA. STAT. § 766.206(5)0b) (1993); see Faber v. Wrobel, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1730,
D1731 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 28, 1995) (stating that the standard for disqualification of
medical experts is less stringent than the standard for the qualifications required to offer
expert testimony at trial). But see Winson v. Norman, 658 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that a doctor who has not been engaged in the actual practice of
medicine for more than ten years and who has limited his professional activities to acting as
a professional "litigation expert" was not a medical expert qualified to execute a verified
medical opinion affidavit as required by the statute).
30. 495 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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applicable statute of limitations period.31 In addition, the plaintiff failed
to observe the mandatory ninety-day presuit screening period prior to filing
suit,32 and failed to plead the good faith certificate alleging compliance
with statutory requirements.33
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that the
filing of the complaint tolled the statute of limitations and requested that the
trial court abate the action pending compliance with the neglected statutory
requirements. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to abate the
action pending the necessary compliance with the statute.34 The defendants
filed a petition for writ of prohibition, asking the Third District Court of
Appeal to preclude the trial court from reviving the abated action.
The Third District Court of Appeal granted the writ and prohibited the
trial court from reviving the action against the University of Miami and Dr.
Scheinberg.36 The court held that the applicable statute of limitations was
not tolled because of the plaintiff's failure to serve a notice of intent to
initiate litigation according to section 768.57(2) of the Florida Statutes.37
The court denied the writ against Jackson Memorial Hospital since that
defendant had received the required notice within the applicable statute of
limitations period.38
For guidance, the court turned to cases interpreting section 768.28(6),
which deals with notice requirements in sovereign immunity cases. 39 The
court stated that because the notice of intent to initiate litigation had not
been served, the statute of limitations had not been tolled; thus, the
limitation period expired soon after the complaint was filed.' The court
concluded that the statutory period expired before the required notice of
intent had been given to the University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg, and
thus, the trial court erred in abating the action as to those defendants.4'
31. Id. at 835 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.57(2) (1985)). Under the applicable statute of
limitations, an action in negligence must be commenced within four years from the date of
the injury. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1993).
32. Knuck, 495 So. 2d at 835 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.57(3)(a) (1985)).
33. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.495 (1985)).
34. Id. at 836.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 837.
37. Knuck, 495 So. 2d at 837.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 836.
40. Id. at 837.
41. Id.
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The court expressly rejected Freundlich's argument that the notice sent to
Jackson Memorial Hospital sufficed as notice to all defendants. 42
The Knuck decision was followed by the Second District Court of
Appeal in Pearlstein v. Malunney43 and was cited with approval in Lynn
v. Miller.' In Pearlstein, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action
without complying with the statutory notice provisions of section 768.57 of
the Florida Statutes.45 As a result, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
based upon the plaintiff's failure to comply with the mandatory requirements
of the statute. The trial court denied the motion, holding that section 768.57
unreasonably discriminates against medical malpractice litigants, deprives
litigants of their constitutional right of access to the courts, and is unconsti-
tutionally vague.46 The trial court ruled that the complaint itself satisfied
the notice requirements of the statute and directed the defendants to file an
answer to the complaint.47 The defendants subsequently sought a writ of
certiorari in the Second District Court of Appeal.
The Second District Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the
48prefiling notice requirements. The court recognized that the Act was
enacted in response to a perceived crisis in the availability of reasonably
priced health care services due to escalating medical malpractice insurance
premiums.49 Further, the court found that a valid legislative purpose exists
in ensuring the protection of public health by assuring the availability of
adequate medical care.50 Thus, the district court quashed that portion of
the trial court's ruling which directed the defendants to answer the com-
plaint.51 The court indicated that the notice requirement is a condition
precedent to filing suit and held that a complaint filed without notice is "for
all intents and purposes, a nonexistent lawsuit.' 52
In Lynn v. Miller,53 the court reiterated that compliance with the
requirements of section 768.57 is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit
42. Knuck, 495 So. 2d at 837.
43. 500 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 511 So. 2d 299 (Fla.
1987).
44. 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
45. Pearlstein, 500 So. 2d at 586.
46. Id.
47. Id at 586-87.
48. Id. at 587.
49. Id. at 586.
50. Pearlstein, 500 So. 2d at 586.
51. Id, at 587.
52. Id.
53. 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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which must be satisfied within the applicable statute of limitations period. 4
The court explained that if the limitations period has run, a trial court lacks
the authority to abate a premature complaint even if, but for the prefiling
notice requirements, the complaint would have been timely filed.5
The Second District Court of Appeal, however, found that the
commencement of a malpractice suit must be distinguished from the
existence of a cause of action. For example, in Malunney v. Pearlstein,56
the court found that the purpose of section 768.57 is wholly procedural
because it provides potential defendants "with an opportunity to resolve
amicably the controversy without the burden of a lawsuit.' 57 The court
held that section 768.57 has no effect upon the continuing existence of a
cause of action.5 8  Accordingly, where the initial complaint is dismissed
because the plaintiff fails to allege that a notice of intent to initiate litigation
was sent to potential defendants, the filing of a new lawsuit properly
alleging notice will not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata 9
There are a number of other significant cases addressing the required
statutory notice. For example, in Glineck v. Lentz,' the court held that
oral notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation is insufficient
compliance with the statute.6' In Wilkenson v. Golden,62 the court held
that a patient's letter to a dentist's insurance carrier did not constitute a
"notice of intent" where the letter was not sent by certified mail, nor was it
accompanied by a corroborating medical report.63 The statute does not
allow for constructive notice, oral notice, or notice by publication.'
However, there is no need to give a separate notice of intent to a physician
by a spouse of the injured person in a loss of consortium claim. 65 This is
54. Id. at 1012.
55. Id.
56. 539 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
57. Id. at 495; see also Castro v. Davis, 527 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
58. Malunney, 539 So. 2d at 496.
59. Id. at 495.
60. 524 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 534 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1988).
61. Id. at 458.
62. 630 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 1241.
64. FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (Supp. 1994); see Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 561 So. 2d 324, 325
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), quashed on other grounds, 589 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1991).
65. Chandler v. Novak, 596 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). But see
Scarlett v. Public Health Trust, 584 So. 2d 75, 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing
the spouse's claim for loss of consortium because the notice only referred to one spouse),
overruled sub nom. Chandler, 596 So. 2d at 750.
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because a derivative action is not a separate and distinct action; it is
completely dependent upon the original action filed by the injured spouse.
In Solimando v. International Medical Centers,66 the Second District
Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether a notice of intent sent by
regular United States mail, rather than the statutorily specified certified mail,
sufficiently complied with the Act. The plaintiff had filed a medical
malpractice suit against a number of health care providers. However, the
plaintiff's attorney sent the notice of intent to initiate litigation by regular
mail rather than by certified mail. As a result, the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. They argued that the plaintiff failed to comply with the mailing
provisions of sections 768.57(2) and 768.57(3)(a) which require that the
notice of intent be sent by certified mail.67
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that some
of the health care providers waived the statutory requirements that the notice
be sent by certified mail because the insurance carriers of the health care
providers acknowledged receipt of the notice. Furthermore, the carriers had
responded with letters indicating that they were reviewing the case to
determine whether there was any liability. Thus, the plaintiff argued that the
defendants should be estopped from asserting that notice sent by regular
mail is insufficient. Although the trial court did not address the issue of
waiver or estoppel, it ruled that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case.68 The court only had jurisdiction to grant the motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to comply
with the procedure for mailing notice.69
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's
ruling in holding that the notice requirements are not jurisdictional and are
subject to waiver.71 The court indicated that the failure to comply with the
prelitigation notice requirements of section 768.57 does not deprive the trial
court of subject matter jurisdiction.71 Thus, trial courts may consider the
principles of estoppel and waiver in deciding whether to excuse a party for
noncompliance. 72 Nevertheless, the court did warn that it is essential for the
66. 544 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 549 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.
1989).
67. Id at 1032.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1033-34.
71. Solimando, 544 So. 2d at 1034-35.
72. Id at 1035.
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complaint to allege compliance with the statute.73 However, in recognizing
the difficulty facing a plaintiff who may not be able to frame a complaint
invoking the jurisdiction of the court, the court adopted and approved the
view that a complaint setting forth factual allegations concerning waiver of
the notice requirements of section 768.28(6) satisfies the presuit notice
requirements of the statute.74 Accordingly, a medical malpractice plain-
tiffs failure to comply with pre-litigation notice requirements does not
necessarily deprive a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore,
a trial judge may consider principles of estoppel and waiver in deciding
whether to excuse the plaintiff for noncompliance.
75
B. Amending the Complaint
The issue of whether a trial court in a medical malpractice action could
permit amendment of a complaint so as to allege compliance with the
presuit requirements was first addressed in Lindberg v. Hospital Corp.76
In Lindberg, the plaintiffs, Kurt and Mary Lindberg, filed a medical
malpractice action on April 4, 1986 against the Hospital Corporation of
America, Dr. Jamie Alalu, Dr. Robert Liem, and Dr. Bernard Cheong,
alleging negligent care and treatment of Kurt Lindberg in April and May of
1984. On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs sent notices
of intent to initiate litigation to each defendant by certified mail. The
defendants, however, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint
because the plaintiffs failed to comply with conditions precedent to filing a
complaint. Specifically, the defendants alleged that the plaintiffs failed to
notify the defendants of their intent to sue within the statute of limitations
period. The motion alleged further that the plaintiffs' failure divested the
court of its subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, thus requiring
dismissal.7 7 At the hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs requested leave to amend their complaint to allege that the notice
requirement had been satisfied. The trial court dismissed the cause of
action, and refused to grant the plaintiffs' leave to amend.78 The plaintiffs
appealed.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Bryant v. Duval County Hosp. Auth., 502 So. 2d 459, 462-63 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 511 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1987)).
75. Bryant, 502 So. 2d at 462.
76. 545 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
77. Id. at 1384-85.
78. Id. at 1385.
Vol. 20
461
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Khouzam
In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that the statute of limitations had been tolled
because notice had been given within the statutory period.79 Thus, the trial
court should have permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint so as to
allege compliance with the statutory prerequisites.80
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Holding Electric, Inc.
v. Roberts,"' which held that under section 713.06(3)(d)(1), delivery of a
contractor's affidavit is not jurisdictional, although it is a prerequisite to
maintaining the action and must be completed within the statutory limitation
period. 2 Therefore, the trial court has authority to allow the plaintiffs to
amend the complaint provided that the notice is given within the appropriate
statute of limitations period. 3 However, because the Fourth District Court
of Appeal acknowledged that its holding directly conflicts with Pearlsteins4
and Malunney 5 it certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida:
IS THE FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE PRE-SUIT SCREENING
PROCESS OF SECTION 768.57, FLORIDA STATUTES, A FATAL
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT OR MAY IT BE CORRECTED BY
FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE SUBSEQUENT TO FILING THE
COMPLAINT SO LONG AS THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO
LITIGATE IS SERVED WITHIN THE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
PERIOD? 6
The supreme court answered the certified question in Hospital Corp.
of America v. Lindberg.7 The court held that "in medical malpractice
actions, if a presuit notice is served at the same time [the] complaint is filed,
the complaint is subject to dismissal with leave to amend."88 The court
held further that "[t]he plaintiff may subsequently file an amended complaint
asserting compliance with the presuit notice and screening requirements of
79. Id. at 1388.
80. Id.
81. 530 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1988).
82. Lindberg, 545 So. 2d at 1388 (citing Roberts, 530 So. 2d at 303).
83. Id.
84. 500 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 511 So. 2d 299 (Fla.
1987).
85. 539 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 547 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1989).
86. Lindberg, 545 So. 2d at 1388.
87. 571 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1990).
88. Id at 449.
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section 768.57 and the presuit investigation and certification requirements
of section 768.495(1)." 89 However, practitioners in the field of medical
malpractice should note that failure to timely file the presuit notice within
the statute of limitations period will require dismissal of the complaint.90
In Southern Neurosurgical Associates, P.A., v. Fine,9 the court held
that where the limitation period has not yet run, a presuit notice served
simultaneously with the filing of the complaint will cause the complaint to
be dismissed with leave to amend.92 The plaintiff may then file an
amended complaint alleging compliance with presuit notice and screening
requirements.93 However, if the statutory period for initiating the suit has
run before the plaintiff satisfies the presuit notice or screening requirements,
the trial court will be divested of subject matter jurisdiction.9"
C. The Mode of Service
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Patry v. Capps,95 answered a
certified question regarding whether the certified mail requirement for the
notice of intent letter is a substantive element of the statute or a procedural
one which can be disregarded by the trial court once the defendant receives
actual written notice in a timely manner that does not result in any
prejudice.96 In Patry, a medical malpractice action was filed against Dr.
William Capps for negligence in delivering the Patrys' child by caesarean
section. The trial court dismissed the action because the plaintiffs failed to
comply with the mode of service required in the statutes.9 Dr. Capps was
served with the Patrys' intent to initiate litigation by hand delivery rather
than by certified mail. The district court relied on Solimando and Glineck
in affirming the trial court's dismissal.98
In deciding whether strict compliance with the mode of service is
mandated, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the purpose behind the
89. Id.
90. See Miami Physical Therapy Assocs. v. Savage, 632 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
91. 591 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
92. Id. at 254-55.
93. Id. at 255.
94. Id.; see also Berry v. Orr, 537 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988),
review denied, 545 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1989).
95. 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994).
96. Id. at 10.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 13.
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legislation.99 The court recognized that the purpose of the Act is to
promote the resolution of medical malpractice claims early in the claim
process so as to avoid a full, adversarial proceeding."0 The court con-
cluded that the statutory requirements regarding the mode of service were
"merely a technical matter of form that was designed to facilitate the orderly
and prompt conduct of the screening and settlement process by establishing
a method for verifying significant dates in the process. ' .. In this case,
because Dr. Capps acknowledged timely receipt of the written notice and
was not prejudiced by the method of delivery, the supreme court held that
strict compliance with the statute was not required.0 2 However, the court
emphasized that unlike the general notice requirement in section 768.57(2),
the mode of service authorized in the statute does not go to the heart of the
presuit notice and screening process.'0 3 The court disapproved Solimando
and Glineck because they conflicted with the court's opinion."
D. Health Care Practitioners
The purpose of the notice provision is not to deny access to the
courts,'0 5 or function as a trap for medical malpractice claimants."
Instead, it is designed to resolve claims amicably.'07 In Weinstock v.
Groth,'0° the Supreme Court of Florida was faced with the issue of
whether a clinical psychologist is a "health care provider" for purposes of
determining whether a plaintiff must comply with the notice requirements
of section 766.106(2). The court held that prospective defendants in medical
negligence actions are "health care providers" as defined in section
99. lId at 11.
100. Patry, 633 So. 2d at 11-12; see Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla.
1991) (holding that the Act purports to aid in amicably resolving medical malpractice
claims); see also Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1993) (stating that the purpose
of the Act is to facilitate the resolution of claims prior to trial); Williams v. Campagnulo, 588
So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1991) (stating that the Act promotes settlement at an early stage).
101. Patry, 633 So. 2d at 12.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993).
106. Zacker v. Croft, 609 So. 2d 140, 142 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied,
620 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1993).
107. Moore v. Winterhaven Hosp., 579 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (citing
Castro v. Davis, 527 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)), review denied, 589 So. 2d
294 (Fla. 1991).
108. 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
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768.50(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes. °9 The court also recognized that the
clear purpose of the Act is to promote settlement of medical malpractice
claims in order to reduce the overall societal cost of health care and not to
deny access to the courts."' Accordingly, the court held that "the proper
test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to notice under section
766.106(2) is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under
the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)."'
Thus, because psychologists are not included in the definition of a "health
care provider" in section 766.50(2)(b), the plaintiff was not required to
comply with the notice requirement of section 768.106(2).
On the other hand, a potential defendant who does not fall within the
definition of a "health care provider" may nevertheless be entitled to
statutory notice if the defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of the
health care provider." 2 Therefore, the employer of a health care provider
may also be a prospective defendant even though the employer does not fall
within the statutory definition of a health care provider. 3  Such an
employer "may be vicariously liable under the professional medical
negligence standard of care... when its agent or employee, who is a health
care provider, negligently renders medical care or services.""' 4 For
example, in NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough,"5 the court held that a
nursing home, which is not defined as a health care provider under the
statutes, is entitled to statutory notice of a negligence action against it
because the nursing home is vicariously liable for nurses who are both
employees and health care providers. 16
E. Statute of Limitations
In Zacker v. Croft,'17 a patient who suffered a heart attack after being
treated for chest pains brought a medical malpractice suit against his
physician. The patient mailed a notice of intent to initiate litigation to the
109. Id. at 837.
110. Id. at 838 (citing Ragoonanan v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 619 So.
2d 482 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838.
114. Id. (citing NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1991)).
115. 590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
116. Id. at 441.
117. 609 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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physician's last known address. The issue before the court was whether the
patient tolled the statute of limitations by mailing the notice of intent to an
incorrect address.118 The court stated that insofar as the claimants exer-
cised reasonable care and diligence to determine the correct address, the
statute of limitations was tolled." 9 The court upheld the tolling of the
limitations period in order to comply with the purpose of the notice
requirements which is to promote the settlement of medical malpractice
claims and not to be used as a trap for medical malpractice plaintiffs. 20
It is important to note here that, although certain information must be
contained in the notice, the statute does not require any particular form or
specific wording.' The Fifth District Court of Appeal, in Shands
Teaching Hospital & Clinic, Inc. v. Barber," held that the notice only
needs to describe the occurrence of the underlying claim and include "the
expert corroborative opinion [which] is designed to prevent the filing of
baseless litigation."" The court held that the notice of intent letter, coupled
with the corroborating affidavit, adequately described the incident which
gave rise to the negligence claim.124 Therefore, the purpose of the
statutory notice provision had been fulfilled."z
F. The Ninety-Day Extension
Another significant aspect of the Act is the provision for an extension
of the ninety-day presuit screening period.12 6  Under the statute, the
plaintiff must conduct a reasonable investigation to determine whether there
is a good faith belief that the defendant was negligent in the care and
treatment of the plaintiff. 27 The notice of intent must then be served
upon prospective defendants within the statutory period prescribed in section
95.11 of the Florida Statutes. However, section 766.104 permits an
automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations for those who
petition the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and who pay the
118. Id. at 141.
119. Id. at 142.
120. Id.
121. See Tracey v. Barrett, 550 So. 2d 558, 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
122. 638 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Stebilla v. Musallem, 595 So.
2d 136, 138 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 604 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1992)).
123. Id. at 572.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. FLA. STAT. § 766.104(2) (1993).
127. Id. § 766.104(1).
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filing fee.'28 In Kalbach v. Day, 29 the court examined the ninety-day
extension for filing medical malpractice actions and determined that it is "in
addition to other tolling periods."'30  The court held that the extension
begins to run after the ninety-day tolling provision under section 766.106
which commences after the notice of intent to initiate litigation has been
mailed.'
Computation of the ninety-day screening period was addressed by the
Supreme Court of Florida in Boyd v. Becker.'32 The court reviewed the
appellate court's opinion which noted a conflict between Barron v.
Crenshaw,'33 sections 766.106(3)(c) and 766.106(3)(a) of the Florida
Statutes, and rule 1.650 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.'34
The court analyzed the statutory provisions involved and adopted the
Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision which modified rule 1.650 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.'35 In Boyd, the defendant, Dr. Becker,
performed an operation on Mr. Boyd on June 3, 1988 which resulted in an
unexpected scar on Mr. Boyd's neck. On June 2, 1990, Mr. Boyd applied
for and received an automatic extension of the statute of limitations pursuant
to section 766.104(2). On August 30, 1990, before the expiration of the
ninety-day extension period, Mr. Boyd mailed to Dr. Becker a notice of
intent to initiate litigation. The notice of intent was received by Dr. Becker
on September 3, 1990. On February 1, 1991, Mr. Boyd filed suit against
Dr. Becker. However, February 1st was the last day of Mr. Boyd's final
extension which was computed from the date that the notice of intent was
128. Id. § 766.104(2). Section 766.104(2) provides that:
Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment
to the clerk of the filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief judge,
an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to
allow the reasonable investigation required by subsection (1). This period shall
be in addition to other tolling periods. No court order 'is required for the
extension to be effective. The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed
to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run.
Id.
129. 589 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), dismissed sub nom. Frei v. Kalbach,
598 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1992).
130. Id. at 449 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.104(2) (1989)).
131. Id. at 450.
132. 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993).
133. 573 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
134. Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 482.
135. Id. at 484 (adopting the holding in Barron, 573 So. 2d at 19).
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received by Dr. Becker, rather than the date the notice of intent was
mailed.3 6
Dr. Becker moved for dismissal arguing that Mr. Boyd's claim was
barred by the statute of limitations. In support of his position, Dr. Becker
"relied on the language in section 766.106(3)(a) that states: 'No suit may
be filed for a period of 90 days after notice [of intent to initiate litigation]
is mailed to any prospective defendant."",13 7  Dr. Becker argued that
because the notice letter was mailed on August 30, 1990, the tolling of the
statute of limitations began on that date and ended ninety days later on
November 28, 1990. It was submitted that the claim should have been filed
on or before January 28, 1991 which includes the sixty-day extension
authorized under section 766.106(4). The defense asserted that on
November 28, 1990, there was an implicit rejection of plaintiff's claim
which triggered the countdown for the sixty-day extension."3 8
In response, however, Mr. Boyd argued that the ninety-day presuit
period should be calculated based on the language in section 766.106(3)(c)
which states that "[flailure of the prospective defendant [or insurer or self-
insurer] to reply to the notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed
a final rejection of the claim [for purposes of this section].' 1 9 According-
ly, Mr. Boyd argued that because the final sixty-day period began on
December 3, 1990, ninety days after Dr. Becker received the notice, the
lawsuit was timely filed on February 1, 1991."
The court recognized that section 766.106(3)(a) conflicts with section
766.106(3)(c) because the latter provision computes the time period when
the notice is mailed and the former from the date it is received."' The
court held that the conflict should be resolved in a way that allows the claim
136. Id. at 482-83.
137. Id. at 483 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (1989)) (alteration in original).
138. Id. Section 766.106(4) reads as follows:
The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set
forth in s. 95.11. However, during the 90-day period, the statute of limitations
is tolled as to all potential defendants. Upon stipulation by the parties, the 90-
day period may be extended and the statute of limitations is tolled during any
such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an
extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period
of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit.
FLA. STAT. § 766.106(4) (Supp. 1994).
139. Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 483 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(c) (1989)) (alteration
in original).
140. Id.
141. Id at 483.
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to be considered on its merits. 42 To hold otherwise would effectively
limit the time the defendant would have to evaluate the merits of the claim,
which in turn would defeat the legislative intent of allowing each defendant
a full ninety days to evaluate the merits of the claim. 43 The court then
modified rule 1.650(d)(2) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to
conform with the Fifth District Court of Appeal's ruling in Barron v.
Crenshaw.'" The Barron court ruled that the ninety-day period for filing
a response is computed from the date the notice is received. 145  To
reconcile the difference, the court deleted the word "mailed" and inserted the
word "received.' 14
6
In Mason v. Bisogno,147 the court determined when the sixty-day
provision of the statute begins to run. The court held that rule 1.650(d)(2)
is clear and unambiguous in providing that the statute of limitations com-
mences on the earliest of several events. 48 For example, commencement
of the limitations period would include the claimant's receipt of a written
rejection of the claim or the expiration of an extension of the ninety-day
presuit period. 49 Therefore, in order to avoid an action from being time
barred, the lawsuit must be filed before the earlier of either receipt of a
written rejection or the expiration of the ninety-day extension period.
Additionally, the ninety-day period may be extended upon stipulation
by the parties, thus tolling the statute of limitations during any such
extension.15' However, practitioners should note that an extension of the
ninety-day presuit screening period as to some of the defendants does not
toll the statute of limitations as to all defendants involved in the medical
malpractice action.
G. Pretrial Settlement
Included among its many objectives, the Act is also designed to
encourage pretrial settlement of meritorious claims in order to avoid
142. Id.
143. Id. at 484.
144. Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 484; see Barron v. Crenshaw, 573 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
145. Barron, 573 So. 2d at 19.
146. Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 484.
147. 633 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 641 So. 2d 1345 (Fla.
1994).
148. Id. at 467.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.104(4) (1991)).
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expensive litigation and to anticipate further increases in medical malpractice
insurance premiums. 151 The Act requires potential parties to assist an
insurer or self-insurer in its investigation of potential claims. 52 The Act
also requires potential parties to engage in informal discovery during the
presuit investigation period in order to promote and expedite discovery.'
Section 766.106(6) states that "[u]pon receipt by a prospective defendant of
a notice of claim, the parties shall make discoverable information available
without formal discovery. Failure to do so is grounds for dismissal of
claims or defenses ultimately asserted.' 54
In Morris v. Ergos,55 the defendant physician appealed an order
striking his defenses for failure to timely respond to presuit discovery
requests. In reversing the trial court's order, the Second District Court of
Appeal held that the striking of the physician's defenses was too excessive
a remedy. 56 The court reasoned that "[w]hile the physician's failure to
respond to the discovery questions until after suit was filed was clearly
neglectful and it is questionable whether under the circumstances ... the
neglect was excusable, we conclude that the striking of his defenses was too
harsh a remedy."' 57 The court further stated that "even when a party's
conduct in response to discovery requests is 'laggard and slothful,' dismissal
of a suit is not necessarily warranted."'' 5  Thus, dismissal is justified "only
in extreme situations for flagrant or aggravated cases of disobedience.
'1 59
151. MacDonald v. Mclver, 514 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
152. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (Supp. 1994). The section provides that:
Each insurer or self-insurer shall investigate the claim in good faith, and both
the claimant and prospective defendant shall cooperate with the insurer in good
faith. If the insurer requires, a claimant shall appear before a pretrial screening
panel or before a medical review committee and shall submit to a physical
examination, if required. Unreasonable failure of any party to comply with this
section justifies dismissal of claims or defenses.
Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id. § 766.106(6).
154. Id. (emphasis added). These provisions of the Act were tested and upheld in the
following cases: Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,
624 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993); Pinellas Emergency Mental Health Servs. Inc. v. Richardson, 532
So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); and Morris v. Ergos, 532 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1988).
155. 532 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
156. Id. at 1361.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Summit Chase Condominium Ass'n v. Protean Investors, Inc., 421 So.
2d 562, 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
159. Id. (quoting Summit Chase Condominium Ass'n, 421 So. 2d at 564).
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However, in this case, it did not appear that the plaintiffs in Morris were
prejudiced by the delay or that time was of the essence because they did not
file suit for nearly five months after the expiration of the ninety-day
period.' 6° Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the action for
further proceedings.'
61
In Pinellas Emergency Mental Health Services, Inc. v. Richardson,'
62
the court vacated the trial court's order dismissing the defendant's answer
and defenses in a medical malpractice action.163 A notice of intent to
initiate litigation was sent to the defendant, Pinellas Emergency Mental
Health Service ("PEMHS"), with an accompanying discovery request,
including a series of interrogatories and a request for production. The notice
informed PEMHS that either the center or its medical malpractice insurance
company was required by law to conduct a good faith investigation of the
claim and serve a response to the claimant's attorney within ninety days.
However, no response was furnished. The claimant's attorney sent a second
discovery request which was also ignored by PEMHS. Suit was subsequent-
ly filed against PEMHS and several other defendants. The trial court
entered a default judgment against PEMHS for failing to respond to the
complaint."6 The default was ultimately set aside and the court allowed
PEMHS to file an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint.
165
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the PEMHS's answer and
defenses on the basis of the health service's failure to respond to the
discovery requests and to follow the procedures contained in the Act. The
trial court entered an order dismissing PEMHS's answer and defenses on the
basis that, as a matter of law, the court did not have any discretion to
disregard the defendant's failure to comply with the statute.1 s
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
order.' 67 The court stated that the trial court should have exercised its
discretion to determine whether PEMHS's failure to make discoverable
information available was unreasonable under the statute. 68 The court
explained that although the statutory language in section 768.57(3)(a)
160. Morris, 532 So. 2d at 1361.
161. Id.
162. 532 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
163. Id. at 61.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 62.
167. Richardson, 532 So. 2d at 63.
168. Id.
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implies mandatory compliance, the legislature, by including the word
"unreasonable," intended that compliance be exercised in a reasonable
manner.'69 Therefore, "subsection (3)(a) should not be interpreted to mean
that in every instance where a party does not cooperate with the insurer or
self-insured in good faith, the party's claim or defenses must be dismissed
as a matter of law.""17  Instead, dismissal is available subject to the
exercise of discretion by the trial court, after it considers whether the
prospective defendant acted unreasonably in failing to perform the statutory
duty to cooperate with the presuit investigation. 7'
H. Reasonable Investigation
Duffy v. Brooker72 provides an excellent discussion of the require-
ments of the statute regarding reasonable investigation. To comply with the
intent of the medical malpractice statutes, the notice of intent and the
corroborating medical expert opinion, taken together, must provide sufficient
information indicating the manner in which the defendant doctor allegedly
deviated from the standard of care. 7 3 Sufficient information is necessary
for the defendants to evaluate the merits of the claim. Additionally, the
response and the corroborating medical expert opinion must also provide
sufficient information to the claimant as to why the defendant doctor did not
purportedly commit malpractice. 74
In Duffy, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
order imposing sanctions against the defendants for failing to comply with
the reasonable investigations provisions of the presuit screening process
contained in section 766.106.175 The plaintiff served a notice of intent
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 624 So. 2d 267 (Fla.
1993).
173. Id. at 545.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 546. Section 766.106(1)-(3) provides in relevant part:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Claim for medical malpractice" means a claim arising out of the
rendering of, or the failure to render medical care or services.
(b) "Self-insurer" means any self-insurer authorized under s. 627.357 or
any uninsured prospective defendant.
(c) "Insurer" includes the Joint Underwriting Association.
(2) After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s. 766.203 and
prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, a claimant shall notify each
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prospective defendant and, if any prospective defendant is a health care provider
licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, chapter 461, or chapter
466, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation by certified mail,
return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice.
Notice to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation must include
the full name and address of the claimant; the full names and any known
addresses of any health care providers licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459,
chapter 460, chapter 461, or chapter 466 who are prospective defendants
identified at the time; the date and a summary of the occurrence giving rise to
the claim; and a description of the injury to the claimant. The requirement for
notice to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation does not
impair the claimant's legal rights or ability to seek relief for his claim, and the
notice provided to the department is not discoverable or admissible in any civil
or administrative action. The Department of Business and Professional
Regulation shall review each incident and determine whether it involved conduct
by a licensee which is potentially subject to disciplinary action, in which case
the provisions of s. 455.225 apply.
(3)(a) No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed
to any prospective defendant. During the 90-day period, the prospective
defendant's insurer or self-insurer shall conduct a review to determine the
liability of the defendant. Each insurer or self-insurer shall have a procedure for
the prompt investigation, review, and evaluation of claims during the 90-day
period. This procedure shall include one or more of the following:
1. Internal review by a duly qualified claims adjuster;
2. Creation of a panel comprised of an attorney knowledgeable in the
prosecution or defense of medical malpractice actions, a health care provider
trained in the same or similar medical specialty as the prospective defendant,
and a duly qualified claims adjuster;
3. A contractual agreement with the state or local professional society
of health care providers, which maintains a medical review committee;
4. Any other similar procedure which fairly and promptly evaluates the
pending claim.
Each insurer or self-insurer shall investigate the claim in good faith, and both
the claimant and prospective defendant shall cooperate with the insurer in good
faith. If the insurer requires, a claimant shall appear before a pretrial screening
panel or before a medical review committee and shall submit to a physical
examination, if required. Unreasonable failure of any party to comply with this
section justifies dismissal of claims or defenses. There shall be no civil liability
for participation in a pretrial screening procedure if done without intentional
fraud.
(b) At or before the end of the 90 days, the insurer or self-insurer shall
provide the claimant with a response:
1. Rejecting the claim;
2. Making a settlement offer; or
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letter on the defendant alleging that the defendant's negligence caused her
husband's death. The notice letter attached a four-page affidavit of a board
certified gastroenterologist and internist. The affidavit stated that there were
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant committed malpractice in
his care and treatment of the decedent which resulted in his demise. The
affidavit described the documents that were reviewed during the investiga-
tion and the grounds supporting the opinion.'7 6 In response to the notice
of intent to initiate litigation, Mr. Daniel Stephens, a claims adjuster for the
defendant's insurance carrier, sent a letter stating that "[a]fter a thorough
review of this matter, we find no basis to support a claim of negligent injury
against Dr. Patrick Duffy. Thereby your client's claim is hereby denied.
Enclosed is a copy of the required corroborating affidavit to support our
position."77
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant doctor
and filed a Motion Requesting Determination as to Whether [the] Defen-
dant's Denial of Claims Rests on a Reasonable Basis according to section
766.206(1) of the Florida Statutes. 17  Prior to the hearing, the defense
attorney filed a response to the motion and attached to it a sworn statement
3. Making an offer of admission of liability and for arbitration on the
issue of damages. This offer may be made contingent upon a limit of general
damages.
(c) The response shall be delivered to the claimant if not represented-by
counsel or to the claimant's attorney, by certified mail, return receipt requested.
Failure of the prospective defendant or insurer or self-insurer to reply to the
notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed a final rejection of the claim
for purposes of this section.
(d) Within 30 days of receipt of a response by a prospective defendant,
insurer, or self-insurer to a claimant represented by an attorney, the attorney
shall advise the claimant in writing of the response, including:
1. The exact nature of the response under paragraph (b).
2. The exact terms of any settlement offer, or admission of liability and
offer of arbitration on damages.
3. The legal and financial consequences of acceptance or rejection of
any settlement offer, or admission of liability, including the provisions of this
section.
4. An evaluation of the time and likelihood of ultimate success at trial
on the merits of the claimant's action.
5. An estimation of the costs and attorney's fees of proceeding through
trial....
FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)-(3) (Supp. 1994).
176. Duffy, 614 So. 2d at 540.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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by an expert. The sworn statement was identical to the statement in the
initial response letter, but added the following paragraph that "I have
previously rendered said medical opinion on December 11, 1990, and that
said expert opinion was inadvertently not sworn and attested to. My
opinions have not deviated or changed any from the opinion rendered on
December 11, 1990.,,179
The issues presented at the hearing included whether the expert's
statement complied with section 766.203(3) and whether a reasonable
investigation was performed by the insurance company and the expert.18°
The plaintiff had the burden of establishing a prima facie case that she had
complied with the statute, thus shifting the burden to the defendant."' At
the hearing, the claims adjustor testified that while she did not have any
"on-hand" involvement with the review of the claim, she believed that there
was a good faith review and determination by the company that the
defendant was not negligent.
82
After listening to the arguments, the trial judge rejected the defense's
argument and struck the insurance company's response.1 83 The court held
the insurance company "personally responsible to the plaintiff' for
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred during the investigation of the
claim. 84 The trial court concluded that the insurance company's response
179. Id.
180. Id. at 540-41.
181. Duffy, 614 So. 2d at 541.
182. Id. The claims adjuster who testified at trial was the successor adjuster. She was
not the same person who evaluated the claim upon receipt of plaintiff's notice of intent to
initiate litigation. Id.
183. Id. at 542.
184. Id. The trial judge stated:
There is no factual information of any nature whatsoever in either the letter of
December 13, 1990, from Stephens to plaintiff's attorney or the "CORROBO-
RATION OF MEDICAL EXPERT OPINION" signed by Dr. Edgerton by which
one might "verify" that a "reasonable investigation" had preceded denial by
Physicians of the claim. In particular, the Court notes that, in its opinion, Dr.
Edgerton's statement consists of nothing more than a series of legal conclusions.
It identifies neither the medical records which Dr. Edgerton reviewed nor the
factual bases upon which his ultimate legal conclusion rests. It does not set
forth Dr. Edgerton's professional qualifications, so that one might attempt to
"verify" whether Dr. Edgerton qualifies as a "medical expert," as that term is
defined in § 766.202(5). In fact, it does not even indicate where Dr. Edgerton
practices. Moreover, because of these deficiencies, it is impossible to determine
intelligently whether or not Dr. Edgerton made a "reasonable investigation" (or,
for that matter, whether he made any investigation).
Duffy, 614 So. 2d at 542 (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.205(5)(a) (1989)).
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rejecting the claim "was not in compliance with the 'reasonable investiga-
tion' requirements of the statute and did not rest 'on a reasonable ba-
sis."" 8 To hold otherwise "would fly in the face of the clearly expressed
legislative intent."
186
In affirming the trial court's order, the appellate court reiterated the
purpose of the medical malpractice suit which is to require defendant's to
conduct reasonable investigations in good faith.187 Because the insurance
company failed to comply with the statutory requirements of conducting a
good faith investigation of the allegations set forth by the claimant, the court
properly imposed sanctions against the insurance company. 188 In contrast,
Dressier v. Boca Raton Community Hospital189 illustrates the importance
of complying with the intent of the medical malpractice statutes from the
plaintiffs' perspective. The appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint where the plaintiff failed to provide any information
regarding the manner in which the defendants had allegedly deviated from
the standard of care 1 ° As a result, the stated purpose of the Act was
thwarted and, thus, the court's dismissal of the complaint was proper.
However, nothing in the Act requires the corroborating expert opinion
to identify every possible instance of medical negligence. For example, in
Davis v. Orlando Regional Medical Center,"9 the corroborating affidavit
alleged several acts of negligence against the defendant hospital in causing
injury to the patient.193 Although the affidavit did not mention any post-
surgical negligence, it was revealed during discovery that post-surgical
negligence was in fact an issue. Thus, the hospital sought to exclude that
evidence on the basis that the affidavit failed to mention it.'94 The court
rejected the hospital's position holding that the purpose of the corroborating
opinion is not to require a protracted detail of the plaintiffs theory of the
case.'95 The corroborating opinion simply provides justification for the
plaintiff's claim and demonstrates that it is not frivolous.
185. Id. at 543.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 546.
189. 566 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 581 So. 2d 164 (Fla.
1991).
190. Id. at 574.
191. Id.
192. 654 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
193. Id. at 665.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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In Damus v. Parvez,196 the court was faced with the issue of whether
a physician is obligated to produce a verified medical report where the
physician did not issue a response rejecting the medical malpractice claim.
The defendant doctor did not send the plaintiff a response denying liability.
Instead, the defendant denied liability in his answer to the complaint. The
plaintiff argued that the medical report should be produced in order to
ensure that the denial was made "in good faith." The court held that in
order to comply with the good faith requirement of section 766.206(3), the
report need not be produced prior to an evidentiary hearing where there was
no response rejecting the claim. 197 However, this subjects the physician
to the risk of being sanctioned by the trial court's striking the physician's
pleadings and assessing attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section
766.206(3) if the court finds that good faith was lacking.'98
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing is a sampling of the cases decided since the enactment
of the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985. Practitio-
ners in this field of law would be well-advised to strictly follow the precise
requirements of the Act. With careful attention to details and the specific
procedures required by the Act, potential difficulties and loss of rights may
be avoided in handling medical malpractice claims or defenses. Of course,
whether the Act will actually accomplish the goals of the Florida Legislature
still remains to be seen.
196. 556 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
197. Id. at 1137-38.
198. Id. at 1138.
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among Florida family law attorneys. Questionnaires were sent to 500
members of the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar. The results indicate
that a majority of attorneys who were originally forced into using mediation
perceive a great number of benefits in the process.
I. THE MEDIATION EXPERIENCE OF FAMILY LAW ATTORNEYS-
MEDIATION IN GENERAL
Although mediation has been in use throughout the world for centuries,
it did not begin to gain support as a viable alternative to our adversarial
judicial system until the last fifteen or twenty years. Mediation is a type of
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"), which has long been touted as the
answer to many problems in our judicial system. This claim has been
supported by research reflecting positive effects of ADR upon the judicial
system and upon the parties who have used mediation. The original claims
and subsequent supporting literature have combined to produce steady
growth in all types of ADR over the last fifteen years.'
In the family law arena, mediation appeared to be a perfectly logical
solution to the inappropriateness of asking the legal system to become
involved in and attempt to solve the private problems of families. More so
than any other area, family law disputes seemed most in need of the
mediation process. Family law disputes involve the most private personal
of issues. The courts are ill-equipped to truly resolve such problems, and
in the past there were very few viable options until the advent of mediation.
Mediation allows the parties to take control of their own issues and process,
allows for flexibility which the courts do not have, provides an avenue for
addressing issues not specifically covered in the statutes, and removes the
court from the emotional issues that attend such disputes.
1. See Craig McEwen, State Justice Institute Conference Examines Research on
Court-ConnectedADR, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1994, at 7,7; NATIONAL INST. FOR DisP.
RESOL., NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS ON: PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1992 (finding that 82% of those surveyed would engage in arbitration or mediation, as
opposed to litigation); see also Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Making the Right
Choice, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 66, 66 (stating that ADR settles disputes at a more
expedient rate and at a lower cost, which in turn, "satisf[ies] clients' dispute resolution goals
better than litigation"). But see Robert D. Raven, The Future of Court-AnnexedADR, DisP.
RESOL. MAG., Spring 1994, at 2, 2 (arguing that while ADR has expanded within the court
system, the progress has been slow because the "court-annexed arbitration programs often
take months to settle").
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I1. MEDIATION IN FLORIDA
In Florida, there are three types of mediation recognized by statute or
procedural rule: county, circuit, and family. The Supreme Court of Florida
provides a method by which a person can become "certified" in each area
of mediation based on education, training, and completion of a mentorship.2
Florida allows certification of attorney-mediators and mental-health-
mediators, as well as being one of the few states in the union which certifies
accountant-mediators. 3
Although all three types are used extensively throughout the state, there
are a greater number of persons certified by the Supreme Court of Florida
as Circuit Court Mediators (1214) and County Court Mediators (1110) than
as Family Court Mediators (968).4 An interesting note, however, is that of
the 5166 persons who have completed mediation training, approximately
50% are not certified by the Supreme Court of Florida.5
Notwithstanding the fact that the use of all three types of mediation has
grown in the recent past, it appears that attorneys have more readily
embraced the use of circuit and county court mediation, while the use of
family court mediation seems to have stalled. More complaints seem to be
voiced by attorneys concerning Family Court Mediation than the other types
of mediation. There are concerns that mediation cannot be effective if it is
mandatory because of the nature of the relationship issues involved.
Additionally, there are concerns that mediation is not appropriate for
domestic violence cases, that the mediation process creates disadvantages
based on gender, and that non-lawyer mediators are trained insufficiently in
legal issues.6 These complaints are heard from numerous individuals
involved in the family law arena: judges, mental health professionals,
teachers, guardians ad litem, and most importantly, attorneys.
The growth of mediation in the family law area could be facilitated by
cultivating more support for its use among family law practitioners. By
defining the problems perceived by family law attorneys, we may be able
to correct any misperceptions of the mediation process. This article explores
some of the perceptions family law attorneys have concerning their
experience with, and use of, mediation.
2. FLA. R. CERTIFIED & COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.010.
3. Id. 10.010(b).
4. Sharon Press, Exploring Alternatives, FLA. DISp. REsOL. CTR. NEwSL., Spring
1994, at 1, 7.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Ill. THE SURVEY
In examining the use of family law mediation, a written survey was
sent to 500 members of the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar.7 A
random sample of membership across the state was performed by the Family
Law Section and surveys were sent to these members in the Spring of
1994.8 A total of 150 attorneys responded to the survey.
A. Demographics
Geographically, most of the respondents (43.6%) practiced primarily in
South Florida, in the l1th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 20th Judicial Circuits.9
The next largest group of respondents (32.3%) practiced primarily in Central
Florida, in the 6th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 18th, and 19th Judicial Circuits.'0
The smallest group of respondents (22.2%) practiced in the Florida
Panhandle, in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 14th Judicial
Circuits."1
Almost one-half of the respondents (46.4%) have practiced family law
for ten years or less.' 2  A little less than one-third of the respondents
(29.6%) began practicing law between 1974 and 1983.13 While 16% of the
respondents began practicing family law between 1964 and 1973, only 6.7%
of the respondents began before 1964.14
Most of the respondents devote a substantial percentage of their
practices to family law matters. Well over half of the respondents (60.4%)
indicated that over 50% of their practice is devoted to marital and family
law cases, and another 26.8% indicated that they spend between 50% and
75% of their practice in family law matters." One-third of the respondents
(33.6%) devote over 75% of their practice to family law cases.1 6
7. The Florida Bar has approximately 48,000 members and the Family Law Section
has 3047 members. Susan W. Harrell, Survey Responses, (Sept. 21, 1994) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Survey]; see infra part IV.
8. The survey instrument that was used solicited a wide range of information. A
portion of the results of this survey was used to support another article. See Susan W.
Harrell, Why Attorneys Attend Mediation Sessions, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1995, at 369.
9. Survey, supra note 7, at 1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Survey, supra note 7, at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Only 6% of the respondents indicated that they were Florida Bar Board
Certified in Family Law,17 and less than one-fourth of the respondents
(18.1%) had taken a Supreme Court of Florida-Certified forty-hour Family
Law Mediation Training course. Of the respondents who did complete
a certified family law mediation training course, the majority did so between
1990 and 1994 (85.1%), and the remainder (14.9%) between 1983 and
1988.19
B. The Experience of Florida Family Law Attorneys-
The First Attempt
While some Florida family law practitioners first had clients attempt
mediation in the late 1980s, it was not until the early 1990s that a large
number of attorneys began to see their cases go through the mediation
process. Most of the respondents (46.3%) had their first experience with
family law mediation between 1990 and 1992.20 Not quite one-third of the
respondents (28.2%) had their first experience with family law mediation
between 1986 and 1989.21 Only 7.5% of the attorneys who responded first
attempted family law mediation between 1982 and 1985, while 2.1% first
attempted family law mediation between 1976 and 1979.22 A surprising
10% of the respondents did not have a case employ family law mediation
until 1993 or 1994.23
When attorneys first took their cases to mediation, it was, for the most
part, involuntary. Well over half of the respondents (55.7%) indicated that
their first experience with mediation was initiated by a court order.24
However, just over 30% indicated that their first attempt in mediation was
initiated by their own suggestion.25 This can be interpreted to show that
these attorneys had the inclination to attempt mediation. However, the
opposing attorney was credited with initiating the use of family law
mediation by only 6% of the respondents.26
17. Id
18. Id
19. Survey, supra note 7, at 1-2.
20. Id at 2.
21. IM
22. Id
23. Id.
24. Survey, supra note 7, at 2.
25. Id
26. Id.
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The respondents were also asked to rate their first experience with
family law mediation. 7 Almost two-thirds (63.1%) felt the experience was
"excellent" (23.5%) or "good" (39.6%), while 30.9% classified their first
attempt at family law mediation as either "fair" (24.2%) or "poor"
(6.7%).8 Such ratings of their first experience could be attributed to many
different factors, which fell beyond the scope of the survey instrument.
However, there may be some relationship between the ratings and the
discipline of the professional who acted as the mediator.
About two-thirds (62.4%) of the respondents indicated that their first
case involving family law mediation was mediated by an attorney-mediator
and 10.7% utilized a judge-mediator.29 Mental-health-mediators were the
second largest type of mediator used, with 10.7% using a masters degree
mental health professional and 2.7% using a doctorate degree mental-health-
professional. A certified public accountant ("CPA") was used as a mediator
in only 2% of the first cases. In addition, there were a few respondents
who could not remember, or did not know the background of, their first
family law mediator.
C. Recent Experience of Florida Family Law Attorneys
The respondents were asked a series of questions relating to family law
cases, which they had worked on over the twelve months immediately
preceding receipt of the survey." These questions explored the number of
such cases in which mediation was attempted and completed, and who made
the initial suggestion that mediation be considered.32
D. Mediation Was Attempted
Most of the respondents used mediation on a frequent basis. Over the
twelve-month period, 44.9% of the respondents attempted mediation in over
50% of their family law cases, while 53.7% of the respondents attempted
mediation in less than 50% of their family law cases during that same
period.33
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Survey, supra note 7, at 2.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id.
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E. Mediation Was Successfully Completed
Successful completion was defined to include total and partial success,
that is, an agreement was reached on one or more issues to the satisfaction
of the client. Based on this definition, 44.3% of the respondents indicated
that a successful mediation was experienced in over 50% of their cases
during this twelve-month period.34  However, 53% of the respondents
indicated that a successful mediation was experienced in less than 50% of
their cases during this period of time.35
F. The Respondent-Attorney Made the Initial Suggestion to Use
Mediation
When the respondents were asked what percentage of cases they had
made the initial suggestion that mediation be considered, 39.5% said they
were responsible in over 50% of their cases.3 6 Just over one-half (55.1%)
said they were responsible for making the initial suggestion to consider
mediation in less than 50% of their cases during the same period of time.
One contributing factor to this response could be the number of courts
which automatically issue mandatory mediation orders.
G. The Opposing Attorney Made the Initial Suggestion to Use
Mediation
Interestingly, while a greater number of the respondents credit
themselves with initiating mediation, most of 'them did not -provide any
credit to their opposing counsel for making the initial suggestion. Over 86%
of the respondents estimated that their opposing attorney made the initial
suggestion that mediation be considered in less than 50% of their family law
cases during the twelve-month period.37 Only 6% indicated that the
opposing attorney had made the initial suggestion in 50% to 75% of their
cases during this same period of time.38
34. Survey, supra note 7, at 3.
35. I
36. Id
37. Id.
38. Id
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H. The Client Made the Initial Suggestion to Use Mediation
It is clear that mediation is infrequently proffered by clients. Over 92%
of the respondents indicated that their clients suggested mediation as a
consideration in less than 50% of their cases during the twelve-month period
in question." Additionally, most of the respondents only credited the
client for suggesting this first step in less than 5% of their cases during that
same period of time.4°
I. The Judge Made the Initial Suggestion to Use Mediation
In their recent experience, 61.11% of the respondents indicated that the
judge did not initiate mediation in most of their cases. 41 Only one-third
(32.9%) of the respondents experienced judges making this initial suggestion
in over 50% of their cases during the period in question.42 These results
seem to suggest that attorneys are discussing and initiating mediation before
court involvement, even though most of the respondents' first mediation
experience was court ordered.
J. Why Do Attorneys Avoid Mediation?
When asked to identify a reason or reasons that the respondents have
used to justify not attempting mediation in their family law cases over the
twelve-month period, the responses were very diverse. The reason most
often used by the respondents (48.3%) was that there was "[n]o possibility
of settlement outside a courtroom. 43
The remaining responses were spread among a number of possible
choices. Just over 14% of the respondents felt that an allegation of spouse
abuse was sufficient justification for not attempting mediation. 4 The next
most frequent response was that there is no reason not to use mediation and
that it should always be attempted.45 Approximately the same number of
respondents were concerned about the financial cost of mediation for some
of their clients.46
39. Survey, supra note 7, at 3.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Survey, supra note 7, at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Legal issues were perceived to be too complex for a non-attorney
mediator in some cases and justified foregoing any attempt at mediation by
10.7% of the survey respondents.47 However, only 2% of the respondents
avoided mediation because they felt that there were not enough attorney-
mediators available.48 Of the respondents, 3.4% justified not attempting
mediation because the financial issues in some of their cases were too
complex for a non-CPA-mediator. 49  Less than 1% did not attempt
mediation because there were not enough CPA-mediators. 0 These
responses could be perceived as pure territorialism by attorneys. While
attorneys continue to complain that non-lawyer mediators are inadequately
trained in family law, they do not seem willing to recognize or admit that
attorney-mediators are insufficiently trained in child development, family
dynamics, stages of the divorce process, and how to deal with two parties
simultaneously.
Fewer than 1% of the respondents (0.7%) did not engage in mediation
in some of their cases because they represented the wife and apparently felt
the client's gender made an attempt at mediation inappropriate.51 This
would counter the argument that mediation is biased against women. 2
K. How Do Attorneys Use Mediation?
To get some idea as to the investment each of the respondents made
into pursuing the process of mediation by educating their clients, the survey
asked each respondent to estimate the amount of time spent preparing each
client for his or her first family law mediation session. Over half of the
respondents (54.4%) spent between thirty minutes and one hour with each
client.53 A fairly equal number of respondents spent over one hour with
each client (19.5%), and less than thirty minutes with each client
(20.1%).' a There were 2.7% of the respondents who spent no time with
their clients preparing them for their first mediation session. 5 These
47. ML
48. Id
49. Survey, supra note 7, at 3.
50. Id
51. Id.
52. See Junda Woo, Mediation Seen As Being Biased Against Women, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 1992, at Bl, B7 (claiming insignificant gender bias against women engaged in the
mediation process).
53. Survey, supra note 7, at 3.
54. Id
55. Id
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results reflect that most of the attorneys understand the importance of
preparing clients for mediation, and the possible relationship between such
preparation and a successful outcome in the mediation process.
L. Why Do Attorneys Use Family Law Mediation?
The survey asked respondents to list the five most important benefits
of using family law mediation. The most common response was "[m]edi-
ation increases settlement possibilities" (94%).56 This result clearly
indicates the major selling point of mediation among family law attorneys.
The next most frequent response, "[s]aves the client money" (79.2%),
is a positive indication that a majority of attorneys are conscious of the
economic burden which litigation places on their clients." However, the
respondents were less concerned (63.8%) with the time that can be saved by
the clients, the attorneys, and the court in applying mediation. 8
Another cited benefit (63.1%) is that mediation serves the best interests
of the children by not litigating.59 Just under two-thirds of the respondents
(62.4%) preferred family law mediation because it "tempers . . . [the]
attitude[s] of unreasonable clients."'
Just over one-half of the respondents (55%) perceived mediation as
benefiting the client by affording them with a certain "measure of con-
trol.' Beyond that, fewer respondents believed mediation provided the
client with much satisfaction. Only 35.6% felt that the use of family law
mediation left clients satisfied with the judicial process. 62 A mere 6.7%
believed that the use of family law mediation made clients more satisfied
with their attorney.63
A few attorneys have a distorted view of the potential benefits of
family law mediation. Family law mediation is seen by some attorneys as
a "[g]ood discovery tool" (8.1%), and as a "[u]seful tactic to gain time [by]
delay[ing] final hearing[s]" (0.7%).6
To determine whether most attorneys were motivated by altruism when
they pursued mediation, the respondents were asked to estimate the
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Survey, supra note 7, at 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Survey, supra note 7, at 4.
64. Id.
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percentage of their family law cases over the twelve-month period in which
they pursued mediation with the sole or primary objective being to obtain
more information from the opponent. In other words, whether they used
mediation as a discovery tool. It is comforting to note that the largest
number of respondents (80.5%) used mediation with this sole or primary
objective in less than 5% of their cases during the twelve-month period.65
However, 10.7% used mediation to accomplish this objective in 5% to 25%
of their cases, and 2% of the respondents did so in 25% to 50% of their
cases. 66 Another 0.7% pursued mediation as a discovery tool in 50% to
75% of their cases over the twelve-month period.67
M. Respondent's Comments
A large number of attorneys who responded to the survey also spent
time providing detailed comments to many of the questions. Overall, the
remarks expressed a consensus on four major issues: the benefits of family
law mediation far outweigh the disadvantages; although there are some
attorneys who abuse the family law mediation process, it is infrequent and
may be partially prevented through education of the family law mediation
process; attorneys would be far more likely to encourage use of the family
law mediation process if there were more well-trained and experienced
family law mediators available; and, attorneys and judges alike need to be
educated that mediation is not a cure-all. Although it is appropriate and
effective in a vast majority of cases, there are certain situations that make
family law mediation inappropriate.
N. Conclusions
The results of this survey confirm that the majogity of family law
attorneys in Florida find mediation beneficial and use it appropriately in
serving the client's interests. It is shocking to see that attorneys, albeit a
small percentage, would abuse this process by using it as a discovery tool.
The true goal of the process is to assist parties in resolving their family
disputes with the least amount of damage to their relationship. Notwith-
standing that this type of abuse is apparently accomplished in the name of
zealous advocacy, it is apparent that a small percentage of attorneys who
may sabotage the process do not understand that mediation in family law
65. Id.
66. Ma
67. Ma2
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cases cannot be viewed in the same fashion as other types of mediation.
The "misuse ... [of the mediation] process ... turn[s] it into an adversarial
proceeding."68  Therefore, attorneys must allow mediation to serve its
purpose.
Despite research which indicates that clients are more satisfied when
mediation is used,69 certain attorneys still do not seem to believe their
clients will be as satisfied with their services when mediation is employed.
Some attorneys are not willing to surrender control of their cases to the
mediation process. The bottom line, they maintain, is that clients are only
interested in having their problems solved. Nancy S. Palmer, the Immediate
Past-Chair of the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar, explained the
intention of the mediation process to litigators who see mediation as taking
fees from their pockets and stated, "[a]s the dinosaur was once roaring and
powerful, so was the family litigator, but as the dinosaur, the roaring and
powerful litigator could soon be extinct, if we fail to be sensitive to the
public's changing demands. 7°
Through the pursuit of mediation, there is an extreme possibility of
reaching at least a partial success for the client. Litigation only creates more
problems for the client.71  As more attorneys focus on the purpose of
family law mediation and the numerous benefits to be gained by all those
concerned, the true interests of clients will be better served.
68. Jose C. Feliciano, Lawyers, Advocates and Mediation: Three Perspectives, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Spring 1994, at 4, 6.
69. Nina R. Meierding, Does Mediation Work? A Survey of Long-Term Satisfaction
and Durability Rates for Privately Mediated Agreements, MEDIATION Q., Winter 1993, at
157.
70. Nancy S. Palmer, Family Law - Letter to the Editor, FLA. B. NEWS, June 1,
1994, at 2, 3.
71. See Robert L. Haig & Robert S. Getman, Does "Hardball" Litigation Produce
the Best Result for Your Client?, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1993, at 30, 33-34 (discussing the court's
reluctance in implementing "hardball litigation"); see also James E. Brill, Long After the
Price is Forgotten, FLA. B. NEws, Apr. 1, 1993, at 11, 11 (stating that quality lawyer-like
skills include "prompt and appropriate action on the clients' behalf'); Philip H. Magner Jr.,
One Lawyer's Guide to the Meaning of the Profession, FLA. B. NEWS, Nov. 1, 1992, at 9,
9 (emphasizing that "'[h]ardball' should be played on the diamond, and not in the practice
of law"); Benjamin Sells, Give Peace, Alternative Dispute Resolution a Chance, FLA. B.
NEWS, June 15, 1994, at 23, 23 (advocating mediation and settlement in the quest for peace
between adversarial parties).
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IV. APPENDIX A-SuRvEY RESPONSES
1. The circuit in which you primarily practice:
0 = 1.3%
1 = 3.4%
2 =3.4%
3 =0%
4 =7.4%
5 =2% 10= 2%
6 = 8.1% 11 = 18.1%
7=4% 12= 3.4%
8 =2% 13= 6%
9 =5.4% 14= 0%
15 = 5.4%
16 = 1.3%
17 = 16.1%
18= 4%
19 = 3.4%
20 = 2.7%
Other = 0.6%
2. Are you Board Certified in Family Law ?
No = 94% Yes = 6%
3. The year in which you began practicing marital and family law:
1948 - 1969 = 11.4%
1970 - 1979 = 26.7%
1980 - 1989 = 43.8%
1990 - 1993 = 16.8%
Other = 1.3%
4. The approximate percentage of your practice over the last 12 months
which was devoted to marital and family law cases:
0%-25% =14.1%
25% - 50% = 24.8%
50% - 75% = 26.8%
75% - 100% = 33.6%
Other = 0.7%
5.A. Have you taken a Florida Supreme Court Certified 40-hour family law
mediation training course?
No = 81.2% Yes = 18.1% Other = 0.7%
5.B. If yes, what year?
1995]
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1983 - 1988 = 2.7% 1990 - 1994 = 15.4% Other = 81.9%
6. The approximate year in which you first had one of your family law
clients attempt mediation:
1976 - 1979 = 2.1%
1982 - 1985 = 7.5%
1986 - 1989 = 28.2%
1993 - 1994 = 10%
Other = 52.2%
7. Your first experience with family law mediation (your first family law
case in which mediation was attempted) was initiated by:
The opposing attorney = 6%
My suggestion = 30.2%
A court order = 55.7%
Other = 8.1%
8. Your first experience with family law mediation (your first family law
case in which mediation was attempted) was:
Excellent = 23.5%
Good = 39.6%
Fair 24.2%
Poor = 6.7%
Other = 6%
9. Your first experience with family law mediation (your first family law
case in which mediation was attempted) was handled by:
CPA mediator = 2%
Ph.D. level mental health mediator = 2.7%
Master's level mental health mediator = 10.7%
A former/retired judge = 10.7%
Attorney mediator = 62.4%
Other = 11.5%
For Questions 10-15, please provide the approximate percentage of your
marital and family law cases over the last 12 months...
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10. in which mediation was attempted:
11. in which mediation was successfully completed:
12. in which you made the initial suggestion to your client that he/she
consider mediation:
13. in which your client made the initial suggestion that mediation be
considered:
14. in which the opposing attorney made the initial suggestion that
mediation be considered:
15. in which the judge made the initial suggestion that mediation be
considered:
Q10 Qll Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15
0%-5% 14.1% 17.4% 20.8% 78.5% 42.3% 26.2%
5%-25% 24.8% 14.1% 14.8% 12.1% 32.9% 19.5%
25%-50% 14.8% 21.5% 19.5% 2% 11.4% 15.4%
50%-75% 22.1% 24.2% 17.4% 0% 6% 11.4%
75%-100% 22.8% 20.1% 22.1% 0% 0% 21.5%
Other 1.4% 2.7% 5.4% 7.4% 7.4% 6%
16. Which of the following reasons have you used during the last 12
months to justify NOT attempting family law mediation:
I represent the wife = 0.7%
Not enough CPA-mediators available = 0.7%
Not enough mental-health-mediators available = 0.7%
Not enough attorney-mediators available = 2%
Financial matters too complex for non-CPA mediator = 3.4%
Legal issues too complex for non-attorney mediator = 10.7%
Spousal abuse is being alleged = 14.8%
No possibility of settlement outside a courtroom = 48.3%
Other = 18.7%
17. Approximately how much time do you spend preparing each client for
his/her first family law mediation session?
None = 2.7%
Less than 30 minutes = 20.1%
30 minutes to 1 hour = 54.4%
More than one hour = 19.5%
Other = 3.3%
19951
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18. The approximate percentage of your marital and family law cases over
the last 12 months in which you pursued mediation with the sole or primary
objective being to obtain more information (i.e., as a discovery tool):
Less than 5% = 80.5%
5% - 25% = 10.7%
25%-50% = 2%
50%- 75% = 0.7%
75%- 100% = 0%
Other = 6.1%
19. Of the following possible benefits of family law mediation, please
check the five which you feel are most important:
1. "Mediation increases settlement possibilities" = 94%
2. "Saves the client money" = 79.2%
3. "Saves time for the clients, attorneys, and court" = 63.8%
4. "In best interest of minor children not to litigate" = 63.1%
5. "Tempers attitude of unreasonable clients" = 62.4%
6. "Gives the client some measure of control" = 55%
7. "Clients are more satisfied with judicial process" = 35.6%
8. "Good discovery tool" = 8.1%
9. "Clients are more satisfied with their attorney" = 6.7%
10. "Other" = 4%
11. "Useful tactic to gain time (delay final hearing)" = 0.7%
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I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called Fabre/Messmer' line of cases constitutes perhaps the
most poorly reasoned and politically biased decisions in Florida jurispru-
dence. In these cases, Florida courts seem to abandon fundamental
principles of fairness which provide that only those who are given fair
notice and opportunity to respond can be legally blamed for a wrongful act.
The following article outlines both the Fabre and Messmer decisions, and
analyzes those decisions from the defense and plaintiff perspectives. Next,
the article surveys subsequent decisions. It notes the impact of these cases
on our judicial system and the probable resulting negative public perception
of the judicial system's ability to be fair and just.
II. PRECEDENT FLORIDA CASES
A. Messmer Came First
The first in this historic line of cases was decided by the Fifth District
Court of Appeal in Messmer v. Teacher's Insurance Co.2 That case arose
out of a car crash in which the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by
her husband. The defendant truck driver was uninsured, but the plaintiff had
uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $300,000. The uninsured
motorist claim was submitted to arbitration as required by the terms of the
Teacher's Insurance Company ("Teacher's") policy.3
The arbitrators found that the defendant was 20% responsible for
causing the accident. They awarded the plaintiff total economic damages
in the amount of $52,455, and total noneconomic damages in the amount of
$200,000. 4 Plaintiffs husband was not a party to the lawsuit, either as a
defendant or as a third party defendant, under Florida's then existing law of
contribution.5 The policy, which also insured the husband, contained an
exclusion for liability claims by members of the insured's household, so
there was no liability insurance coverage for plaintiff's injuries caused by
her husband.6 Notwithstanding her husband's absence of liability coverage,
1. Fabre v. Marin, 597 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed by 623 So.
2d 1182 (Fla. 1993); Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
2. 588 So. 2d at 610.
3. Id. at 611.
4. Id.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(f) (1987).
6. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611 n.1.
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plaintiff's insurance policy did not provide coverage for her husband's
negligence. The trial court's interpretation was affinred.7 The trial court
and the Fifth District Court of Appeal and ultimately the Supreme Court of
Florida failed to follow Florida's well-established rules of statutory
construction.8 There even appears to be an internal conflict within the
court's own holding, when it states that "[tihe use of the word 'party'
simply describes an entity against whom judgement is to be entered."9 By
its own holding, the court should not have considered plaintiffs husband as
a party, since he was not an entity against whom judgment was or could
have been entered.
Teacher's paid the economic damage award in full, plus costs.10 But
the trial court, interpreting Florida's law on apportionment of damages,
11
ruled that Teacher's only had to pay 20% of noneconomic damages.12 The
appellate court determined that "party" meant party to the incident, rather
than party to the lawsuit. 3 This analysis, that the legislature intended to
equate liability with fault, meant a wrongdoer could and should escape full
7. Id. at 611.
8. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984), stated: "[w]hen the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given
its plain and obvious meaning." Il. at 219 (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137
So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)). Holly stated that courts in the State of Florida are "without power
to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify or limit, its express
terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of
legislative power." Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219 (quoting American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of
Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968)). But see City of Boca
Raton v. Gidman, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1983) (holding that statutes should be
construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature); State v. Webb,
398 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla. 1981) (holding that legislative intent should be given effect
regardless of whether such construction varies from statute's literal meaning).
9. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611.
10. ld.
11. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1987) provides:
(3) APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES. - In cases to which this section applies,
the court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such
party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and
several liability; provided that with respect to any party whose percentage of
fault equals or exceeds that of a particular claimant, the court shall enter
judgment with respect to economic damages against that party on the basis of the
doctrine of joint and several liability.
Id.
12. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611.
13. See id
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responsibility to an innocent victim whenever it could share blame upon an
entity absent from the proceedings. Such reasoning was flawed because it
failed to consider Florida's law of contribution 14 in pari materia. Further-
more, the court failed to consider, or perhaps was not provided with, the
argument that the legislative intent in abrogating part of the joint and several
liability doctrine was based upon a belief that well-heeled tortfeasors were
too often footing the bill for other tortfeasors who were parties to the
lawsuit and could not pay their share of the damages.
Nevertheless, Messmer opened the door to allow the apportionment of
liability on the verdict form to people or entities who were not parties to the
lawsuit and were not given a chance to defend themselves by their accusers.
B. Then There Was Fabre
About seven months after the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided
Messmer, a similar issue came before the Third District Court of Appeal in
Fabre v. Marin.15 In that case, the plaintiff was also a passenger in an
automobile that was hit by another car. As in Messmer, plaintiffs driver
was her husband. The plaintiff alleged that she was injured when the
defendant's car ran plaintiff's car off the road and into a guardrail.
Defendants were underinsured and so plaintiff sued both Fabre and her own
uninsured/underinsured carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company ("State Farm"). The jury found plaintiff's husband 50% liable
and the defendant 50% liable, and awarded total damages of $12,750 for
economic losses and $350,000 for noneconomic losses. 6 The court
entered judgment against both defendants (the Fabres and State Farm) for
the total amount of the damages, $362,750.17 Defendants filed several
post-trial motions, but the salient one was a motion to reduce plaintiff's
recovery by 50%, the amount of fault attributed to the defendants. The trial
court denied the motion. s
The Third District Court of Appeal agreed the case was factually
indistinguishable from Messmer but declined to adopt Messmer's holding. 9
The Fabre I court concluded that section 768.81(3) of the Florida Statutes
was in fact ambiguous with regard to the meaning of the word "party." The
14. See generally FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1987).
15. 597 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("Fabre I').
16. Id. at 884-85.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 885.
19. Id.
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court noted that the legislature did not define the term, and that the word
could in fact have three possible meanings.2" They declined to adopt the
definition that the word "party" could include non-parties to the lawsuit,
since subsection three of the relevant statute requires the trial court to enter
judgment against liable parties and the court could not have jurisdiction to
enter judgment against non-parties.2"
Although the Messmer and Fabre I courts both applied the same
standards in analyzing their respective cases, the Third District Court of
Appeal considered and applied fundamental rules of statutory construction
to give full force and effect to all statutes whenever possible.22 The Fabre
I court, in an in-depth review, also fully considered the comparative fault
statuteP and the doctrine of interspousal immunity. 4  The court stated
that sections 768.81(2) and 768.81(3) of the Florida Statutes revealed that
the legislative language consistently reduced claimant's recovery only as a
result of the claimant's own fault.' The Fabre I court, unlike the Messmer
court, took into account the history of Florida jurisprudence as well as the
legislative history on the relevant issues.
Importantly, the Fabre I court defined intellectual honesty when it
stated that "[w]hen the meaning of a statute is in doubt, a rational, sensible
construction, avoiding unreasonable consequences, is favored."'26 Writing
for a unanimous court, Judge Baskin declined to usurp the legislative
function by adding to the statute, writing: "[i]n the absence of any language
in-subsection three reducing an innocent plaintiff's recovery, and in view of
the statute's express provision of the measure by which to reduce a
negligent claimant's award, we conclude that subsection three should not be
applied to bar Mrs. Marin's recovery." 27 The case was then certified to the
supreme court as being in conflict with Messmer.28
20. Fabre I, 597 So. 2d at 885. The word could mean "1) persons involved in an
accident; 2) defendants in a lawsuit; or 3) all litigants in the lawsuit." Id.
21. Id.
22. See generally id. at 885-86.
23. I& (analyzing FLA. STAT. § 768.81(2), (3) (Supp. 1988)).
24. Fabre I, 597 So. 2d at 886.
25. Id at 885.
26. Id. at 886 (citing Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1981) and Radio
Tel. Communications, Inc. v. Southeastern Tel. Co., 170 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1964)).
27. IM
28. Id.
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C. The Showdown
The Supreme Court of Florida broke the tie on August 26, 1993 in its
review of Fabre v. Marin.29 Writing for the majority, Justice Grimes
reviewed the facts and holdings of both Messmer and Fabre 130 The court
then provided an overview of the historical doctrines of contributory
negligence, joint and several liability, comparative negligence, and
contribution among joint tortfeasors.3' The court compared Fabre, in
which the plaintiff was entirely innocent, to Walt Disney World Co. v.
Wood.32 In Disney, the jury found the defendant was only 1% negligent,
a non-party to the lawsuit was 85% negligent and, most importantly, the
plaintiff was 14% negligent.33 Thus, the Disney plaintiff was both
negligent and was more negligent than the defendant! However, the Disney
court reasoned that section 768.81 of the Florida Statutes did not completely
replace the concept of joint and several liability and that judgment should
be entered against each party liable on the basis of that party's fault.34 The
Disney court never considered that Florida's contribution statute35 and third
party practice rule36 allowed Disney to make the plaintiff's fianc6, the non-
party, a defendant in the case, since it was Disney and not the plaintiff who
felt the fianc6 was at fault. Of course, no one will ever know whether
apportionment would have been the same if Disney, the accuser, had been
required to openly name the fianc6 and provide a fair chance for a response,
rather than accuse him behind his back. The court's opinion seems to
presume that the results would have been the same. Therein lies the flawed
reasoning. This concept flies in the face of centuries old tradition and
experience of adversarial jurisprudence. That tradition holds as its
fundamental principle that justice is best served when all sides have their
say. Instead, Florida's high court allowed the defendant to point the finger
of blame away from itself. It simultaneously placed the burden of suing all
potentially liable entities upon the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff does not
29. See generally Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) (reviewing Fabre 1, 597
So. 2d at 883).
30. Id. at 1183-84.
31. Id. at 1184-85.
32. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1975).
33. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185 (analyzing Disney, 515 So. 2d at 198).
34. Disney, 515 So. 2d at 201 (assessing Disney 86% of damages despite jury findings
of non-party fianc6's 85% fault).
35. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (Supp. 1986).
36. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
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believe those entities are liable. This requirement raises ethical concerns for
plaintiff's counsel.
Interestingly, the Fabre court bolstered its position by saying that even
if the statute was ambiguous, "[we] believe that the legislature intended that
damages be apportioned among all participants to the accident."37 But the
court provided no basis for reaching that conclusion, such as references to
legislative hearings or committee meetings. There was no legislative
directive that the statute should be liberally construed to limit a defendant's
liability. There was no reference to support further constriction of the joint
and several doctrine beyond what the legislature had already done.
The court did make reference to a seven-year-old legislative finding
which states the reasons why the legislature wanted comprehensive tort
reform and would enact such reform themselves." It would seem, then,
that the court should not have added to or expanded the statute. Neverthe-
less, the law today is as follows: Any entity who is potentially liable may
be blamed by a named defendant and may be placed on the verdict form for
apportionment of liability, without being made a party to the lawsuit.
The supreme court's holding forces plaintiffs and their counsel into a
conflict between themselves. For example, plaintiff's counsel is ethically
bound to name only those defendants whom he or she believes in good faith
to be liable, yet the Fabre decision by the Supreme Court of Florida forces
counsel to name all potential entities the defense may use to avoid or reduce
its own responsibility. As a result, plaintiff is forced to sue entities he or
she may not believe liable. There is no doubt that the legislature has the
right and the power to modify or eliminate joint and several liability.
Likewise, it has the ability to prescribe apportionment among entities who
are not parties to the lawsuit. And of course, the supreme court has the
power to do as it did in Fabre. But where the legislature has expressly
addressed the issue to the extent it thought necessary, the question is not
whether the court could, but whether it should, expand the legislation
beyond its strict meaning.
II. SURVEY OF FLORIDA CASES BETWEEN
JULY, 1994 AND JULY, 1995
Florida courts have repeatedly confronted Fabre/Messmer party liability
issues since the final disposition of the cases. The remainder of this article
37. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
38. Il (citing Tort Reform Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws 695,
699 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (Supp. 1986)).
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surveys post Fabre/Messmer cases, focusing on the Fabre/Messmer issue of
liability in each case and, perhaps, gives insight into the future of Florida
decisions.
A. First District Court of Appeal
In Department of Corrections v. McGhee,39 two felons escaped from
the custody of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") while being taken to
a doctor for an eye examination. The escapees fled from Florida to
Alabama and then to Mississippi, where they later shot plaintiff's husband,
a park ranger. Suit was filed against the DOC, alleging that the agency was
negligent in its care, supervision and control of the felons and that, as a
result of such negligence, the inmates escaped and thereafter caused the
death of Robert McGhee, Jr., plaintiff's husband."n
The Fabre/Messmer issue in this case was whether the jury should be
permitted to apportion noneconomic damages between negligent and
intentional tortfeasors. In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge
Ervin also discussed pertinent aspects of section 768.81 of the Florida
Statutes.4' He specifically pointed to the language of section 768.81(4):
(b) The section does not apply to any action brought by any person to
recover actual economic damages resulting from pollution, to any action
based upon an intentional tort, or to any cause of action as to which
application of the doctrine of joint and several liability is specifically
provided by chapter 403, chapter 498, chapter 517, chapter 542, or
chapter 895.42
Judge Ervin notes that the DOC argued in the trial court that the felons,
who were not named defendants, were partially at fault based upon their
intentional and criminal conduct and, therefore, the jury should consider the
various percentages of fault of all tortfeasors.43 Mrs. McGhee took the
position that DOC's claim for apportionment was barred by the provisions
of section 768.81(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes since the felons committed
intentional acts."4
39. 653 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Ervin J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 1091-92.
41. Id. at 1099-1101; see generally FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1993).
42. McGhee, 653 So. 2d at 1099-1100 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.81(4)(a) (1989)).
43. Id. at 1100.
44. Id.
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Judge Ervin reasoned, agreeing with the decision of the trial court, that
since plaintiff's action against the DOC was based on negligence, plaintiff's
argument must fail.45 He specifically noted that, "[n]o action was brought
by appellee on the theory of intentional tort.' 4 6 Section 768.81 of the
Florida Statutes requires a jury's consideration of each individual's "fault"
contributing to an injured person's damages even if such person is not or
cannot be a party to the lawsuit.47 According to Judge Ervin:
I consider that the comparative fault statute, in precluding the compar-
ing of fault in any action based upon intentional fault, expressed an
intent to retain the common law rule forbidding an intentional tortfeasor
from reducing his or her liability by the partial negligence of the
plaintiff in an action based on intentional tort. However, such exclusion
has no applicability to an action, such as that at bar, based solely on
negligence, and, consequently, the fault of both negligent and intentional
tortfeasors may appropriately be apportioned as a means of fairly
distributing the loss according to the percentage of fault of each party
contributing to the loss. I would therefore affirm as to this issue.48
Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc. v. Nash,49 involved a plaintiff,
Lucille Nash, who was robbed and pistol-whipped in the parking garage of
Methodist Hospital in Jacksonville.' She sued defendant, a security guard
service, for negligence. The Fabre/Messmer issue dealt with the verdict
form. Defendant, Wells Fargo, moved to include the hospital, a non-party,
on the verdict form. The trial court denied defendant's motion and the case
was submitted to the jury with only the defendant appearing on the verdict
form.5'
In this decision, the First District Court of Appeal, following Fabre,
held that the case must be reversed and that the hospital, a non-party, must
be included on the verdict form, even though Nash had not included the
hospital in the suit.52  There was no discussion in this decision of the
extent to which there was any "evidence" of fault on the part of the hospital.
45. l at 1101.
46. IaU
47. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1989).
48. McGhee, 653 So. 2d at 1101.
49. 654 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
50. IUt at 156.
51. It
52. Id.
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B. Second District Court of Appeal
In Peterson v. Morton F. Plant Hospital Ass'n, Inc.," a wrongful
death suit was filed alleging medical malpractice against a hospital and two
of its employees, a nurse and a nurse midwife.54 A Dr. Keller, who
specialized in obstetrics and gynecology, was also a defendant. Before trial,
Dr. Keller reached an informal settlement with no documentation. Plaintiff
unsuccessfully moved in limine to exclude any evidence of the $250,000
settlement, and both the fact of the settlement and the amount of the
settlement were disclosed to the jury during the trial.55 Defense counsel
stated in final argument:
[T]hey have already received or will receive funds from Dr. Keller.
When you couple that with the amount that they've received or are
receiving from the government, it more than equals the amount of
money [the plaintiffs' attorney] has asked you for for [sic] care and
services. More, greater than. 6
Later, the trial court instructed the jury that Dr. Keller had settled and
the hospital was blameless for his actions. However, the court instructed the
jury it could still assign Dr. Keller a percentage of liability regardless of any
insurance coverage. The jury then returned a verdict for the hospital and its
two nurses.57
The court treated Dr. Keller in this instance as a Fabre party.
Nevertheless, the District Court of Appeal reversed this verdict and
remanded the case for a new trial holding that the disclosure of the amount
of the settlement clearly prejudiced the plaintiffs in this case." "In many
respects, the trial court allowed the defendants to treat Dr. Keller as both a
party who had settled and as one who had not."59
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Baione,60 a wrongful death action, Baione's
estate brought an action for damages against the manufacturer of asbestos
products. The suit claimed that Baione's death was caused by his exposure
to asbestos products during the course of his employment. The
53. 656 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
54. Id. at 502.
55. Id. at 502.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Peterson, 656 So. 2d at 501.
59. Id. at 503.
60. 642 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
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Fabre/Messmer issue in this case was whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to permit the apportionment of fault against non-parties to the suit,
other manufacturers of the asbestos. The Second District Court of Appeal
held that the evidence was insufficient and, therefore, the trial court judge
correctly denied the manufacturer's request to have the jury make assess-
ments of fault of non-party entities. 1
In Seminole Gulf Railway, Ltd. v. Fassnacht,62 plaintiffs, a retired
couple, suffered injuries when their vehicle, driven by the husband, collided
with defendant's train.63 Plaintiffs brought a negligence suit and a suit for
personal injury damages against the owner of the Seminole Gulf Railway.
The jury verdict form directed the jury to consider the liability of defendant
Seminole, the liability of the plaintiff husband, and the amount of
noneconomic damages, if any. The jury found defendant and the plaintiff
husband each 50% negligent and awarded plaintiffs $35,000 each for past
and future noneconomic damages.64
Relying on section 768.81(3) of the Florida Statutes, Seminole moved
to have Mrs. Fassnacht's award reduced by Mr. Fassnacht's percentage of
comparative fault.6" The Second District Court of Appeal ultimately held
that Seminole's position was correct in accordance with the holding of
Fabre and directed Mrs. Fassnacht's award be accordingly reduced.66
It should be noted that in a partially concurring and partially dissenting
opinion, Judge Altenbemd concluded that the Fabre/Messmer issue had not
been adequately preserved by the defendant in trial court.67 Judge Alten-
bemd stated:
The record does not reflect that the defendant asked for relief under
section 768.81 until after the jury returned its verdict. In my opinion,
a defendant should raise section 768.81 as an affirmative defense, just
as defendants have always raised contributory or comparative negli-
gence. A defendant should request jury instructions on this issue
similar to the standard instructions for comparative negligence.... If
a defendant wants the benefit of section 768.81, the jury should be told
61. Il
62. 635 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Altenbemd, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
63. Id at 143.
64. Id
65. Id at 144; see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1989).
66. Seminole Gulf, 635 So. 2d at 144.
67. Id
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about the effect that statute will have on its verdict, just as it is told
about the effect of traditional comparative negligence.6
On a further review of the apportionment of damages issue, Judge
Altenbernd noted that the majority's opinion awarded Mrs. Fassnacht only
$17,500 since section 768.81(5) of the Florida Statutes does not apply to
cases with damages of $25,000 or less.69 Ironically, the plaintiff's recovery
was smaller due to the larger jury award. Judge Altenbermd noted:
[t]his result may seem logical and fair to the legislature, but I doubt it
is the result that most jurors would anticipate. In assessing damages,
a jury should have a general understanding of the overall ramifications
of its verdict. This jury had no reason to anticipate that Mrs. Fass-
nacht's award would be 50% of what they actually awarded.7"
C. Third District Court of Appeal
The wrongful death action in Chesterton v. Fisher,7 1 involved a
plaintiff who died of mesothelioma, an asbestos-related cancer, and the
defendants, manufacturers and sellers of packing and gasket materials.
Plaintiffs previously settled with approximately twenty-six manufacturers of
asbestos-containing insulation. Although this case was reversed and sent
back for a new trial on other grounds,72 the court mentioned that Fabre
was decided subsequent to the first trial.73 The Third District Court of
Appeal wrote:
[a]t the time of trial, the trial court did not have the benefit of the
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Fabre v. Marin .... Therefore,
on remand if there is sufficient "evidence to consider the liability of
other nonparties," the jury is to be instructed pursuant to Section
768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1993), and provided with jury instructions
and a verdict form that permits the jury to apportion liability among all
alleged tortfeasors. 74
68. Id.
69. Id. at 145; see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81(5) (1989).
70. Seminole Gulf, 635 So. 2d at 145.
71. 655 Fla. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
72. Id. at 171.
73. Id. at 172.
74. Id. (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Dougherty, 636 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
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In City of Homestead v. Martins,75 the Third District Court of Appeal
held that the amount of a judgment against a defendant hospital could not
exceed the percentage of liability apportioned against it by the jury.76 The
court held that pursuant to Fabre, it was error for the trial court to award an
amount that exceeded the percentage of liability attributed to it by the jury.
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Ashraf v. Smith,77 a medical
malpractice case, followed Fabre by holding that a defendant physician's
request to include a non-party hospital on the verdict form should have been
granted.78 The court ruled that if, at retrial, the jury determined the
hospital was not a negligent cause of the plaintiff's death, then the original
judgment against the defendant physician and the physician's protective trust
fund would be reinstated.79
In Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Viera,'° the wife of a man killed from
an elevator shaft fall brought an action against the elevator maintenance
company and Dade County, the elevator owner. The plaintiff privately
settled with Dade County and went to trial against the elevator company.
The elevator company, Schindler, requested that Dade County be listed on
the verdict form for apportioning liability. The trial court denied the request
and the jury only considered the liability of the elevator company and the
deceased. The jury entered a verdict finding the elevator company 75% at
fault and the decedent 25% at fault. On appeal, the Third District Court of
Appeal held that reversal was required under Fabre and the jury should
apportion liability among "all persons responsible for the accident,"'"
including Dade County.
D. Fourth District Court of Appeal
The plaintiff in Yablon v. North River Insurance Co., 2 was injured
in a car wreck. She and her husband privately settled with two tortfeasors,
Ford Motor Company and Pompano Lincoln Mercury. At the time of the
crash, plaintiff had insurance with North River, under a policy which
contained benefits for uninsured/underinsured coverage. The policy
provided that uninsured motorist ("UM") benefits would not apply if there
75. 645 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
76. Id.
77. 647 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
78. Id. at 893.
79. IM
80. 644 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
81. Id at 564.
82. 654 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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was a settlement "without our consent." 3 Due to the settlements without
the UM carrier's "consent," the lower court held, in a declaratory judgment
action, that there was no UM coverage.84 The crux of the case was really
whether or not the nonconsensual settlement with these tortfeasors had
somehow "prejudiced" the UM carrier.85 In this instance, the appellate
court held that plaintiffs had made a requisite showing of lack of prejudice
to defeat coverage based, at least in part, on the Fabre decision.86 With
the abrogation of joint and several liability, North River would not be
compromised by private settlements. They would still only be liable for
their percentage share of liability.87 Accordingly, the finding of "no
coverage" was reversed.88
With regard to our discussion of Fabre/Messmer issues, Brown v. City
of Lauderhill89 assists us only in that it provides a further definition of a
"party" under section 768.81(3) of the Florida Statutes. The court here was
simply trying to determine whether or not a city is a real party in interest to
various attorney's fee claims. The court noted that "often the term 'party'
is recognized as including those who are real parties in interest." 90
In Bell South Human Resources Administration, Inc. v. Colatarci,91 a
Southern Bell employee was injured while participating in a physical
activities program sued the corporation operating the program for damages.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to include
nonparty tortfeasors on the verdict form. Following Fabre, the court
decided that failure to include nonparty tortfeasors on a verdict form
required reversal of the plaintiff's verdict in this personal injury case despite
plaintiffs contention that the defendant's proffer did not show sufficient
evidence of negligence by nonparties. 2
In East West Karate Ass'n, Inc. v. Riquelme,93 a karate student who
ruptured his spleen brought a negligence action against a karate association.
On appeal, the karate association claimed that the trial court erred by not
including the sparring partner's name to the jury on the verdict form.
83. Id. at 1034.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1035.
86. Id.
87. Yablon, 654 So. 2d at 1035.
88. Id. at 1036.
89. 654 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
90. Id. at 303 (citing Fabre, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) as an example).
91. 641 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
92. Id. at 428.
93. 638 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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Following Fabre, the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed
the case.94
E. Fifth District Court of Appeal
The plaintiff in Wet 'n Wild Florida, Inc. v. Sullivan,9 was injured
while pulling a drowning woman from a "wave pool." The complaint
alleged negligence on the part of the lifeguard employees of defendant Wet
'n Wild. According to the plaintiff, if the employees had rescued the
victim, the plaintiff would not have been injured. Wet 'n Wild took the
position "that it had not breached any duty owed to Sullivan and that
Sullivan was herself negligent and that the victim was negligent."96 The
Fabre/Messmer issue noted in this case was whether or not the trial court
erred in not submitting the issue of the victim's negligence to the jury for
its consideration. 97 The court decided that the jury should consider, and
apportion accordingly, the relative negligence of all parties, including the
drowning victim.9'
A car wreck led plaintiff to sue in DeWitt Excavating, Inc. v. Walt-
ers.99 In 1988, a DeWitt employee negligently directed Hashim to turn
into the path of Walters' oncoming vehicle. Plaintiff Walters settled
privately with Hashim and went to trial against DeWitt Excavating. The
jury found the remaining defendant, DeWitt Excavating, 25% negligent.
Consequently, DeWitt was held liable for the first $25,000 in damages and
for 25% of the excess, after subtracting the settlement amount."° The jury
found Hashim 75% negligent and plaintiff 0% negligent.01
The case was reversed and remanded holding that once damages exceed
$25,000, the doctrine of joint and several liability is inapplicable to the
action and, thus, a nonsettling defendant is responsible for only that portion
of the entire noneconomic damages equivalent to the percentage of
94. Id. at 605.
95. 655 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 1995).
96. Id. at 1172.
97. See id. at 1174.
98. Id.
99. 642 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
100. Id. at 834.
101. Id. at 833.
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fault."02 Therefore the defendant was not jointly and severally liable for
the first $25,000 in damages.'0 3
Turner v. Gallagher'O° deals primarily with the 120-day service rule
regarding service of a summons and complaint and whether or not the 120-
day rule applies to the Department of Insurance in a sovereign immunity
case. Here, the court looks to Messmer for guidance in defining the term
cc 1105'dfnatmenaparty. Further, "the term 'defendant' unambiguously means a party
named in a lawsuit against whom some type of relief or recovery is sought
or who claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff."'" The court held that
the rule requiring service of process upon a defendant within 120 days after
the filing of the initial pleading does not apply to the Department of
Insurance in a negligence action/sovereign immunity action under the statute
requiring service of process upon the Department of Insurance.'0 7
F. Supreme Court of Florida
In the Wells v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center,
Inc.,'O° decision, considered by many legal scholars to be the most
instructive, informative and well-reasoned decision on the Fabre/Messmer
issue, the Supreme Court of Florida favorably resolved the confusion and
conflict surrounding the treatment of liability settlements and setoffs after
Fabre. This case involved a medical malpractice action in which the
claimant settled before trial with defendant doctors for $300,000 and later
went to trial against the defendant hospital. The jury determined claimant's
total damages at approximately $575,000 and apportioned 90% of the fault
to the hospital. The trial court denied the hospital's motion for a reduction
in the judgment based upon the $300,000 already paid by the settling defen-
dants."°  The hospital appealed the trial court's decision and the First
District Court of Appeal reversed, citing footnote three in Fabre and
102. Id. at 834.
103. See id. The opinion provides a step-by-step review of how to determine a damages
award in similar situations. DeWitt, 642 So. 2d at 834-35.
104. 640 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
105. Id. at 121. The Messmer court noted that "party" is a non-limiting term. Id.
(citing Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611).
106. Turner, 640 So. 2d at 121 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) and Messmer, 588 So.
2d at 610).
107. Id.
108. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S278 (June 15, 1995).
109. Id.
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deviating from conflicting portions."' The First District Court of Appeal
certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of Florida:
(A) IS A NONSETILING DEFENDANT IN A CASE TRIED
UNDER SECTION 768.81(3) ENTITLED TO SETOFF OR RE-
DUCTION OF HIS APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DAMAG-
ES, AS ASSESSED BY THE JURY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF SECTIONS 768.041(2), 46.015(2) OR 768.31(5)(a), BASED
UPON SUMS PAID BY SETTLING DEFENDANTS IN EXCESS
OF THEIR APPORTIONED LIABILITY AS DETERMINED BY
THE JURY?
(B) DOES THE RULE AS TO SETOFF APPLY EQUALLY TO
BOTH ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC DAMAGES?'"
Both certified questions were answered in the negative."'
In a decision authored by Chief Justice Grimes and concurred with by
every other justice, the court held that the setoff statutes apply only to
damages for which the parties are jointly and severally liable."' They do
not apply to damages for which there is only proportional liability.
Accordingly, there is no setoff for any portion of a settlement attributable
to noneconomic damages." 4  The allocation of settlement proceeds
between economic and noneconomic damages must be determined by the
respective percentages ultimately fixed by the jury.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justices Wells and Kogan noted that
this issue is but one of many problems arising from the Fabre decision and
called for a reexamination of Fabre."5 In another concurring opinion,
Justice Anstead expressed his concern that the legislature had not acted to
clear up these problems."
6
Il. CONCLUSION
At one point in time in the not-too-distant past history of tort law, any
amount of contributory negligence completely barred a plaintiff's claim. As
a result of the extreme harshness of this concept, the doctrine of joint and
110. Id. at S280 (citing Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1186 n.3).
111. Id. at S278.
112. Id.
113. See Wells, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at S279.
114. IL at S280.
115. See id. at S281 (Wells, J., and Kogan, J., concurring).
116. See id. (Anstead, J., concurring).
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several liability developed slowly throughout the country. The theory of
joint and several liability allows the plaintiff to collect the full amount of
damages from any tortfeasor who caused the plaintiff's injuries. Members
of the Florida Bar Association during these years discussed whether the
doctrine of joint and several liability caused inequities. The matter was a
choice: If there had to be a loss, the question was whether the loss should
be borne by the guilt-free victim or by the wrongdoing tortfeasor. The
obvious answer and the one uniformly chosen by the courts was that the
cost should be borne by the parties sharing responsibility for the injury.
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, statutes and case law
developed the concept of comparative negligence. Replacing contributory
negligence with comparative negligence eliminated what had been an
illogical and antiquated bar to compensation. Eventually, defendants began
to argue that the doctrine of comparative negligence was logically inconsis-
tent with the common law doctrine of joint and several liability. In Florida,
the doctrine of joint and several liability was retained. This was so until the
enactment of the 1986 Tort Reform Act and subsequent interpretations of
that Act, including the decision in Fabre. The Fabre case represents a
policy decision that losses resulting from negligence of unknown or
uninsured tortfeasors should be borne by the injured plaintiff, even when
that plaintiff may be totally free from any fault or wrongdoing. Such a
policy is abhorrent to the fundamentals of our system of justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of condominium form of ownership draws its earliest
codification in the law to the Napoleonic Code of France.' Nearly two
hundred years later, in the early 1960s, this ownership concept was
introduced in Florida when the Florida Legislature enacted The Condomini-
um Act, chapter 711 of the Florida Statutes.' Florida's Condominium Act,
although establishing the basic framework of condominium law, was void
of requirements for the operation and management of the condominium as
well as of consumer protections for the condominium unit owner.
Consequently, in the middle of the 1970s, the Condominium Act was
significantly revised and renumbered as chapter 718, Florida Statutes.3
These revisions added significant consumer protections for unit owners as
well as enumerated comprehensive requirements for the operation and
management of condominiums by their associations.4
1. Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1971). In addition, while not
codified, the legal scholars trace the concept of condominium ownership to early Roman
times. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 718.11 l(1)(a) (1993), which provides, with the exception of
associations which were already in existence on January 1, 1977, that:
The operation of the condominium shall be by the association, which must be a
corporation for profit or a corporation not for profit .... The owners of units
shall be shareholders or members of the association. The officers and directors
of the association have a fiduciary relationship to the unit owners.
Id.
2. See FLA. STAT. § 711 (1963). Chapter 711 was subsequently repealed and replaced
by chapters 718 and 719 of the Florida Statutes, which deal with condominiums and
cooperatives, respectively. See 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-222.
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.101-718.622 (1993).
4. See id. § 718.102(1), (2) (stating that the purposes of chapter 718 are "[t]o give
statutory recognition to the condominium form of ownership . . . [and] [to establish
procedures for the creation, sale, and operation of condominiums").
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Condominium law in Florida has developed into a sophisticated and
orderly real property concept. Yet, the application of condominium law on
ownership and enjoyment of real property has not been without its conflicts.
There are compromises that must be made for the benefits of the condomin-
ium concept. The benefits of community living, which include sharing of
maintenance responsibilities, ensuring quality common facilities and
amenities, promoting community stability, and providing an organization
with central responsibility in managing the operation of the condominium,
are offset by the compromise that owners make with the degree of freedom
and autonomy they forego to live in such a community.5 The condominium
association, an entity created by statute6 and governed by its board of
directors,7 is given the difficult task of trying to maintain the delicate
balance between preserving the common scheme for the benefit of all unit
owners and protecting the rights of each unit owner.8 The board of
directors is typically composed of unit owners which itself has its advantag-
es and disadvantages.
On the one hand, unit owners appreciate this democratic aspect,
whereby a member of their own class can vote to make the choices that
presumably the rest of the unit owners desire. On the other hand, unit
owners who serve on association boards of directors often lack the expertise
which would be desired of a person who represents others and owes them
fiduciary duties. This observation, of course, neglects the increasingly
prevalent power struggles which arise between unit owners as they attempt
to gain control of an association. These conflicts were made evident in the
Ocean Trail cases,9 spanning over eight years of bitter litigation between
the Ocean Trail Condominium Unit Owners Association and the unit
5. See Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975). The court in Hidden Harbour stated:
It appears to us that inherent in the condominium concept is the principle that
to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit
owners since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities in
common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice
which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.
Id. at 181-82.
6. See FLA. STAT. § 718.104.
7. See id. § 718.111.
8. Aquarian Found., Inc. v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
9. Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Levy, 489 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Mead v. Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc., 638 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993), quashed by 650 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1994).
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owners. In a surprising (to some), albeit logical interpretation of the Florida
Condominium Act, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the unit owners
who had prevailed in their suit against the association were responsible for
the association's attorney's fees in defending the suit because the attorney's
fees constituted a common expense.'0 Before all was said and done, more
than one million dollars in attorney's fees were incurred between the two
sides with many residents spending much of their retirement savings in the
process."
This comment reviews the Ocean Trail litigation in the context of
Florida condominium law and analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court of
Florida's comment-worthy decision. Part II provides a general overview of
the relevant portions of the Florida Condominium Act, chapter 718 of the
Florida Statutes, dealing with association organization and powers. Part I
discusses the three appellate opinions issued in the Ocean Trail litigation.
Part IV analyzes some of the possible implications that the Supreme Court
of Florida's decision may have on condominium law and practice. Part V
identifies some possible measures that could ameliorate the impact of the
decision on unit owners, and Part VI concludes briefly.
II. CONDOMINIUM POWERS UNDER CHAPTER 718 OF THE
FLORiDA STATUTES
The Condominium Act provides that the governing body of the
condominium association may be elected with varying notice and election
procedures and requirements. 2 As such, the condominium association is
analogous to a quasi-government, applying democratic principles. 3 Since
board members are democratically elected, owners' dissatisfaction may be
heard by the results in the next board elections." Another method by
which dissident owners may display their disapproval of board action is by
bringing a lawsuit against the association.
This latter remedy is derived from section 718.111 of the Condominium
Act 5 which provides the association with the authority to sue as well as
10. Ocean Trail, 650 So. 2d at 8.
11. See De' Ann Weimer, Condo War Over Ruling Protects Boards From Challenges,
PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 19, 1994, at 9B.
12. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112.
13. Id. §§ 718.111-.112.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(k) (providing for recall and removal of directors from
office with or without cause by the vote or agreement of the majority of all voting interests,
and prescribing the procedure to be followed).
15. Id. § 718.111.
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be sued with respect to the exercise or nonexercise of its powers. 6 This
authority necessarily contemplates that judgments may be granted and
entered against the association.
A condominium association is treated like other profit or not for profit
corporations 7 that own property. If a judgment against the association is
not satisfied, then the property of the association would be subject to
execution and levy. Therefore, by opting to bring a lawsuit against the
association to challenge board action; owners must realize the implication
that may arise if a judgment is entered in their favor.
Essentially, owners must be cognizant that they, as individuals,
comprise the membership of the association, and thus, any action seeking
monetary damages against the association amounts to bringing an action
seeking monetary damages against themselves individually. The issue that
ensues as a result of the membership of a condominium association winning
a monetary judgment against the association is how such a judgment should
be satisfied. A condominium association is unlike most other corporations
since a condominium association does not operate a business that receives
cash flow from sales or services; rather, for the most part, it obtains its
16. ML § 718.111(3). Subsection 3 provides:
The association may contract, sue, or be sued with respect to the exercise or
nonexercise of its powers. For these purposes, the powers of the association
include, but are not limited to, the maintenance, management, and operation of
the condominium property. After control of the association is obtained by unit
owners other than the developer, the association may institute, maintain, settle,
or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf of all unit owners concerning
matters of common interest, including but not limited to, the common elements;
the roof and structural components of a building or other improvements;
mechanical, electrical, and plumbing elements serving an improvement or a
building; representations of the developer pertaining to any existing or proposed
commonly used facilities; and protesting ad valorem taxes on commonly used
facilities and on units; and may defend actions in eminent domain or bring
inverse condemnation actions. If the association has the authority to maintain
a class action, the association may be joined in an action as representative of that
class with reference to litigation and disputes involving the matters for which the
association could bring a class action. Nothing herein limits any statutory or
common-law right of any individual unit owner or class of unit owners to bring
any action which may otherwise be available.
FLA. STAT. § 718.111(3).
17. See id. § 718.111(2) (providing that "[t]he powers and duties of the association
include those set forth in this section and those set forth in the declaration and bylaws and
chapters 607 [The Florida Business Corporation Act] and 617, as applicable, if not
inconsistent with this chapter").
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revenues exclusively from assessing its members."8 As such, a judgment
entered against the association because of improper board action would
either be satisfied from the proceeds payable under an errors and omissions
insurance policy (if any), assessments collected from the members, or the
property owned by the association would be subject to execution and
judgment. 9
Ill. How ONE ASSOCIATION BOUGHT AND PAID FOR A LAwsuIT
The three reported Ocean Trail cases demonstrate how the condo-
minium form of ownership contains latent flaws which can manifest
themselves in ways that, to some, may seem inequitable to the unit owners.
One of its problems can be reduced to the following basic scenario. First,
the association's board of directors decides to undertake some action or
expenditure. Second, the unit owners challenge the association's authority
to undertake such action, and the dispute proceeds to litigation. Third, one
side prevails, incurring substantial attorney's fees in so doing.
If the prevailing party is the association, then, assuming the court does
not award attorney's fees, a special assessment levied against the unit
owners to pay for the association's attorney's fees does not seem so
inequitable. In fact, section 718.303 of the Florida Statutes currently
provides for an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party
in suits between an owner and an association. 20 It is not uncommon for
the prevailing party in litigation to seek payment of its fees and costs from
the losing party and, most likely, the association will recover its attorney's
fees from the unit owners who lost the litigation. However, if the unit
owners are the prevailing party and seek payment of their fees through the
association, they will likely end up writing themselves a check because the
unit owners fund the association. Section 718.303(1) currently provides that
a unit owner who prevails in an action against an association is entitled to
reimbursement for special assessments levied by the association to pay its
litigation expenses.2' It is unclear how or whether section 718.303(1)
18. Id. § 718.115(2) (stating that "[f]unds for the payment of common expenses shall
be collected by assessments against unit owners in the proportions or percentages provided
in the declaration"). See also id. § 718.103(7) (defining "common expenses" as "all expenses
and assessments which are properly incurred by the association for the condominium").
19. This note will not address the possibility of instituting any malpractice actions or
claims against any party who might have given the board of directors incorrect or improper
advice which might have led to the judgment granted against the association.
20. FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1).
21. Id. § 718.313(1).
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would be applied when the unit owners as a class prevail in a suit against
their association or when a substantial majority of the unit owners prevail
or even when a significant number of unit owners prevail; this issue is
discussed in Part IV A of this comment, infra. At the time that the Ocean
Trail litigation commenced, section 718.303(1) did not include its current
provision entitling a prevailing unit owner to reimbursement for litigation
assessments.
Furthermore, the association has the power to levy and enforce special
assessments to pay judgment liens on the association.22 If the litigation
expenses are not paid to the association, a claim of lien would probably be
the next step for the unpaid parties. Thus, regardless of whether the unit
owners win or lose in litigation against their own association, they will end
up paying for both sides' attorney's fees.
In Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Levy, 3 the unauthorized act
was a land purchase, and the association's attorney's fees, which the unit
owners ended up paying, totaled approximately $194,000.' In retrospect,
one has to wonder whether the unit owners would have been better off not
contesting the board's action. At least then they would have had a real
property asset to show for their special assessment payments. The owners
must now realize that the price of democracy is high.
A. Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Levy
On March 7, 1985, at a general meeting, the Ocean Trail Unit Owners
Association, the master association for the five building complex known as
Ocean Trail Condominium, took control of the association's board of
directors from the developer, Campeau Corporation Florida.25 The first
owner-board of directors was elected, and within a week the trouble began.
On or about March 13, 1985, the newly-elected five-member board entered
into a written contract to purchase a parcel of land adjoining the condo-
minium complex.26 The parcel was owned by Campeau and was originally
intended to be the site of a sixth condominium building, but Campeau later
22. See id. § 718.111(4) (granting associations the power to make and collect
assessments and to lease, maintain, repair, and replace the common elements); id. §
718.115(2) (granting associations the power to make assessments to pay common expenses).
A judgment lien against the association as an entity would be a common expense.
23. 489 So. 2d at 103.
24. See iL at 103-04.
25. Id. at 103.
26. Id. at 103-04.
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decided not to build a sixth building.27 The board sought to add the parcel
to the condominium complex.28 The association's counsel advised the
board of directors that because Ocean Trail Unit Owners Association was
a homeowners' association and not a condominium association, it had
authority to purchase property without bringing the matter to a vote of the
unit owners;29 furthermore, the board of directors was advised that under
the association's bylaws and declaration it could levy a special assessment
to fund the purchase without unit owner approval.30 Relying on this
advice, the association, based solely upon a vote of the board of directors,
entered into the $914,000 contract without taking any formal vote of the unit
owners.3 The board made a special assessment to fund the purchase, and
each of the 602 units in the complex was assessed $1518.44.32 This
transaction was closed within two weeks, on March 25, 1985.33
Several owners challenged the board's action on grounds that the board
had no authority to undertake the purchase without bringing the matter to
a vote of the owners.34 The articles of incorporation and the bylaws of the
association permitted the purchase of additions to the common elements only
in accordance with the declaration of condominium. 35  However, the
declaration of condominium of each building in the complex was silent on
the association's power to purchase real property.36 The owners sued the
association and the developer, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the
authority of the association to enter into the agreement to purchase land, and
to rescind the agreement.37 The Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach
County granted the plaintiff owners partial summary judgment on their claim
for a declaratory judgment, holding that the purchase of the adjoining parcel
27. Id. at 104. See also Petitioner's Initial Brief at 3, Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n
v. Mead, 650 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1994) (No. 91-00350).
28. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 3, Ocean Trail (No. 91-00350).
29. This article will not address the question of whether the association should have
been governed by the current version of the Condominium Act, chapter 718 of the Florida
Statutes, which was amended subsequent to the association's 1985 purchase of the subject
parcel.
30. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 3, Ocean Trail (No. 91-00350).
31. Ocean Trail, 489 So. 2d at 104.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Ocean Trail, 489 So. 2d at 104.
37. Id.
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"materially altered and modified the appurtenances to the Plaintiffs'
units. 38  Under a 1984 change to section 718.110(4) of the Florida
Statutes,39 unanimous consent of the owners was required before the
association could purchase the property.40 The association appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam the Palm
Beach County Circuit Court's partial summary judgment for the individual
owners. Judge Glickstein concurred specially, explaining the factual
background of the case, and the reasons for the court's holding. Citing
section 718.110(4) of the Florida Statutes, as well as Beau Monde, Inc. v.
Bramson,4" and Tower House Condominium, Inc. v. Millman,42 Judge
Glickstein stated that the association had no authority to enter into the
purchase agreement without obtaining the unanimous approval of the
owners.4 3 The court also decided to wait until testimony was presented
before ruling on the rescission claim." Ultimately, the purchase was
rescinded by the Palm Beach Circuit Court. Thus, the newly-formed
condominium association had committed its first unauthorized act. More
challenges by the owners were to follow.
B. Mead v. Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc.-The Fourth
District Court of Appeal's Decision
After the purchase of the adjoining parcel was rescinded, the associa-
tion recovered $630,000 of its purchase price from the seller.4 Some of
38. L
39. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (Supp. 1984). Section 718.110(4) provides:
Unless otherwise provided in the declaration as originally recorded, no
amendment may change the configuration or size of any condominium unit in
any material fashion, materially alter or modify the appurtenances to the unit, or
change the proportion or percentage by which the owner of the parcel shares the
common expenses and owns the common surplus unless the record owner of the
unit and all record owners of liens on it join in the execution of the amendment
and unless all the record owners of all other units approve the amendment.
Id.
40. 1l
41. 446 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 453 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1984).
42. 410 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
43. Ocean Trail, 489 So. 2d at 104.
44. Id.
45. 638 So. 2d at 963. The original contract price was $914,000; it is not clear whether
the association recovered all of its purchase money.
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the owners sued to obtain refunds of the $1518.44 special assessments"
which had been made to fund the rescinded purchase.47 The association,
apparently faced with a loss due to the rescinded purchase litigation, made
a claim against the association's errors and omissions insurance carrier.48
The claim was eventually settled for $275,000.4 9
After obtaining the proceeds of the rescission and the insurance claim
settlement, the directors first paid their lawyers a fee of $175,000, as well
as some other costs." The owners who had sued and obtained judgments
for a refund of the prior special assessment were paid from the balance left
over." The balance was insufficient to make refunds to all of the own-
ers. 52 Because of this shortfall, the association made a special assessment
of $500 to cover the refunds of the prior special assessment for the
rescinded purchase. 3 The new special assessment was not well received by
the owners, who again brought suit as a class, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the $500 special assessment was unauthorized.54 The owners
later added a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by the directors in settling
with the insurance carrier and also for its disbursement of the insurance
proceeds. The trial court granted judgment for the association, holding that
the special assessment, the insurance settlement and the disbursement were
proper and authorized by the articles of incorporation and the bylaws under
the provisions for common expenses. 6 The owners appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the $500
assessment was a direct product of the first unauthorized act of the
association's directors, and therefore was just as unauthorized as the prior
land purchase agreement.57 The court stated:
It is immaterial that this second assessment was not used to make the
purchase itself, but instead merely to pay costs and expenses directly
related to the fact of the purchase. It was a natural and entirely
46. See Ocean Trail, 489 So. 2d at 104.
47. Mead, 638 So. 2d at 963.
48. Id. at 964.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Mead, 638 So. 2d at 964.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Mead, 638 So. 2d at 964.
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foreseeable consequence of the directors' folly. Directors cannot be at
once unauthorized to do some act and at the same time [be] authorized
to impose assessments to pay for the consequences of the unauthorized
act.
51
The court also held that the disbursement of the $275,000 insurance
settlement was improper because it reimbursed some, but not all, of the unit
owners.59 This violated section 718.116(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
which provides that no unit owner may be excused from paying his share
of common expenses unless all other unit owners are also proportionately
excused.60 The court questioned how the settlement could have been
approved when it was insufficient to cover the attorney's fees and fully
reimburse all unit owners for the prior assessment.61
The court explained that, were it to hold otherwise, it would, as a court
of equity in a declaratory judgment action, be "allow[ing] persons who
suffer from some unauthorized act to pay for the privilege of doing so."'62
Nevertheless, on motion for rehearing, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida. 63  The supreme
court was not persuaded by the reasoning of the district court of appeal.
58. IM The court cited Scudder v. Greenbriar C Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 566 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), and Rothenberg v. Plymouth No. 5 Condominium Ass'n,
511 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1987), for the
proposition that the propriety of an assessment is tied to the purposes for which it is made,
and that the purposes must be authorized by some power granted to the association. Mead,
638 So. 2d at 964. 'To state it as simply and directly as we can, an association's power to
impose assessments on unit owners for common expenses is limited to authorized expenses,
and does not extend, as is the case here, to unauthorized acts by the directors." Id.
59. Id. at 964-65.
60. FLA. STAT. § 718.116(9)(a).
61. Mead, 638 So. 2d at 965. The court stated that the association could have done
three things when faced with the shortfall from the insurance settlement: 1) renegotiate the
attorney's fees; 2) reimburse all of the unit owners in full and partially pay the attorney's
fees; or 3) pay the attorney's fees in full and reimburse the unit owners partially, but equally.
Id.
62. Id at 964.
63. Id at 965.
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C. The Supreme Court of Florida's Decision64
On November 10, 1994, the Supreme Court of Florida answered the
following question certified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal:
WHETHER A CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION CAN ENFORCE A
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT IMPOSED TO PAY JUDGMENTS,
ATORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN CONNECTION
WITH A LAWSUIT BROUGHT BY UNIT OWNERS AGAINST THE
ASSOCIATION IN WHICH THE ASSOCIATION'S PURCHASE OF
REAL PROPERTY WAS INVALIDATED AS AN UNAUTHORIZED
ACT AND SUBSEQUENTLY RESCINDED.65
The court answered the question "yes," quashing the decision of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal and remanding with instructions to affirm
the final judgment.66 The court disagreed with the district court of appeal's
holding that the $500 special assessment to cover the litigation costs
incurred in rescinding the unauthorized land purchase and to partially refund
the special assessment to purchase the land was not authorized.67 Justice
Wells stated that the Fourth District "erroneously ignore[d] that the special
assessments were collected in order to pay valid judgments against the
Association."68  Under section 718.115(2) of the Florida Statutes, a
condominium association is empowered to make special assessments against
unit owners to pay for common expenses. 69 The court reasoned that
because condominium associations may sue or be sued with respect to the
exercise of their powers,70 judgments may be entered against the associa-
tion subjecting its property to execution and levy.71  Protection of the
condominium's common elements is a valid purpose for making special
assessments. Furthermore, section 6.5 of Ocean Trail's declaration of
condominium provided that liens upon the common areas shall be paid as
64. Ocean Trial Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Mead, 650 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1994).
65. Id. at 5-6.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. § 718.115(2). "Common expenses include the expenses of the operation,
maintenance, repair, or replacement of the common elements, costs of carrying out the
powers and duties of the association, and any other expense designated as common expense
by this chapter, the declaration, the documents creating the condominium, or the bylaws."
Id. § 718.115(1).
70. Id. § 718.111(3).
71. Ocean Trail, 650 So. 2d at 7.
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a common expense.' The court held that the reasons for the judgment
against the association were irrelevant; what mattered was the existence of
judgment that would imperil association property to the detriment of all unit
owners.73 The court noted that "a unit owner's duty to pay assessments is
conditional solely on whether the unit owner holds title to a condominium
unit and whether the assessment conforms with the declaration of condomin-
ium and bylaws of the association, which are authorized by chapter 718,
Florida Statutes."'74 Unit owners could not refuse to pay a valid assess-
ment; their remedy for unauthorized 'actions by the association's directors
consisted of voting them out of office or, if justified, bringing an action for
breach of fiduciary duty.' The Supreme Court of Florida distinguished
Scudder 6 and Rothenberg,77 on which the Fourth District Court of Appeal
based its decision, in that those cases merely determined whether a particular
expenditure was proper, and did not involve "lawful judgments rendered
against the association for unlawful expenditures. 78 With regard to the
questioned insurance settlement, the court held that the settlement and
subsequent disbursement did not require court approval, and was within the
discretion of the association's directors.79
Justice Kogan concurred in part and dissented in part with the
opinion." Although he agreed with the majority's holding with regard to
the propriety of the insurance settlement and disbursement, he noted that the
effect of the court's ruling was to make unit owners who prevailed as
plaintiffs in an action against the association pay their own judgment.8 He
agreed with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's logic that the association's
board could not perform an unauthorized act and at the same time be
authorized to impose assessments to pay for the consequences of the
unauthorized acts. 2 Justice Kogan referred to a phrase in the definition of
"common expenses," which the majority' did not mention in its opinion:
"[a]s noted by the district court, section 718.103(7), defines 'common
expenses' as 'all expenses and assessments which are properly incurred by
72. Id.
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 566 So. 2d at 359.
77. 511 So. 2d at 651.
78. Ocean Trail, 650 So. 2d at 8.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 8 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id.
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the association for the condominium."' 83 According to Justice Kogan, the
expenses for which the $500 special assessment was imposed were not
common expenses because they were improperly incurred due to the
association's unauthorized act.84 He rejected the association's argument
that the board of directors had acted in good faith, even though the board
of directors based its action on advice of counsel when it committed the
unauthorized act of purchasing the adjoining parcel. Justice Kogan found
no such defense available under the Condominium Act.85
Justice Kogan referred to the 1991 amendment of section 718.303(1)(e),
which although inapplicable to the current case because of its later effective
date," was consistent with his argument that once an association's act is
challenged by a unit owner and is held to be unauthorized, the association
has no right to enforce assessments against the successful owner to pay the
litigation expenses incurred in defending the unauthorized act.87 Section
718.303(1)(e), as amended, provides that a unit owner who prevails in an
action against his condominium association has a right to reimbursement for
any special assessments imposed by the association to fund the litigation.88
83. Ocean Trail, 650 So. 2d at 8 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Section 718.303(1) was amended by the Laws of Florida 1991, ch. 91-103, § 14,
which became effective on April 14, 1992. See ch. 91-103, § 14, 1991 Fla. Laws 722, 743.
87. Ocean Trail, 650 So. 2d at 9 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. The current section 718.303(1) provides, in relevant part:
(1) Each unit owner, each tenant and other invitee, and each association
shall be governed by, and shall comply with the provisions of, this chapter, the
declaration, the documents creating the association, and the association bylaws
and provisions thereof shall be deemed expressly incorporated into any lease of
a unit. Actions for damages or for injunctive relief, or both, for failure to
comply with these provisions may be brought by the association or by a unit
owner against:
(a) The association.
(b) A unit owner.
(d) Any director who willfully and knowingly falls to comply with these
provisions.
The prevailing party in any such action ... is entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys fees. A unit owner prevailing in an action between the
association and the unit owner under this section, in addition to recovering his
reasonable attorney's fees, may recover additional amounts as determined by the
court to be necessary to reimburse the unit owner for his share of assessments
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Justice Kogan interpreted the 1991 changes to section 718.303(1)(e) to mean
that an association's assessments due to litigation over its actions would be
properly incurred common expenses unless and until such time as the
litigation results in a finding that the association's acts were unauthorized.89
The majority's decision seems to contradict Justice Kogan's interpretation
of the rights afforded to unit owners under section 718.303(1)(e). The
majority opinion did not mention this section, and it is possible that the
court's holding that unit owners must pay assessments to fund the associa-
tion's litigation expenses could be limited in application to cases prior to the
effective date of section 718.303(1)(e). This is probably not the correct
view, however. Although the amended statute entitles a prevailing unit
owner to a refund of an assessment to fund the association's litigation
expenses, it does not preclude the unit owner's from being required to pay,
in some form other than an assessment, for the association's expenses. As
discussed further below, the association's litigation expenses are still
common expenses, and the unit owners could be forced to either pay or lose
their interest in the common elements through foreclosure.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. If the Unit Owners Sue Their Association as a Class and
Prevail, No One Will Be Left to Pay the Association's Legal
Fees
As mentioned in Part I of this comment, it is unclear how section
718.303(1) of the Florida Statutes would be applied in a situation where the
unit owners as a class sue their association and prevail or when a significant
number of unit owners sue and prevail. The statute's wording only refers
to "[a] unit owner" as the party entitled to reimbursement for any special
assessments levied by the association to fund its expenses of litigation."
If the entire class of unit owners was entitled to reimbursement for litigation
expense assessments levied by their association, how would the association
fund th& reimbursement? If section 718.303(1) is applied literally, then
there will be no one left to pay a special assessment for litigation expenses
when the unit owners sue as a class instead of individually. Similarly, if a
levied by the association to fund its expenses of the litigation. This relief does
not exclude other remedies provided by law.
FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1) (1993).
89. See iL
90. See id.
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large group of unit owners sues and prevails, should the few unit owners
who were not plaintiffs bear the burden of paying all the litigation expenses?
In such situations, the conflict between section 718.303(1) and section
718.116(9)(a) becomes apparent. Section 718.116(9)(a) provides that no
unit owner may be excused from paying his share of common expenses
unless all other unit owners are also proportionately excused.9' It does not
seem as though the two statutes can be reconciled. The logical, orderly
system of condominium law breaks down at this point. The association is
a corporate entity which is supposed to represent its constituent unit owners.
When the unit owners as a class sue the entity that is supposed to be their
representative, they are suing themselves. If the unit owners are exempt
from paying the association's attorney's fees, the unpaid attorneys will have
no alternative but to assert their claim by enforcing a lien against the
association property, which would probably result in foreclosure of the
property. If the association does not own any real property, the judgment
could be levied and enforced against the association's bank account.
Because the unit owners have a collective interest in the association property
or the association's bank account, they will still end up paying for expenses
incurred by the association. Thus, although section 718.303(1), if applied
literally, would prevent the owners from paying in the form of a special
assessment, it will not prevent the unit owners from paying in a different
and less acceptable manner.
B. Unit Owners Will Seek to Impose Personal Liability on
Directors to a Greater Degree Than Before
The Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Ocean Trail could be
interpreted as a move to provide more protection for individual directors on
the decisions they make, thereby removing one of the major disincentives
to serving on condominium association boards. The association's power to
make assessments to pay for the costs incurred in defending their actions,
whether proper or not, allows directors to cover whatever losses are not paid
by their insurers. However, unit owners, now realizing that they will
ultimately have to pay for their victory if it is against the association, might
begin to sue directors individually rather than as their representatives.
Obviously, an action against a director may not be possible if the circum-
stances do not give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Neverthe-
less, if that is the only way that unit owners can seek relief against what
they perceive as wrongful acts by their association's board, suits seeking
91. Id. § 718.116(9)(a).
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personal liability against directors can be anticipated. Most associations'
articles of incorporation indemnify the officers and directors for their actions
taken on behalf of the association unless such action was the result of gross
negligence or willful misconduct. Assuming the same facts as in Ocean
Trail, where the directors act on the advice of counsel, it is likely that the
association would be obligated to indemnify the directors for their wrongful
acts. Hence, the result is the same: the unit owners end up paying
themselves.
V. POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO MINIMIZE OCEAN TRAIL'S
IMPACT ON UNIT OWNERS
A. Increased Use of Arbitration as an Alternative to Suits
Between Unit Owners and Their Associations
Arbitration and other forms of alternate dispute resolution are becoming
increasingly in vogue. Applied to disputes between unit owners and
condominium associations, arbitration is a potential alternative which, while
not eliminating the problem, would reduce the severity of potential
assessments to cover litigation expenses. Disputes between the unit owners
and their association should be submitted to binding arbitration using a
procedure which is already in place for the recall of association board
members9" as well as for "internal disputes arising from the operation of
the condominium among developers, unit owners, associations, and their
agents and assigns."93 Although the voluntary arbitration provision was
already in place when the Ocean Trail litigation began, the parties did not
make use of it. Had they done so, they perhaps could have avoided at least
a good part of the total litigation expenses. Chapter 718 currently requires
arbitration before a suit can be filed, such that the Ocean Trail dispute
would, under current law, probably be subject to arbitration.
B. Establish Mandatory Minimum Required Levels of Errors and
Omissions Insurance
As noted in Mead, the association's errors and omissions insurance was
insufficient to cover the litigation costs incurred by the association.9 4
Although the shortfall was arguably attributable to the association's decision
92. See FLA. STAT. §§ 718.112(k)(3), 718.1255 (1993).
93. Id. § 718.112(1).
94. Mead, 638 So. 2d at 964.
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to settle for less than the full amount of its expenses, it is possible that the
association would have incurred additional attorney's fees if forced to
litigate its claim for coverage against the insurer. If a mandatory minimum
level of errors and omissions insurance was required, such problems could
be reduced if not avoided. This modification in condominium law should
be implemented with the insurers providing for the defense of the associa-
tion. Although requiring an increased amount of coverage would result in
higher insurance premiums, which would be a common expense to be paid
by the unit owners, the benefits of increased protection in a worst case
scenario would more than offset this higher cost. It would also demonstrate
fiduciary prudence on the part of the board of directors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The condominium form of real property ownership is intended to
operate as a democracy. The association is the government. The board of
directors is democratically elected by the owner constituency and is
supposed to represent the owners' interests. Ideally, the system should
provide for sharing of many amenities in the form of common elements
which the unit owners might not be able to afford individually in exchange
for the sharing of common expenses. In reality, however, the microcosm
of condominium government mirrors the operation of larger-scale democra-
cies: there are power struggles, and the governmental representatives are
challenged when they lose touch with their constituency, exceed their
authority, and abuse their "taxing and spending powers." The unit owners
at the Ocean Trail Condominium learned all too well that the price of
democracy is high when they challenged the unauthorized action of their
representative association and its board of directors. The Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Ocean Trail may to some seem unfair toward unit
owners. Nonetheless, the court's holding comports with the logic and letter
of Florida's Condominium Act, although it raises a potential conflict with
section 718.303(1). The severity of the unit owners' potential exposure can
be reduced by taking various measures, but the fact of their ultimate
common liability must be recognized as a basic concept underlying
condominium law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida recently decided a case
concerning the enforceability of a homeowner's association restriction
against the installation of satellite dishes Specifically, the court addressed
whether the restriction violates the First Amendment.? Latera v. Isle at
Mission Bay Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.3 involves two competing interests:
1. Latera v. Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Ass'n, 655 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
2. Id. at 145.
3. Id.
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the rights of homeowners to have free access to information,4 and the
powers of homeowner's associations to establish and enforce rules regarding
the "uses to which individually owned property may be put."5 This article
addresses whether Florida courts should enforce a private homeowner's
association's restrictive covenant prohibiting the installation of satellite
dishes on homeowner's property.
Part II of this article will explore the growth of the satellite industry.
Next, Part III will provide an overview of the Latera case. Part IV will then
discuss the validity of homeowner's association restrictions. Specifically,
this section will address certain powers of the homeowner's association, and
how courts determine whether homeowner's associations have exercised
these powers in a reasonable manner. Part V will evaluate the reason-
ableness of the restriction prohibiting satellite dishes in the Latera case.
Specifically, this section will analyze the differing arguments put forth by
the homeowners and the homeowner's association in the Latera case.
Finally, Part VI will evaluate the constitutionality of the homeowner's
association's restriction prohibiting satellite dishes in the Latera case.
Specifically, this section will discuss whether the right to receive infor-
mation via a satellite dish is a fundamental right. This section also analyzes
arguments of both the homeowners and the homeowner's association
regarding whether there is sufficient state action for the homeowners in
Latera to claim a constitutional violation.
II. GROWTH OF THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY
The number of satellite dishes being used in United States homes
increased from an estimated 900,000 units in 1984 to approximately 2.8
million units in 1991.6 Today, there are over 4.3 million home satellite
units operating in United States homes, and system sales exceeded over
30,000 per month in 1993.7 Congress facilitated this growth of home
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. See WAYNE S. HYATr, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER AsSOCIATION PRACTICE:
COMMUNYry AsSOCIATION LAW 12 (2d ed. 1988).
6. Ward White, Home Satellite Dish Industry: A Brief Study of Growth and
Development, 34 How. L.J. 243, 243 (1991).
7. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Satellite Television Alliance In Support of Position
of Appellant at 8, Latera v. Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Ass'n, 655 So. 2d 144 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 93-2952) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae].
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satellite dish use by encouraging the advancement of new technologies and
services to the public.'
Modem satellite reception systems have the capability to receive a wide
variety of program services. Satellites offer both educational and entertain-
ment programming unavailable from any other source, including hundreds
of domestic as well as international television and radio signals.' Within
the last twenty years, satellites have "revolutionized the world's ability to
communicate with itself."10 Since cable systems have not fully utilized this
programming, only by installing and maintaining a satellite dish antenna can
one "realize the full potential of the communications revolution.""
Although newer satellite dishes are smaller in design, the general size of
dishes required to receive clear satellite signals ranges between eight and
twelve feet in diameter.12 Satellite transmissions are microwave signals
that must travel in a straight line from transmitter to receiver. 3 Therefore,
a direct, unobstructed line between the "orbiting communications satellites"
and the home satellite dish antenna is vital for reception. 4 Accordingly,
since location of the satellite dish can impair its effectiveness, factors such
as topography, landscaping, or building obstructions can limit or govern a
homeowner's placement of the dish.'5 Since satellite dishes can be quite
large and are required to be placed outdoors, many homeowner's associa-
tions regulate or restrict the installation of satellite dishes for safety and
aesthetic reasons.' 6 Consequently, the home satellite industry has consid-
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988). The section provides:
It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new
technologies and services to the public. Any person or party (other than the
Commission) who opposes a new technology or service proposed to be
permitted under this chapter shall have the burden to demonstrate that such
proposal is inconsistent with the public interest.
Id.; see also id § 701.
9. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 8, 9, 17, Latera (No. 93-2952).
10. Id at 17.
11. Id.
12. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 9, Latera (No. 93-2952).
13. Id
14. Id at 10.
15. Id.
16. See Ross v. Hatfield, 640 F. Supp. 708, 709 (D. Kan. 1986); Portola Hills
Community Ass'n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 581 (Ct. App. 1992); Esplanade Patio
Homes Homeowners' Ass'n v. Rolle, 613 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(directing lower court to enforce a valid restriction against satellite dishes in community);
Killearn Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. Keever, 595 So. 2d 1019, 1022 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995]
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ered these concerns and "has made great strides in recent years in encourag-
ing creative landscaping to reduce or eliminate aesthetic objections to
satellite dish installations, and by developing products that camouflage the
antennas or conceal them in other structures, such as patio furniture, that is
commonplace and generally accepted in most communities."' 7
Ill. LATERA V. ISLE AT MISSION BAY HOMEOWNERS ASS'N, INC.
On August 15, 1991, Ken and Tina Marie Latera purchased a lot within
the Isle at Mission Bay, a single family residential community which is one
of ten subordinate communities organized under the control and authority
of the Mission Bay Association."8 Two officers of the Mission Bay
Association assured the Lateras that they would be permitted to install a
satellite dish on their property. 9 On July 22, 1991, the Lateras submitted
plans for the installation of their satellite dish to the Mission Bay Design
Review Committee and obtained oral approval prior to the purchase of their
lot.20 The Design Review Committee then gave the Lateras' plans an
initial review and conditional approval on August 28, 1991.21 The
conditional approval required the Lateras to buffer the satellite dish with
landscaping around the entire rear perimeter of the property and disguise the
satellite dish as patio furniture.22
The Design Review Committee granted tentative written approval on
May 1, 1992, and final written approval on August 19, 1992, as all the
1992) (finding that restriction precluding satellite dish in side yard was not arbitrarily applied
where the dish was visible from the front of the property and other homeowners installed
satellites in their backyards); Prinzing v. Jockey Club of North Port Owners Ass'n, 483 So.
2d 833, 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming lower court's holding that a television
satellite antenna dish "constitute[d] a 'structure' as contemplated by [the] deed restrictions");
Breeling v. Churchill, 423 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Neb. 1988).
17. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 10, Latera (No. 93-2952).
18. Appellants' Initial Brief at 1, Latera (No. 93-2952).
19. The Lateras were told that a satellite dish would be permitted on the Lateras'
property "under certain design restrictions devised to insure the ascetic integrity of the
Mission Bay community." Id. The Lateras were also told that the Master Association's
(Mission Bay) Design Review Committee would administrate the matter pursuant to the
Mission Bay Design Review Standards Board. Id.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id.
22. The landscaping was to include six-foot ficus trees to preclude the satellite dish from
being seen from any neighboring lots or the street. Appellants' Initial Brief at 2, Latera (No.
93-2952).
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Design Review Committee's conditions had been satisfied.23 Then on
April 24, 1992, the Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Association ("Isle"),
notified the Lateras that they were in violation of an Isle covenant which
prohibited the installation of television-receiving satellite dishes.24
Consequently, the Isle's attorney notified the Lateras on October 14, 1992,
that the Isle fined them $1000 for failing to remove the satellite dish.25
Subsequently, on December 22, 1992, the Isle placed a claim of lien on the
Lateras' property for the $1000 fine.26 Finally, on February 1, 1993, the
Isle filed suit to foreclose the lien and sought injunctive relief to enforce the
Isle's restrictive covenant.2
7
A. Statement of the Case
The Lateras raised four affirmative defenses in their Answer to the
Isle's Complaint." The third affirmative defense alleged "that an absolute
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3. Article eleven, section ten of the Isle's declaration of covenants, entitled,
"Antennas," provides that "[n]o television or other outdoor antenna system or facility, shall
be erected or maintained on any lot." Answer Brief of Appellee at 1, Latera (No. 93-2952)
(emphasis omitted). Article eleven, section eighteen of the Isle's Declaration entitled,
"Additional Restrictions", provides: "[a]dditional restrictions on the use of lots and the
property generally are contained in the Master Declaration. In the event of any conflict
between the restriction in this Declaration and those in the Master Declaration, the more
restrictive restriction shall control." Ik (emphasis omitted). The Lateras only sought
permission to install their satellite dish from the Mission Bay Master Association, when
apparently they also needed the approval of the Isle. Id. at 2-3.
25. Appellants' Initial Brief at 3, Latera (No. 93-2952).
26. Id.
27. Answer Brief of Appellee at 7, Latera (No. 93-2952).
28. The first affirmative defense alleged was estoppel, laches, and unclean hands on the
part of the Isle, as the Lateras went through great expense to seek and did receive approval
from the Master Association's Design Review Committee. Appellants' Initial Brief at 4,
Latera (No. 93-2952). In response to this defense, the Isle alleged that the Lateras:
waived and/or were estopped to contest the application of Article XI, Section 10
of THE ISLE's Declaration, due to their failure to submit any plans for review
or approval to THE ISLE and due to the fact that the Defendants knew, or
should have known of the restriction contained in THE ISLE's recorded
Declaration.
Answer Brief of Appellee at 8-9, Latera (No. 93-2952).
The second affirmative defense alleged was that the restriction was ambiguous in the
context of the other governing documents, as the Isle's Declaration did not specifically
address a restriction against satellite dishes, while the Master Association's documents
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restriction was unenforceable as a matter of law," and that "the Isle's
attempt to impose an absolute restriction without a balancing of the equities
or hardships [was] unconscionable and therefore arbitrary, unreasonable and
unenforceable." 29 The Lateras' fourth affirmative defense alleged "[c]onsti-
tutional violations, including the Lateras' First Amendment right to free
access to information, which the Isle's access to cable did not satisfy. 30
The Lateras also relied on a federal governmental policy to facilitate the use
of satellite dishes.31 However, in rejecting these defenses, the trial court
granted the Isle's motion for summary judgment without any opinion.3"
B. Appellate Court's Decision
On appeal from the final summary judgment order, the appellate court
addressed the issue of "whether a restriction against the installation of
satellite dishes violates the First Amendment."33  The court rejected the
First Amendment argument regarding the Lateras' rights to privacy and free
access to information, reasoning that "the right to install a satellite dish has
specifically discussed the acceptability of satellite dishes upon conditional approval provided
certain design restrictions were complied with. Appellants' Initial Brief at 4, Latera (No. 93-
2952).
29. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
30. The other constitutional violation alleged concerned the Lateras' right to privacy.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
31. Id
32. Id. A thirty-minute hearing was held on the Isle's motion for summary judgment.
Both parties submitted memoranda and the court reviewed the file, in addition to listening
to argument of both counsel. Appellants' Initial Brief at 5, Latera (No. 93-2952).
33. Latera, 655 So. 2d at 145. The court also addressed the issue of "whether a satellite
dish is an 'antenna' within the meaning of the covenant." Id. at 144-45. The court rejected
the Lateras' argument that a satellite is different than an antenna because a satellite only
receives microwaves, whereas an antenna can receive or transmit electromagnetic waves. Id.
at 145. Rather, the court ruled that there was no valid difference between a satellite dish and
an antenna, and thus held that a satellite dish is an "antenna" within the meaning of the
covenant. Id. (citing Breeling, 423 N.W.2d at 471 (holding restriction prohibiting antennas
includes satellite dish)). The Breeling court also held that a homeowner's claim that
enforcement of a restrictive covenant abridges the First Amendment right of freedom of
speech is without merit. Breeling, 423 N.W.2d at 470. The Latera court also cited DeNina
v. Bammel Forest Civic Club, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986) and Gunnels
v. North Woodland Hills Community Ass'n, 563 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Latera, 655 So. 2d at 145.
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not been recognized as a 'fundamental right."' 34 Accordingly, the court
stated:
[a]s the Supreme Court [of the United States] has consistently held, a
policy which does not affect a fundamental right is accorded a "strong
presumption of validity," and such policy must be upheld against a
constitutional challenge "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis" for such a policy.
35
The appellate court also found no merit in the Lateras' argument that the
covenant was unreasonably or arbitrarily applied.36 Therefore, the appellate
court affirmed the final summary judgment order which required the Lateras
to take down their satellite dish and enjoined them from further violating the
Isle's restrictive covenant prohibiting satellite dishes.37
IV. VALIDITY OF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION
RESTICTIONS
Florida has a large amount of community association development.
Thus, Florida courts are continuously faced with dilemmas concerning the
enforceability of homeowner's association's restrictions regulating the use
of homeowner's property.38 The interests of the association in maintaining
the integrity of the community and the market value of homes within the
community often conflict with the interests of the homeowners within the
association.39 Usually the interests of the homeowners include the desire
34. Il at 146 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (discussing the right to
free speech); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (discussing the right to marry);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (discussing the right to
procreate)). The court in Latera distinguished Gerber v. Longboat Harbour North
Condominium, 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (involving a covenant abridging right to
free speech), vacated in part, 757 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1991) and Franklin v. White
Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (involving
covenant abridging right to marry and procreate on the basis that the rights involved in these
cases have been regarded as "fundamental rights"), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
35. Latera, 655 So. 2d at 146 (citing Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993)).
36. Id. at 145.
37. Id.
38. See HYATT, supra note 5, at 3.
39. See Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Note, Community Association Use Restrictions: Applying
the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 653, 654 (1988).
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to freely use and enjoy their property without any "unnecessary and burden-
some interference" by the association.'
A. Powers of the Homeowner's Association
A simple decision to use one's property as he or she desires can
become complicated when the property is within the confines of a communi-
ty association.41 The community association is empowered by a recorded
declaration of covenants, conditions, restrictions,42 and/or association
bylaws43 to impose restrictions on the use and occupancy of property. 44
Community association covenants or rules address typical public concerns
such as the maintenance of common areas and facilities, common services,
architectural standards, and appropriate maintenance by individual property
owners.45  In addition to these concerns, homeowner's associations may
also attempt to regulate private aspects of the lives of association mem-
bers.46
40. See id.
41. A community association is a generic term used to describe all forms of mandatory
membership in a housing association. HYATr', supra note 5, at 10. See also FLA. STAT. §
468.31(1) (1993). The individual unit owners automatically become members subject to the
association's procedures and powers upon purchase or conveyance of the property unit.
HYATT, supra note 5, at 10. Common types of community associations include homeowner's
associations and condominium associations. See id. at 2, 13, 19. The major difference
between condominium and homeowners' associations is the ownership of common property,
or those parts of the community other than the individually owned homes, units, or lots. Id.
at 20. Under a condominium association, the common property is owned in common by all
the unit owners, while under a homeowner's association the association has title to the
common property and the property owners have membership interests in the common
property. Id. A second difference is that under Florida law, condominium associations are
governed by different legislation than homeowner's associations. See Ch. 95-274, § 52-63,
1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1882, 1998-2005 (West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 617.302-312)
(governing homeowner's associations). See also FLA. STAT. §§ 718.101-718.1255 (1993)
(governing condominium associations).
42. The declaration is the basic creating document in a community association. HYATT,
supra note 5, at 356. This document may include plans for development and ownership,
proposed operation methods, and rights and responsibilities of owners within the association.
Id. Terms of the declaration are recorded in the land records and, therefore, continue to
apply to each subsequent property owner. Id. at 357.
43. The association bylaws usually provide rules and procedures for operating and
governing the association. Id.
44. See id. at 12.
45. Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REv. 472, 473
(1985).
46. Id.
537
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Grieve
At times, though, it is permissible for the association to regulate private
aspects of the lives of association members in order for the association to
fulfill its responsibilities.47 Associations have a broad range of responsibil-
ities, which may include: overall management of the land and community;
providing repair services and maintenance for streets, parks, lighting
systems, and recreational facilities; and employing appropriate means of
security.4" Also, the documents creating the association usually include
standards for architecture and the environment, as well as a system to
establish and enforce these standards, which reflect the aesthetics of the
community.49 Therefore, when the association properly performs these
duties, the association preserves the nature and character of the development.
Consequently, homes within a community association are likely to be worth
more."0 Many homeowners are enticed by the assurance and confidence
of a homeowner's association.5' However, homeowners often learn that the
restrictions homeowner's associations establish sometimes prove to be
unreasonable or serve no useful purpose to association values.5"
B. Test for Reasonableness
When evaluating whether the interests of the homeowner's association
or the interests of the individual property owner should prevail, a starting
point is the realization of the proposition set forth in Sterling Village
Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach."3 The court noted that "[e]very man
may justly consider his home his castle and himself as the king thereof;
nonetheless his sovereign fiat to use his property as he pleases must yield,
at least in degree, where ownership is in common or cooperation with oth-
ers."54 Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court of Florida has
47. See id at 473-74.
48. HYATr, supra note 5, at 12-13.
49. Id.
50. Gunnels, 563 S.W.2d at 338.
51. Id.
52. See James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582; White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379
So. 2d 346, 352 (Fla. 1979); Harbour Watch Homeowners Ass'n v. Derderian, 618 So. 2d
315, 316 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Kies v. Hollub, 450 So. 2d 251, 255 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Voight v. Harbour Heights Improvement Ass'n, 218 So. 2d 803, 806 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
53. 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla.
1971).
54. Id See also Basso, 393 So. 2d at 638-39. Although these cases involve
condominium associations, they can be analogized with cases involving homeowner's
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acknowledged the need for reasonable restrictions relating to the use,
occupancy, and transfer of units in order to protect the interests of other unit
owners." Courts have often referred to these principles when they have
ruled on the enforceability of various community association restrictions
limiting the free use and enjoyment of property subject to the declarations
of the associations. 6
Although the Florida courts have never ruled on the validity of a
private covenant prohibiting the installation of a satellite dish, they have
reviewed a broad range of covenants. These covenants include: age
restrictions; 57 restrictions against replacing screen enclosures with glass;
58
restrictions against having pets;59 restrictions prohibiting horses, detached
barns, or wire fences;' restrictions against displaying "for sale" signs;
61
restrictions against parking commercial vehicles in uncovered streets or
driveways; 62 restrictions against construction of tennis court lighting,63 a
associations, as both homeowner's associations and condominium associations are types of
community associations. See HYATr, supra note 5, at 2. Likewise, both the Lateras and the
Isle cited cases involving condominium associations in support of their arguments. Although
condominium associations and homeowner's associations are governed by different statutes,
the associations are treated similarly under Florida law. See supra note 41. However,
homeowner's associations are not as heavily regulated as condominium associations. See
supra text accompanying note 41.
55. Franklin, 379 So. 2d at 350 (finding condominium restriction prohibiting residency
of children under twelve enforceable if not arbitrarily and selectively applied).
56. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 638-39.
57. See Franklin, 379 So. 2d at 351. The court asserted that age restrictions are
enforceable as a "reasonable means to accomplish the lawful purpose of providing
appropriate facilities for the differing housing needs and desires of the varying age groups."
Id. Furthermore, the court acknowledged that age restrictions can not be used arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Id.; see also Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378,
383 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding age restriction not unreasonably or selectively
applied); Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 342 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
58. See, e.g., Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d at 688 (upholding requirement of association
approval to substitute glass for screen because the alteration is material and substantial).
59. See, e.g., Wilshire Condominium Ass'n v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that "a restriction against the replacement of dogs is reasonably
consistent with principles that promote the health, happiness and peace of mind of unit
owners living in close proximity"); see also Pines of Boca Barwood Condominium Ass'n v.
Cavouti, 605 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
60. See, e.g., James v. Smith, 537 So. 2d 1074, 1078 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(upholding restrictive covenants).
61. See, e.g., Derderian, 618 So. 2d at 316 (affirming that prohibition against "for sale"
signs places unlawful burden on homeowner's right to sell property).
62. See Cottrell v. Miskove, 605 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The
court upheld the restriction, reasoning that "[flailure to enforce the restriction would thwart
Vol. 20
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skateboard ramp,' or a swimming pool and deck;6" restrictions requiring
association approval before selling a unit;66 restrictions against maintaining
a shallow water well;67 and restrictions prohibiting the use of alcoholic
beverages in the clubhouse and adjacent areas. 8 In determining the
validity of these various association use restrictions, the courts have split the
cases into two categories. Cases involving the association declaration are
classified as category one restrictions, and cases involving board of
directors' rules are classified as category two restrictions. 9
Courts view category one use restrictions with a strong presumption of
validity, as they are considered "covenant[s] running with the land," which
homeowners knew of or should have been aware of at the time they
purchased their homes.70 Other homeowners are entitled to rely on these
restrictions, especially since these very same restrictions may have
influenced their decision to purchase within the community.71 Therefore,
the clear intention of all property owners of the subdivision... who have purchased property
in reliance upon the restrictive covenants." Id. at 574.
63. See Kies, 450 So. 2d at 256. The association covenants did not expressly prohibit
a tennis court lighting system. Id. Moreover, there was no evidence showing the lighting
system created a nuisance or was detrimental to community aesthetics. Id. The court further
stated that "covenants imposed by a general plan, restraining the free use of real property,
although generally valid and enforceable, are not favored in the law and will not be honored
by the courts unless the restraint is within reasonable bounds." Id. at 255.
64. See Lathan v. Hanover Woods Homeowners Ass'n, 547 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The court allowed the homeowner to maintain the skateboard ramp
due to conflict regarding whether architectural review board approval was necessary before
erecting the skateboard ramp, since vague restrictions are construed in favor of the property
owner in order to promote the free use of land. Id. at 321.
65. See, e.g., Palm Point Property Owners' Ass'n v. Pisarski, 608 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding the property owners' association did not have standing to
maintain an action to enforce the restrictive covenants), review granted, 618 So. 2d 1369
(Fla.), decision approved, 626 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1993).
66. See, e.g., Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The
court asserted that the association did not arbitrarily or unreasonably invoke its right of first
refusal since the prospective purchasers of the unit intended to lease the unit instead of
occupying it. Id. at 967-68.
67. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640. The court held that the association "failed to demonstrate
a reasonable relationship between its denial of the Bassos' application [to maintain a well]
and the objectives which the denial sought to achieve." Id.
68. See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding the restriction on the use of alcoholic beverages noting
widespread use of such restrictions in governmental and private sectors).
69. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 639; see also Cavouti, 605 So. 2d at 985.
70. See Basso, 393 So. 2d at 639; Cavouti, 605 So. 2d at 985.
71. Answer Brief of Appellee at 26, Latera (No. 93-2952).
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restrictions placed by the associations in their recorded declarations of
covenants, conditions, and restrictions will not be invalidated unless they are
"clearly ambiguous, ' '12 applied arbitrarily, or violative of public policy or
a fundamental constitutional right.73
Category two restrictions, those imposed by the association board, must
be "reasonably related to the promotion of the health, happiness and peace
of mind of all the unit owners" in order to be valid and enforceable.74
Therefore, unlike declaration restrictions which may still be valid even if
they seem somewhat unreasonable, unreasonable restrictions imposed by an
association board will not be enforced by courts."
V. REASONABLENESS OF THE ISLE'S RESTRICTION PROHIBITING
SATELLITE DISHES
A. The Lateras' Arguments
Florida courts have never ruled that a homeowner's association
restriction absolutely prohibiting satellite dishes was unreasonably or
arbitrarily applied. Nevertheless, the Lateras asserted that the absolute
restriction against satellite dishes was arbitrary and unreasonable as applied
to their property.76 Their argument is based on the fact that the satellite
was not visible to other residents and the Isle was attempting to enforce the
restriction without considering its underlying purpose or the interests of the
parties.77 Therefore, the Lateras argued that the Isle's attempt to enforce the
satellite restriction was "unconscionable" as an "absolute rule., 78
The purpose of the Isle's restriction against satellites is to "maintain
'property value by insuring aesthetics."'7 9  The Lateras' satellite dish
complied with this purpose, as the Lateras made all feasible steps to insure
that the satellite dish was "unobtrusive and harmonious with community
72. Harrington, 467 So. 2d at 381.
73. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640; Cavouti, 605 So. 2d at 985.
74. Cavouti, 605 So. 2d at 985 (citing Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640). See also Norman, 309
So. 2d at 182, for the proposition that "the test is reasonableness. If a rule is reasonable the
association can adopt it; if not, it cannot." The court further stated that what is considered
unreasonable will depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id.
75. See Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640.
76. Appellants' Initial Brief at 20, Latera (No. 93-2952).
77. Il
78. Id.
79. Id. at 21.
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aesthetics."8 The Lateras satellite dish in no way conflicted with commu-
nity aesthetics within the Isle at Mission Bay since it could not even be
seen. Furthermore, the Lateras' satellite was disguised as patio furniture and
wa secluded within eight-foot hedges and a fence." The Isle, however,
did not take this into account, nor did it evaluate whether the Lateras'
alleged violation of the restrictive covenant contravened the purpose for
imposing the restriction in the first place. Likewise, the Isle did not take
into account the equities or hardships of the parties. Therefore, the Lateras
maintained that the Isle's attempted enforcement of the restrictive covenant
was unreasonable and arbitrary. 2 As support for this argument, the Lateras
relied on the case of Kies v. Hollub83 for the proposition that "covenants
... restraining the free use of real property... are not favored in the law
and will not be honored by the courts unless the restraint is within
reasonable bounds."84 If an otherwise valid restrictive covenant is being
exercised in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, it is unenforceable. 5
Similarly, the Lateras maintained that even if the Isle's restriction against
satellites may otherwise be valid, it should not have been enforced in their
case because it was exercised in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner.86
The Lateras also cited an analogous California case, Portola Hills
Community Ass'n v. James,7 where the court held that a private restriction
prohibiting a homeowner from installing a satellite dish was unreason-
able.8 The court refused to enforce the restrictive covenant that complete-
ly banned satellite dishes within the community association 9 because it
was not visible to other association residents or to the public." The court
balanced the intent of the homeowner's association as a whole against the
80. Id.
81. Appellants' Reply Brief at 15, Latera (No. 93-2952).
82. Appellants' Initial Brief at 21, Latera (No. 93-2952).
83. 450 So. 2d 251, 255 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
84. Idl (citing Soranaka v. Cook, 343 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
85. Appellants' Initial Brief at 21-22, Latera (No. 93-2952).
86. Id at 22.'
87. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 583.
88. Appelants' Initial Brief at 23, Latera (No. 93-2952).
89. The covenant reads: "'13. Satellite Dish: Absolutely no satellite dish of any nature
will be acceptable on the exterior of the units or lots anywhere within the Association. Cable
television has been provided for this purpose."' James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581 (emphasis
omitted).
90. The ten-foot satellite dish was hidden in the back of the homeowner's two-story
house, and surrounded by a high slope in the back, six-foot fences, and substantial shrubbery.
Id. at 582 n.2.
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homeowner9 and concluded it was not reasonable to put an outright ban
on satellite dishes.92 Additionally, the court made reference to a federal
government policy to "foster the use of satellite dishes."93 The court based
its decision on the fact that prohibiting a satellite that can not be seen does
not promote "any legitimate goal of the association."94 The Latera court
could have justifiably relied on this same reasoning to preclude enforcement
of the Isle's restriction against satellite dishes.
The Lateras also relied on Voight v. Harbour Heights Improvement
Ass'n,95 which involved covenants reserving the right of the association to
approve or disapprove proposed construction plans for lots within the
community.96 The Voight court concluded that the association's veto
power could not be exercised unreasonably or arbitrarily. 97 The final
argument asserted by the Lateras was that equity may refuse to enforce
restrictions where there has been a change in circumstances which renders
enforcement unreasonable. 98  Accordingly, the Lateras asserted that
circumstances have changed regarding satellite dishes in that their size,
appearance, and ability to be disguised have been altered substantially since
the Isle's documents were drafted. 99 The Lateras further argued that
"[s]ince dishes merely collect signals and do not omit any interference, as
an antenna might do, such wholesale restriction, in light of the continuing
progress in technology is archaic and renders strict enforcement unreason-
able. ,"1°°
91. The homeowner installed the satellite dish after seeking approval from the
Architectural Control Committee, which was denied. Il at 582.
92. Id. The court noted that restrictions regulating satellites for aesthetic reasons would
be appropriate. Id. at 583.
93. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582 n.2.
94. Id. at 583.
95. 218 So. 2d at 805. The court stated:
covenants restraining the free use of real property, although not favored, will
nevertheless be enforced where the intention of the parties is clear and the
restrictions and limitations are confined to a lawful purpose and within
reasonable bounds, but such covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free
and unrestricted use of real property.
Id.
96. Appellants' Reply Brief at 14, Latera (No. 93-2952).
97. Voight, 218 So. 2d at 805.
98. Appellants' Initial Brief at 24, Latera (No. 93-2952) (citing Edgewater Beach Hotel
Corp. v. Bishop, 163 So. 214 (Fla. 1935)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 24-25 (citing Noble v. Kisker, 183 So. 836 (Fla. 1938)).
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B. The Isle's Arguments
In arguing that the satellite restriction is enforceable, the Isle first
asserted that property owners' interests "must yield ... where ownership is
in common or cooperation with others, '. °1 and that courts regard restric-
tions within recorded declarations to be "of paramount importance in
defining the rights and obligations of unit owners."' "m The Isle relied on
White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin,'03 a case wherein the Supreme
Court of Florida acknowledged the necessity of reasonable use restrictions
within a condominium association.1°4 The Isle also emphasized the strong
presumption of validity courts give to restrictions recorded in association
declarations. 10 5  Covenants recorded in association declarations are
strongly presumed valid mainly because other homeowners justifiably rely
on these restrictions." Presumably, a homeowner knows of these
restrictions before purchasing property within the association and can decide
at that time whether they want to be subject to them.'O° Thus, the proper
time to object to a restriction is before making the decision to buy within
a community, rather than after.'0 s
The Association maintained that other homeowners in the association
chose "to live in a community that would not be cluttered by unsightly or
aesthetical displeasing 'outdoor television antenna systems . . .,.
101. Answer Brief of Appellee at 24, Latera (No. 93-2952) (citing Breitenbach, 251 So.
2d at 685).
102. Id. (citing Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n, 351 So. 2d 755, 757-58
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977)). The court in Pepe stated:
A declaration... is more than a mere contract spelling out mutual rights and
obligations of the parties thereto-it assumes some of the attributes of a covenant
running with the land, circumscribing the extent and limits of the enjoyment and
use of real property. Stated otherwise, it spells out the true extent of the
purchased, and thus granted, use interest therein. Absent consent, or an
amendment of the declaration ... as may be provided for in such declaration,
•.. this enjoyment and use cannot be impaired or diminished.
Pepe, 351 So. 2d at 757-58.
103. 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
104. The court held that "a condominium restriction or limitation does not inherently
violate a fundamental right and may be enforced if it serves a legitimate purpose and is
reasonably applied." ML at 350.
105. Answer Brief of Appellee at 25-26, Latera (No. 93-2952).
106. Id. at 26.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 29. The Isle also claimed the homeowners should be protected from hazards
that could occur should "'outdoor television antenna systems or facilities' break loose in a
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Consistent with the principle that the interests of the homeowner's associa-
tion in the aesthetics of its community outweighed the interests of the
individual property owners,1 ° the Association relied on Woodbridge
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Desmond.' In Woodbridge, the court stated
that a satellite dish disguised as patio furniture was still a satellite dish and
thus subject to the association's declaration that prohibited satellite
dishes. 112
Finally, the Isle maintained that if it allowed the Lateras to maintain
their satellite dish in violation of the restrictions, then the Isle could not
enforce this restriction against other homeowners under the "doctrine of
'selective enforcement.""' 3 Accordingly, the Isle argued the result would
be the association "mushroom[ing]" into "a 'satellite dish' farm," which
would not be fair to the other homeowners who purchased their homes
relying upon the Isle's declarations." 4 Overall, the Isle's position con-
storm or hurricane." Answer Brief of Appellee at 29, Latera (No. 93-2952). In defense of
this argument, the Lateras emphasized that their satellite dish was securely embedded in
concrete and survived Hurricane Andrew without proving to be dangerous. Appellants'
Reply Brief at 15, Latera, (No. 93-2952).
110. Answer Brief of Appellee at 28, Latera (No. 93-2952).
111. Appellants' Initial Brief at 22 (citing Woodbridge Homeowners Ass'n, No. 91-CV-
0415 (Oh. Clearmont County Ct. C.P. 1991)).
112. Answer Brief of Appellee at 27-28, Latera (No. 93-2952). The Woodbridge court
held that:
To say that the satellite dish does not violate the Declaration just because it
looks like a piece of patio furniture would be, in affect [sic] rewriting the
restrictions on behalf of the Homeowners Association. If the Homeowners
Association wanted to exclude well disguised satellite dishes from the operation
of the restrictive covenants, it could have done so ... This court, however, does
not have the authority to provide exceptions to the restrictive covenants.
Id. at 28. In defense to the Isle's argument that a disguised satellite is still a satellite and
thus subject to the restriction prohibiting satellites, the Lateras argued the issue is not whether
a satellite ceased to be a satellite dish when it is disguised. Appellants' Initial Brief at 22-23,
Latera (No. 93-2952). Rather, the Lateras asserted that the issue concerned the purpose for
enacting and enforcing the restriction: "to preserve and protect property value by controlling
ascetics." Id. Since the satellite was disguised as patio furniture, this purpose was met
without the need to enforce the restrictive covenant. See id. at 23.
113. Answer Brief of Appellee at 30, Latera (No. 93-2952) (citing Fifty-Six Sixty
Collins Ave. Condominium, Inc. v. Dawson, 354 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
114. Id. The Isle claimed the Lateras had two alternatives if they wanted to have a
satellite dish: move to a community which permits satellite dishes, or obtain support of
enough Isle homeowners to seek an amendment to the declaration addressing the permissibili-
ty of satellite dishes. Id. at 30-31.
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cerned serving the interests of the homeowners who purchased homes in the
Isle in reliance on the declaration restrictions 1 5
VI. CONSTITUTIONALrrY OF THE ISLE'S RESTRICTION
PROHIBITING SATELLITE DISHES
A. Fundamental Right
The Lateras' local cable company only carries a limited number of
satellite services. 16 Without access to a satellite dish, the Lateras will not
be able to receive the unique programming available only through satellite
reception." 7 The Lateras have a First Amendment right to free access to
information. ' Therefore, by denying the Lateras the opportunity to
receive unique satellite programs, the Isle abridged the Lateras' First
Amendment rights.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects First
Amendment freedoms of press and speech from being abridged by state
action." 9 The Supreme Court of California in Weaver v. Jordan,"
stated that the First Amendment right of freedom of speech and press
includes the right to receive information."' In Weaver, the Supreme
Court of California concluded that the "Free Television Act," which banned
subscription television when homeviewers were charged, violated the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and press." The court empha-
sized that "the rights of free speech and press are worthless without an
effective means of expression," and that the First Amendment protects
"amusement and entertainment as well as the exposition of ideas.
Most importantly, the Weaver court recognized that "[t]he right of freedom
115. Id. at 30.
116. Residents of the Isle at Mission Bay have access to cable television through West
Boca Cablevision. The cable system, however, does not offer programs available on satellite,
including "C-Span II (complete coverage of U.S. Senate proceedings and public affairs
programming not duplicated on C-Span I), SCOLA (international programming from foreign
television broadcasters) and NASA Select (complete coverage of all NASA launch and space
flight activities)." Brief of Amicus Curiae at 9 n.21, Latera (No. 93-2952).
117. Id.
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
119. See id. amend. XIV. See also Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
120. 411 P.2d 289 (Cal.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966).
121. Id. at 294.
122. Id. at 299.
123. Id. at 294; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae at 11, Latera, (No. 93-2952).
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of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, [and] the right to read ....
Subsequently in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 25 the Supreme
Court of the United States stated "[i]t is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences .... ,,2 There are also many other Supreme Court cases
recognizing or confirming the importance of the basic First Amendment
right to receive information.' Likewise, federal courts in Florida have
recognized that the First Amendment encompasses the right to receive
information.2 8  However, in Decker v. City of Plantation,129 the court
noted that the "First Amendment right to receive information via a satellite
dish is a relative right which may be outweighed by important governmental
interests, such as the protection of community aesthetics."' 30
Additionally, in Abbott v. City of Cape Canaveral,13 1 the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida expressed the view
that Red Lion did not guarantee a person the right to receive access to the
maximum amount of satellite programming available. 132  Abbott claimed
that a local Cape Canaveral ordinance regulating placement of satellite
dishes violated his First Amendment rights since the placement of his
satellite affected the amount of satellite programming he could receive.'
33
124. Weaver, 411 P.2d at 294 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482).
125. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
126. Id. at 390.
127. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 12, Latera (No. 93-2952). The following Supreme
Court cases were cited in the brief: Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)
(invalidating ordinance governing zoning restrictions on live entertainment); First Nat'l Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 367 (challenging
constitutional basis of the FCC Fairness doctrine); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (stating "the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas"); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (stating "the right of freedom of speech and
press ... necessarily protects the right to receive it").
128. See Abbott v. City of Cape Canaveral, 840 F. Supp. 880, 886 (M.D. Fla.) (stating
the "First Amendment may protect the right to receive suitable access to television
broadcasts"), aff'd, 41 F.3d 669 (1 lth Cir. 1994); Decker v. City of Plantation, 706 F. Supp.
851, 854 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
129. 706 F. Supp. at 854.
130. Id.
131. 840 F. Supp. at 880.
132. Id. at 886. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause the right to receive satellite
television programming of one's choice is not a fundamental right, the proper standard of
review is whether the ordinance is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest." Id.
(citing Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 353 (9th Cir. 1992)).
133. Id. at 882.
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The court concluded that the ordinance was a "content-neutral"'34 ordi-
nance "regulating the time, place, and manner of expression."' 135 "Courts
will uphold a content-neutral ordinance" against First Amendment claims if
it "furthers a substantial governmental interest and does not unreasonably
limit alternative avenues of communication.' 36  Accordingly, the court
upheld the ordinance because it served a substantial government interest by
protecting the health, safety, and aesthetic values of the community. 37
Furthermore, Abbott failed to show a limitation on his alternative avenues
of communication.' 38
Abbott is distinguishable from Latera because Abbott involved a city
ordinance regulating the placement of a satellite dish in Abbott's yard.'39
Placement of a satellite dish can hinder the number of satellite signals that
can be received."4° However, in Latera, the homeowner's association
completely banned the placement of satellite dishes anywhere on the
homeowner's property. 4 ' Consequently, the Lateras were not confronted
with the situation where they missed out on a few satellite programs because
an ordinance required their satellite dish to be inconveniently placed. 2
Rather, the homeowner's association restriction prevented the Lateras from
receiving access to all satellite programs with the exception of the few
services they could obtain through their cable system. 43 Therefore, the
homeowner's association's restriction prohibiting satellites unreasonably
limited the Lateras' alternative avenues of communication.
134. Id. at 886.
135. See Johnson, 982 F.2d at 353.
136. Abbott, 840 F. Supp. at 886; see also Johnson, 982 F.2d at 353; Brief of Amicus
Curiae at 13, Latera (No. 93-2952) (emphasis omitted) (noting "a rule or regulation
restricting access to protected communication will never be sustained unless the regulation
permits a reasonable alternative means of access to the same communication").
137. Abbott, 840 F. Supp. at 886.
138. Id.; see also Johnson, 982 F.2d at 354. The Johnson court found that a city
ordinance setting height, screening, and setback requirements for satellite-receive-only
antennas is a valid time, place, and manner regulation. Id Furthermore, the Johnson court
found that the city ordinance serves to prevent "installation of satellite antennas that
unreasonably interfere with other individuals' enjoyment of their land and which pose issues
of public safety." Id.
139. Abbott, 840 F. Supp. at 881-82.
140. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 10, Latera (No. 93-2952).
141. Latera, 655 So. 2d at 145.
142. See Johnson, 982 F.2d at 352; Decker, 706 F. Supp. at 853; Kessler v. Town of
Niskayuna, 774 F. Supp. 711, 712 (N.D.N.Y. 1991); Keever, 595 So. 2d at 1020; Brophy v.
Town of Castine, 534 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1987).
143. Latera, 655 So. 2d at 145.
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Furthermore, the Isle's restriction against satellites may serve to protect
the welfare and aesthetic values of the Isle community.'" But as previ-
ously emphasized, the Lateras' satellite dish did not harm community
aesthetic values because it was not visible to the public. Therefore, an
effective argument could be made that the Isle's restriction is not a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, 45 and the Isle is not
justified in depriving the Lateras of information they have a First Amend-
ment right to receive.
B. State Action
There are many cases involving satellite dishes which concern the
federal law preemption" of local ordinances which regulate satellite size
and/or placement.'47 Homeowners have alleged that zoning ordinances
144. Appellants' Initial Brief at 21, Latera (No. 93-2952).
145. A time, place, and manner regulation will not be sustained unless there is
reasonable alternative access to the same communication. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 13,
Latera (No. 93-2952) (citing Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (stating "a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the
remaining modes of communication are inadequate")). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 518 n.24 (1981); Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97-98
(1977) (striking ordinance prohibiting "for sale" signs as alternative communication channels
to list residence were likely to be more expensive and less effective); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating
statute prohibiting the advertisement of prices for prescription drugs and rejecting in the
process an argument that consumers could acquire the same information by simply making
inquiries to pharmacists); Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 (invalidating regulations prohibiting door
to door distribution of circulars and handbills and rejecting arguments that communication
is still possible); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
146. According to the F.C.C. regulation:
State and local zoning or other regulations that differentiate between satellite
receive-only antennas and other types of antenna facilities are preempted unless
such regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health, safety or aesthetic objective;
and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable limitations on, or prevent, reception
of satellite delivered signals by receive-only antennas or to impose costs on the
users of such antennas that are excessive in light of the purchase and installation
cost of the equipment.
47 C.F.R. § 25.104 (1994).
147. See Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1099 (1995); Johnson, 982 F.2d at 350; Abbott, 840 F. Supp. at 880; Decker, 706
F. Supp at 851. The Loschiavo court concluded that homeowners "are entitled to bring a
section 1983 action against the City of Dearborn to enforce their right to install a receive-
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violate their First Amendment right to receive information, since the
placement of a satellite can impact the amount of satellite signals that can
be received.148 The state action issue does not arise in these cases,
however, since the zoning ordinances in question constitute the requisite
state action needed to assert a constitutional violation. 49
The state action issue does, however, arise in cases where private
individuals assert that a homeowner's association has violated their
constitutional rights. For example, in Ross v. Hatfield, 50 the court found
a lack of state action where a covenant banning television antennas outside
residences had not been judicially enforced, and no suit had ever been
initiated to enforce the covenant.1 5' The Ross court acknowledged the
uncertainty regarding the applicability of Shelley v. Kraemer52 to non-
racial discriminatory covenants, but stated that Shelley required "actual
judicial enforcement of the covenant before state action may be found."'5
In Florida, the supreme court in Harris v. Sunset Islands Property
Owners, Inc.,"M opined that:
only satellite antenna for private viewing of satellite programming." Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at
553. See also Kessler, 774 F. Supp. at 718, which granted plaintiff's summary judgment
motion because the Town of Niskayuna ordinance "operates to differentiate between TVROs
[satellite television receive-only dish antennas] and other antenna facilities yet fails to state
a legitimate objective for the distinction." Therefore, the court found the ordinance was
preempted by federal legislation. Id.; see, e.g., Carino v. Town of Deerfield, 750 F. Supp.
1156, 1164 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing complaint because the state supreme court expressly
considered and rejected the preemption argument), aff'd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991); Alsar
Tech. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 563 A.2d 83, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989)
(holding the Nutley ordinance is discriminatory and preempted by F.C.C. regulation due to
unreasonable burden on satellite reception).
148. See Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 550; Johnson, 982 F.2d at 350; Abbott, 840 F. Supp. at
881; Kessler, 774 F. Supp. at 713; Carino, 750 F. Supp. at 1160; Decker, 706 F. Supp. at
852; Brophy, 534 A.2d at 664 (recognizing "that the right to receive information is a
component of the concept of free speech"); L.I.M.A. Partners v. Borough of Northvale, 530
A.2d 839 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (discussing validity of Northvale's zoning
ordinance).
149. See Ross, 640 F. Supp. at 712.
150. Id. at 708.
151. Id. at 710.
152. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants
discriminating against persons of different race from ownership of property denied petitioners
equal protection).
153. Ross, 604 F. Supp. at 710.
154. 116 So. 2d 622 (1959) (involving covenants restricting sale and occupancy of land).
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[t]he rule of Shelley v. Kraemer . . . has become so thoroughly
grounded in the decisions of the state courts around the country as well
as in the courts of the federal system that only a total blindness to the
compelling and controlling aspects of the decision would enable us to
avoid it.'55
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that judicial
enforcement of a covenant in violation of the rights of property owners
constitutes the requisite state action necessary for the property owner to
assert a constitutional violation.'56
Finally, in Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n,' 57 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal discussed two tests used to determine
whether conduct of private persons or groups constitutes state action
subjecting them to constitutional limitations: the "public function test," and
the "state involvement test."'' 58 The court stated that "[u]nder the public
function test, state action will be found where the functions of a private
individual or group are so impregnated with a governmental character as to
appear municipal in nature."'5 9 Additionally, the court stated that "[u]nder
the state involvement test, there must be a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged activity such that the activity may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself."'16' Applying these tests, the court
concluded that the homeowner's association did not act in such a public
manner that its actions could be considered state action.'
61
In the instant case, the Lateras claimed that the Isle at Mission Bay
Homeowner's Association deprived them of their constitutional right to
receive information.' 62 Since the Isle is not a governmental entity and is
not acting on behalf of the government, there was an issue as to whether
there was state action. 63 Because the Constitution limits state action that
abridges First Amendment rights through incorporation of the Fourteenth
155. Id. at 625.
156. See id. at 624 (recognizing that a state can only act through its executive,
legislative, or judicial branches as expressed in Shelley).
157. 502 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
158. Id. at 1381.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Latera, 655 So. 2d at 146.
163. See Appellants' Initial Brief at 25, Latera (No. 93-2952); Answer Brief of Appellee
at 31-35, Latera (No. 93-2952); Appellants' Reply Brief at 17, Latera (No. 93-2952).
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Amendment, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a claim alleging First
Amendment infringement, unless it finds sufficient state action.1
64
1. The Lateras' Arguments
The Lateras maintained that judicial enforcement of the Isle's private
restrictive covenant constituted state action and therefore, they were deprived
of their constitutionally protected right to receive information. r65 They
relied on the well known principle established in Shelley that "acts of a state
court enforcement of a private restrictive covenant constituted 'state
action.' ' 166 The Lateras noted that the Shelley opinion did not limit its
findings to private restrictive covenants that are discriminatory in nature. 67
Accordingly, the Lateras cited cases where courts applied the principle
established in Shelley to other constitutionally protected activities,
16 1
including the First Amendment right to free speech, 69 and the First
Amendment right to display an American flag. 7
In Gerber v. Longboat Harbour North Condominium, the court found
that a condo regulation prohibiting display of the American flag except on
designated national holidays infringed upon the unit owner's First Amend-
ment rights.17' The court refused to enforce the covenant, reasoning that
judicial enforcement would constitute sufficient state action depriving the
owner of his constitutional rights within the meaning of the Civil Rights
Act.7 The Isle sought judicial enforcement of a private restrictive
covenant prohibiting satellite dishes.173  Therefore, according to the
reasoning in Gerber, and consistent with Shelley, there was sufficient state
164. See Ross, 640 F. Supp. at 710.
165. Appellants' Initial Brief at 25, Latera (No. 93-2952).
166. Id. (citing Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20).
167. Id.
168. Appellants' Initial Brief at 25, Latera (No. 93-2952).
169. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
170. Gerber v. Longboat Harbour North Condominium, 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla.
1989), order vacated in part, 757 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
171. Id. at 887.
172. Id. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
173. Answer Brief of Appellee at 7, Latera (No. 93-2952).
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action in Latera for the homeowner to successfully allege a constitutional
claim.
2. The Isle's Arguments
In defense to the Lateras' claim of a constitutional violation, the Isle
maintained that there could be no violation of the Lateras' constitutional
rights without state action.' 74 The Isle argued there was no state action,
stating that "[i]t is now generally accepted that neither the recording of a
non-discriminatory restrictive covenant in the Public Records nor its
enforcement through the courts of this state constitutes sufficient 'state
action' to render parties purely private contracts relating to the ownership
of real property unconstitutional." '75  The Isle also reasoned that courts
should enforce the private non-discriminatory covenants because the Lateras
could have chosen not to purchase property within the association if they did
not approve of the restriction against satellites. 76 The Isle further asserted
that the availability of a forum to resolve private conflicts does not
constitute state action. 7 7 Accordingly, the Isle maintained that in order to
constitute state action, the court must use its power to "compel or legiti-
mize" private actions, which is the equivalent of state encouragement. 178
174. Id. at 34.
175. Answer Brief of Appellee at 31, Latera (No. 93-2952) (citation omitted); see also,
Quail Creek Property Owners Ass'n v. Hunter, 538 So. 2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989); Rocek v. Markowitz, 492 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Schreiner v.
McKenzie Tank Lines, 408 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), decision approved, 432
So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983). Contra Appellants' Reply Brief at 17, Latera, (No. 93-2952) (citing
Quail Creek, 538 So. 2d at 1289). In Quail Creek the homeowners sought injunctive and
declatory relief from enforcement of a covenant prohibiting display of a "for sale" sign.
Quail Creek, 538 So. 2d at 1289. The homeowners never established that they attempted to
display the sign, or that they were prevented from doing so by the association. Id. The court
held that "neither the recording of the protective covenant in the public records, nor the
possible enforcement of the covenant in the courts of the state, constitutes sufficient 'state
action' to render the parties' purely private contracts relating to the ownership of real
property unconstitutional." Id. The Appellants' Reply Brief quoted the above passage,
placing emphasis on the word "possible." Appellants' Reply Brief at 17, Latera (No. 93-
2952).
176. Answer Brief of Appellee at 32, Latera (No. 93-2952) (citing Rocek, 492 So. 2d
at 461; Franklin, 379 So. 2d at 346).
177. Id. (citing Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 718; Girard v. 94th Street & 5th Ave. Corp.,
396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), order aff'd, 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 425
U.S. 974 (1976)).
178. Id. at 33 (citing Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 720).
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Additionally, the Isle argued that under Shelley judicial enforcement of
private covenants may involve state action in some instances, but the
applicability of Shelley remains undeveloped.'79 According to the Isle, the
court in Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines"' rejected the proposition in
Shelley which mandated that there was state action whenever a state court
becomes involved or refuses to get involved in a private matter.'8 '
Finally, the Isle argued that to recognize Shelley as creating state action
whenever there is judicial involvement in a private matter would "obliterate
the line between private and state actions."" The Isle further contended
that because its recorded declaration prohibiting satellites was not discrimi-
natory, there was no state action even if judicially enforced.'83 Conse-
quently, the Isle maintained that there can be no constitutional violation of
the Lateras' rights. 18 4
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth District Court of Appeal failed to recognize that the right
to receive information via a satellite dish is a constitutionally protected
right."'85 Further, the court failed to recognize that a restriction, premised
on aesthetic reasons, prohibiting a satellite dish which is not visible is
unreasonable and arbitrary. 8 6  Because the court failed to make these
findings, its decision was incorrect.
The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that the
right to receive information, including amusement and entertainment, is
guaranteed by the First Amendment.'87 The Supreme Court of the United
States has also acknowledged that state action exists when courts enforce
private covenants.'88 Further, it is federal government policy to promote
179. Id. at 32 (citing Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 719; Edwards v. Habib, 397 F. 2d 687
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969)).
180. 408 So. 2d at 711.
181. Answer Brief of Appellee at 33, Latera (No. 93-2952). In Schreiner, the court
found there was no state action where an employee sought state court resolution of a private
conflict involving constitutional violations against his employer. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at
720.
182. Answer Brief of Appellee at 33, Latera (No. 93-2952).
183. Id. at 34.
184. Id.
185. Latera, 655 So. 2d at 146.
186. Id.
187. See Weaver, 411 P.2d at 294.
188. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
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new technology, including the use of satellite dishes.'89 The satellite
industry is a rapidly expanding industry which offers unique programming
services that exceed the capabilities of ordinary cable systems. 19° There-
fore, satellite technology should not be hindered by the restrictions of
homeowner's associations prohibiting the erection and maintenance of
satellite dishes. Accordingly, it was error for the Latera court to enforce the
Isle's private restrictive covenant, which is in violation of the Lateras' First
Amendment rights.
The interests of homeowner's associations in community aesthetics may
sometimes justifiably outweigh the interests of individual property owners.
But, notwithstanding the promotion of the homeowner's associations' goals,
restrictive covenants should not infringe upon rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. Homeowners should not have to give up every
one of their freedoms simply by their decision to reside in a community
regulated by a homeowner's association. The aesthetics of the community
can still be preserved, despite the installation of a satellite dish, because of
the new technology rendering satellites smaller and capable of being
disguised and sometimes even totally concealed.
Florida courts have consistently held that a private restrictive covenant
will not be enforced if an association applies it unreasonably or arbitrari-
ly. 191  Since satellite dishes have developed into more aesthetically
acceptable structures, these new satellite features should be considered in
determining the reasonableness of an association's restriction prohibiting
them. The Latera court could have justifiably relied on the reasoning that
the prohibition of a satellite dish which cannot be seen does not promote
any goal of the association. Accordingly, the Latera court should have
evaluated whether prohibiting a disguised satellite dish was unreasonable or
arbitrary. The court was in error to find that such an argument was without
merit.
The holding in the Latera case is likely to have an adverse impact on
future cases involving restrictive covenants imposed by homeowner's
associations, at least from the standpoint of a homeowner within a
community association. The tests used by Florida courts in the past to
determine the validity of these restrictions were formulated for a purpose:
to limit the unreasonable exercise of power by associations.'92 Unfortu-
nately, the holding in Latera does not coincide with this purpose. Rather,
189. 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988). See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
191. See Basso, 393 So.2d at 640; Cavouti, 605 So. 2d at 985.
192. See Basso, 393 So. 2d at 639.
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the Latera decision can be used in subsequent cases by homeowner's
associations as authority in support of the position that First Amendment
rights of homeowners are not violated if the association precludes them from
receiving information via a satellite dish. Further, according to Latera,
courts will be justified in enforcing restrictive covenants without first
evaluating the equities and hardships of the individual homeowner against
the interests of the homeowner's association, to determine whether a
restrictive covenant was arbitrarily applied or is so unreasonable as to render
it invalid. As a result, homeowners who choose to live within the confines
of a community association which prohibits satellite dishes will have to
sacrifice their First Amendment right to receive information, regardless of
whether the restriction actually preserves the aesthetics of the community.
Zelica Marie Grieve
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I. OVERVIEW
This note discusses the Florida constitutional amendment which banned
the use of gill nets and other entangling nets in Florida waters and the "Net
Ban Assistance Plan" that was enacted by the Florida Legislature to
compensate commercial fishermen who have lost their jobs as a result of
this amendment. Part II discusses the evolution of the net ban. Part HI
focuses on two programs that were passed by the legislature to compensate
commercial net fishermen for their losses related to the net ban, the
economic assistance for loss of income program, and the net buy-back
program. Part IV explains where eligible fishermen can go for compensa-
tion and the procedures for obtaining compensation. Part V ends with a
summary of what the compensation programs mean to commercial
fishermen.
II. INTRODUCTION
The commercial and recreational fishing industries became sharply
divided in 1994 during the fight to ban commercial fish-netting off the
Florida coast. The hot issue was a proposed amendment to the Florida
Constitution which would limit the use of fishing nets in Florida coastal
waters. A petition drive, which was initiated by Karl Wickstrom, publisher
of Florida Sportsman magazine, resulted in Amendment Three (as it was
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known on the ballot) being placed on the ballot.1 Wickstrom and other
sport fishermen had unsuccessfully lobbied the Florida Legislature to obtain
a ban on gill netting, and began the petition drive in 1992.2 In the months
leading up to the November 8, 1994 state election, the two sides took cheap
shots at one another, each arguing that the other side's platform could not
be substantiated.3 In the end the more powerful sportfishing lobby won.
Article X, section 16 of the Florida Constitution became a reality.4
1. See Karl Wickstrom, Constitution Here We Come, FLA. SPORTSMAN, Nov. 1992, at
18.
2. Russ Fee, Florida Net Ban Dies, NAT'L FISHERMAN, May 1992, at 8.
3. See Phillip Longman, Fish Fight: Pay Up or Cut Bait, FLA. TREND, Jan. 1992, at
32; Don Wilson, Ban on Nets Needed to Protect Resources, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 15,
1994, at C16.
4. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16. The text of the amendment reads as follows:
§ 16. Limiting marine net fishing
(a) The marine resources of the State of Florida belong to all of the
people of the state and should be conserved and managed for the benefit of the
state, its people, and future generations. To this end the people hereby enact
limitations on marine net fishing in Florida waters to protect saltwater finfish,
shellfish, and other marine animals from unnecessary killing, overfishing, and
waste.
(b) For purposes of catching or taking any saltwater finfish, shellfish or
other marine animals in Florida waters:
(1) No gill nets or other entangling nets shall be used in Florida waters;
and
(2) In addition to the prohibition set forth in (1), no other type of net
containing more than 500 square feet of mesh area shall be used in nearshore
and inshore Florida waters. Additionally, no more than two such nets, which
shall not be connected, shall be used from any vessel, and no person not on a
vessel shall use more than one such net in nearshore and inshore Florida waters.
(c) For purposes of this section:
(1) "gill net" means one or more walls of netting which captures
saltwater finfish by ensnaring or entangling them in the meshes of the net by the
gills, and "entangling net" means a drift net, trammel net, stab net, or any other
net which captures saltwater finfish, shellfish, or other marine animals by
causing all or part of heads, fins, legs, or other body parts to become entangled
or ensnared in the meshes of the net, but a hand thrown cast net is not a gill or
an entangling net;
(2) "mesh area" of a net means the total area of netting with the meshes
open to comprise the maximum square footage. The square footage shall be
calculated using standard mathematical formulas for geometric shapes. Seines
and other rectangular nets shall be calculated using the maximum length and
maximum width of netting. Trawls and other bag type nets shall be calculated
as a cone using the maximum circumference of the net mouth to derive the
radius, and the maximum length from the net mouth to the tall end of the net
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Florida voters voted by an overwhelming 71.7% margin to ban all gill
nets and other entangling nets from use in Florida waters.5 Florida waters
extend three miles out from the Atlantic coast and nine miles into the Gulf
of Mexico. 6 The ban prohibits the use of other nets containing more than
500 square feet of mesh area in nearshore and inshore Florida waters.7
Nearshore and inshore Florida waters extend one mile out from the Atlantic
coast and three miles out into the Gulf of Mexico.8 Gill nets are walls of
netting which capture saltwater finfish by ensnaring or entangling them in
to derive the slant height. Calculations for any other nets of combination type
nets shall be based on the shape of the individual components;
(3) "coastline" means the territorial sea base line for the State of Florida
established pursuant to the laws of the United States of America;
(4) "Florida waters" means the waters of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf
of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, and any other bodies of water under the
jurisdiction of the State of Florida, whether coastal, intracoastal or inland, and
any part thereof; and
(5) "nearshore and inshore Florida waters" means all Florida waters
inside a line three miles seaward of the coastline along the Gulf of Mexico and
inside a line one mile seaward of the coastline along the Atlantic Ocean.
(d) This section shall not apply to the use of nets for scientific research
or governmental purposes.
(e) Persons violating this section shall be prosecuted and punished
pursuant to the penalties in s. 370.021(2)(a), (b), (c)6. and 7., and (e), Florida
Statutes (1991), unless and until the legislature enacts more stringent penalties
for violation thereof. On and after the effective date of this section, law
enforcement officers in the state are authorized to enforce the provisions of this
section in the same manner and authority as if a violation of this section
constituted a violation of Chapter 370, Florida Statutes (1991).
(f) It is the intent of this section that implementing legislation is not
required for enforcing any violations hereof, but nothing in this section prohibits
the establishment by law or pursuant to law of more restrictions on the use of
nets for the purpose of catching or taking any saltwater finfish, shellfish, or
other marine animals.
(g) If any portion of this section is held invalid for any reason, the
remaining portion of this section, to the fullest extent possible, shall be severed
from the void portion and given the fullest possible force and application.
(h) This section shall take effect on the July 1 next occurring after
approval hereof by vote of the electors.
Id.
5. Florida Business Network's 1994 General Election Analysis, FLA. BUS. NETWORK,
November 9, 1994, at 17-18.
6. DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., NET GUIDELINES
(1995) [hereinafter NET GUIDELINES].
7. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16(b)(2).
8. Id. § 16(c)(5); NET GUDELINES, supra note 6.
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the meshes of a net by the fish's gills.9 Entangling nets are described as
"a drift net, trammel net, stab net, or any other net which captures saltwater
finfish, shellfish, or other marine animals by causing all or part of heads,
fins, legs, or other body parts to become entangled or ensnared in the
meshes of the net . . . ."'0 A drift net is a form of gill net. It is "a large
net that is arranged to drift with the tide or current and that is either buoyed
up by floats or attached to a drift boat."" A trammel net is "constructed
of two or more walls of netting hung from the same cork and lead lines,
with one wall having a larger mesh than the other(s), which traps a fish in
a pocket of netting when the fish pushes the smaller wall through a mesh in
the larger wall."' 2 A stab net is "a gill or trammel net, that sinks to the
bottom when placed, set, or fished in water deeper than its hanging
depth."' 3
Other types of nets which are not specifically referenced in the
constitutional amendment, but which are nevertheless illegal as a result of
the net ban, are beach, purse, and seine nets, and shrimp trawls.1 4 This is
because they fall under section 16(b)(2) of the amendment, which prohibits
the use of other types of nets containing more than 500 square feet of mesh
area in nearshore and inshore waters. 5 In general terms, a seine is a
"small-meshed net suspended vertically in the water, with floats along the
top margin and weights along the bottom margin, which encloses and
concentrates fish, and does not usually entangle them in the meshes. ' 6
More specifically, a beach or haul seine is a "seine that is hauled or dragged
over the bottom into shallow water or onto the beach, either by hand or with
power winches."' 7 Purse seines are seines that are "pulled into a circle
around fish with rings attached to the lower margin below the lead line to
allow a purse line to be drawn to close the bottom of the seine."' 8 The
9. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16(c)(1). The Florida Administrative Code similarly describes
a gill net as "a wall of netting suspended vertically in the water, with floats across the upper
margin and weights along the bottom margin which captures fish by entangling them in the
meshes, usually by the gills." FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 46-4.002(2) (1995).
10. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16(c)(1).
11. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 690 (1971).
12. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 46-4.002(11) (1995).
13. Id. r. 46-4.002(10).
14. See ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2660, 2663 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 370.0805(5)(a)4.-5.).
15. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16(b)(2).
16. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 46-4.002(8) (1995).
17. Id. r. 46-4.002(8)(a).
18. Id. r. 46-4.002(8)(b).
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effect is that a pouch is created allowing the fish to be pulled out of the
water. A trawl is "a large conical net with a device for keeping its mouth
open that is dragged along the sea bottom in gathering fish or other marine
life." 1
9
II. THE NET BAN ASSISTANCE PLAN
Throughout all of the turmoil associated with the constitutional
amendment and petition drive, both sides agreed that if the net ban
amendment passed, it would be important that the Florida Legislature take
steps to provide economic support to the fishermen who would be forced to
enter new fields of employment. The "Save Our Sealife" ("SOS")
Committee, an organization started by Karl Wickstrom to lobby for the
passage of the net ban amendment, suggested that a surcharge be placed on
sport fishing licenses as a way to raise money to help those most hurt by the
ban.20 The amendment does not specifically provide for such compensa-
tion, but it appears that part of the original plan was to create economic
assistance programs for the net fishermen if and when the net ban passed.
The decision to compensate the fishermen who are being affected by
this net ban is purely the result of legislative initiative. There is no legal
requirement that these fishermen be compensated for the loss of the ability
to fish coastal waters. To date, no Florida court has recognized a right to
fish in public waters, nor has any court recognized a property right in the
fish that swim off the Florida coast.21 Those arguing to have this constitu-
19. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIONARY 2433 (1971).
20. See Karl Wickstrom, Victory for the Sea, FLA. SPORTSMAN, Dec. 1994, at 10, 11
(recommending a three dollar surcharge on sport and commercial fishing licenses, licensing
of shore anglers to raise additional funds, and private sector donations to help "full-time,
veteran net-users whose gear is the type eliminated from use in nearshore waters"); see also
Wickstrom, supra note 1, at 19.
A surcharge on fishing licenses was used in California in a voter initiative that banned
gill nets in California waters. CAL. CONST. art. XB, §§ 1-16. California voters adopted the
Marine Resources Protection Act of 1990 which initially limited the use of gill nets and
trammel nets in certain California waters, and eventually banned the use of such nets in those
waters on January 1, 1994. Id § 3. In passing the California net ban, the voters also
implemented a license buy-back program. Id. § 7. Because section 7 required enabling
legislation to put this program in motion, the California Legislature passed section 8610.7
of the Califomia Fish and Game Code. Id § 7(d); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 8610.7
(Deering Supp. 1995). This program is funded in part through three dollar surcharges on
certain fishing licenses and in part through contributions and donations from those wishing
to contribute to the buy-back program. Id. § 8610.8(c)-(e).
21. See State v. Lee, 41 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1949) (holding that taking or use of wild
animals, ferae naturae, for private purposes is subject to governmental regulation for the
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tional amendment overturned are claiming that the fishermen have property
rights in their nets and that they have a liberty interest in the right to fish.22
The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County,
Florida recently refused to grant a temporary injunction that would have
kept the amendment from going into effect on July 1, 1995.23 Although
it did not rule on the merits of the case, the court expressed its opinion that
general good); Sylvester v. Tindall, 18 So. 2d 892, 898 (Fla. 1944) (explaining that "[t]he
State has a sovereign right, and a consequent sovereign duty," with regard to game and fish
conservation); Nash v. Vaughn, 182 So. 827, 828 (Fla. 1938) (stating that fish are ferae
naturae and are owned by the state when in a state of freedom for the public).
22. See Complaint at 10-12, Lane v. Chiles, No. 95-2972 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. filed June 20,
1995). Another lawsuit has been filed against local television stations seeking damages for
the airing of paid political announcements paid for by net ban proponents. Dee Rivers,
Florida Net Ban Goes into Effect, NAT'L FISHERMAN, Sept. 1995, at 13, 72. The claim is
that these commercials contained falsehoods about the Florida net fishing industry. Id. One
of the advertisements showed footage of a University of Georgia study of shrimp trawl
bycatch. Letter from David L. Harrington, Associate Director, University of Georgia Marine
Extension Service (Nov. 7, 1994) (on file with Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from
David L. Harrington). "Bycatch," also known as "by-kill," is a term used to describe the fish
that are unintentionally caught through the net fishing process. Florida's Bycatch Reflects
Global Emergency, FLA. SPORTSMAN, Nov. 1994, at 22, 22. David L. Harrington of the
University of Georgia Marine Extension Service indicated that the footage shown to Florida
voters was not a true representation of the situation in Florida. Letter from David L.
Harrington, supra. According to Harrington, they "were testing.., in an area where no
sensible fishermen would trawl when this particular video footage was filmed." Id.
Other arguments being made center around the subject matter of this amendment and
the sufficiency of the explanation of the amendment placed on the voting ballot. Complaint
at 8-10, Lane (No. 95-2972). These two issues were considered by the Supreme Court of
Florida prior to the November 8, 1994 election pursuant to the Florida Constitution. See
Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997 (Fla.
1993). The court ruled in favor of the sport fishermen. Id. at 999.
For an interesting discussion of possible constitutional arguments against the
amendment, see Alexandra M. Renard, Will Florida's New Net Ban Sink or Swim?:
Exploring the Constitutional Challenges to State Marine Fishery Restrictions, 10 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 273 (1995).
23. Order Denying Motion for Temporary Injunction, Lane v. Chiles, No. 95-2973 (Fla.
2d Cir. Ct. decided June 29, 1995). The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and
for Leon County, Florida denied the motion for temporary injunction on the grounds that the
plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of the four elements necessary for the issuance of a
temporary injunction. Id. at 2. The court said that there was no proof that there was no
adequate remedy at law, that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted, that
they were likely to succeed on the merits of the case, and that the injunction will serve the
public interest. Id. at 2-4 (citing City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co.,
634 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), affd, 659 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1995)).
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a regulatory takings argument would likely prove unsuccessful.24 If the
court decides in favor of the commercial fishermen on the takings issue once
the full case is heard on its merits, the state will be required to compensate
the fishermen for their losses related to the net ban. Until that time,
however, the only type of compensation that these fishermen can receive
from the State of Florida will come from legislatively enacted compensation
programs.
In response to the call for compensation, the Florida Legislature passed
House Bill 1317, the "Net Ban Assistance Program," on June 18, 1995.25
The purpose of this program, which is to be administered and enforced by
the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security ("DLES"), is "to
provide economic assistance to commercial saltwater products licensees
suffering certain losses in income as a result of the amendment, to purchase
commercial fishing gear rendered illegal or useless by the amendment, and
to retrain commercial fishermen economically displaced by the amend-
ment."'26 "Every person, firn, or corporation which sells, offers for sale,
barters, or exchanges for merchandise any saltwater products, or which
harvests saltwater products with certain gear or equipment as specified by
law, must have a valid saltwater products license."'27 In restricting
eligibility for economic assistance to holders of saltwater products licenses,
the legislature apparently has pinpointed the group that it believes will be
24. Id. at 5-6.
25. Ch. 95-414, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2660 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805).
26. Id. §'1,'1995 *Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2661 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805(1)(a)).
27. Ch. 95-148, § 983, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 773, 1155 (West) (amending FLA.
STAT. § 370.06(2)(a)). Such licenses can be issued in the name of an individual or to a valid
boat registration number. Id. The fees for such licenses are $50 and $100 respectively. Id
Where the license is attached to an individual's name, no other fisherman can legally sell fish
to a licensed wholesale dealer under that license. Telephone Interview with Ken Baer,
Legislative Liason, DLES, Division of Unemployment Compensation (Aug. 14-15, 1995)
[hereinafter Interview with Ken Baer]. In contrast, the license that is registered to a vessel
allows multiple fishermen to work on the boat. Id. The fishermen will then make
arrangements as to how much they each make for their aggregate fishing activities. Id.
Technically, the catches are being sold by the boat, allowing the fishermen to fish without
a license. Id. A team of fishermen could choose to share the cost of a boat and the attached
license, or the boat owner could choose to hire fishermen to work off his boat for a
percentage of the catch. Id. Similarly, several individual licensees could choose to work
from one vessel, each with the ability to sell his own catch. Interview with Ken Baer, supra.
1995]
563
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
most harshly affected by this net ban and which it can afford to compen-
sate.
28
The two major economic assistance programs created by Florida House
Bill 1317, which are the focus of this note, are the "net buy-back program"
and "economic assistance for loss of income" programs. Economic
assistance is to come in the way of retroactive unemployment compensation
under chapter 443 of the Florida Statutes. 9 The buy-back of nets is to be
funded through an appropriation of twenty million dollars to the Seafood
Workers Economic Assistance Account within the Special Employment
Security Administration Trust Fund.3' Additionally, the bill acts to clarify
the eligibility of the displaced fishermen for Job Training Partnership Act
("JTPA") services. 31 The JTPA was passed by the federal government
to prepare youth and adults facing serious barriers to employment for
participation in the labor force by providing job training and other
services that will result in increased employment and earnings, increased
educational and occupational skills, and decreased welfare dependency,
thereby improving the quality of the work force and enhancing the
productivity and competitiveness of the Nation.32
28. Other groups of people who will be adversely affected by this net ban were to be
given economic assistance in early versions of this assistance plan. Fla. HB 1317, § 1 (draft
of Mar. 7, 1995). Evidently, the legislature believed that the state could not support a
compensation program that would have allowed more of those who will be affected by the
ban to receive financial assistance. The original version of House Bill 1317 would have
provided compensation to wholesale and first level retail saltwater product dealers who are
licensed under section 370.07 of the Florida Statutes. Id.
Although the net ban amendment will directly affect the net fishermen, those who make
a living buying and selling fish from commercial fishermen are losing a valuable source of
income. Many fish markets deal primarily in the types of fish that are caught using gill nets
and will be forced to buy and sell more expensive types of fish to compensate for the loss
in supply. These stores sell to low income customers who will most likely be unable to
absorb the increased prices. See Robert Johnson, Economic Focus: Fish Industry,
Consumers Feel Bite From Net Ban, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at F1 (discussing the adverse
effects that have been felt since the net ban went into effect).
29. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2662 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(4)(a)).
30. Id. § 3, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2664.
31. Id. § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2661 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805(l)(b)). Because the focus of this paper is the state programs which have been
created to assist the fishermen in making the transition away from gill net fishing and into
both related and unrelated professions, the intricacies of the Job Training Partnership Act will
not be addressed.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. V 1993).
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The legislature has also directed various state agencies and private
economic development entities to make a concerted effort to create new
employment opportunities in related fields or other unrelated industries for
the fishermen who have lost their livelihoods as a result of this ban.33
Finally, there is a call to the Department of Environmental Protection to
work with the Department of Commerce and the Department of Community
Affairs to identify grant and low interest loan programs that would be
available to fishermen who would like to stay in the fishing industry but
who will need capital in order to fund the conversion of their existing
equipment into legally permissible fishing equipment.34
To make the economic assistance program most effective for those who
have been directly affected by the net ban, the Florida Legislature saw the
need to create eligibility restrictions which would control the number of
people who could qualify for unemployment compensation. Besides the
licensing requirements mentioned above, anyone who has violated a Marine
Fisheries Commission rule or any provision under chapter 370 of the
Florida Statutes three or more times in a single license year since 1991, or
more than four times between 1991 and 1995, inclusive, is ineligible for
benefits under these programs.35 Additionally, the fisherman must have
been a resident of Florida on November 8, 1994, the date of the election in
which article X, section 16 of the Florida Constitution was passed by
33. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2661 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(1)(c)). The focus of this note does not allow for an in-depth discussion of the
various programs referenced in the net ban assistance plan. For information regarding
available training and retraining services, fishermen can go to their local Jobs and Benefits
office or Private Industry Council, or can contact Sonya Seay by phone at (800) 633-3572
and by mail at Division of Jobs and Benefits, 1320 Executive Center Drive, Suite 200, Atkins
Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0667. FLA. DEP'T LABOR & EMPLOY. SEC., NET FISH-
ING FACTS 2 (June 1995) [hereinafter NET FISHING FAcrs].
34. Ch. 95414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2661 (West) (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 370.0805(1)(d)). Those interested in information regarding small business loans and
other government assisted financing programs should contact the Florida Department of Com-
merce at (800) 342-0771, (904) 922-8639, or (904) 488-9357. NET FISHING FACTS, supra
note 33, at 3.
35. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2661 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(2)(a)). The constitutional amendment prescribes penalties for violation of the net
ban. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16(e). Violators are to punished pursuant to the penalties stated
in § 370.021(2)(a), (b), (c)6. & 7., and (e) of the Florida Statutes. Id. The penalties come
in the form of fines, imprisonment, and the suspension or revocation of fishing licenses.
FLA. STAT. § 370.021 (Supp. 1994).
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Florida voters.36 One rationale for the residency requirement might be to
keep fishermen from other states from coming to Florida to sell nets that
had previously been banned in their respective states, and for which there
were no programs implemented to buy-back the nets.37 With regard to the
net buy-back program, only those nets which were useable on June 30, 1995
and which have been rendered illegal by the amendment can be sold back
to the state.38
Applications for unemployment compensation or to sell back illegal
nets are being taken on a "first-come, first-served basis. 39  Holders of
saltwater product licenses have until December 31, 1995 to apply with the
DLES in order to receive unemployment benefits under this plan.4 Those
with saltwater products licenses and those with resident commercial fishing
licenses under section 372.65 of the Florida Statutes could begin to apply
for net buy-back assistance on July 1, 1995 and have until December 31,
1995 to utilize the program.4 Given that a finite amount of money has
been appropriated for the buy-back program, it behooves the fishermen to
apply as soon as possible to sell back their nets."
36. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2661 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(2)(b)).
37. For example, when the Texas Legislature banned the use of gill nets in Texas waters
in 1988, the government did not create a net buy-back program. FLA. DEP'T LABOR &
EMPLOYMENT SEC., A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE: ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS RESULTING FROM THE NOVEMBER 8, 1994 PASSAGE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 3 (NET FISHING BAN), vol. 2 at 64-65 (Feb. 1995)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS]. These fishermen were left
with nets that could not be transformed into legally useable nets for other purposes and which
had no resale value. Id. at 65.
38. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(5)(b)).
39. Id. § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2661 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805(3)(a)).
40. Id.
41. IaM § 1, 1995 Fla Sess. Law Serv. at 2661-62 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805(3)(b)).
42. There has been some concern over fishermen choosing to delay their applications
for the net buy-back program until the Florida courts have ruled on the legality of this
constitutional amendment. Waiting to apply may result in a loss of compensation for their
now illegal nets. Those involved with the net buy-back program are encouraging all eligible
fishermen to apply now so as to improve their chances of reaping some economic benefit
before the funds run out. Telephone Interview with Sharon Barney, Seafood Industries
Specialist, Netban Task Force, Div. of Labor, Employ., and Training, Fla. Dep't of Labor &
Employ. Sec. (Aug. 15, 1995) (Barney is one of many commercial fishers that have been
employed by the DLES to assist in the application for net buy-backs and unemployment
Vol. 20
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A. Economic Assistance for Lost Income
As noted above, the economic assistance for lost income resulting from
the net ban is to come from the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund
("Fund").43 Under this new legislation, those who hold valid saltwater
products licenses can apply for retroactive elective coverage, pursuant to
section 443.121(3)(a), by paying unemployment taxes to the state Fund.44
What this means is that the failure on the part of fishermen to pay
unemployment taxes prior to becoming unemployed does not deny them of
the right to claim unemployment benefits.
One might ask why it was necessary for the legislature to affirmatively
state that these fishermen can now become eligible for unemployment
coverage, and why it is that these fishermen are not already eligible to
receive unemployment benefits. The reason that it was necessary for the
legislature to enact legislation which enables fishermen to claim unemploy-
ment benefits is that the fishing industry is not presently covered by the
laws that govern unemployment compensation.4 6 Section 443.036(19)(n)
of the Florida Statutes explains that certain jobs do not constitute "employ-
ment" so as to qualify the worker for unemployment compensation. 7
Fishing is one of those excluded professions.41 Thus, fishermen do not
compensation.) [hereinafter Interview with Sharon Barney].
43. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2662 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(4)(a)).
44. F A. STAT. § 443.121(3)(a) (1993).
45. A question that arises when considering the use of unemployment compensation to
support these commercial fishermen, is why should someone who has never contributed any
money to the Fund now be able to come forward and collect unemployment benefits that will
essentially be paid for by all those who have supported the Fund in years past? It seems
unfair to those who have been forced by law to pay into the Fund to have to support a group
of individuals who were not intended to receive unemployment benefits. While this is a
valid concern that might be considered in the future by lawmakers, there is nothing in the
present unemployment compensation system that prohibits retroactive elective coverage.
46. Id. § 443.036(19)(n)(3) (Supp. 1994).
47. Id. § 443.036(19)(n).
48. See id. § 443.036(19)(n)(3). This subsection explains that:
Service performed by an individual in, or as an officer or member of the crew of a
vessel while it is engaged in, the catching, taking, harvesting, cultivating, or farming
of any kind of fish, shellfish, crustacea, sponges, seaweeds, or other aquatic forms of
animal and vegetable life, including service performed by any such individual as an
ordinary incident to any such activity, except:
a. Service performed in connection with the catching or taking of salmon or
halibut for commercial purposes.
b. Service performed on, or in connection with, a vessel of more than 10 ten
net tons....
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qualify for unemployment benefits, and there is no requirement that
fishermen with employees pay taxes to the fund. Also, those fishermen who
work independently do not have to pay unemployment taxes because the
self-employed cannot receive unemployment compensation.49 Given that
the law does not mandate the coverage of fishermen or the self-employed,
any fisherman who wants to collect unemployment must now retroactively
"elect" coverage pursuant to section 443.121(3)(a). °
Members of the Florida Legislature questioned representatives of the
federal government as to the legality of retroactive elective coverage when
it was considering the passage of this plan." Initially, the federal govern-
ment officials were skeptical about the legality of such a program.52 The
federal government was concerned about the detrimental effect that
widespread use of retroactive elective coverage could have on the resources
available to pay out unemployment benefits. 3 Just as insurance companies
would be unable to survive if a law was passed which required them to
write policies for those who have already suffered injury, so too would the
national unemployment system run out of money in the event that anyone
could qualify for unemployment compensation retroactively.
Upon review of current federal unemployment compensation law,
however, the federal government officials were unable to locate any
provision that would prohibit an individual from retroactively electing
coverage.14 Given the harmful effect that this net ban will have on those
fishermen who have spent their lives fishing and who will have difficulty
making a transition into a new profession, the federal government officials
Id.
There was some initial concern by those who represent the commercial fishing industry
that Florida fishermen who own ten-ton boats would not be able to apply for unemployment
compensation. Many of these fishermen have not made the required contributions to the
Fund. The commercial fishermen have been assured by the state that the failure to abide by
this law, which apparently was never strictly enforced, does not deny the boat owner of
eligibility. Interview with Sharon Barney, supra note 42.
49. See Hartenstein v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employ. Sec., 391 So. 2d 386, 387
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that self-employment does not constitute "employ-
ment" under chapter 443 of the Florida Statutes).
50. FLA. STAT. § 443.121(3)(a) (1993).
51. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
52. Id.
53. Id
54. Id. According to Mr. Baer, the United States Department of Labor, Legislative
Review Office was consulted. After reviewing the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the
Social Security Act, that office concluded that retroactive elective coverage is permissible.
Id.
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agreed that unemployment compensation would be an acceptable way to
allow these individuals to be compensated while they seek replacement
work." Florida is thus currently the only state in the country with a plan
that allows for the use of retroactive elective coverage 6 Arguably, if this
ban directly affected a larger group of people than it appears it will affect,
the federal government officials might have fought harder against retroactive
elective coverage.
Every person who is eligible to receive unemployment compensation,
whether by law or by election, receives between ten and twenty-six weeks
of unemployment compensation. 7 The duration of benefits is determined
by looking at the number of weeks that an individual has worked during his
"base period."5 8 The base period is the "first four of the last five com-
pleted calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individu-
al's benefit year."5 9 The benefit year is the "l-year period beginning with
the first day of the first week with respect to which the individual first files
a valid claim for benefits .... ,60 What this means is that if fisherman X
applied for benefits on July 1, 1995, the length of time that he will receive
benefits will depend upon the number of weeks in which X worked during
his base period beginning April 1, 1994 and ending March 31, 1995. If X
makes contributions to the Fund for the fifty-two weeks in which he worked
his gill nets off the Naples, Florida coastline between April 1, 1994 and
March 31, 1995, he is entitled to twenty-six weeks of unemployment
compensation. A claimant receives benefits for the period equal to half the
number of weeks worked during his base period. 1 The law requires that
the individual who is claiming unemployment benefits have been employed
at least twenty weeks during the applicable base period. 2 Thus, another
commercial fisherman, who only worked twenty weeks during that same
base period would only be entitled to the minimum ten weeks of benefits.
The calculation of the weekly benefit amount that a claimant is entitled
to receive is based on the average amount of wages paid to that claimant
weekly throughout his base period.6 3 The claimant receives one-half of his
55. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
56. Id.
57. FLA. STAT. § 443.111(4)(a)1.; Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
58. FLA. STAT. § 443.111(4)(a)(1).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 443.036(6).
61. Id. § 443.111(4)(a)1.; Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
62. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
63. FLA. STAT. § 443.111(2)(a).
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average weekly wage, biweekly, for the duration of his benefit year.64 The
minimum amount that one can receive in benefits is $10 and the maximum
is $250, meaning that a person who earns less than $20 per week is
ineligible.65 Using this formula, if X (from the example above) earned
$26,000 during his fifty-two week base period, he would receive the
maximum $250 per week for the twenty-six weeks in his benefit year. The
$26,000 salary he received is divided by fifty-two, resulting in an average
weekly wage of $500 and a weekly benefit amount of $250 for twenty-six
weeks. Pursuant to the law, X will receive a check in the amount of $500
every two weeks for twenty-six weeks.
In order to buy into the Fund, the fisherman will have to pay contribu-
tions equal to 2.7% of the first $7000 of gross wages.66 For a fisherman
who earned in excess of $7000 in gross pay during his base period, the
maximum contribution for the year will be $189.67 The fisherman who
earns below $7000 during his base period pays a lesser amount in taxes
because his benefits will be less than that received by a higher paid
individual.
Under the loss of income assistance plan, an individual fisherman can
elect to be covered for the years 1994 and 1995.68 Because of the July 1,
1995 start up date for the loss of income assistance program, a fisherman
who elects coverage only for his 1994 landings can receive a maximum of
nineteen weeks of full benefits. There is a maximum of thirty-nine possible
weeks in which this fisherman could have possibly worked between April
1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, the period of time in which he would be
able to claim unemployment if he filed a claim on July 1, 1995.69 Partial
benefits are paid to the claimant for the thirty-ninth week.7"
One rationale for only claiming the weeks worked in 1994 may be that
the fisherman did not earn an appreciable amount in the first calendar
quarter of 1995, which would be the fourth calendar quarter in the base
period for a fisherman applying on July 1, 1995. By disregarding the time
he worked in 1995, he will be able to avoid paying unemployment taxes to
the Fund for work done in 1995 and will be able to increase his average
weekly payment of benefits. Although he will receive benefits for a shorter
64. Id. § 443.111(1)(b), (2)(a).
65. Id. § 443.111(2)(a).
66. Id. § 443.131(2)(a); NET FISHING FACrS, supra note 33, at 1.
67. NaT FISHING FACrs, supra note 33, at 1.
68. See id.
69. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
70. Id.
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period of time than he would if h6 elects both 1994 and 1995 coverage, the
fisherman may have financial obligations for which he needs to receive the
maximum amount of benefits for which he is eligible.
The fisherman who was unable to work the minimum twenty weeks
required to receive benefits in 1994 does not have the option of electing
only for 1994 coverage. He will need to use the weeks he worked in 1995
to qualify for unemployment benefits. The fisherman who chooses, or is
forced, to elect coverage for both the 1994 and 1995 calendar years will be
required to pay up to $378 in taxes to initiate his benefits, depending upon
how much he made in 1994 and 1995. Again, the fisherman is required to
make contributions equal to 2.7% of the first $7000 of gross income he
earned in a given year. The maximum of $378 would be required of a
fisherman who earned in excess of $7000 in both years.
Electing coverage for only the 1995 calendar year is not an option for
someone applying prior to October 1, 1995 because that individual will not
have been able to work the minimum twenty weeks required for eligibility.
This may be the only choice for a fisherman who was unable to work during
the latter part of 1994, and may be the best choice for the fisherman who
made little money in 1994, but was having a prosperous 1995 net fishing
season up until the time that the net ban went into effect. By applying after
October 1, 1995, the latter fisherman gains an additional thirteen weeks to
increase his 1995 earnings. The result is that both his average weekly wage
and duration of benefits will increase. Ken Baer, an employee of the DLES,
Division of Unemployment Compensation, explained that the department is
using all the income that the commercial fisherman brought in during the
applicable base period to arrive at the average weekly wage that is used in
calculating how much a fisherman is entitled to receive.7' At first glance,
the language contained in section 370.0805(4)(a) appears to suggest that
only recorded landings of species affected by the net ban will be used to
determine earnings during the base period.7" However, a closer reading of
the text indicates the fisherman must only show that at least some of his
income during the base period came from sales of affected species.73
In the event that a fisherman's average weekly wage cannot be
determined by using the formula stated above, section 370.0805(4)(b) directs
the DLES to calculate unemployment wages by "multiplying tthe] total
pounds of catch per calendar year as recorded on trip tickets by the
71. Id.
72. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2662 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(4)(a)).
73. Id.
19951
571
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
unadjusted average annual coded species-grouping values published in the
Marine Fisheries Information System's Annual Landings Summary" limited
to certain enumerated species.74 The DLES is instructed to use only
income generated from catches of the affected species of fish." However,
in an effort to replace as much of the eligible fisherman's lost income as
possible, the DLES is using any income generated by a fisherman during his
74. Id. § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2662 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
370.0805(4)(b)). Every time a commercial fisherman sells his catch to a dealer, a trip ticket
must be filled out by the dealer buying the fish. ECONOMIC AssIsTANCE AND RETRAINING
NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. II at 79-80. The information contained on these tickets is used
primarily for conservation purposes by the Marine Fisheries Commission. Id. The
mandatory information entered on these tickets, which includes the fisherman's saltwater
products license number, the wholesale or retail seafood dealer's license number, the date of
the sale, the amount of time spent fishing, the range of counties in which the species is
usually caught, the type of gear used and how much of it used, species codes, size codes, and
total amount caught, allows for the development of fishing quotas and restricted fishing areas.
Id. This data, along with other non-mandatory data (area fished, depth, unit price, and dollar
value), is invaluable to the DLES in determining the amount of benefits due to the fisherman.
By using the average price that has been paid throughout the state for the specific species
affected by the ban and the landing information entered on the trip tickets, the DLES can
establish how much unemployment compensation is due to a particular fisherman during his
benefit year.
The "average annual coded species-grouping values" are average prices for which the
various species of fish caught in the state are sold for by commercial fishermen. Interview
with Ken Baer, supra note 27. A term that is used synonymously with annual coded species-
grouping value is "ex-vessel value." Id. Just as the price of orange juice rises and falls on
the commodity markets, so too does the price of fish in the fish markets. By using an
average value, the DLES can democratically issue benefits to the affected commercial
fishermen who have elected coverage.
The following is a list of species under § 370.0805(4)(b) which represent the types of
fish that are most commonly caught with the types of nets that have been banned as a result
of the amendment: bait fish, ballyhoo, bluefish, bluerunner, croaker, black drum, flounders,
grunts, jacks, ladyfish, Spanish mackerel (if landed on Florida's west coast), menhaden (if
landed on Florida's east coast or in Tampa Bay), mullet, pinfish, pompano, Spanish sardines
(not landed in Tampa Bay), scaled sardines, scad, shad, sheepshead, spot, seatrouts, whiting,
miscellaneous industrial fish, white shrimp, Spanish mackerel (landed on Florida's east coast
and for which trip ticket amounts do not exceed 1500 pounds per ticket), brown shrimp (if
trip ticket amounts do not exceed 500 pounds per ticket), pink shrimp (if trip ticket amounts
do not exceed 500 pounds per ticket), and bait shrimp (landed on Florida's east coast). Ch.
95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. at 2662-63 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805(4)(b)l.- 29.).
75. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(4)(c)).
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base period.76 The goal is to help replace as much of the eligible fisher-
man's lost income as possible.
Partial unemployment benefits are available to a fisherman who is
working only part-time and whose weekly income generated from that part-
time job is less than his weekly benefit amount.77 The amount of income
generated from the part-time job is subtracted from his weekly benefit
amount.7" Additionally, if a person finds a temporary job, his benefits can
be postponed until the job has ended.79 Presently, some of these fishermen
who have been employed by the DLES to assist in implementing the net
buy-back assistance program are utilizing the postponement option.80
The final eligibility requirement for this economic assistance program
is that the fisherman must also be accepted and enrolled in an approved
training program or have completed such a program, or be registered in a
DLES job search program."1 This requirement is not unique to this
program. Anyone who makes a claim for unemployment benefits has the
duty to look for a suitable replacement for his lost job.82 Unemployment
compensation is intended to sustain an individual who has lost his job and
is not meant to be a replacement for employment. To insure that the
individual is making an effort to find replacement employment, individuals
are required to report the status of job searches to the DLES, Division of
Unemployment Compensation.83 Failure to do so will render the claimant
ineligible for future benefit checks.84
76. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
77. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2662 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(4)(a)); FLA. STAT. § 443.111(3)(b) (Supp. 1994).
78. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(4)(d)). Approved training programs include aquaculture research and training
programs, opportunities under the Job Training Partnership Act, DLES employment
programs, or courses offered at state universities, community colleges, and vocational
schools. Id.
82. FLA. STAT. § 443.111(1)(b).
83. Id. Every two weeks the claimant must report as to the status of his job search. If
he fails to do so, he is not eligible to receive further benefit checks. He is required to "attest
to the fact that he is able and available for work, has not refused suitable work, and is
seeking work and, if he has worked, to report earnings from such work." hM
84. Id.
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B. The Net Buy-Back Program
The legislature created the net buy-back program to compensate the
owners of nets which have been rendered illegal or useless by the passage
of Amendment Three. "The primary goals of equipment buy outs are to
ensure compliance with new fishing restrictions and to equitably recompense
the fishers' capital investment in their gear." 5 This buy-back program has
been limited to the compensation of only those commercial saltwater product
licensees and resident commercial fishing licensees "who can document an
annual gross income of $2500 or more from net-caught landings of saltwater
products during the period beginning July 1, 1991, and ending June 30,
1995."86 The net buy-back program's expansive coverage allows both
saltwater products license holders and freshwater commercial fishermen to
sell back their nets.87 However, the lost income assistance discussed above
is only available to saltwater commercial fishermen. In order to sell
freshwater fish, a resident commercial fishing license must be obtained at
a cost of $25.8 It is unclear why the buy-back program is open to both
groups of people while unemployment is only available to the one group.8 9
85. ECONOMIc ASSISTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. I at 5. In this
report the DLES, expressed concerns over the temptation to continue to use the gill nets
because of the absence of substitute employment. Id. at 40. Additional concern was raised
over the possibility that these nets might be discarded in ways that are detrimental to the
environment. Id. Fishermen might cast them into the ocean or deposit them in a nearby
wooded area. Id. By offering to purchase these nets, the state can better prevent this type
of activity from occurring.
86. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(5)(a)).
87. Four families living on the St. Johns River in northern Florida are eligible to sell
their nets back because they have recorded landings of affected species. Some of the
affected species (e.g., mullet) swim up the river into brackish water and were caught by these
families using gill nets and the like. Given that one of the main goals of the constitutional
amendment was to control the harvesting of depleting fish populations, it is beneficial for the
state to buy-back these nets as well. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
It is unfortunate that these families are not eligible for retroactive elective unem-
ployment coverage because they are being directly affected by this net ban. When the net
ban assistance plan went into effect on July 1, 1995, one of these families applied for
retroactive coverage and was denied. The Governor's office has been notified of this
situation and efforts are being made to solve the problem. Ken Baer, from the DLES,
believes that in the rush to get the programs passed before the regular session ended, the
legislature overlooked these families. Id.
88. FLA. STAT. § 372.65(1)(a) (1993).
89. The Final Bill Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, prepared by the Florida
House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce, does not shed any light on the
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Two possible explanations center around enforcement and conservation
concerns. Because there are concerns that some fishermen will not honor
the ban, purchasing nets from as many people as possible reduces the threat
that the nets will continue to be used.9" The buy-back of the nets also
helps insure their safe disposal.91  After examining trip ticket data
compiled by the Department of Environmental Protection, the DLES
determined that it could help those most harmed by the net ban if it limited
eligibility to those who used net fishing as their primary source of
income.92 The DLES concluded that a threshold level of $2500 per year
would separate those earning a living through net fishing and those
purchasing fishing licenses for other purposes.93 A substantial number of
those who own saltwater product licenses are recreational fishermen who
purchase their licenses to circumvent size limits and bag limits which are
more restrictive on recreational fishing.94 There are others who do in fact
use their licenses for commercial purposes, but only as a means of
supplementing their income.95 Of the 6103 fishermen who held commer-
cial licenses in 1991 and who had landings of affected species, 1699 had
average yearly landings exceeding $2500 in value. 96 By focusing on a
smaller group of individuals, the legislature apparently feels that it can best
use the money that has been appropriated to fund this buy-back program.
The maximum number of nets a single license holder can sell back is
predicated upon the "licensee's average annual gross income attributable to
the sale of eligible saltwater products during the 3-year period of July 1,
1991, through June 30, 1994."97  Unlike the lost income assistance
program, the DLES is using only the income produced through landings of
affected species to compute the average income level of the fisherman.9
legislature's reasoning. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Com., HB 1317, Second Engrossed (1995)
Staff Analysis (final June 18, 1995) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Com. Comm. HB 1317
Staff Analysis].
90. EcoNoMic AssIsTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. I at 40.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 42.
94. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
95. Id.
96. EcoNoMic AssIsTANcE AND RETRAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. 1 at 42.
97. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663-64 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(5)(c)). The term "eligible saltwater product" appears to be synonymous with the
term "affected species" used elsewhere in the statute. Again, these are the species of fish
that have traditionally been caught with gill nets and other entangling nets.
98. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
19951
575
: Nova Law Review 20, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
The DLES is using any type of documentation that the fisherman can
produce to substantiate his landings of affected species over the past four
years. 99
It is interesting to note that the time period used to determine average
income for purposes of establishing which fishermen are eligible to sell their
nets back differs from the time period used to calculate the average income
figure which determines the number of nets a fisherman can sell. The latter
average income figure is computed by averaging only three years of gross
income as opposed to four. The result allows some of the eligible fishermen
to sell back more nets solely because their first three years of fishing during
the designated period were more profitable. By excluding the July 1, 1994
through June 30, 1995 fishing season, those fishermen who had low yearly
earnings during one of the first three years of the general eligibility period
are disadvantaged. The fishermen who did better in the first three years of
the period have the advantage of being able to exclude the worst of the four
years, but the fishermen who earned the most in the last year do not enjoy
the benefit of their success. The result is that not everyone pinpointed to
receive economic assistance is being given the same opportunity to cut his
or her losses. According to Ken Baer, this situation could not be
helped."° When this program was being considered by the legislature, it
became apparent that the 1994 and 1995 data would not be available for
use.
10
'
The minimum amount of nets which can be sold under this program is
four and the maximum is ten."° Licensees who made between $2500 and
$4999 can sell the minimum four nets.'0 3 Those earning more than $5000
but less than $10,000 may sell back six nets."° Those with incomes
exceeding $10,000 but lower than $20,000 may sell as many as eight
99. Id. The DLES is accepting trip tickets, notarized landing journals, catch receipts,
share settlements, crew share receipts, etc. Id. Share settlements reflect the amount caught
by those fishing together and the amount of fish that went to each fisherman. Id. Similarly,
a crew share receipt will show how much a crewmember made for a given fishing trip. Id.
100. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
101. Id. Baer explained that the 1994 data was not available until June, 1995. It would
not be possible to get the data for the first part of 1995, and thus incomes for the July 1,
1994 through June 30, 1995 fishing season could not be computed. Id.
102. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663-64 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 370.0805(5)(c)).
103. Id. § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805(5)(c)l.).
104. Id. § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 370.0805(5)(c)2.).
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nets.1°5 Anyone earning over $20,000 but less than $30,000 is also
eligible to sell eight nets. 06 Licensees who average over $30,000 per year
may sell the maximum ten nets.1 7 The DLES found a positive correlation
between incomes and the number of nets owned by a particular fisher-
man.10s  All licensees are limited to selling back two shrimp trawls."°
Putting a cap on the number of nets that can be sold was important because
of the concern that a market might be created for the illegal nets."0 The
DLES was concerned that fishermen would import worthless nets from
fishermen in other states to be sold in the buy-back program."' Such
activity would likely limit the number of fishermen who could recover under
this program.
A nonnegotiable figure has been attached to each type of net which the
state is willing to buy back."' Two different proposals for administering
the buy-back program were presented by the DLES.13  The state could
have chosen to appraise each net and attach a value to it or it could have
attached a nonnegotiable price to each type of net eligible for buy-back."'
The latter plan is financially more attractive because there is less adminis-
trative cost attached to it."5  Past programs implementing an appraisal
system have encountered legal problems." 6 Such a problem could arise
if a fisherman, unhappy with the value attached to his nets, decides to go to
court to challenge the appraisal. The increased costs resulting from
105. Id. § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 370.0805(5)(c)3.).
106. Id. § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2664 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805(5)(c)4.).
107. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2664 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(5)(c)5.).
108. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. I at 42.
109. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. at 2664 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(5)(d)).
110. ECONoMIc AsSIsTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. I at 42-43.
111. Id. at 43.
112. Ch. 95-414, §1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(5)(a)). The legislature affirmatively stated in the statute that this nonnegotiable
figure is not a reflection of the actual value of such a net in the retail market. Il
113. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. I at 42.
114. Id.
115. See generally Kurt Schelle and Ben Muse, Buyback of Fishing Rights in the U.S.
and Canada: Implications for Alaska, Presented at the 114th Annual Meeting of the American
Fisheries Society, in Ithaca, New York 11-14 (Aug. 15, 1984) (on file with the Nova Law
Review) (explaining that the cost of running an appraisal-based vessel buy-back program
results in a drain on the funds available to buy back the boats).
116. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. I at 39, 42.
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administrative and court proceedings would in turn reduce the amount that
can be paid to the fishermen. Unfortunately, the nonnegotiable price could
negatively impact those with newer, more expensive nets since they may not
receive compensation commensurate to their capital expenditures for the
equipment. In contrast, fishermen with older, less expensive nets may get
more than their nets are worth. The important thing is that there be a way
for these fishermen to get back some of the money that they have invested
in an industry that no longer exists.
As an additional control on financial resources, only certain types of
nets can be sold to the state under this buy-back program." 7 The constitu-
tional amendment bans the use of gill nets and other entangling nets, and
limits other nets to certain sizes, but it does not ban all types of nets." 8
For example, hand-thrown cast nets can still be used and non-gill nets under
500 square feet of mesh area are acceptable." 9 If the nets were in good
working condition on June 30, 1995 and are now illegal, then they are
eligible for sale.12° Thus, the plan requires that the nets be useable but for
the ban created by the constitutional amendment.' 2' Without such re-
straints, it is likely the limited funds would be more quickly depleted.
Consequently, some fishermen would probably not receive any compensa-
tion. Deep water and shallow water gill nets, trammel nets, beach, purse,
and seine nets, and shrimp trawls which exceed the 500-square-foot limit are
included in the program."
117. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(5)(a)1.-5.).
118. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16.
119. Id. § 16(a)(2), (c)(1).
120. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 370.0805(5)(b)).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2663-64 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
370.0805(5)(a)1.-5.). The legislature appears to have adopted some of the recommendations
of the DLES, provided in Economic Assistance and Retraining Needs Resulting from the
November 8, 1994 Passage of Constitutional Amendment 3, regarding the pricing of the nets
eligible for buy-back. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND RERAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol.
I at 43. The department's "high value" recommendations of $1000 for deepwater gillnets and
trammel nets of at least 600 yards in length were chosen, while the department's "low value"
recommendation of $500 for shallow water gill nets greater than 600 yards in length was
approved. Id.; ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2660, 2663 (West) (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 370.0805(5)(a)1.-3.). All types of seines were attached a value of $3500.
Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 370.0805(5)(a)4.). The legislative history does not
indicate why the department's high value recommendation of $750 for all types of seines was
disregarded in favor of the $3500 price tag. Id.; Com. Comm. HB 1317 Staff Analysis,
Vol. 20
578
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/1
Streisfeld
Up to twenty million dollars will be available to buy back the nets of
eligible fishermen. This money is to come from transfers of both "[s]tate
funds that were appropriated to match federally funded programs but have
not been expended as of June 30, 1995"'' and "[u]nobligated and unap-
propriated trust fund balances of the DLES," so long as the transfer of the
latter funds does not jeopardize agency operations." The Executive
Office of the Governor is to place these funds into a Seafood Workers
Economic Assistance Account within the Special Employment Security
Administration Trust Fund."2 Interestingly, the statute states that funds
that have not been spent at the end of fiscal year 1995-1996 are to remain
in the account for use by the program in subsequent years. 126  This
statement is illogical in light of the fact that the program has a cut off date
of December 31, 1995. Assuming that there is money left in the account at
that time, further legislation would be necessary to extend the program. 27
IV. WHERE Do I GO TO GET COMPENSATION?
Fishermen who are interested in applying for either lost income
assistance or selling their nets must do so at one of the twenty-three "one
stop centers" located throughout the state." The DLES has set up
stations in various coastal communities around the state to counsel those
eligible for unemployment compensation as to the various options relating
to their elective coverage, that is, whether to elect coverage for 1994 or
supra note 89; ECONOMIC AsSISTANCE AND RETRAINING NEEDS, supra note 37, vol. I at 43.
Shrimp trawls of at least 500 square feet are worth $500 a piece. Ch. 95-414, § 1, 1995 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. at 2663 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 370.0805(5)(a)5.). Any gill net,
trammel net, or seine which is less than 600 yards in length is valued proportionately. Id.
§ 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. 370.0805(5)(a)).
A fisherman who is selling back his nets must include the float line, webbing, and
leadline that go along with the net being sold back, which must be cleaned and removed of
its weights. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 370.0805(5)(b)1.-2.).
123. Ch. 95-414, § 3(1), 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 2664.
124. Id. § 3(2).
125. Id. § 3.
126. Id. § 4(2).
127. If extending the program is deemed undesirable or unnecessary, one possible use
of the remaining funds would be to give economic support to those indirectly affected by the
net ban, i.e., the wholesale and retail saltwater dealers.
128. NET FISHING FAcrs, supra note 33, at 1, 3-4. Centers are located in Pensacola,
Niceville, Panama City, Apalachicola, Crawfordville, Cross City, Crystal River, Hudson,
Pinellas Park, Brandon, Bradenton, Englewood, Cape Coral, Naples, Mayport, Oakhill,
Cocoa, Ft. Pierce, Riviera Beach, Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, Marathon, and Key West. Id. at
3.
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1995, or both. 129 The two people assigned to each center will have access
to the trip ticket information needed to compute the amount of weekly
benefits due to the claimant, and the DLES is requesting that fishermen
bring with them any other documentation of their earnings for the relevant
base period. 3° Tax return information, such as an IRS Form 1099, is an
invaluable source for verifying the income of a fisherman for 1994.'
The net buy-back program encompasses a two stage process.' First,
the fisherman must fill out an application with the department at any of the
one stop centers, designating the number of applications he would like to
sell to the state.'33 The fisherman is then notified as to how many nets he
is eligible to sell, and is given a time and place to return his nets.'34 Upon
surrender of the nets, a receipt is issued and a check is sent via mail to the
fisherman.'35 As of August 21, 1995, 840 miles of nets had been collect-
ed by the DLES at the various one stop centers throughout the state, a
distance stretching from Florida to Chicago. 136 On August 25, 1995, 2874
nets had been purchased by the DLES at a cost of $4,865,258.96.'
V. CONCLUSION
It was important that the Florida Legislature take affirmative action to
compensate the net fishermen. Although they may represent a small
segment of the state population, they have been displaced from their jobs as
a result of a choice made by the general population of the state. These
fishermen have survived poor fishing seasons in the past, but this net ban
effectively leaves them unemployed. The law does allow them to continue
to fish using other means, but they have lost one of the most efficient and
effective ways of doing their jobs. The law does not require that these
fishermen be compensated for their loss, but notions of ethics and social
policy demand that a group such as this be given financial assistance to help
them make the transition into new trades. The legislature has taken
important steps to assist the fishermen in getting back on their feet. The use
129. Id. at I.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. NET FISHING FACrs, supra note 33, at 2.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Interview with Ken Baer, supra note 27.
137. Telephone Interview with Andrea Turner, Fla. Dep't Labor & Employ. Sec., Office
of Communication (Aug. 25, 1995).
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of retroactive elective unemployment coverage, which does not exist
anywhere else in the United States, allows those who have no source of
income to receive benefits that will enable them to support themselves and
their families. Those qualifying for partial benefits will be able to
supplement their incomes until they find replacement employment. The net
buy-back program allows fishermen to mitigate their capital losses related
to running their fishing businesses.
Although the constitutional amendment is being challenged in the state
courts, it is important that eligible fishermen apply for the available
assistance while funding is available. Even if the fishermen are successful
in their lawsuit, it may be months or years before the final decision
regarding the net ban has been reached. The economic assistance is
available for only a short time and is limited in its funding. If the lawsuit
proves to be unsuccessful, the fishermen will be left with nets that are
worthless and useless much like the fishermen in Texas who were given no
compensation when that state banned gill netting in Texas waters. It is
unfortunate that the net fishermen have lost their jobs, but it would be
foolish to let the resources available go to waste. No doubt more may need
to be done in the future to help these fishermen, but economic assistance is
presently available to help begin the recovery process.
Jonathan M. Streisfeld
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